Chief Marshal of Artillery Nikolai Voronov. Hero of the Soviet Union Voronov Nikolai Nikolaevich: biography, achievements and interesting facts What ideas lead to

Year of the rank of Marshal of Artillery. During the Great Patriotic War, N.P. Voronov led the Soviet artillery, the main fire strike force of the Soviet Army.

His name is associated with the implementation of a number of important assignments from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to coordinate the actions of several fronts in major operations of the Soviet Armed Forces, including the liquidation of the encircled Nazi troops at Stalingrad. N. N. Voronov’s services to his socialist Motherland were noted by awarding him the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, awarding him fifteen Orders of the Soviet Union and nine medals, including six Orders of Lenin and the Order of the October Revolution. His ashes were buried in the Kremlin wall in March 1968.

I had to meet N.N. Voronov many times and work for a number of years under his direct supervision as one of his closest assistants. In addition to official official relations, we talked a lot, exchanged opinions on various issues of building our artillery as a branch of the military, identified the next problems of its development and ways to solve them. Conversations in his free time covered a wide range of Nikolai Nikolaevich’s varied interests, from art and literature to sports, which he was interested in, being a passionate fan of football and chess and an active participant in sport hunting and fishing.

All this justified my agreement to give a short story about this remarkable man and warrior, using documents and personal impressions. After all, who, if not our youth - the successors of the great deeds of their fathers and grandfathers - can know and learn from the rich experience of those who constitute the glory and pride of the people.

N. N. Voronov’s father, Nikolai Terentievich, the son of a cook, received sufficient education in Petrograd to serve as a clerk. However, his seemingly prosperous existence was destroyed. He was drawn to educated workers, Social Democrats, he sympathized with them and was noticed by the political police. After the revolution of 1905, the tsarist government dealt harshly not only with participants in protests against the government, but also with those who sympathized with them. As “unreliable”, Nikolai Terentyevich became unemployed. For three years he could not find a job. Tormented by hopeless poverty, N. N. Voronov’s mother committed suicide. When Nikolai Terentyevich finally found a job and was able to take in his son and daughter from his friend’s wife who had sheltered them, Kolya Voronov began preparing to enter the gymnasium. The year was 1908. He was not accepted into the gymnasium, as the son of an “unreliable” one. Only the next year he was able to begin studying at a private real school. Such schools, maintained by public organizations or private individuals, existed in a number of large cities. They educated children who, for one reason or another, were denied access to state-owned secondary educational institutions.

The blows of fate continued to haunt little Voronov - the First World War began, with it came high prices: it became difficult for his father to support his family alone, and Nikolai left school after finishing the 4th grade, going to work for a successful lawyer as a technical secretary. The father and his family moved to a rural area, where it was easier to support the family. But... in 1916 he was mobilized into the army, and young Voronov had to take care of his family upon himself. Nevertheless, he still did not leave the evening general education courses and passed the exams as an external student for a secondary school in 1917.

After the February Revolution, my father came to Petrograd as a delegate of the regimental soldiers’ committee.

In October, Nikolai Voronov was left without work - the lawyer was forced to close his office. After the October Revolution, bank employees announced a boycott of Soviet power, then the Bolsheviks appealed to workers to help establish banking. Nikolai Voronov went to work in a bank.

After the October Revolution, the young Soviet Republic had to defend itself from internal counter-revolution and interventionists literally from the first day. The formation of the Red Army began. After reading the appeal in the newspaper, Voronov entered the Petrograd artillery courses in March 1918. From that time on, his new life began - the life of a warrior of the proletarian revolution.

In September 1918, having completed the course with a new rank - paint (red commander), he was appointed platoon commander in a howitzer battery and left for the front against Yudenich's troops. While still on the course, he joined a group of RCP(b) sympathizers. Among those who recommended him was a member of the party bureau of courses, M.V. Zakharov, now Marshal of the Soviet Union.

The first mentor in a combat situation was the battery commander A. G. Shablovsky. N.N. Voronov remained grateful to him for the rest of his life and kept in touch with him until his death. In his memoirs, reserve colonel A.G. Shablovsky says that the young painter Voronov enjoyed a special favor among the Red Army soldiers for his cheerful disposition, he knew how to make “they forget about dangers and maintained the high morale of the Red Army soldiers.” He gives examples of the heroism of the soldiers and commanders of the battery, in particular he recalls the following fact:

“...to carry out a private fire mission, we had to move forward one howitzer with a gun crew about a kilometer and a half from the position. The First Infantry Regiment, which had arrived shortly before early in the morning, suddenly, without warning and for no apparent reason, retreated to the main position of the battery. The extended howitzer was abandoned without a harness. Fortunately, an armored vehicle arrived from the reserve and scattered the whites with fire; carried away by the pursuit of our infantry north of the highway, the whites did not notice a howitzer well camouflaged in the bushes south of the highway. Taking advantage of the favorable situation, N.N. Voronov, whom I mentioned with color, galloped at the head of the team to the howitzer abandoned by the infantry and safely led it to the battery.”

Repeatedly, the platoon commander, and then the battery commander, Nikolai Voronov, in battles with Yudenich’s troops and in battles with the White Poles, showed an example of personal courage to the soldiers. During the attack on Warsaw, the battery he commanded was always in the battle formations of the Eighty-third Regiment of the Tenth Infantry Division. By that time, it was armed with light 76-mm cannons to replace the 122-mm howitzers that were gradually out of action. The command of a light cannon battery, more mobile, facilitated the continuous escort of infantry with fire and wheels.

Military luck betrayed our troops, and they were forced to retreat under the blows of fresh operational reserves of the Belopol troops. Nikolai Voronov's battery covered the infantry's retreat with fire. The regiments and battalions of the Twenty-eighth Infantry Brigade of the Tenth Infantry Division were melting away in battle without receiving replacements. By mid-August each numbered less than 200 people. On August 17, the brigade was surrounded by Polish troops. About this day, the former commander of the Tenth Infantry Division N. Kakurin wrote that the commander of the Eighty-third Infantry Regiment decided in the village of Yuzefovo, where the White Poles surrounded the entire Twenty-eighth Infantry Brigade, to strike in the north- and south-east directions and clear the road for those who followed him Eighty-second and Eighty-fourth rifle regiments.

“Deploying into an eccentric battle formation, the Eighty-third Infantry Regiment moved into the attack. Despite their small numbers and heavy enemy fire, the riflemen boldly rushed forward. After momentary success, they rushed back to the village. Yuzefov, suffering heavy losses in killed and wounded. The battle was so fleeting that the battery, located in a narrow street with. Yuzefov barely had time to fire one or two rounds of grapeshot at the Poles who had gone on the attack and was captured by the enemy, since she could not and did not have time to lift up her limbers and turn around in a narrow street clogged with running people and convoys. Here the commander of the first battery, Comrade, died the death of the brave. Voronov, who fired with buckshot and was left alone to ruin his guns.”

Everything was as N. Kakurin wrote, except for the last part. Having damaged the remaining two guns with one of the fighters, N. Voronov was hit by a shell explosion, was shell-shocked and lost consciousness. When he woke up, he saw that the enemy had already passed the village, and the Red Army soldier Volkov from his battery was standing next to him with his horse. Volkov helped the commander climb into the saddle, and they began to make their way to their own. However, at night they mistakenly ended up in the White Poles’ location. Due to a concussion in his legs, Nikolai Voronov could not control his horse and was captured. Twice he faced amputation of his legs. After the conclusion of peace, after 8 months of being in captivity, he was repatriated and was treated in hospital for a long time. But he still returned to duty. Again he commanded a battery, first in the Second, and then in the Twenty-seventh Omsk Rifle Division. This is where my first meeting with N.N. Voronov took place.

In the spring of 1923, as part of a group of employees of the division's political department, I checked the organization of party political work in the division's artillery.

The artillery of the division, after another reorganization in January 1923, was small at that time - only two divisions (howitzer, cannon), a school for junior officers and an artillery park. Therefore, we quickly became acquainted with the commanders of divisions and batteries. The commander of the howitzer battery, N. N. Voronov, immediately attracted our attention with his appearance - very tall and very thin. As it turned out a little later, he was a sociable person, with a special kind of cordiality and a constant joke. Soft deep tenor, slightly stuttering speech. He spoke slowly, carefully following his wording. He was physically well prepared, loved equestrian sports, football and tennis, which was beginning to take root in the army, and was fond of photography.

