GDR army uniform. Igor Khodakov

The GDR (German Democratic Republic) is a state located in the central part of Europe and existed from 1949 to 1990. Why is this period firmly entrenched in history? We will talk about this in our article.

A little about the GDR

East Berlin became the capital of the GDR. The territory occupied 6 modern federal states of Germany. The GDR was administratively divided into lands, districts and urban areas. It is worth noting that Berlin was not included in any of the 6 states and had a special status.

Creation of the GDR army

The East German Army was created in 1956. It consisted of 3 branches of the military: ground, navy, and on November 12, 1955, the government announced the creation of the Bundeswehr - the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. On January 18 of the following year, the law “On the creation of the National People’s Army and the formation of the Ministry of National Defense” was officially approved. In the same year, various headquarters subordinate to the ministry began their activities, and the first subsections of the NPA took the military oath. In 1959, the F. Engels Military Academy opened, where young people are trained for future service. She played an important role in the formation of a strong and combat-ready army, since the training system was thought out to the smallest detail. However, it should be noted that until 1962, the GDR army was replenished by hire.

The GDR included Saxon and Prussian lands, where the most militant Germans had previously lived. It was they who contributed to the fact that the NPA became a powerful and rapidly growing force. The Prussians and Saxons quickly moved up the career ladder, first occupying senior officer positions and then taking over control of the NNA. You should also remember the traditional discipline of the Germans, love of military affairs, the rich experience of the Prussian military and advanced military equipment, because all this together made the GDR army almost invincible.

Activity

The GDR army began its active work in 1962, when the first maneuvers were held on the territory of Poland and the GDR, in which soldiers from the Polish and Soviet sides participated. The year 1963 was marked by a large-scale event called “Quartet,” in which the NPA, Polish, Czechoslovak and Soviet troops participated.

Despite the fact that the GDR army was not at all impressive in terms of numbers, it was the most combat-ready army in all of Western Europe. The soldiers showed excellent results, which was largely based on their studies at the F. Engels Academy. Those who joined the mercenary army were trained in all skills and became powerful killing tools.

Doctrine

The National People's Army of the GDR had its own doctrine, which was developed by the leadership. The principles of army organization were based on the denial of all postulates of the Prussian-German military. An important point of the doctrine was the strengthening of defense forces to protect the country's socialist system. The importance of cooperation with the armies of the socialist allied countries was separately emphasized.

Despite the great desire of the government, the National People's Army of the GDR was not able to completely break all ties with the classic military traditions of Germany. The army partially practiced the old customs of the proletariat and the era of the Napoleonic wars.

The 1968 Constitution stated that the National People's Army of the GDR was called upon to protect the territory of the state, as well as its citizens, from external attacks by other countries. In addition, it was indicated that all efforts would be devoted to protecting and strengthening the socialist system of the state. To maintain its power, the army maintained close contact with other armies.

Numerical expression

By 1987, the national army of the GDR numbered 120 thousand soldiers. The army's ground forces consisted of 9 air defense regiments, 1 air support regiment, 2 anti-tank battalions, 10 artillery regiments, etc. The GDR army, which had sufficient weapons, defeated the enemy with its ability to handle its resources, cohesion and a thoughtful tactical approach.

Preparation

Soldiers were trained at higher officer schools, which were attended by almost all young people. The previously mentioned F. Engels Academy, which graduated professionals in their field, was especially popular. By 1973, the army consisted of 90% peasants and workers.

Structure in the army

The territory of Germany was divided into 2 military districts, which were controlled by the People's Army of the GDR. The district headquarters are located in Leipzig and Neubrandenburg. A separate artillery brigade was also created, which was not part of any district, each of which had 2 motorized divisions, 1 missile brigade and 1 armored division.

Army uniform

The Soviet army of the GDR wore a uniform with a red stand-up collar. Because of this, she received the nickname "canary". The Soviet army served at the State Security building. Soon the question arose about creating our own form. It was invented, but it was very reminiscent of the Nazi uniform. The government's justification was that the required quantity of such uniforms was in warehouses, that its production was established and did not require intervention. The reason for the adoption of the traditional uniform was also the fact that the GDR did not have large financial investments. The emphasis was also placed on the fact that if the army is people's, then its uniform should be associated with the proletarian folk tradition.

