Russian history in faces. Peter I as a commander and statesman Peter 1 commander

Traditionally, Peter I is considered both in historiography and in public opinion to be a great commander. In the final part of a long post dedicated to debunking myths about Peter, I propose to deal with the fact that how great a commander Peter the Great was based on historical facts.

It was under Peter I that Russia fought the second longest war (21 years) in its history - Northern (the longest was the Livonian War under Ivan the Terrible - 35 years).

Do you remember how the Northern War began for Russia? From the most shameful defeat at Narva on November 19, 1700 (all dates are given according to the Julian calendar).
Why do I consider this defeat shameful?
Well, judge for yourself.

The Swedish garrison of the Narva Fortress was 1.900 people, the army of Charles XII numbered about 9 thousand man with 37 guns. The Russian army that besieged Narva numbered up to 40 thousand people with 195 guns.

A. E. Kotzebue
"Battle of Narva in 1700"

How did this first of the major battles of the Northern War end, in which the overwhelming advantage in both weapons and manpower was on the Russian side? Complete, as they said then, embarrassment . The Russian army was completely defeated, which can be seen at least from the ratio of losses.

Swedish losses amounted to about 2 thousand people , and the Russians lost up to 7 thousand , as well as all artillery pieces and that especially shameful, all the banners and standards , 3/4 of which were taken by the Swedes at the capitulation, and not lost in battle.

Someone may try to justify Peter by the fact that he did not directly participate in the Battle of Narva, since on the eve of it he left for Novgorod, entrusting command of the army to the mercenary Duke Karl-Eugene von Croix, who did not at all want this appointment and, in the midst of the battle, surrendered to the Swedes.

But I don’t think that this can serve as an excuse for the king. Moreover, this only emphasizes Peter's inability to understand people and his helplessness in matters of both tactics and strategy.

Gustav Söderström
"Swedish victory in the Battle of Narva"

The main battle of the Northern War is considered to be the famous Battle of Poltava June 27, 1709 .
But if it was a decisive victory of the Russian army over the Swedes, then how to explain the fact that after it did the war continue for another 12 years?

But is it worth being proud of a victory if it was won over an enemy that was obviously weak at the time of the battle?

Denis Martin
"Battle of Poltava" (1726)

The Swedes took part in the Battle of Poltava 16,800 soldiers with 41 guns , of which only 4 could fire (for the rest there were neither charges nor gunpowder - they were used up during the siege of Poltava). The army of Charles XII was opposed by the Russians 46 thousand army with 302 guns .

It would be surprising if, with such superiority, the Russian army could not win!

A. E. Kotsubu
"Poltava Victory"

But at the same time, as he rightly wrote Boris Bashalov : “The Poltava Victoria is not at all a turning point in the Northern War, but rather finishing off the remnants of the Swedish army, exhausted by repeated Sheremetev and other commanders. The military genius of Peter in all these defeats is not visible through any magnifying glass.”
To Poltava, as he wrote V. O. Klyuchevsky , - it has arrived “30 thousand emaciated, worn out, demoralized Swedes. This rabble besieged Poltava for two months. Charles XII stormed Poltava three times and nothing worked out for him.”

By the way, Poltava was defended by a 4,000-strong garrison , who was helped by about the same number of ordinary people armed with anything. Then the Battle of Poltava began with the hungry, demoralized Swedes. But even so, the success of the Poltava “Victoria” was decided not by Peter I, but Field Marshal B.P. Sheremetev , commanded all Russian troops during the battle.

Equestrian portrait of Field Marshal B.P. Sheremetev
works by K. Schurman (1710)

The mediocrity of Peter I as a strategist and commander is best expressed by his Prut campaign of 1711 .

Already accustomed to winning battles with a significant superiority over the enemy, Peter with his 80 thousand army (160 guns) encountered in Moldova with 190 thousand Turkish-Crimean army (440 guns) and, of course, was defeated.

Because of the mischievous plans of the Russian Tsar, the Russian army found itself in a completely catastrophic situation. When Peter himself finally realized this, he agreed to the most humiliating terms of peace with the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Peter agreed to return to Turkey the recently (in 1696) conquered Azov and adjacent territories; give Sweden Livonia except Ingria, where a new capital was being built - St. Petersburg (as compensation for Ingria Peter was ready to hand over Pskov to the Swedes!) .

Only thanks to the talents of the Russian diplomat P. P. Shafirova and the corruption of the Turkish pashas, ​​the conditions of the Prut Peace were not so deplorable.

Pyotr Pavlovich Shafirov (1669 - 1739),
Russian diplomat, vice-chancellor, holder of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called

Thus, it turns out that as a diplomat Peter I was weaker than his own boyars.