Many years later, Nikolai Nikolaevich, when I asked where he learned to play football, said that as a child his father rented an apartment on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, in Udelny. It was at the same time a dacha area. In the summer, a team of foreigners usually trained there—I think they were Englishmen who lived in St. Petersburg. All his free time, little Voronov could watch the training for hours, spellbound. Finally, the team coach paid attention to him and began teaching him how to hit the ball.

He did not grow up to participate in this football team, learned a lot and retained his affection and love for football until the end of his life. In 1937-1968, he was the most serious and devoted fan of the CSKA team. At the end and after the war, the senior coach of the team, B. A. Arkadyev, freely came into the office of the Chief Marshal of Artillery, and he always found time to discuss with him a number of the team’s needs, the procedure for meeting them, and then the conversations turned to a critical analysis of the last game and to the tactical plan upcoming. One day, in August 1946, I was returning with him in his official plane from an exercise in the Leningrad area. On the way, we had a serious and interesting conversation about a number of current problems in the development of artillery sciences; he led it very actively. At the time of landing at the Central Airfield, a football match at the Dynamo stadium was visible through the plane window. Nikolai Nikolaevich remembered that the CSKA team was playing and suggested going straight from the airfield to the stadium. We were both tired from the routine and, naturally, were in a hurry to rest. At first I took his offer as a joke, which he was generous with. However, when we got into the cars, he ordered the driver of his car to go to the stadium.

Even with physical ailments, which especially bothered him in the last decade of his life, Nikolai Nikolaevich rarely missed football matches of his favorite team. Only one other hobby that he carried throughout his life - hunting - could distract him from being present at the stadium on the day of the CSKA team's game. He had many conversations with the players of this team, knew everyone’s personal needs and helped the team as best he could.

And then, in the twenties, in Dorogobuzh, he himself taught the battery soldiers to play football, and they watched with admiration his deft techniques in handling the ball.

But this was not the only thing that attracted Nikolai Voronov’s attention. His battery maintained excellent internal order, and from the point of view of the interests of our inspecting group, this battery commander stood out for his active participation in party and propaganda work and, in particular, for this reason enjoyed high authority among his comrades and subordinates.

The second meeting with N.N. Voronov was longer. The division's artillery was transferred to Vitebsk, in the fall of 1924 it was reorganized into an artillery regiment, in which I was a senior political worker from the beginning of 1924. With me, N.N. Voronov arrived from the Higher Artillery School and was first deputy and then division commander. Here I had the opportunity to get to know him closely.

This time, attention was drawn to his passion for military literature and meaningful speeches with reports and messages at meetings of the military-scientific society of the regiment and the Vitebsk garrison. At this time, he published several articles in the “Bulletin of AKUKS” (Artillery advanced training courses for command personnel. - Author’s note). He continued to actively participate in party political work, and also enjoyed authority as an excellent commander and a good comrade, always ready to help everyone who turned to him (in the theory and practice of artillery shooting, in artillery tactics and combined arms combat). He was sensitive to the moods and needs of his subordinates.

In the spring of 1925, I left for a new duty station and the next time I unexpectedly met Voronov was only 12 years later. I learned later from his stories how his life turned out over these years.

In 1927, he entered the M.V. Frunze Military Academy and graduated in May 1930. For three years he commanded an artillery regiment in the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division and for some time was the division's artillery chief.

Studying at the academy actually began the second period of life and service in the army. In the Moscow Proletarian Division, he actively participated in experimental exercises and shooting, in military testing of new types of artillery weapons, and then in the work of the statutory commission for the development of the Artillery Battle Manual (Part 2 - the combat use of artillery of the division and corps). From here he As part of our military mission, he went to Italy (August 1932) for military maneuvers.

During these years, he often had to meet in an official setting with senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense. They, of course, noticed the modesty, efficiency and hard work of the young regiment commander. The position of regimental commander in the army was a difficult but honorable service. Developing abilities for high responsibility for the assigned work, she taught leadership in combat training, training personnel, and understanding all the intricacies of managing a regiment in battle. In this post, the commander’s character was finally polished and his will was strengthened. With the qualities developed in the practice of commanding a regiment, the commander, as a rule, then went through all the steps of the career ladder to its top and usually compared favorably with those who were not trained in command of a regiment.

Therefore, it was no coincidence that in the spring of 1934 he was appointed head and military commissar of the oldest artillery school in the Soviet Army, the First Leningrad Artillery School. From here he once again went to Italy for maneuvers. Successful command of the school was awarded the first government award - the Order of the Red Star. He also received the rank of senior commanding officer - brigade commander (corresponds approximately to the modern military rank of major general. Author's note). Here, essentially, the second period of Voronov’s service in the Soviet Army ended. He had the knowledge and skills of artillery management at the tactical level of command and control (division, corps).

At the end of 1936, his request to be sent as a volunteer to the fighting Republican Spain was granted. There he received new combat experience and plenty of material for thought. He was summoned from there earlier than the period for which he was released. According to senior advisers, he was twice awarded government awards during his stay in Spain - the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner.

I was interested in how eyewitnesses assessed N.N. Voronov’s combat activities in Spain. The officers I knew willingly shared their impressions of the senior artillery adviser. They noted his amazing tact in addressing his subordinates and in his relationships with the commanders of Spanish units and formations. In a combat situation, he was always calm, restrained, often resorted to a joke, hiding behind it hints of mistakes made by his interlocutors, in an inoffensive form and with obvious affection for his interlocutor. He really conveyed his knowledge and experience and did it very tactfully. They noted his persistent desire to be convinced on the spot how the artillery was fighting, how well the reports and reports corresponded to reality. He did not change the aphorism: “It is better to see once than to hear a hundred times.”

It must be said that in our practice we learn many aphorisms, fair and useful, but we often forget to follow them exactly when it is necessary. Nikolai Nikolaevich did not deserve such a reproach, always acting in accordance with his convictions. The desire for the greatest reliability of knowledge of the situation was the style of work of N. N. Voronov, developed by practice.

It is not always possible to see for yourself everything that is happening on the battlefield. The higher the command and control level, the less ability its commander has to do this. At best, and not always, he has time to personally familiarize himself with the course of events in the main direction or in the most critical sector of the battle or battle. We have to use reports and reports, although they often do not provide a reliable reflection of reality. A military leader of the past once said that “in war, most reports are false, and the rest are unreliable.” Meanwhile, he recommended that, especially staff officers and generals, be able to form a picture of the situation that is closest to reality from this mass of unreliable information. This advice, paradoxical as it may seem, is applicable to people who have been through a good school of field service and participation in battles. To use it, you need to really know well the commanders operating on the battlefield, whose reports you have to use. It’s good, of course, to have henchmen who are freed from responsibility for the course and outcome of the battle, and to use them to help you control. But these latter too must be educated so that their report is credible.

Apparently, this explains the fact that during the Great Patriotic War N.N. Voronov was very reluctant to part with those who helped him in his work and in whom he had confidence.

I had to hear from him the first conclusions from reflections on the experience of the war in Spain, regarding the combat use of artillery in modern warfare. This happened in the very first days of his return from Spain.

On a June day in 1937, a corps commander-artilleryman entered the carriage of the Leningrad-Luga country train, in which all the seats were reserved for two gatherings of artillery commanders: deputy heads of artillery schools for training and students - artillery graduates of the M. V. Frunze Academy. . At that time, no one held such a high rank among the artillery command staff; it corresponded approximately to the modern military rank of colonel general. It became clear that we had before us a new chief of artillery of the Red Army. It was N.N. Voronov, who was awarded the rank of corps commander out of turn after returning from Spain, shortly before the events described. He was going to Luga to pick up his family. Sitting down with Divisional Commander V.D. Grendal, who headed the academy group, N.N. Voronov struck up a conversation. Gradually, many of those traveling in the carriage joined in. The conversation took on the peculiar character of a “press conference.” N.I. Voronov was asked many questions about the events in Spain, and with enviable conscientiousness he not only answered, but also sought to convince us of the correctness of his conclusions about the use of artillery, and sought for us to understand the tasks arising from them for us, the artillerymen. The entire four hours of the journey were spent in lively conversation, from answering questions they gradually moved on to an exchange of opinions. You also had to be able to do this from the first meeting - you need to have a special charm, then they begin to talk boldly with a high-ranking boss.