The uniform of the GDR army inspired some forgotten fear associated with the times of Nazism. The story tells that when a military band was visiting Prague, half of the Czechs fled in different directions when they saw the uniform of soldiers with helmets and wicker shoulder straps.

The GDR army, whose uniform was not very original, had a pronounced color differentiation. Members of the navy wore blue clothing. The air services of the Air Force wore light blue, while the air defense and anti-aircraft missile forces wore light gray uniforms. you should wear bright green clothes.

Most of all, the color differentiation of the military was manifested in the uniform of the ground forces. Artillery, air defense and missile troops wore brick-colored clothing, motorized rifle troops wore white, airborne troops wore orange, and military construction troops wore olive. The rear services of the army (medicine, military justice and financial service) wore dark green uniforms.

Equipment

The equipment of the GDR army was quite significant. There was almost no shortage of weapons, since the Soviet Union supplied large quantities of modern military equipment at an affordable price. Sniper rifles were quite developed and widespread in the GDR. The GDR Ministry of State Security itself placed an order for the creation of such weapons to strengthen the positions of anti-terrorist groups.

Army in Czechoslovakia

The GDR army invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, and from that time on the worst period for the Czechs began. The invasion took place with the help of troops from all countries participating in the Warsaw Pact. The goal was the occupation of the territory of the state, and the reason was a reaction to a series of reforms that were called the “Prague Spring”. It is difficult to know the exact number of deaths, since many archives remain closed.

The GDR army in Czechoslovakia was distinguished by its composure and some cruelty. Eyewitnesses of those events recalled that the soldiers treated the population without sentimentality, not paying attention to the sick, wounded and children. Mass terror and unreasonable harshness - this is how one can characterize the activities of the people's army. Interestingly, some participants in the events said that the Russian army had practically no influence on the troops of the GDR and had to silently endure bullying of the Czechs on the orders of the high command.

If we do not take into account the official history, then it becomes interesting that, according to some sources, the GDR army was not introduced into the territory of Czechoslovakia, but was concentrated at the borders of the state. There is no justification for the atrocities of the GDR National Army, but one must take into account the mental stress, fatigue and sense of guilt with which the Germans marched on Prague. The number of deaths, as well as how many of them were actual accidents, remains a mystery.

Composition of the GDR Navy

The army of the GDR was the most powerful of all the allied countries of the USSR. He owned modern ships that came into use in the 1970-1980s. At the time of German reunification, the navy had 110 ships and 69 auxiliary vessels. They had different purposes, but were modern and equipped. The ships were built at national shipyards in the USSR and Poland. The air force had at its disposal 24 equipped helicopters. The Navy personnel was approximately 16 thousand people.

The most powerful were 3 ships built in the USSR. At the same time, the GDR army had a special class of ships that were very compact in size.

Activities after German reunification

On October 3, 1990, Germany was reunified. By this time, the size of the GDR army was almost 90 thousand people. For some political reasons, a powerful and fairly large army was disbanded. Officers and ordinary soldiers were not recognized as military personnel, and their length of service was cancelled. The personnel were gradually dismissed. Some of the military were able to return to the Bundeswehr, but received only lower positions there.

If the military was considered unfit to serve in the new army, then a logical explanation can still be found for this. They were brought up in a certain way, their focus was the opposite of the goals of a united Germany. It is quite strange that the new government decided to sell or dispose of most of the military equipment. The German leadership was actively looking for wealthy sellers in order to sell the still modern equipment at a higher price. Some of the ships were transferred to the Indonesian fleet.

The US government became very interested in the Soviet technology of Germany and hastened to acquire some of it for itself. The boat, which was delivered to the US Navy research center in the city of Solomon, aroused the greatest interest. A lot of research was carried out on it, and at the same time it was highly appreciated by American shipbuilders. As a result, it was recognized that such RKAs pose a great threat to the US Navy.