As you know, the Northern War, which lasted for 21 years, ended with the signing August 30, 1721 Treaty of Nystadt , according to which Russia received significant territorial increments: Estland, Livonia, Ingria and part of Karelia.
But at the same time, it is somehow not customary to mention that Russia was returning Finland, which had already been conquered by this time, to Sweden, and most importantly, had to pay Sweden monetary compensation for the lands conquered during the long war in the amount of 2 million efimki (1.3 million rubles). Whether it’s a lot or a little, judge for yourself: efimok - silver thaler weighed between 28 and 32 grams of high-grade silver.

This is the only case in world history when the victorious country pays indemnity to the side that was defeated in the war!

That is, it turns out that Did Peter I simply buy from Sweden what Russia got during a long and bloody war?
So why then was it necessary to fight for 21 years? And where is the “great military talent” of Peter the Great? For some reason I just can’t see him.

I am by no means alone in this assessment of Peter’s military genius.
In his book “Robespierre on the Throne” B. Bashilov wrote: “The war of Peter I with Sweden was the most mediocre war in Russian history. Peter had absolutely no talent as a commander. If in the Time of Troubles, without a government, Russia drove out the Poles in 6 years, then Peter I, having a huge superiority in forces, fought in Sweden 21 years old. The wars of Peter I are an example of his mediocrity as a commander."
About the Northern War V. O. Klyuchevsky writes this: “Rarely has a war taken even Russia so much by surprise and been so poorly thought out and prepared.”

Well, there is nothing more to add to this.

Thank you for attention.
Sergey Vorobiev.

Peter's foreign policy, as noted in the History of the Russian Army, except for the rejection of Turkish proposals in the Prut campaign, is impeccable. The benefit of Russia was the only criterion that guided the first Russian emperor in his relations with foreign powers.

Peter proves himself to be a loyal ally throughout the war. He does not like to bind himself in advance with promises and agreements, but once he has given his word, he keeps it sacredly.

The allies helped the Russians out more than once during various periods of the war, however, as soon as the tsar saw that they did not reciprocate at all and in reality only sought to exploit Russia, he immediately broke off all relations with them and subsequently waged the war completely separately.

Peter's genius was fully reflected in military affairs, in the structure of the armed forces and in the leadership of them. A brilliant organizer and great commander, according to Kersnovsky, Peter was significantly ahead of his era in all respects.

In the reorganization of the army, Peter gave the main place to the element of quality, which he achieved by most attracting into the guard the class that most preserved military traditions and from ancient times was intended for military service.

This concerns Peter's decree introducing compulsory, personal and lifelong service for nobles. Having established personal military service for the nobility, Peter I gave the conscription service of other classes a communal character. Each community, rural or petty-bourgeois, was obliged to supply one recruit from a certain number of households, deciding by its verdict who would go into service.

The recruit had to be between 20 and 35 years old, nothing else was required of him: military receivers had to accept “whoever the donors announce and appoint as a reward.”

The community collected money for the assigned recruit, usually 50 - 200 rubles, which at that time was a large sum, five times more than the bonuses of Western European mercenaries.

Service freed people from slavery, and under Peter there were many fugitive serfs willing to serve. Under Queen Elizabeth, fugitives were no longer accepted, and those who appeared were flogged and sent back to the landowners, which was, according to the author of “The History of the Russian Army,” a huge psychological mistake.

So, Peter retained the basic principle of the structure of the Russian armed force - the compulsory nature of compulsory military service, which at all times was sharply different from the mercenary and recruitment system of Western countries. Moreover, this principle was emphasized even more clearly by Peter: conscription was declared lifelong and permanent (while in Moscow Russia it was only temporary).

The recruitment system was definitely territorial in nature. In 1711, the regiments were assigned to provinces and were supported at the expense of these provinces. Each regiment had its own recruitment district - a province that gave the regiment its name. Pskovites served in the Pskov Regiment, and soldiers’ children from Butyrskaya Sloboda served in the Butyrsky Regiment. In Ingermanlapdsky - residents of the northern Novgorod possessions.

Peter appreciated the importance of the sense of compatriotism developed among the Russian people. Unfortunately, after Peter's death, proper attention was not paid to preserving the territorial system. The regiments constantly changed their quarters and their recruiting districts, walking from one end of Russia to the other.

By the middle of the 18th century, this system completely died out and as a result, Russia, the only country that had a territorial system at the beginning of the 18th century, was the only country in the 20th century that did not have this system.

Anton Kersnovsky considers the advantages of Peter I, as the organizer of the Russian armed forces, to be that the ground armed forces in Peter’s army were divided into the active army and local troops - garrison troops, land militia and Cossacks.

The Land Militia was formed from the remnants of the former military classes (gunners, soldiers, reiters) in 1709 and settled in Ukraine to protect the southern borders. After the Bulavin rebellion, Peter did not particularly trust the Cossacks, but, understanding the great importance of the Cossacks in the life of the state, he settled the Cossacks on the outskirts.

Buchholz's unsuccessful campaign in Central Asia resulted in the establishment of the Siberian Cossack army, and the result of the Persian campaign was the resettlement of part of the Don Cossacks to the Terek, where the Terek army was subsequently formed.