From this conversation I remember N.N. Voronov’s deep conviction that the role of artillery in modern warfare is not declining, but increasing. He proved this with examples from the experience of the war in Spain. He said that the growth of tank equipment and aviation does not reduce the need for artillery, but increases it. He pointed to favorable conditions for the growth of mass artillery production in connection with the success of the country's industrialization in 1929-1937. It is known that during the war no one ever complained about a surplus of weapons and everyone tried to speed up the process of rearmament of the army with new models and speed up the process of replacing some models with new ones, even more advanced in their combat qualities.

Then this question was not idle. We, artillery commanders who loved our branch of the military, were worried about ideas coming from abroad about the inevitable loss of the role of artillery in modern (for the thirties) war. For one reason or another, such views penetrated into our military theoretical press and even into official manuals that reflected the trend in the development of military doctrine.

In such a serious work as “The Nature of Operations of a Modern Army” by V.K. Triandafillov (3rd ed., 1936, p. 115), it was said that two battalions of tanks could replace one artillery regiment of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. This was written in 1929, when we had extremely low-power artillery. The author apparently considered this replacement as a way out of the situation. However, by the time of the aforementioned conversation, such a view was still reflected in official manuals, including in the draft Artillery Field Manual (Part 2, 1937), which had already passed all stages of development.

In the mid-thirties, during exercises it also happened that in calculating the required firepower for solving a combat mission, they replaced artillery with aviation; The “equivalent” was considered to be one artillery battalion for one squadron of light bombers.

We, the artillerymen, did not internally share all this, intuitively understanding the illegitimateness of the very question of such a “replacement” of artillery with tanks or aircraft. But there were no “erudite and courageous” people among us who could oppose such a point of view with another. Of course, N.N. Voronov’s statements then, in the carriage, made us happy - in his face we saw a man who deeply understood the role of artillery and truly loved his branch of the military. His point of view made its way in life. Somewhat later, J.V. Stalin spoke about the enormous role of artillery in modern warfare. He expressed the desire to have her first-class. Then, serious justifications for the need for the all-round development of artillery appeared, precisely in connection with the rapid development of tank and aviation weapons, in works headed by such authoritative theorists of the combat use of artillery as V.D. Grendal and A.K. Sivkov.

I remember from the same conversation N.N. Voronov’s statements about the growing importance of massive artillery fire. He came to this conclusion and illustrated it for us with his modest experience of the massive use of artillery in Spain. As the most suitable example, he cited the case of the concentration of fire from 22 artillery batteries on one height occupied by the rebels in the Madrid area. Voronov understood, of course, that in the absence of large masses of artillery this experience was incomplete, but he was able to see in it a prototype of the near future. Then he could not yet foresee the mighty flourishing of Soviet artillery that it achieved during the Great Patriotic War. But he already understood the trend of its development, its patterns and correctly understood his own role as the chief of artillery of the Red Army; he considered his main task to clear the way for the rapid growth and development of artillery.

From the understanding of the importance of massive artillery fire followed the recognition of the great role of maneuver in the creation of large artillery groupings, and, consequently, their dependence on the availability of reserve assets. This also resulted in the great importance of centralized control of these groups in the interests of combat interaction with tank and rifle formations. Not without pleasure, Nikolai Nikolaevich recalled in a conversation with us about the excellent roads of Spain, which, even in mountainous terrain, made it possible to quickly and easily carry out the operational transfer of batteries of light guns behind trucks used as tractors. In this he guessed the growing importance of operational artillery maneuver in the near future.

Later, during the Great Patriotic War, I was convinced more than once that N.N. Voronov was able to consider, in the limited-scale experience of the war in Spain, much of what had to be solved on the scale of a major war.

I also remember his persistent warning about the dangers of disrupting the interaction of artillery fire with an infantry strike. He talked about cases of infantry being late in rising to attack after the end of artillery preparation. As a result, such attacks were thwarted by the reviving fire weapons of the defending enemy. He warned that artillery preparation for an attack, built on suppressing the enemy’s fire system (in the First World War, artillery preparation for an attack until 1918 was based on the destruction and complete destruction of the enemy’s defenses), does not ensure the silence of enemy fire weapons; they come to life some time after suppression . You need to be prepared for this. Back then, we naively believed that it was like that “over there,” but it couldn’t happen here. Four years later, we became convinced that this often happens here too: gross violations in the interaction of artillery with infantry and tanks were common, especially in the first period of the Patriotic War.

I relate this conversation in detail because it left a deep impression on all of us; Much of what he warned us against then had to be faced in a combat situation. Finally, I’m also telling you because, later working with him side by side, I became convinced of how consistently he put into practice the ideas that he considered useful for the business.

So, for Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov, a new period of service in the Soviet Army began - he rose to those circles of military command that directly headed the Armed Forces and had direct contact with the leadership of the country as a whole.

At first it seemed that it would be easy to solve new problems of armament, military organization, growth and development of artillery, and to develop methods for its combat use in new conditions. Based on this, Voronov developed a whole program of measures and outlined them in a detailed memo presented to the People's Commissar of Defense in November 1937. It turned out, however, that it was easy to solve issues that were only traditionally subordinate to the chief of artillery - issues of combat training and the development of the theory and practice of the combat use of artillery. As for the weapons program, the situation was much more complicated. The People's Commissar only included Voronov in the commission that developed the artillery weapons system (the system was the weapon program, indicating which guns, for which troops, at which command level to contain and in what quantity. - Author's note).

The memo launched a broad program of equipping artillery with reconnaissance equipment, without which the effect of its combat use, primarily heavy and long-range equipment, was sharply limited, and in a number of cases its very use became pointless. The program raised the question of creating an artillery spotter aircraft that would allow reconnaissance of enemy artillery batteries that were not visible from high-altitude observation posts and hidden in the depths of the enemy’s battle formation, determine their exact location (coordinates) and adjust artillery fire on unobservable targets.

Voronov also raised the question of developing a new sound measuring station for detecting, determining the location and correcting firing at a sounding target (an artillery battery). True, in 1936 a sound measuring station was already put into service, much more advanced than the previous ones, but it still did not solve many problems with the required accuracy. Nikolai Nikolaevich wrote: “Sound measurements will play a big role in a future war.” This forecast was justified: artillery headquarters calculated that during 1942-1945, in 46 operations of the Soviet Army, 33,721 artillery batteries (i.e., 83.5 percent of all explored batteries by artillery instrumental reconnaissance) and 3,435 mortar batteries were reconnaissance using sound-metric batteries. (63.5 percent).

A number of Voronov’s proposals were aimed at developing means of optical, topographic and meteorological reconnaissance, providing reconnaissance agencies with vehicles and means of traction. In the same way, he provided for further improvement and the creation of new models of heavy and high-power artillery, despite the fact that since 1937 new and modernized artillery systems had already begun to arrive. His memorandum raised the question of improving anti-aircraft artillery and its fire control devices, the development of self-propelled artillery, expanding the types of mortar weapons, means of mechanical propulsion, radio communications, etc. Entire sections of the note were devoted to the latest problems of combat training of artillery personnel and organizational the regular structure of artillery units.

In such an extensive report, not everything was, of course, equal in depth of thought, persuasiveness and vividness of justification. Much came from what was “sick” in Voronov himself, which developed as a result of a long and painful comprehension of the experience. The report also included some of the statements of the new employees - Voronov talked a lot with them in the process of becoming familiar with the state of affairs in the vast “economy” of which he became the head. He was not able to critically study all the problems in the history of the issue of arming the army with certain types of artillery weapons, types of guns and their models. His own experience in combat use was limited to the 76 mm cannon, 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers, he closely observed the 122 mm cannon, 152 mm howitzer-gun in action, he was familiar with the remaining systems, but had not yet directly penetrated into the specifics of their combat use.

With his memo, N.N. Voronov interfered with the functions of a number of main departments, bypassing the complex, difficult and not always pleasant path of preliminary approvals due to inexperience. Therefore, his proposals met with more objections than might have been the case under other conditions.