It is interesting that not a single ship of the National People's Army became part of the navy of the united Germany. This was the end of the history of the GDR navy, whose ships can be found in 8 different states.

Disappointment

After the unification of Germany, the country rejoiced, but thousands of officers of the former people's army were abandoned to their fate. The GDR army, photos of which are presented in the article, was confused, disappointed and angry. Only recently, soldiers represented the elite of society, but now they have become scum, whom they did not want to hire. Quite soon, the population of the country itself realized that it was not the unification of Germany that had occurred, but an actual absorption by its western neighbor.

Former military men stood in line at stock exchanges to get any job to feed themselves and their families. All that employees (with higher and lower ranks) of the GDR received after unification was discrimination and humiliation in all spheres of life.

Ranking system

In the NNA, the rank system consisted of Ranks and insignia were thoughtfully adapted to the system of the Soviet Army, since its gradation was somewhat different from the German one. By combining these two systems, the GDR army created something of its own. Generals were divided into 4 ranks: Marshal of the GDR, Army General, Colonel General and Lieutenant General. The officer corps consisted of colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains and senior lieutenants. Next came the division of warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers.

The National People's Army of the GDR was a powerful force that could significantly change the course of history throughout the world. Fate turned out to be such that the soldiers did not have the opportunity to show all their strength and power, since this was prevented by the unification of Germany, which led to the complete collapse of the NPA.

National People's Army (NNA, Volksarmee, Nationale Volksarmee, NVA) - the armed forces of the GDR, which were created in 1956 and consisted of three types of control bodies:

• ground forces (Landstreitkräfte);
• navy (Volksmarine);
• air Force (English) Russian(Luftstreitkräfte), and military branches, special forces and services.

Encyclopedic YouTube

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✪ Nationale Volksarmee DDR 1956-1990 | National People's Army of the GDR 1956-1990

✪ Präsentiermarsch der Nationalen Volksarmee

Subtitles

Creation

On November 12, 1955, the German government announced the creation of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundeswehr).

In 1959, the F. Engels Military Academy began its work.

In 1961, the first command and staff exercises of the NNA of the GDR and the Soviet Army of the USSR Armed Forces were held.

Until 1962, it was recruited and NPA formations were not present in East Berlin.

In October 1962, the first NPA maneuvers took place in the territories of the GDR and Poland, in which Polish and Soviet troops took part.

On September 9-12, 1963, the international military exercise “Quartet” was held in the south of the GDR, in which the NNA of the GDR, Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak troops took part.

Despite its relatively small numbers, the National People's Army of the GDR was the most combat-ready army in Western Europe.

Doctrine

The official position of the leadership of the GDR on defense issues was formulated as “the denial of all traditions of the Prussian-German military,” and was based on further strengthening the defense capability of the socialist system of the GDR, as well as on close interaction with the armies of socialist countries. The NPA continued the traditions of the armed struggle of the German proletariat, as well as the liberation movement of the Napoleonic wars. However, in fact, there was no complete break with the classical military tradition of Germany.

Correspondence of the colors of the edging of the shoulder straps to the branches of the military:

Land Forces (Landstreitkräfte)

Air Force (Luftstreitkräfte)

Navy (Volksmarine)

Border Troops (Grenztruppen)

After the unification of Germany, hundreds of GDR officers were abandoned to their fate.

An old photograph: November 1989, the Berlin Wall, literally saddled by a jubilant crowd of thousands. Only the group of people in the foreground - the GDR border guards - have sad and confused faces. Until recently, formidable to their enemies and rightly aware of themselves as the elite of the country, they overnight turned into extraneous extras at this holiday. But this was not the worst thing for them...

“Somehow I accidentally ended up in the house of a former captain of the National People's Army (NPA) of the GDR. He graduated from our higher military school, is a good programmer, but has been unemployed for three years now. And around the neck is a family: a wife, two children.

From him for the first time I heard what I was destined to hear many times.