General Leer argued that Peter was “a great commander who knew how to do everything, could do everything and wanted to do everything.” Peter's military talent was only one of the sides of his multifaceted genius.

Anton Kersnovsky does not question Peter’s intelligence on a national scale. The king, in his opinion, combined a politician, a strategist and a tactician - a great politician, a great strategist, a great tactician. This combination, rare in history, was found after him only among two great commanders - Frederick II and Napoleon.

Charles XII was in this respect the complete opposite of Peter. Karl was a brilliant tactician, a leader who carried his subordinates along with him, but he was not a strategist or a politician. The Swedish king waged war only out of love for war, and this “physical” love for war, due to the complete lack of statesmanship, ultimately led his army to death and his country to decline.

In 1706, Karl had every opportunity to end the war with an honorable peace for Sweden, but did not want to take advantage of it, and eight years later, after Poltava, when the situation in Sweden became desperate, his unbridled

by stubbornness he brought against himself a new enemy - Prussia.

Analyzing the policy of the Swedish king, A. Kersnovsky finds that he lacks a strategic eye.

For four years in a row, the Swedish king wandered in Poland, driving Augustus II from place to place (and giving valuable rest to the Russian army, which meanwhile was learning to fight at the expense of the ill-fated Schlippenbach), instead of immediately disarming his enemy with a blow to Saxony.

The young king had no organizational abilities; there was no concept of an organized base. He did not know how to retain the conquered territory, and therefore all his victories turned out to be fruitless.

As soon as he leaves any area in Poland, it is immediately occupied by the enemy, or rather, it again plunges into anarchy, the elements of which begin immediately outside the Swedish camp.

Having received from his father a small but remarkably organized and trained army of veterans, Charles XII uses it brilliantly, but does not spare it at all.

In the winter of 1707-1708. with a poorly dressed and poorly supplied army, Charles rushes into the deep Lithuanian forests and starts a completely senseless guerrilla war with the population, solely to satisfy his thirst for adventure and absolutely not sparing the army.

At the beginning of the war, Karl was 19 years old, he was an ardent young man, stubborn and unrestrained, possessing extraordinary abilities and not taking advice from anyone. The role model for the young Swedish king was Alexander the Great.

However, Voltaire noted that Charles “was not Alexander, but was worthy to be Alexander’s first soldier.”

If Charles wages war “for the sake of war,” then Peter’s conduct of war is entirely subordinated to his policy. He does nothing for nothing, always guided solely by the interests of “the state entrusted to Peter.”

Charles XII received his army ready-made from his father, Peter I created his own with his own hands. Knowing how to demand superhuman efforts from his troops when necessary (to the point of carrying ships on his hands hundreds of miles), Peter never wastes their strength. The commander’s aspirations, in his own words, should be aimed at winning victory with “little bloodshed.”

As a talented tactician, Peter is far ahead of his era. He introduces horse artillery 100 years before Napoleon and half a century before Frederick. In all his instructions to the troops, the red thread is the idea of ​​mutual assistance and support of units - “the second of one to the other” - and the coordination of the actions of various types of weapons.

During the first period of the war, Peter acted with the utmost caution. The quality of the Swedish army was still too high, and Peter understood the main reason for the tactical superiority of the Swedes over the Russians - their “closeness”. Peter, not without success, opposed the Swedes with his field fortification, which ensured his success in the Battle of Poltava.

Anton Kersnovsky also draws attention to the structure of Peter's cavalry. Under Peter, all of them were exclusively of the dragoon type and were superbly trained in both horse and foot formation. Dragoons were Peter's favorite branch of the army. In general, the element of active defense predominated in Peter's tactics, which corresponded to the circumstances of that era. The purely offensive principle was introduced into Russian tactics only in the Seven Years' War by Rumyantsev.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF RUSSIA

Siberian State University

telecommunications and computer science

on the topic: Peter I - the great reformer, commander.

Completed by: Timonin K. S. group RA-05.

Checked by: Kondratyeva L. R.

Novosibirsk 2000.

1. Introduction. ........................................................ ............. 3

2. Coming to power. Opposition. ........................….. 5

3. Creation of an army and navy. .................................…. 9

4. Reforms of government, life, culture. ................…..14

5. Conclusion. ........................................................ ..........21

6. List of references. ...........................................22

Introduction

The transformations of Peter the Great, his activities, personality, role in the fate of Russia are questions that interest and attract the attention of researchers of our time no less than in past centuries.

‘’ Recently, many writers and publicists, continuing in this regard the traditions of Slavophile and populist historiography, write that without Peter and his transformations, the development of Russia could have taken a different, less dramatic path. The question is to what extent the transformations were random or natural, whether they meant a radical break in the continuity of the historical process or, on the contrary, were its logical continuation, whether Peter was a great transformer or a tyrant arose a long time ago, almost during the very era of transformations.'' The answer to these questions, in my opinion, must be sought both in the personality of Peter, and in the circumstances with which he was surrounded, in those objective tendencies of the Russian historical process that influenced the course of reforms, in many ways giving them such a rapid, sometimes inconsistent character. This topic attracted me because of its diversity, versatility and depth. Using this topic as an example, we can consider the process of development, formation and strengthening of the state, growing to the level of a Great Power; the formation of absolutism, and we can also highlight an aspect of this topic that is relevant today - the role of the individual in history.