At first, it seemed to N.N. Voronov that it was enough to submit a justified application for assistance, and it would receive support. In practice, however, this was far from the case. For example, as we have already said, in November 1937 N.N. Voronov raised the question of creating a special artillery spotter aircraft. In this regard, he wrote to the People's Commissar of Defense: “All attempts to adapt existing aircraft for this purpose should be considered an impossible task.” Then he presents the draft tactical and technical requirements for a special aircraft, agreed with the head of the Air Force. But three and a half years later, in March 1941, he again had to write about the same thing to the head of the Main Artillery Directorate: “...Our artillery continues to remain blind, for three years and a half there has been some kind of incomprehensible red tape with an artillery aircraft... It’s impossible to endure any longer.”

Again, practical suggestions are presented. But they again did not meet with support. So we entered the war with the R-5 aircraft removed from service with the Air Force and transferred to the detachments of artillery spotter aircraft. Their unsuitability for this purpose was known back in the mid-thirties.

This is just one of many examples of the fact that it is not enough to have your own opinion, even if justified, to resolve the necessary matter. Gradually, N. N. Voronov learns the art of convincing the people necessary for this, winning among them “like-minded people,” since joint speeches on any issue found a shorter path to the implementation of the proposal.

In general, the path of the chief of artillery to improving artillery was not “strewn with roses”; there were more “thorns” on it. Apparently, he himself understood that he needed to understand a lot and learn more deeply than he had previously imagined. This can also explain the fact that he actively participates in testing samples of guns, means of traction, etc., directly for hours, until physical fatigue, he spends time on the tractor and makes test runs himself, participates in testing ammunition, etc. It seemed that he could limit himself to receiving test reports and studying them. He wanted to see everything for himself. During the tests, I talked dozens and hundreds of times with engineers, designers, craftsmen, officers, junior commanders, and ordinary Red Army soldiers. He knew how to “stir up” everyone and force them to sincerely express their impressions and opinions about the weapons they tested.

As his knowledge improves, Voronov no longer confines himself only to issues of combat use of tested and created samples, he delves into the affairs of design bureaus and artillery factories. Learning a lot of useful things from them, he, in turn, enriched them with his combat experience and helped them better understand the tactical and technical requirements for artillery weapons.

In this regard, People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov increasingly began to entrust him with participation in various commissions to resolve disputes that arose between the customer and the supplier, since he was already convinced of Voronov’s impartiality and the courage of his judgments.

The former director of one of the artillery factories, and then the head of the Main Directorate of the Artillery Industry in the People's Commissariat of Armament and a member of the board of this People's Commissariat, N. E. Nosovsky, in his memoirs, notes the determination of N. N. Voronov in taking responsibility for recommendations to the government. In a number of cases, he took the side of the artillery industry workers, having previously thoroughly studied on the spot the reasons for certain discrepancies.

With the permission of N. E. Nosovsky, I allow myself to quote an excerpt from his memoirs. Once, he writes, the production program for 45-mm anti-tank guns was disrupted due to an insignificant defect. The Main Artillery Directorate previously accepted guns with such a defect; their survivability and reliability were tested by experimental shooting. And after, during the war, when a lot of such guns were fired, there were no complaints about them. At the same time, in 1939, there was a threat of disruption to their production program, since the military representative stopped accepting them, and the Main Artillery Directorate supported him. P.N. Voronov was at the plant, understood the essence of the dispute on the spot and took the side of the plant, and not his department. The Defense Committee authorized the acceptance of such guns.

And one more moment from the memoirs of N. E. Nosovsky about N. N. Voronov, I think, is worth citing here.

At the plant where the new 122-mm howitzer designed by F. F. Petrov was being manufactured, changes were introduced to the already approved drawings for technological reasons. Representatives of the GAU did not agree to these changes. N.N. Voronov and N.E. Nosovsky were entrusted with resolving the dispute directly at the factories. Having carefully studied the essence of the matter and the rationale for certain changes, N. N. Voronov, who had the final word, sided with the production workers.

“We can say,” recalls Nosovsky, “that thanks to N.N. Voronov, an important matter that had been stalled at the two largest factories for several months was resolved. Issues were resolved well and in a businesslike manner together with N.N. Voronov, who always approached them carefully and wisely. He was a man of great culture, simple, who knew how to treat artillery production workers with respect and trust... The managers of artillery factories, for their part, loved and respected N.N. Voronov, who was always responsive to the affairs of artillery factories.”

From this review one cannot conclude that N.N. Voronov easily agreed with production engineers and designers. For example, such a case is known. Back in 1936, by decree of the Defense Committee, the 76-mm F-22 divisional gun was adopted. N.N. Voronov conducted additional tests in winter conditions, many design flaws were revealed, and he protested the resolution. A person with courage, courage and will could take such a step. After all, he brought the matter to discussion in the supreme authorities. For him, this action against the GAU and the People's Commissariat of Armaments, and essentially against the Defense Committee, could have far-reaching consequences.

During the discussion, he found himself alone against everyone, and if J.V. Stalin had not supported him, he would have had a hard time. As N.N. Voronov himself told me, J.V. Stalin said something like this: “The production of guns is not the production of soap! We need to listen to criticism, we need to eliminate all discovered shortcomings in the gun so that it becomes combat-ready...” A new government commission was created with the participation of N. N. Voronov. Parallel tests were carried out on four more gun samples, and then a decision was made to refine the sample. It managed to eliminate the previous design flaws, but the idea of ​​a universal cannon (firing at ground and air targets) had to be abandoned, and the new cannon went into mass production in 1940.

Despite the fact that not everything was accomplished that was planned, a lot was done. Before the start of the Great Patriotic War (1938-1941), almost three times more new types of guns were adopted than during the entire second five-year plan. Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov made a significant contribution to this matter of enormous importance. He became known and respected in scientific and technical artillery circles.

In addition to the listed matters, he had the main functions of combat training of artillery personnel and artillery units for war. Here he found himself in unusual conditions: his previous activities as a regiment commander and head of a school were concentrated in a very limited space - a barracks, a military camp, a summer camp at an artillery range. Now the units subordinate to him were located on the territory from the Barents to the Black Sea and from the Western Bug to the Pacific Ocean. It was necessary to recognize personnel in military districts, armies, etc. and organize all work in accordance with real ideas about command personnel. Finally, it was necessary to take the matter of personnel training into our own hands.

He gives an opinion to the draft Artillery Battle Manual (Part 2, 1937), approving it and thereby putting an end to the mistrust that still existed in this project due to the fact that the project manager was subject to repression.

This charter served well in preparing artillery for war. In 1940, N. N. Voronov sought to introduce a record of command personnel and coordinate with him all appointments and movements. He is seeking the reassignment of artillery military educational institutions to him. Before this, they were under the jurisdiction of the Main Directorate of Universities. And then a ten-hour school day was introduced in schools. On top of this there is an hour of daily small arms and artillery training and training in shooting from hand weapons. There was no time left for self-preparation, extracurricular political education work and rest. Protests not only did not help, but were also unsafe for the official position of the protester.

Having received the artillery schools under his control, N.N. Voronov convenes a meeting of the chiefs and, despite his good personal experience, listens carefully to our proposals, allows a broad discussion of the situation in the schools, answers questions, and promises to give answers to some later. He immediately promises to help on a number of issues and keeps his promises. The meeting lasted three days. Nikolai Nikolaevich used the breaks to talk with the heads of the schools, and even began to eat in the canteen with us, taking advantage of every opportunity to get to know better those who were entrusted with the responsible task of training and educating artillery commanders.

His authority in our eyes grew literally by the hour these days. It was nice to realize that at the helm was not only a knowledgeable and experienced artilleryman, but a very intelligent person who knew how to listen, give an intelligent explanation, was not arrogant, and one could have a conversation with him. By his behavior alone at this gathering, Nikolai Nikolaevich achieved such respect for himself that sending directives could not achieve in several years. Through us, the heads of the schools, through our stories about the new chief of artillery, his authority rose, it spread to the schools, our respectful reviews of him penetrated the ranks of the cadets, tomorrow's commanders, and with them all the artillery units.

During the time N.N. Voronov was in charge of the Soviet artillery, our army, even before the Great Patriotic War, had to conduct military operations three times, the scale of which consistently increased from the participation of two reinforced rifle divisions to several combined arms armies. These are military events in the area of ​​Lake Khasan in 1938, on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 and the Soviet-Finnish War in 1939-1940.