You betrayed us... - the former captain will say. He will say it calmly, without strain, gathering his will into a fist.

No, he was not a “political commissar”, did not collaborate with the Stasi, and yet he lost everything.”

The problem, however, is much deeper: having abandoned the soldiers and officers of the army we created to the mercy of fate, have we not thereby betrayed ourselves? And was it possible to preserve the NPA, albeit under a different name and with a changed organizational structure, but as a loyal ally of Moscow?

Let’s try to figure it out, of course, as far as possible, within the framework of a short article, especially since these issues have not lost their relevance to this day, especially against the backdrop of NATO’s expansion to the east and the spread of US military-political influence in the post-Soviet space.

So, in 1990, the reunification of Germany occurred, causing euphoria on the part of both West and East Germans. It's finished! The great nation regained its unity, and the much-hated Berlin Wall finally came down. However, as often happens, unbridled joy gave way to bitter disappointment. Of course, not for all residents of Germany, no. Most of them, as sociological surveys show, do not regret the unification of the country.

Disappointment affected mainly some of the residents of the GDR, which had sunk into oblivion. Quite quickly they realized: in essence, an Anschluss had occurred - the absorption of their homeland by its western neighbor.

The officer and non-commissioned officer corps of the former NPA suffered the most from this. It did not become an integral part of the Bundeswehr, but was simply dissolved. The majority of former GDR soldiers, including generals and colonels, were dismissed. At the same time, their service in the NNA was not credited either for military or civilian work experience. Those who were lucky enough to wear the uniform of their recent opponents found themselves demoted in rank.

As a result, East German officers were forced to stand in line for hours at the labor exchange and hang around in search of work - often low-paid and unskilled.

And worse than that. In his book, Mikhail Boltunov quotes the words of the last Minister of Defense of the GDR, Admiral Theodor Hofmann: “With the unification of Germany, the NPA was dissolved. Many professional military personnel have been discriminated against."

Discrimination, in other words, humiliation. It couldn’t have been otherwise, for the famous Latin proverb says: “Woe to the vanquished!” And doubly woe if the army was not crushed in battle, but simply betrayed by both its own and the Soviet leadership.

The former commander-in-chief of the Western Group, General Matvey Burlakov, spoke directly about this in one of his interviews: “Gorbachev and others betrayed the Union.” And didn’t this betrayal begin with the betrayal of his faithful allies, who ensured, among other things, the geopolitical security of the USSR in the western direction?

However, many will consider the last statement controversial and will note the irreversibility and even spontaneity of the process of unification of the two Germanys. But the point is not that the FRG and the GDR inevitably had to unite, but how this could happen. And West Germany's absorption of its eastern neighbor was far from the only way.

What was the alternative that would allow the NPA officer corps to take a worthy position in the new Germany and remain loyal to the USSR? And what is more important for us: did the Soviet Union have real opportunities to maintain its military-political presence in Germany, preventing NATO expansion to the east? To answer these questions we need to take a short historical excursion.

In 1949, a new republic appeared on the map - the GDR. It was created as a response to education in the American, British and French occupation zones of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is interesting that Joseph Stalin did not seek to create the GDR, taking the initiative to unify Germany, but on the condition that it did not join NATO.

However, the former allies refused. Proposals to build the Berlin Wall came to Stalin at the end of the 40s, but the Soviet leader abandoned this idea, considering it to discredit the USSR in the eyes of the world community.

Remembering the history of the birth of the GDR, one should also take into account the personality of the first chancellor of the West German state, Konrad Adenauer, who, according to the former Soviet ambassador to Germany Vladimir Semenov, “cannot be considered only a political opponent of Russia. He had an irrational hatred of Russians."

Under these conditions and with the direct participation of the USSR, the NPA was created on January 18, 1956, which quickly turned into a powerful force. In turn, the GDR navy became the most combat-ready along with the Soviet one in the Warsaw Pact.