Different historians have different assessments of Peter and his activities. Some, admiring him, push his shortcomings and failures into the background, others, on the contrary, strive to put all his vices in the first place, accusing Peter of wrong choices and criminal acts.

When considering the life and work of Peter, we must not forget that he worked in conditions of internal and external struggle: external - constant military action, internal - opposition. The dissatisfied boyars formed opposition circles, and later Tsarevich Alexei joined them. It was difficult for Peter's contemporaries to understand him: the Tsar was a carpenter, the Tsar was a blacksmith, the Tsar was a soldier who tried to understand all the details of the work he was doing. The image of the “anointed one of God” - the king-father, which reigned in the minds of people, constantly came into conflict with the real figure of the new king.

It is not surprising that many did not understand Peter, his style of thinking, his ideas, which often lived in a different political space.

Peter was not like his predecessors either in appearance or in his lively and open character. Peter's personality is very complex and contradictory, but at the same time Peter I was a very integral person. In all his endeavors, sometimes very contradictory, there was still a rational grain. As mentioned above, it is impossible to consider Peter’s activities without taking into account the fact that out of the 35 years of his reign, only about 1.5 years Russia was in a state of complete peace. Constant military actions influenced the course of reforms and, in general, all domestic and foreign policies.

The old never leaves the public stage voluntarily, and the new is always born in tough battles with the outdated. Peter had to fight many prejudices and remnants, which sometimes turned out to be too strong to break them at the first blow.

The era of Peter I is of great interest for study and research, because... looking at it we follow the process of development and growth of the state. The transformation of Russia from the wild despotic kingdom of Moscow into the Great Empire. Over the course of several decades, a new management system was built, an education system was created, a periodical press was created, a regular army was formed, and a navy emerged. Industry is developing, foreign trade is intensifying, and the economy is stabilizing. Thanks to Peter's foreign policy, political isolation was ended, and Russia's international prestige was strengthened.

Peter the Great and his generals

While Peter I was on the throne, the Russian army fought almost continuously. Virtually all resources, financial, material and human, were concentrated on achieving the next military objectives. The army needed not only guns, cannons, ships, food and much more. The army needed good soldiers and good commanders.

Franz Yakovlevich Lefort. Engraving

In any case, no worse than the Swedish, French, Polish, Turkish and other armies.

At first, the tsar invited foreigners to Russian service, but paying for the services of mercenaries cost the treasury a pretty penny.

Under Peter I, the formation of the Russian military school, Russian military art, and the traditions of the regular Russian army began.

Admiral F.A. Golovin. Vintage portrait

One of the leading military leaders of the Russian army during the Northern War was Boris Petrovich Sheremetev(1652-1719). A representative of an ancient and noble family became a room steward at the age of 13, and at 30 received the rank of boyar. He began his military service in Belgorod and Sevsk, where troops under his leadership blocked the Crimeans’ path to the southern Russian districts. During the Azov campaigns (1695-1696), Sheremetev’s troops operated in the lower reaches of the Dnieper.

Near Narva, Sheremetev, together with everyone else, drank the bitter cup of defeat. On the sad day of November 19, 1700, the Swedes beat the Russians piece by piece. During the retreat across the Narva River, more than a thousand people from the noble cavalry under the command of Sheremetev simply drowned, and the military leader himself escaped from the battlefield.

Charles XII believed that the Muscovites were finished, and the main forces redeployed to Poland to fight the army of the Polish and Saxon king Augustus II. A “small war” began in the Baltic theater, in which the Russians gradually began to gain the upper hand. Already on December 27, 1701, a little over a year after the defeat at Narva, 17 thousand people under the command of Sheremetev unexpectedly attacked the Swedes who were celebrating the Nativity of Christ. Half of Schlippenbach's 7,000-strong corps remained. In Moscow, bells rang to celebrate, cannons were fired, and everyone was treated to wine, beer and honey. Swedish banners and standards were hung on the Kremlin towers. For the victory at Erestfer, B.P. Sheremetev received the rank of field marshal and the newly established Order of St. Apostle Andrew the First-Called.

Other battles followed. In some (the capture of Noteburg on October 11, 1702, the fall of Nyenskans on April 22, 1703), Peter I himself took command of Sheremetev’s troops.

B. P. Sheremetev

In 1706, Boris Petrovich suppressed the uprising in Astrakhan, receiving two thousand peasant households from the tsar for this.