The fighting at Lake Khasan was generally fleeting. N.N. Voronov arrived at the place late (he was ordered to travel from Moscow by train). With the permission of the People's Commissar of Defense, he used his visit to the Far East to familiarize himself with artillery units and check their combat readiness. It became clear to him that in many units simplification is allowed in the created environment during exercises and shootings; in a number of garrisons, especially remote ones, they practice conducting training “conditionally” instead of preparing units and commanders for conducting combat operations in field and difficult conditions. After his report to the People's Commissar of Defense, identified deficiencies began to be eradicated in all artillery units.

In the summer of 1939, Voronov flies to the area of ​​​​combat events at Khalkhin Gol. Here he pursues the idea of ​​centralized control of an artillery group by the army command, and then, in the last decisive offensive against the enemy, planning the combat operations of the artillery of the entire group of forces. Here N.N. Voronov was closely involved in solving a number of combat missions. For this operation he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In the fall of 1939, N.N. Voronov took part in a liberation campaign with the troops of the Belarusian Military District in Western Belarus. Now he gets a real understanding of the organization and conduct of the march of many artillery units in the most difficult conditions of a large shortage of mechanical traction equipment and the use of generally unsuitable tractors from agriculture as tractors for heavy guns.

He tried to catch the course of events in the campaign of the troops of the Kyiv Military District in Western Ukraine. He received permission, but didn’t make it, got into a car accident, resulting in a concussion and four broken ribs. We can say, as he himself wrote in his memoirs, his life was saved by a gift from Dolores Ibarruri, received from her in Spain, a metal pencil. A massive pencil blocked the path to the heart with a piece of metal hitting the chest. He did not write in his memoirs that the strong blow caused him numerous injuries in the gastrointestinal tract. The injuries were healed, but many adhesions formed, and therefore periodic pain caused severe suffering for the rest of his life, although the strong body endured the remaining injuries almost without a trace.

After treatment, he had a short rest, devoted to hunting, and then was sent to the Leningrad Military District, where events were brewing that would later lead to war. There he stayed from the beginning to the end, being mainly in the most important direction - the Karelian Isthmus - in the Seventh Army.

Artillery played a decisive role in breaking through the Mannerheim Line. And her boss deservedly received a new government award - the Order of Lenin. A month earlier, N.N. Voronov was awarded the rank of army commander of the 2nd rank. This is a combined arms rank, and then only two artillerymen held it - N.N. Voronov and V.D. Grendal, but the latter then commanded the Thirteenth Army on the same Karelian Isthmus and was actually a combined arms commander. In June 1940, with the introduction of general ranks, N. N. Voronov was awarded the rank of Colonel General of Artillery.

A few days before the Great Patriotic War, N.N. Voronov was appointed head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense. And a month later, on July 19, 1941, in connection with the restoration of the post of chief of artillery of the Red Army, abolished a year before, he was reappointed to this post.

A new period in his life began, the brightest and most productive. Nikolai Nikolaevich joined it at 42 years old, a relatively young man for his position, but quite mature and ready to fully fulfill his responsible, complex and varied duties.

On July 20, 1941, Colonel General of Artillery N.N. Voronov received the first order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - to travel as a representative of Headquarters to the Yelnya area, where fierce fighting was taking place. He stayed there until August 5, when there was a lull in this direction.

Together with the chief of artillery of the Reserve Front, L.A. Govorov, they developed detailed instructions for the fight of artillery against tanks during this difficult time. The instructions reported by L.A. Govorov at Headquarters received approval and were sent to the troops as their directive. Upon returning from the front, N.N. Voronov presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief a detailed report on the main shortcomings in the training of our troops, in their conduct of battles and in their management. It was a courageous and impartial report, mercilessly revealing shortcomings. At the same time, he was deeply optimistic, imbued with deep confidence in the transitory nature of shortcomings and contained practical recommendations aimed at eliminating them as quickly as possible. Such a report was a serious document orienting the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the actual situation on the battlefield near Yelnya.

Voronov did not have to stay in Moscow for long; three times in 1941 he was sent to Leningrad: at the end of August as part of a commission of the State Defense Committee, when the command and control of troops in the northwestern direction was reorganized; in mid-September, now at the request of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, when the blockade of the city began and it was necessary to carefully study the new conditions in its defense; finally, from mid-October to December 5, when a plan to break the blockade was being developed in Leningrad, but there was not enough strength or means to implement it.

Upon his return, N.N. Voronov summarized his reports and oral reports in a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He outlined in detail the positive facts in the actions of the troops and the shortcomings in their management, and objectively characterized the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy. Nikolai Nikolaevich especially noted the heroic behavior of the population of his native Leningrad:

“The population is starving, the city is under air bombing and constant shelling of heavy artillery, many families in the city have been killed and wounded at the front, everyone works without days of rest, above all legal norms, the bulk of the city’s population are wonderful Soviet people, true patriots of the Motherland. They are ready to endure everything just to defeat the enemy... The cadres of the glorious city brilliantly pass the combat test.”

He illustrated what he said with examples.

Between three trips to Leningrad, N.N. Voronov worked hard in Moscow, accelerating the preparation of new formations and sending artillery units to the front. Perhaps, we owe only to his energy and perseverance that in the summer and autumn of 1941, during the period of retreat and heavy losses, all or most of the artillery of great and special power was not abandoned. There were very few units armed with guns from 203 mm to 305 mm; there was no production of such guns at all, and their loss could be irreparable. On the fronts in the summer and autumn of 1941, they were essentially not needed, but they could be required in the event of a breakthrough of heavily fortified positions and fortified areas. N.N. Voronov was deeply confident that a turning point in the course of the war would come sooner or later, and in the enemy’s strategic rear there would be many fortified areas, the breakthrough of which would require especially powerful artillery. However, it was not so easy to snatch these units from the fronts, even with the consent of the Chief of the General Staff. Only the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief helped to gradually withdraw these units to the rear. Several regiments and separate divisions were left only on the Leningrad and Western fronts, and the Southern Front, contrary to the orders received, still retained two regiments of 203-mm howitzers.

In December 1941, N. N. Voronov raised the question of creating special artillery reserves with the chairman of the State Defense Committee, since at that time only rifle and tank formations were being formed. In this regard, he wrote:

“In some of them, the required artillery is being formed. For offensive operations, this artillery will be weak and extremely insufficient. The Supreme Command of the Red Army needs to have its own powerful reserve.”

It must be said that throughout the war N.N. Voronov showed special concern for the artillery of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK). Nikolai Nikolayevich did a lot for the gradual understanding by the leaders of the decision-making bodies of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the need for accelerated growth of the artillery of the RVGK as the main source of means for strategic and operational maneuver of artillery. Therefore, it was easier for the headquarters to carry out organized activities in this direction. It should be noted that in the growth and development of the artillery of the RVGK, N. N. Voronov received constant support from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I. V. Stalin, who remembered the presence of certain artillery formations and directly resolved issues of maneuvering them in a particular strategic operation. The solution to the problem was also made easier because during the war the volume of combined arms formations was reduced and the influx of artillery weapons from industry increased.

N.N. Voronov had been nurturing the idea of ​​organizing large artillery formations for a long time, when it seemed too early to think about it: in the first half of the war we simply experienced a “hunger” in artillery. Consequently, there were no real possibilities for organizing the necessary artillery formations. And Voronov, at the beginning of February 1942, asked me to express my thoughts on the scheme for organizing the artillery corps that he himself had developed.

Reluctantly, he agreed with our judgments that we do not yet have the appropriate conditions for the implementation of his idea, but somehow at Headquarters he expressed his secret dream. I must say, she met with sympathy from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

However, the plan began to be fully implemented only a year later in May-June 1943, when the production of artillery weapons sharply increased. Then five breakthrough artillery corps were formed at once, each consisting of two breakthrough artillery divisions and one division of rocket launchers. This event was preceded by the formation in November - December 1942 of the artillery divisions of the RVGK, first 8-regimental, then 4-brigade.

I remember well that Nikolai Nikolaevich was at first carried away by the idea of ​​​​independently using a breakthrough artillery corps in the battle zone of the shock army. Then, under pressure from the critical comments of his assistants, he agreed with two options for using such a corps in the army zone (the second - through artillery groups, in an already understandable and practice-tested method of control). In the practice of operations of 1943-1944, it was the second method that received universal recognition.

N. N. Voronov, back in 1942 near Stalingrad, where he was the representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters on combined arms issues, turned to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for permission to create a heavy artillery group on the South-Eastern (Stalingrad) Front and “to oblige the command of the South-Eastern Front to maintain this artillery group on the left bank of the Volga." On the memo with this proposal, dated September 26, 1942, there is a resolution by I.V. Stalin: “T-to Zhukov. The measures proposed by Comrade Voronov must be carried out expeditiously.”