This is not an exaggeration, because the GDR included Prussian and Saxon lands, which once represented the most militant German states with strong armies. This is especially true, of course, for the Prussians. It was the Prussians and Saxons who formed the basis of the officer corps of first the German Empire, then the Reichswehr, then the Wehrmacht and, finally, the NNA.

Traditional German discipline and love for military affairs, strong military traditions of Prussian officers, rich combat experience of previous generations, coupled with advanced military equipment and the achievements of Soviet military thought, made the GDR army an invincible force in Europe.

It is noteworthy that in some way the dreams of the most far-sighted German and Russian statesmen at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, who dreamed of a military alliance of the Russian and German empires, were realized in the NNA.

The strength of the GDR army was in the combat training of its personnel, because the strength of the NPA always remained relatively low: in 1987 it numbered 120 thousand soldiers and officers in its ranks, inferior to, say, the Polish People's Army - the second largest army after the Soviet one in the Warsaw Pact .

However, in the event of a military conflict with NATO, the Poles had to fight on secondary sectors of the front - in Austria and Denmark. In turn, the NPA was given more serious tasks: to fight in the main direction - against troops operating from the territory of Germany, where the first echelon of NATO ground forces was deployed, that is, the Bundeswehr itself, as well as the most combat-ready divisions of the Americans, British and French.

The Soviet leadership trusted its German brothers in arms. And not in vain. The commander of the 3rd West Germany Army in the GDR and later the deputy chief of staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, General Valentin Varennikov, wrote in his memoirs: “The National People's Army of the GDR, in fact, before my eyes, grew in 10-15 years from zero to a formidable modern army, equipped with everything necessary and capable of acting no worse than Soviet troops.”

This point of view is essentially confirmed by Matvey Burlakov: “The peak of the Cold War was in the early 80s. All that was left was to give the signal and everything would rush forward. Everything is ready for combat, the shells are in the tanks, all you have to do is put them in the barrel - and off you go. They would have burned everything, destroyed everything there. I mean military installations - not cities. I often met with the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Klaus Naumann. He once asked me: “I saw the plans of the GDR army that you approved. Why didn’t you launch an offensive?” We tried to collect these plans, but someone hid them and made copies. And Naumann agreed with our calculation that we should be in the English Channel within a week. I say: “We are not aggressors, why are we going to attack you? We always expected you to be the first to start.” That's how it was explained to them. We can’t say that we were the first to start.”

Please note: Naumann saw the plans of the GDR army, whose tanks would be among the first to reach the English Channel and, as he admitted, no one could effectively stop them.

From the point of view of the intellectual training of its personnel, the NPA also stood at a high level: by the mid-80s, 95 percent of its officer corps had a higher or secondary specialized education, about 30 percent of officers graduated from military academies, 35 percent from higher military schools.

In a word, at the end of the 80s the army of the GDR was ready for any tests, but the country was not. Unfortunately, the combat power of the armed forces could not compensate for the socio-economic problems that the GDR faced by the beginning of the last quarter of the 20th century. Erich Honecker, who headed the country in 1971, was guided by the Soviet model of building socialism, which significantly distinguished him from many leaders of other countries in Eastern Europe.

Honecker's key goal in the socio-economic sphere is to improve the well-being of the people, in particular, through the development of housing construction and increasing pensions.

Alas, good initiatives in this area have led to a decrease in investment in the development of production and the renewal of outdated equipment, the wear and tear of which was 50 percent in industry and 65 percent in agriculture. In general, the East German economy, like the Soviet one, developed along an extensive path.

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 complicated relations between the two countries - Honecker, being a conservative, reacted negatively to perestroika. And this is against the backdrop of the fact that in the GDR the attitude towards Gorbachev as the initiator of reforms was enthusiastic. In addition, at the end of the 80s, a mass exodus of GDR citizens to Germany began. Gorbachev made it clear to his East German counterpart that Soviet assistance to the GDR directly depended on Berlin's implementation of reforms.