In 1707-1709 he participated in the strategic encirclement of Charles XII in Ukraine. During the Battle of Poltava, Sheremetev was considered the commander-in-chief, and the tsar, in the event of his death, placed full responsibility for the outcome of the battle on him. In the list of those awarded for the Poltava victory, Sheremetev’s name was first. In 1708, Riga and the Dinamunde fortress surrendered to Sheremetev. By the end of 1710, troops under the leadership of Sheremetev and Apraksin liberated the coast from Narva to Riga and the Karelian Isthmus from the Swedes. After the unsuccessful Prut campaign in the summer of 1711, the field marshal stood with the army in Ukraine. In 1714, Sheremetev's troops took part in a campaign in Pomerania to help Danish and Polish troops.

The Tsar often expressed dissatisfaction with Sheremetev’s slowness and called him Cunctator. One of the Roman consuls, Fabius Maximus, received this nickname (can be translated from Latin as “a slow-moving slow-mover”) during the war with Hannibal. He avoided the decisive battle in every possible way and was criticized in the Roman Senate. The cunctator was replaced by the decisive Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terence Varro, who were determined to wage a decisive war. Once the Romans decided to give the Carthaginians a decisive battle, they were defeated at the Battle of Cannae (216 BC). And the experienced Sheremetev strove to prepare thoroughly for any task, preferring calculation to luck.

His trophy after the capture of the city of Marienburg was Marta Skavronskaya. Sheremetev's laundress later became Menshikov's lieutenant and the legal wife of Peter I, Russian Empress Catherine I.

The life of a military man is hard. The field marshal was ill and even asked the king to let him go to a monastery. But instead, Peter ordered him, at the age of 50, to marry the widow of his uncle Lev Naryshkin, Anna Petrovna. The wife was young and beautiful. The marriage produced four children.

B.P. Sheremetev died on February 17, 1719 in Moscow, but he was buried only on April 10, 1719. And not in the Kiev Pechersk Lavra, where his son Mikhail was buried, but in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra by order of Peter. Field Marshal Sheremetev became one of the first figures of the new pantheon of Russia. In 1800, the great Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov will rest here.

Prince N.V. Repnin

Fate is indicative Nikita Ivanovich Repnin(1668-1726), representative of the ancient princely family of Obolensky. The son of a boyar and a butler, he entered the retinue of young Peter with the rank of sleeping bag. At the age of 17 he became a lieutenant in an amusing company. Participated in the Azov campaign and the suppression of the Streltsy protests.

In 1699-1700 he formed soldier regiments, performed the duties of the Novgorod governor, and was engaged in putting in order the fortifications of Novgorod, Pskov, Pechora and Gdov. Troops led by Repnin took part in the “small war” on the territory of Ingria and the Baltic states. Since 1705, Repnin's troops were based in Grodno, Kovno, and Vilno.

In December 1707, Charles XII launched an attack on Grodno and Novogrudok. Repnin was tasked with holding back the onslaught of Swedish troops. The position taken on the Babich River was unsuccessful, and the troops were poorly prepared for battle. On the morning of July 3, 1708, the Swedes crossed the river, bypassed Repnin’s troops, in which panic began. Losses: 100 killed, 600 wounded, 10 guns and various equipment. The Russian army had worse failures, but the tsar was angry at the “irregularity” in the conduct of battle, at the “old custom,” at the “lack of construction, the barbaric vile scream and Cossack customs.” Repnin's regiments were included in different divisions, and he himself was demoted to soldier (instead of executed). “Golovchin’s opportunity” almost ruined the general’s life.

But Peter did not have many experienced military leaders. Already at Lesnaya (September 1708) Repnin commanded a regiment, and in October - a division. During the Battle of Poltava, for the command of infantry regiments, the prince received the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and lands with villages. In 1710 Repnin was the first to enter Riga and became governor general here. Repnin's army did not reach the Prut in 1711. In 1713, in Pomerania, Repnin took Friedrichstadt and Stettin.

A representative of another noble princely family, descended from the Grand Duke of Lithuania Gediminas, was Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn(1675-1730). He was 20 years younger than Sheremetev and was distinguished by determination, initiative and personal courage.

For Misha Golitsyn, military service began at the age of 12, when, among the “amusing little kids,” he became a drummer in the Semenovsky regiment. In 1694 he became an ensign. A year later, for the courage shown in the first Azov campaign, he became a lieutenant. He took part in the battle with the Streltsy regiments at the New Rusalim Monastery.

Prince M. M. Golitsyn. Unknown artist of the 18th century.

In 1700, Golitsyn, with the rank of guard captain, was wounded in the leg near Narva. In 1701 he received the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel. During the assault on Noteburg on October 12, 1702, Peter ordered the assault columns to retreat. Then Golitsyn ordered the boats to be pushed away from the bank of the Neva so that the soldiers would not decide to retreat. And the king’s messenger answered: “Tell the sovereign that now I belong not to Peter, but to God.” After a thirteen-hour battle, Noteburg was taken. Prince Golitsyn received the rank of colonel of the Life Guards, 300 souls of peasants and 3 thousand rubles. And he went down in history as an example of fearlessness!