Subsequent events led to the need to transform the front group into a military organization in the form of an artillery division. On November 3, 1942, N. N. Voronov makes a proposal to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to form a heavy artillery division consisting of five regiments and a separate division of guns of special power. The named division, numbered Nineteenth, played a large role in the defense of troops at Stalingrad and in the operation to eliminate the encircled group.

N. N. Voronov paid great attention to the problem of protecting troops from enemy air strikes. In 1941, the ground forces were left with virtually no anti-aircraft artillery. There were no anti-aircraft artillery units in the RVGK artillery, and fighter aircraft could not even cope with the task of protecting their bombers. Taking advantage of impunity, fascist planes calmly and methodically dived at our troops, disrupting their maneuver and movement. We at the front were more than once indignant at our own powerlessness in the fight against enemy aircraft, but we could not do anything.

As I know, the first, back in 1941, to raise the question with N. N. Voronov about the need to transfer anti-aircraft artillery cover for troops to the chief of artillery of the Red Army was Colonel G. S. Desnitsky, supported by the deputy chief of staff of colonels I. S. Tulovsky . N. N. Voronov repeatedly raised the issue with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about allocating part of the production of anti-aircraft guns at his disposal for the revival of the RVGK anti-aircraft artillery in the ground forces, since the country's air defense forces are loaded with their own tasks.

All this happened before my arrival at work at the Red Army artillery headquarters. Therefore, one event that had significant consequences was completely unexpected for me.

At about 5 o'clock in the morning on June 2, 1942, N. N. Voronov and a member of the Military Artillery Council I. S. Prochko unexpectedly entered my office. Having said hello, Nikolai Nikolaevich jokingly said: “...Well, take over the new management!..” To my perplexed question, he replied: “You, in addition to your main job, should take charge of the military anti-aircraft artillery. The Kremlin has just made a decision to transfer anti-aircraft artillery cover for the troops to us. At the same time, the formation of the first air defense artillery regiments as part of the RVGK artillery is ensured.”

I tried to get rid of the unfamiliar matter with a joke. However, this was a very serious matter, and we had to tackle it with all our energy. As subsequent events showed, this measure was fully justified in the war and played a huge role in protecting troops from enemy air attacks. By the end of the first period of the war (November 19, 1942), we had more than 250 anti-aircraft regiments of the RVGK, and by the beginning of 1945 - more than 500.

So, by 1943, the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army was in charge of almost all types of artillery, except for rocket and self-propelled ones. Since April 1943, rocket units (guards mortars, or “Katyushas”) were also subordinate to him. But self-propelled artillery was transferred to the command of the armored forces. In her person, the armored forces received the military artillery they needed, although many tank commanders for a long time outgrew their disdain for self-propelled guns, often calling them a “damaged tank” (the turret does not rotate).

As for N.N. Voronov, until the end of his tenure as artillery commander, he was looking for a way to introduce self-propelled guns into infantry battle formations, capable of going directly with the advanced infantry units and providing them with immediate assistance by suppressing and destroying the nearest enemy firing points. Already at the end of the war, after a series of consultations with designers, he put forward the idea of ​​“self-propelled” guns. Subsequently, it was carried out by placing a miniature engine on a carriage, capable of moving the cannon on the battlefield.

During the war, N.N. Voronov's official functions gradually expanded. The Department of Inventions and Rationalization of the Ministry of Defense was subordinate to him. Thus, before initiative proposals could be submitted for consideration by the People's Commissar of Defense and the government, they were carefully considered and sometimes studied by N. N. Voronov. He talked with the authors, held meetings with specialists, and participated in testing models or finished products. Both those who took their first steps in science and famous scientists turned to him for support. I remember professor, later academician A.I. Berg, who worked on radar problems, I remember academician B.N. Yuryev, who did a lot for the development of helicopters. Nikolai Nikolaevich then instructed me to hold a broad representative meeting. In his presence, a demonstration flight of a helicopter designed by Bratukhin was held on the territory adjacent to VDNKh. Unfortunately, the work, approved by sailors, polar explorers, fishermen, orderlies, signalmen, artillerymen and other representatives of military and civilian professions, was not started in 1944: there was no opportunity for this - there was a war going on. The introduction of helicopters began after its completion. N.N. Voronov was also involved in the selection of weapons for partisan detachments that were suitable for the conditions of their combat activities. One day in the winter of 1943/44, he invited me to test a new type of mortar. N. N. Voronov was directly connected with the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement P. K. Ponomarenko. More than once in Nikolai Nikolaevich’s office I met with representatives of the command of the partisan detachments.

As we can see, N.N. Voronov’s range of official responsibilities was wide; only a person of his type, knowledge and experience could cover everything and competently manage the matter. In the second half of the war, as is known, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief reassigned to him the country's air defense forces, the command of which he himself had previously exercised directly. This is how N.N. Voronov got another headquarters - the Main Headquarters of the country's air defense.

And yet, all this does not exhaust the activities of N.N. Voronov during the Great Patriotic War.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief saw that the reports of N.N. Voronov, who visited various sections of the Soviet-German front on his instructions, were always truthful, impartial and qualified; his proposals not only on the problems of growth and development of artillery, but also on many general operational issues, as a rule, were seriously justified and deeply thought out. Apparently, these circumstances prompted the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to send N.N. Voronov as a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, entrusting him with coordinating the actions of the fronts participating in strategic operations, or providing assistance to the front. The objective and attentive gaze of N. N. Voronov provided the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Headquarters as a whole with material for the most appropriate major operational decisions. During the Great Patriotic War, N. N. Voronov was a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the Leningrad and Volkhov, South-Western and Don, Voronezh and Bryansk, North-Western, Western and Kalinin, Third Ukrainian and First Belorussian fronts. And everywhere his presence left a noticeable mark.

Fulfilling the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, N. N. Voronov rises to a higher level. He already commands more than one branch of troops, although powerful in terms of the power of fire. His activity in this case is already of a truly military leadership nature. For his services in this particular area of ​​military leadership, Nikolai Nikolaevich was awarded three military orders of Suvorov, 1st degree.

For thirteen years, which included the entire Great Patriotic War, N.N. Voronov stood at the head of the Soviet artillery. He loved his branch of the military and devoted all his energy, all his accumulated knowledge and experience to its development. Realizing that he was approaching the threshold of quantitative accumulation, which should be followed by a new qualitative leap in the development of artillery, Voronov thought through the most appropriate forms of organization and methods of its combat use. Even at a meeting of senior military commanders in the winter of 1940, he put forward a requirement to create artillery densities in the offensive twice as high as those recommended by the Combat Manual.

Voronov's merit in this case was that his proposal was real. Focusing on it, it was possible to think through the entire system of interrelated measures for arming artillery, its military organization, methods of combat use of large masses of artillery and their control.

The predecessors of N. N. Voronov understood, for example, the expediency of the growth and development of artillery, but they thought in terms of tactical scale. N.N. Voronov saw differently; he already foresaw the onset of a period when artillery would become one of the most important factors in operational maneuver and the success of battles of armies and fronts. Already in the mid-thirties, Nikolai Nikolaevich realized that tanks, aircraft and artillery in modern warfare are not competitors, that together they form an organic unity of force that decides the success of battles and the war as a whole. And it followed that the growth of some should inevitably cause increased demands on the growth of others. He did not yet know the specific criterion for the harmonious development of decisive types of weapons, but he already understood that violating the patterns of connection between their development in war would be very costly.

Until the end of the thirties, RVGK artillery was understood mainly as a means of qualitatively strengthening military artillery during breakthroughs of enemy defenses in the directions of the main attack in a particular operation. Therefore, the artillery of the RVGK contained heavy and long-range artillery from 152 mm caliber and above. In 1940, ten anti-tank artillery brigades were introduced into the artillery of the RVGK, each of them included 76-, 85- (anti-aircraft) and 107-mm anti-tank guns and two anti-aircraft divisions of 37-mm guns. This is the first experience in organizing a large formation (two regiments and two separate divisions of 120 anti-tank guns) for inter- and intra-front maneuver. This is the first and reasonable deviation from the established view of the artillery of the RVGK.

Nikolai Nikolaevich well understood the importance of the development of artillery sciences and in 1946 he initiated the creation of the Academy of Artillery Sciences, having met in this proposal the active support of I.V. Stalin, who understood the importance of such an event.

I remember how I was instructed in the winter of 1950 to recommend the candidacy of N.N. Voronov for the post of president of the Academy of Artillery Sciences. Some responsible comrades were quite worried about the outcome of the secret ballot and had special hopes for how and in what form I would make this proposal. However, this, of course, was not the essence of the matter. N. N. Voronov always enjoyed deep authority and respect among the mass of artillerymen. That is why, although there was no “beauty” of rhetoric in my speech, although the candidate I proposed did not have academic diplomas, he was elected president by secret ballot unanimously. Artillery scientists knew the real value of N. N. Voronov’s knowledge in artillery sciences and, accepting him into their ranks, willingly elected him as their leader, although they had no complaints against Academician A. A. Blagonravov, who was at that time the president of the Academy of Artillery sciences and enjoyed serious scientific authority.

Since 1953, N. N. Voronov threw himself headlong into the work of leading the said academy. Over the six and a half years of its existence, a lot of in-depth research was carried out here, including on the firing of ballistic missiles, on the development of a number of scientific ways in the development of missiles, modern fire control devices, etc. Among the academicians and corresponding members of the academy, fruitful work There are many prominent Soviet scientists.

From 1953 to 1958, N. N. Voronov headed the leadership of the Military Artillery Command Academy in Leningrad. And here great credit belongs to him in the formation of this young educational institution. The premises were in need of major repairs, there was no laboratory base, and a number of classrooms were missing.

N. N. Voronov did a lot for this academy, but his health began to noticeably fail, and shortly before his 60th birthday he asked to be transferred to the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense. His request was granted, and he remained in it until the end of his life, carrying out extensive scientific work. His extensive public activities in the military-patriotic education of youth are also known.

Due to my duty, I had to visit many fronts during the Great Patriotic War, some several times. I had to meet a lot of people, from privates to generals, and talk with them on non-official matters. It is amazing that they all knew N.N. Voronov from the end of 1942. And not only because J.V. Stalin addressed the well-known congratulatory telegram to him and K.K. Rokossovsky in connection with the liquidation of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad.

Many met Voronov at the front, and even more heard about him from the stories of others. But in all the reviews there was deep respect for him - and not just as the commander of such a powerful branch of the army as artillery (I note, by the way, in parentheses that the front-line soldiers valued it especially highly), - Nikolai Nikolaevich was respected primarily as a sensitive person and responsive; as a wise military leader who knows how to value everyone’s opinion, as well as to spare the feelings of human and military dignity of those who had to point out mistakes; as a communist - firm and adamant in those cases when it was necessary to defend his beliefs and principles, persistent and selfless when it came to implementing the decision made, achieving the intended goal.

Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov became known to tens of millions of Soviet people at the front and in the rear during the years of the last war. They conveyed their respectful, I would say, loving attitude towards him in oral stories.

They never tired of being interested in his affairs and his fate even when he, burdened by physical ailments, retired from active work.

N. N. Voronov left a deep mark on the history of Soviet artillery and the history of the Great Patriotic War, and his name will not be forgotten by grateful posterity.

Retired Colonel General of Artillery F. Samsonov

Voronov Nikolay Nikolaevich

Publisher's abstract: The author devoted forty-five years of his life to service in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces. Before his eyes and with his direct participation, the cadres of the command staff of the Soviet artillery grew and became stronger, new artillery weapons and military equipment were created, and the tactics of this powerful branch of troops developed. During the Great Patriotic War, Chief Marshal of Artillery Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov served as commander of the artillery of the Red Army and commander of the country's air defense. At the same time, he was sent as a representative of Headquarters on many fronts. In his memoirs, he shares with the reader his impressions of the course of hostilities, depicts vivid images of famous Soviet commanders, shows the situation at Headquarters, the positive and negative aspects of its leadership of the troops. The book contains interesting observations and conclusions.

I'm becoming an artilleryman

The revolution calls to arms

To the front!

First fights

Berezina

Drama on the Bug

By a thread

Back to life

In peacetime

To knowledge!

Moscow Proletarskaya

Italian maneuvers

Spain fights

Volunteer Voltaire

"Telefonica Central"

But Pasaran!

Looking for Replenishments

In Catalonia

The Republic strikes

Before the storm

High post

In the Far East

Khalkhin Gol

Liberation campaign

Finnish forests

Before the Mannerheim Line

Need new tactics

New equipment arrives

Beyond the Dniester

New appointments

Mortal danger over the Motherland

Fatal miscalculations

Thunder struck

The situation at Headquarters

I'm in command of the artillery again

Night conversation

Everyday affairs

The enemy is approaching Moscow

Heroic Leningrad

On the weapon - Leningrad stamp

Nevskaya Dubrovka

Counter-battery combat

Days in Smolny

From front to front

Combat everyday life

The allies are in no hurry

Urgent issues

On the Volga and Don

Secret mission

The plan has matured

Final preparations

Began!

The "pincers" have closed

And there were such flights

At the junction of two fronts

Picked up the tug...

"The match will take place in any weather"

Operation Ring

New task

Ultimatum

The enemy persists

The joys and sorrows of those days

Captured field marshal

The end of the "cauldron"

Second interrogation of Paulus

What were they like?

Conversation at Headquarters

The science of winning does not come immediately

Forgot about the ravines

Air raids again

Self-propelled artillery controversy

Troops march west

The crash of the Citadel

Skill grows stronger in battles

On the approaches to Smolensk

Spas-Demensk

"Plus six"

Smolensk is ours again!

Ill-conceived orders

What will 1944 be like?

Attention to the east!

Is 13 an unlucky number?

A good plan is half the battle

On the Second Baltic

Victory salvoes

I'm becoming an artilleryman

The revolution calls to arms

By a strange coincidence, my grandfather Terenty Ermilovich worked for some time as a cook for an artillery inspector in the tsarist army. Could he have thought then that his grandson would later become the commander of all Russian artillery? No, of course, he, a poor St. Petersburg artisan, never dreamed of this then. "Who was nothing will become everything!" - the proletarians of Russia proclaimed later.

When I remember my childhood, I often see the appalling poverty of ordinary people.

My parents lived on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, in Lesnoy. My father, an office worker, after the 1905 revolution found himself on the list of sympathizers of the “rebels” and lost his job for a long time. The family found itself in dire need. There were days when we lived on black bread and boiled potatoes.

I was then a clumsy, baggy boy, shy and timid.

I remember one winter evening they gave me ten kopecks, our last money. Clutching a precious ten-kopeck piece in his hand, he ran to a nearby shop for bread. And suddenly he slipped, fell into the snow and dropped a tiny silver coin. He called his father, his brother and some other relatives to look for her. They went through the piles of snow with their bare hands, but never found the ill-fated ten-kopeck piece. The family went to bed, drinking empty tea without a piece of bread.

The dilapidated wooden house in which we lived was very cold, it required a lot of firewood, and there was nothing to buy it with. In winter and early spring, we did not take off our coats in the room; the water in the house froze.

Occasionally, grandmother Elena Ivanovna helped us out with firewood. My mother and I brought firewood on children's sleighs in the evening, so that no one would see or know about our bitter need.

In the summer of 1907 we were forced to leave the house in Lesnoy and live with our grandmother. Everything our family had went to pay off debts. Father and mother were still unemployed. My grandmother managed the dachas of the merchant Latkina, who, by the way, was my mother’s godmother. Grandmother’s funds were not enough for our family, the kind old lady began to sell things, got into debt and sometimes even took from the amounts that belonged to the mistress.

The tragic day for our family, November 30, 1908, is forever etched in our memory. The day before, the mother went to a luxurious mansion to visit her godmother, the merchant Latkina. She returned home with her eyes swollen from tears. We sat down to drink tea. They tried to calm her down. The mother held on with all her might, tried to control herself, and was especially attentive to the children.

The next morning I got up earlier than the others and quietly went down the stairs to the kitchen. Everyone in the house was asleep. Suddenly, the mother entered the kitchen, lightly dressed and wearing soft shoes. Seeing me, for some reason she was a little confused, but then she stroked my head and kissed me. In her hands was a glass jar with some white pieces. She took one piece from the jar and began scraping white powder onto the piece of paper with a knife. Her actions were quick and decisive - she was in a hurry. Soon I heard her steps retreating along the corridor, heard her begin to climb the creaking steps of the stairs. Suddenly there was a crash: something large and heavy fell on the stairs...