The prince stormed Nyenschantz (1703), Narva (1704), Mitava (1705), participated in the defense of Grodno, became a major general (1706), and defeated the Swedes at Dobry (August 1708). For his participation in the Battle of Lesnaya (September 28, 1708), the brave Golitsyn received a royal portrait, showered with diamonds, the rank of lieutenant general and, having interceded with the king on behalf of Repnin, who had recently been demoted to a soldier, he received another 800 peasant households. At the head of the guard, Golitsyn took part in the Battle of Poltava (1709), and in 1710 in the capture of Vyborg.

Admiral General F. M. Apraksin. Vintage portrait

In 1712-1713 Golitsyn was busy forming and supplying troops, and was the right hand of Admiral General F. M. Apraksin. Together with other military leaders, he developed and implemented rules for marching service, setting up camps, guard duty, sabotage, and actions of the galley fleet.

In February 1714, at the head of 8 thousand soldiers, he defeated the 8 thousand-strong corps of the Swedish general Armfeld near the village of Nappola near the city of Vasa. After skillful maneuvers and lethal fire from the Russians, more than 5 thousand Swedes and Finns fell in battle, more than 500 with banners and artillery were captured, the rest fled. The prince became general-in-chief. In July 1714, M. M. Golitsyn took part in the famous Battle of Gangut. On July 27, 1720, at the Battle of Grenham Island, he commanded a squadron of 61 galleys and 29 boats. With the help of military stratagem, four frigates and 104 guns were captured, 37 officers and 500 sailors were captured. The winner received a sword and cane, showered with diamonds.

On the territory of Finland, Prince Golitsyn resolutely suppressed the outrages of the troops and did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Finns.

During Peter's campaign in Persia, Golitsyn remained by appointment of the tsar as the main commander in St. Petersburg, then commanded the Russian and Little Russian troops in Ukraine. Peter the Great called him “the direct son of the Fatherland.”

After the death of the emperor, Catherine I promoted M. M. Golitsyn to field marshal general. Under Peter II, he became president of the Military Collegium (Minister of War), senator and member of the Supreme Privy Council. Together with the “supreme leaders” he tried to limit autocratic power during the accession of Anna Ivanovna. For his participation in the “insurgency of the supreme leaders” he fell into disgrace and was removed from the court. He died only 55 years old on December 10, 1730. Brilliant military leaders rarely made successful politicians.

Introduction 2

Chapter 1. Childhood and youth of Peter I 5

Chapter 2. Appearance and personal qualities of the monarch 8

Chapter 3. Peter I as a commander and statesman 10

Chapter 4. Family relationships of Peter 14

Conclusion 17

List of used literature 18

Introduction

Changes in all sectors and spheres of the country's socio-economic and political life, which gradually accumulated and matured in the 17th century, grew into a qualitative leap in the first quarter of the 18th century. Muscovite Rus' turned into the Russian Empire. Enormous changes have occurred in its economy, the level and form of development of the productive forces, the political system, the structure and functions of government bodies, management and courts, the organization of the army, the class and estate structure of the population, the culture of the country and the way of life of the people. The place and role of Russia in international relations of that time changed radically.

All these changes took place on the basis of the feudal-serf system, which gradually became the main brake on the progressive development of the country and entered the stage of its decomposition. Symptoms of the emergence and development of new capitalist relations were becoming more and more clearly evident in the country.

In this regard, already in the first quarter of the 18th century, the main contradiction characteristic of the period of late feudalism can be traced. The interests of the autocratic-serf state and the feudal class as a whole, the national interests of the country, required the development of productive forces, active assistance in the development of industry, trade, and the elimination of the country's technical and economic backwardness. But to solve these problems, it was necessary to reduce the scope of serfdom, create a market for civilian labor, limit and eliminate class rights and privileges of the nobility. The exact opposite happened: the spread of serfdom in depth and breadth, the consolidation of the feudal class, the consolidation, expansion and legislative formalization of its rights and privileges. Therefore, the development of industry, commodity relations, and the strengthening of the power of the state were accompanied by a sharp increase in feudal exploitation, landlord tyranny, and the strengthening of the power of the nobles and the bureaucratic apparatus of the autocracy. This exacerbated the main contradiction between the ruling class and various categories of the serf peasantry, which made up more than 90% of the country's population. The slowness of the formation of the bourgeoisie and its transformation into a class opposed to the class of feudal serfs led to the fact that the merchants and factory owners found themselves drawn into the sphere of serf relations 2.

The complexity and inconsistency of the historical development of the country at this time determined the extreme inconsistency of the activities of Peter I and the reforms he carried out. On the one hand, they had enormous progressive significance, met national interests and needs, contributed to a significant acceleration of the historical development of the country and were aimed at eliminating its backwardness.

On the other hand, they were carried out by serf owners, using serfdom methods and were aimed at strengthening their dominance. Therefore, the progressive transformations of Peter the Great’s time from the very beginning contained conservative features, which, in the course of the further development of the country, became more and more pronounced and, instead of eliminating backwardness, preserved it. As a result of Peter's reforms, Russia quickly caught up with those European countries where the dominance of feudal-serf relations remained, but it could not eliminate the backwardness of the countries that had embarked on the capitalist path of development 3 .

This complexity and inconsistency was manifested with all force in the transformative activity of Peter I, which was distinguished by indomitable energy, unprecedented scope, and courage in breaking down outdated institutions, laws, foundations and way of life. Understanding perfectly the importance of the development of trade and industry, Peter I carried out a number of measures that corresponded to the interests of the merchants. But he also strengthened serfdom and substantiated the regime of autocratic despotism. The actions of Peter I were distinguished not only by decisiveness, but also by the extreme cruelty of an “impatient autocratic landowner.”

When preparing the test, the works of such greatest historians as S.M. were used. Solovyov, V.O. Klyuchevsky, S.F. Platonov. The modern point of view on Peter's transformations was studied using the work of M.T. Belyavsky.

Sergei Mikhailovich Solovyov. In his readings, Solovyov deeply analyzes the activities of Peter I, its results, and the views of Westerners and Slavophiles on the affairs of Peter the Great. He emphasizes the enormity of the transformations and the duration of the influence of Peter's affairs on the historical development of Russia. The famous historian condemns the views of both Westerners and Slavophiles, believing that they were unable to deeply study all the processes that took place during the reign of Peter. He condemns the reverent respect for the works of Peter by some and the harsh condemnation of others. Solovyov’s merit lies in the fact that he is one of the first to see that all of Peter’s activities were determined by the previous development of Russia; he turns to pre-Petrine history to understand where this revolution came from and why it was needed. During this period, the historian believes, in the life of the Russian people there was a transition from one age to another - from an age in which feeling predominates, to an age in which thought dominates. Solovyov treats Peter’s legacy with care and highly appreciates his personality as a transformer. 4

Klyucheskoy’s image of Peter I took a long and complex time to develop. Thus, in “Historical Portraits,” the famous historian develops Solovyov’s thought about the historical conditionality of the activities of Peter I as a “leader” who felt the needs of the people and carried out his reforms together with the people. Klyuchevsky noted Peter’s unflagging sense of duty and thoughts about the public good and how they influenced those around him. However, he ambiguously viewed the results of Peter the Great’s reforms and noticed a discrepancy between their plans and results.

Klyuchevsky wrote that bureaucratization led to massive embezzlement and other malfeasance. Later, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Klyuchevsky’s intimonarchical position became more and more apparent. He reproaches Peter for tyranny, despotism, unwillingness to understand the people in order to achieve the assigned tasks, etc. 5 .

The basis of Platonov’s entire life’s work is the desire to avoid bias, fitting facts into a preconceived scheme. It is from these positions that he approaches the assessment of Peter’s transformations. Having rejected tendentious, laudatory and disparaging interpretations of his personality and activities, highly appreciating the “wealth of natural abilities of Peter” as a commander and civil administrator, Platonov does not strive for assessments, but draws a simple conclusion from an analysis of the facts that in the state created by Peter “there was no neither privileged individuals nor privileged groups, and all of them were equalized in the same equality of lack of rights before the state” 6.

CHAPTER 1. Childhood and youth of Peter I

Pyotr Alekseevich Romanov (Peter I, Peter the Great) - the first All-Russian Emperor, was born on May 30, 1672, from the second marriage of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich with Natalya Kirillovna Naryshkina, a pupil of boyar A.S. Matveeva. Peter was the fourteenth child of Tsar Alexei and the first from his second marriage. The Tsar's first wife, daughter of I.D. Miloslavsky Marya Ilyinichna died, leaving him two sons Fedor and Ivan, and many daughters. Thus, under Tsar Alexei, in the royal family there were two circles of relatives hostile to each other: the eldest children of the tsar with the Miloslavskys and Natalya Kirillovna with her son and relatives. The fact is that Tsarevich Fyodor and Ivan were not distinguished by physical strength and did not show hope for longevity, and the younger Tsarevich Peter flourished in health, therefore, despite the fact that he was the youngest of the brothers, it was he who was destined to become king. This is what the Naryshkins hoped for, but the Miloslavskys were very afraid of this, and only the fear of Tsar Alexei restrained the manifestations of family enmity. 7

With the death of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the silent struggle of the Miloslavskys and Naryshkins turns into an open clash. Quarrels and intrigues began. Boyarin A.S. Matveev, who was then at the head of all affairs, was exiled to the north to Pustozersk. The position of Peter's mother became very difficult.

Peter's training progressed rather slowly. According to old Russian custom, he began to be taught at the age of five. Peter's teacher was the clerk Nikita Moiseev, son of Zotov, a learned man, but who loved to drink. Subsequently, Peter appointed him prince-pope of the clownish college of drunkenness.