Fear seized me, I felt something was wrong.

Mom, mom, what's wrong with you?! - I shouted.

Everyone at home came running to the scream. They lifted the mother and laid her on the bed. The father stood pale, confused, holding a jar with an orange label, on which was a blackened image of a skull and crossbones. My father caught himself, put a coin in my hand and said:

Run quickly to the store, buy milk and hurry, hurry home.

Someone ran after the doctor. As I ran away, I heard my father’s muffled voice:

Valya, Valya, what have you done...

And the milk I brought, and the doctor who arrived, and some pills and powders - all this was already superfluous. The mother's heart stopped beating. The next day I read a short message in the Petersburg Listok newspaper: “On November 30, Valentina Andreevna Voronova committed suicide by taking potassium cyanide.” The reasons for suicide were not specified. We learned about them from our grandmother. It turns out that my mother came to the merchant Latkina, spoke about the family’s plight and admitted that my grandmother spent about 300 rubles on us from the owner’s funds. The mother took everything upon herself, promised to pay off the debt as soon as her husband got a job, and asked for one thing: to spare the grandmother. The merchant's wife became furious and threatened to immediately fire the grandmother, evict her from the apartment and bring her to court. Even after the suicide of my mother, who hoped to save the family with her death, the merchant’s wife carried out all her threats.

Voronov Nikolay Nikolaevich

(04/23/1899-02/28/1968) – Chief Marshal of Artillery (1944)

Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov was born into the family of an office worker in St. Petersburg on April 23, 1899. He received his primary education at a comprehensive school. In 1909, Nikolai Voronov was admitted to a private real school.

The outbreak of the war forced Nikolai to leave the school after 4 years of study. In 1915, Voronov got a job as a technical secretary of a private sworn attorney. In 1917, he took exams for secondary education as an external student.

After the October Revolution, the office where Voronov worked was closed. He entered the Petrograd command artillery courses, which he graduated in September 1918 with a new military rank - Kraskom (red commander) and was assigned to the Petrograd Military District as the commander of a howitzer platoon. Then he was transferred to a reserve mortar artillery battalion as an artillery platoon commander.

The division was sent to the front near Izborsk, where fighting took place. Voronov took part in the defeat of Yudenich and the capture of Pskov.

In 1920, the division as part of the 10th division was transferred to the Zhlobin area to the Berezina in the Brest-Litovsk direction. In battles with the White Poles, Voronov was wounded and captured. During the exchange of prisoners of war, he was returned to Russia, having spent 8 months in captivity. After undergoing treatment in the hospital, Nikolai Voronov returned to duty and received the position of battery commander.

After the end of the civil war, the division in which Voronov served was relocated to Kaluga. Then Voronov was transferred to the 27th Omsk Division, also as a battery commander.

In 1923, Nikolai Voronov passed the exams at the Higher Artillery School of Command Staff. After school, he was appointed to the position of deputy division commander, then commander of an artillery division in the same 27th Omsk Division. In 1926 he became commander of an artillery regiment.

In 1927 he was admitted to the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. Upon completion of his studies at the academy in May 1930, he was assigned to further service in the Moscow Proletarian Division as commander of an artillery regiment. His regiment actively participates in experimental shooting and exercises, and in military testing of new types of artillery weapons. Voronov himself takes part in the work of the statutory commission to develop the artilleryman’s combat manual. In 1932, Voronov was part of the Soviet delegation at military maneuvers in Italy.

In April 1934, he was appointed head and military commissar of the 1st Leningrad Artillery School. His success in leading the school was awarded the Order of the Red Star and the rank of brigade commander. As head of the school, he once again attends military maneuvers in Italy.

In 1936, at his own request, Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov was sent as a military adviser to Republican Spain. During the fighting in Spain, on the recommendation of the senior military adviser, Voronov was awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Red Banner. Nikolai Nikolayevich's colleagues noted his calmness and restraint, his amazing tact in communicating with his subordinates and in his relationships with the commanders of Spanish military units. After his return, Nikolai Voronov was awarded the rank of corps commander-artilleryman in an extraordinary order. No one among the artillery command staff had ever held such a high rank, equal to the modern military rank of colonel general.

In June 1937, Voronov was appointed to the post of chief of artillery of the Red Army. On service matters in 1938 and 1939, he traveled to the Far East, Mongolia and Khalkhin Gol. During the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, he led the artillery of the entire group of Soviet troops, planned and solved a number of combat missions. For carrying out the operation at Khalkhin Gol, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In the fall of 1939, Voronov took part in military operations of the troops of the Belarusian Military District in Western Belarus. During a trip to the troops of the Kyiv Military District in the same 1939, he was in a car accident and as a result - a concussion, many injuries from a strong blow and damage to four ribs.

After treatment and a short rest, Voronov was sent to the Leningrad Military District, where he remained during the Soviet-Finnish War on the Karelian Isthmus in the 7th Army. For successful artillery operations during the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line, Nikolai Voronov was awarded the Order of Lenin. A little earlier he was awarded the rank of army commander of the 2nd rank, and in June 1940, with the introduction of general ranks, he became colonel general of artillery.

In 1940, in connection with the abolition of the post of chief of artillery of the Red Army, Voronov was appointed 1st deputy chief of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army. A few days before the start of the Great Patriotic War, he was appointed head of the country's Main Directorate of Air Defense.

At the end of July 1941, as a representative of Headquarters, Voronov was sent to the Yelnya area, where fierce fighting was taking place. Together with L.A. Govorov developed detailed instructions for fighting artillery with enemy tanks (later it was approved by Headquarters and sent to the troops as a directive). Until the end of 1941, Voronov visited Leningrad three times. At first he helped during the reorganization of command and control of troops in the northwestern direction, then he provided significant assistance in organizing the defense of the city. The last time - in December - during the development of a plan to break the blockade, but there was not enough strength or means to implement it.

Already in December 1941, Voronov raised before the State Defense Committee the question of forming special artillery reserves and organizing large artillery formations. However, his plans began to be fully implemented only in the spring of 1943, when the production of artillery weapons increased. Then five breakthrough artillery corps were formed at once, consisting of two artillery divisions and a division of rocket launchers.

Until the fall of 1942, Voronov worked in various sectors of the front as the chief of artillery and a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters. In September, by order of Headquarters, Voronov was sent to the Stalingrad and Don fronts, taking a direct part in the development and conduct of Operation Ring.

On January 18, 1943, Voronov was awarded the military rank of artillery marshal. Since March 1943, he became commander of the artillery of the USSR Armed Forces.

After the Battle of Stalingrad, Voronov was sent to the Northwestern Front in the Demyansk region, then took part in the Battle of Kursk, supervised the formation of artillery units and reserve formations of the High Command.

Following this, he was sent near Smolensk to the Western and then to the Kalinin fronts, where he took an active part in the liberation of the city.

In 1944, Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov was closely involved in the issues of artillery weapons in the Far East and at the same time directly controlled artillery formations on the Baltic fronts. This year he was awarded the military rank of Chief Marshal of Artillery. During the war, Voronov's official functions expanded noticeably. The Department of Inventions and Rationalization of the Ministry of Defense began to report to him. He carries out extensive scientific work on the development of artillery, on anti-tank and air defense systems, and is developing systems for rocket artillery installations. As a representative of the Headquarters, he constantly travels to the fronts - the 3rd Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian. His services during the war were awarded three Orders of Suvorov, 1st degree.

After the war, in 1946, realizing the importance of the development of artillery, Voronov initiated the creation of the Academy of Artillery Sciences, and in 1950 he was elected president of this academy. During his six years at the academy, numerous studies were carried out under his leadership, including on firing ballistic missiles and controlling artillery fire with special devices.

In 1953, he was appointed head of the Military Artillery Command Academy. He remained in this position until 1958. Shortly before his sixtieth birthday, Nikolai Nikolaevich asked to be transferred to the inspection group of the Ministry of Defense. His request was granted.

His military activities and enormous contribution to the development of artillery over a half-century of service in the armed forces were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, six Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four Orders of the Red Banner, three Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, the Order of the Red Star, five foreign orders, medals.

Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov died on February 28, 1968. He was buried in Moscow near the Kremlin wall.