Zotov went through the alphabet, book of hours, psalter, gospel and apostle with Peter. Tsar Alexei and his eldest sons began their teaching in the same way. Zotov also touched on Russian antiquity, telling the prince about the affairs of his father, about Tsar Ivan the Terrible, about Dmitry Donskoy and Alexander Nevsky. Subsequently, Peter did not lose interest in history and attached great importance to it for public education.

Until the death of his father, Tsar Alexei, Peter lived as a minion in the royal family. He was only three and a half years old when his father died. Tsar Fedor was the godfather of his little brother and loved him very much. He kept Peter with him in the large Moscow palace and took care of his education. 8

Whether Peter learned anything else from Zotov remains unknown; There is a legend that Zotov showed the prince many “amusing sheets,” that is, pictures of historical and everyday content, brought to Moscow from abroad. Studying with Zotov was to be followed by scholastic science, which Peter’s older brothers and even sisters became acquainted with under the guidance of Kyiv monks. Peter had to study grammar, literature, rhetoric, dialectics and philosophy, Latin and Greek literacy and, probably, the Polish language. But before this training began, Tsar Fedor died and the turmoil of 1682 began. Because of this, Peter was left without a systematic education. For the rest of his life he ignored grammar and spelling 9 .

Tsar Fedor Alekseevich dies, leaving no heirs to the throne. According to general opinion, his brother Ivan should have inherited the throne. But 15-year-old Ivan was very sick and weak-minded and, of course, could not accept power. Knowing this, Tsar Fedor’s favorites (Yazykov, Likhachev, etc.) arranged things in such a way that immediately after Fedor’s death, Patriarch Joachim and the boyars proclaimed the younger Tsarevich Peter tsar. However, the rights of Tsarevich Ivan were violated and his relatives could not come to terms with what had happened. The smartest and most decisive among them were Princess Sofya Alekseevna and boyar Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavsky. They raised an army of Streltsy against their enemies (Yazykov and Naryshkins).

The Streltsy were informed that Tsarevich Ivan had been strangled and a list of “traitor boyars” was given to the Streltsy. The Sagittarius believed and began an open rebellion. On May 15, 1682, they armed themselves and came to the Kremlin. Tsarina Natalya Kirillovna brought Tsar Peter and Tsarevich Ivan to the Red Porch of the palace and showed them to the archers. However, the archers did not calm down, broke into the royal palace and, in front of the members of the royal family, brutally killed the boyar Matveev and many relatives of Queen Natalia. Peter, who was an eyewitness to the bloody scenes of the Streltsy rebellion, was surprised by the firmness that he retained at the same time: standing on the Red Porch, he did not change his face when the Streltsy picked up Matveev and his supporters on spears. But the horrors of May were indelibly etched in Peter’s memory, and this is probably where both his well-known nervousness and his hatred of the Streltsy originated. A year later, in terms of development, 11-year-old Peter seemed to the foreign ambassador to be a 16-year-old youth 10.

A week after the start of the rebellion (May 23), the victors demanded from the government that both brothers be appointed kings; another week later (on the 29th), at the new request of the archers, due to the youth of the kings, the reign was handed over to Princess Sophia. Peter's party was excluded from all participation in state affairs. This board, according to B.I. Kurakin, was “very dishonest; great bribery and state theft" 11.

During the entire period of Sophia’s regency, Natalya Kirillovna came to Moscow only for a few winter months, spending the rest of the time in the village of Preobrazhenskoye near Moscow. A significant number of noble families were grouped around the young court, not daring to throw in their lot with the provisional government of Sophia. Left to his own devices, Peter forgot how to endure any kind of constraint, to deny himself the fulfillment of any desire. Queen Natalya, a woman of “small intelligence,” as her relative Prince Kurakin put it, cared, apparently, exclusively about the physical side of raising her son. We see Peter surrounded by “young guys of the common people” and “young people of the first houses”; the former eventually gained the upper hand, and the “noble persons” were kept away. It is very likely that both simple and noble friends of Peter’s childhood games equally deserved the nickname “mischievous” given to them by Sophia.

A fiery, brilliant child cannot sit in a room doing nothing; he rushes out of the sad, disgraced house into the street, gathers around him a crowd of young court servants: he has fun, plays with them: like all living children, he loves to play at war, at being soldiers. On the banks of the Yauza near the village of Preobrazhenskoye, he built himself a “amusing” fortress - Presburg and around it he gathered a whole dozen “amusing” warriors. At first it was a complete rabble of “Preobrazhensky grooms,” as Sophia put it. Then Peter gave this company the form of two soldier regiments (Preobrazhensky - in the village of Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky - in the neighboring village of Semyonovsky), and little by little from the “amusing” regiments, Peter formed real regiments, which later laid the foundation for the guard. Peter's field fun acquired wide dimensions and serious significance. Peter understood the importance of military affairs and began to study engineering and artillery. According to V. O. Klyuchevsky, “being kind by nature as a person, Peter was rude like a king” 12.