What happened next is well known: in 1989, Honecker was removed from all posts, a year later the GDR was absorbed by West Germany, and a year later the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The Russian leadership hastened to withdraw from Germany a group of almost half a million, equipped with 12 thousand tanks and armored vehicles, which became an unconditional geopolitical and geostrategic defeat and accelerated the entry of yesterday’s allies of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact into NATO.

Demonstration performances with GDR special forces

But all these are dry lines about relatively recently past events, behind which is the drama of thousands of NPA officers and their families. With sadness in their eyes and pain in their hearts, they looked at the last parade of Russian troops on August 31, 1994 in Berlin. Betrayed, humiliated, useless to anyone, they witnessed the departure of the once allied army, which lost the Cold War with them without firing a single shot.

And just five years earlier, Gorbachev promised not to abandon the GDR to its fate. Did the Soviet leader have grounds for such statements? On the one hand, it would seem not. As we have already noted, at the end of the 80s the flow of refugees from the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany increased. After Honecker's dismissal, the leadership of the GDR demonstrated neither the will nor the determination to save the country and take truly effective measures for this that would allow the reunification of Germany on an equal basis. Declarative statements not supported by practical steps do not count in this case.

But there is another side to the coin. According to Boltunov, neither France nor Great Britain considered the issue of German reunification to be relevant. This is understandable: in Paris they were afraid of a strong and united Germany, which had twice crushed the military power of France in less than a century. And of course, it was not in the geopolitical interests of the Fifth Republic to see a united and strong Germany at its borders.

In turn, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher adhered to a political line aimed at maintaining the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as compliance with the terms of the Final Act in Helsinki, the rights and responsibilities of the four states for post-war Germany.

Against this background, it does not seem accidental that London wanted to develop cultural and economic ties with the GDR in the second half of the 1980s, and when it became obvious that the unification of Germany was inevitable, the British leadership proposed extending this process for 10-15 years.

And perhaps most importantly: in containing the processes aimed at the unification of Germany, the British leadership counted on the support of Moscow and Paris. And even more than that: German Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself was not initially the initiator of West Germany’s absorption of its eastern neighbor, but advocated the creation of a confederation, putting forward a ten-point program to implement his idea.

Thus, in 1990, the Kremlin and Berlin had every chance to realize the idea once proposed by Stalin: the creation of a united, but neutral and non-NATO Germany.

The preservation of a limited contingent of Soviet, American, British and French troops on the territory of a united Germany would become a guarantor of German neutrality, and the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany created on an equal basis would not allow the spread of pro-Western sentiments in the army and would not turn former NPA officers into outcasts.

All this was quite feasible in practice and met the foreign policy interests of both London and Paris, and Moscow and Berlin. So why did Gorbachev and his circle, who had the opportunity to rely on the support of France and England in defending the GDR, did not do this and easily went for the absorption of their eastern neighbor by West Germany, ultimately changing the balance of power in Europe in favor of NATO?

From Boltunov’s point of view, the determining role in this case was played by the personality factor: “...Events took an unexpected turn after the meeting of foreign ministers, at which E. A. Shevardnadze ( Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. - Auto.) went into direct violation of Gorbachev’s directive.

The reunification of two independent German states is one thing, the Anschluss, that is, the absorption of the GDR into the Federal Republic, is another. It is one thing to overcome the division of Germany as a cardinal step towards eliminating the division of Europe. Another is the transfer of the leading edge of the continental split from the Elbe to the Oder or further to the east.

Shevardnadze gave a very simple explanation for his behavior - I learned this from the presidential assistant ( THE USSR. - Auto.) Anatoly Chernyaev: “Genscher asked for this. And Genscher is a good person.”

Perhaps this explanation oversimplifies the picture associated with the unification of the country, but it is obvious that such a rapid absorption of the GDR by West Germany is a direct consequence of the short-sightedness and weakness of the Soviet political leadership, which, based on the logic of its decisions, was more focused on the positive image of the USSR in the West world rather than the interests of one’s own state.

Ultimately, the collapse of both the GDR and the socialist camp as a whole, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union, provides a clear example of the fact that the determining factor in history is not some objective processes, but the role of the individual. The entire past of mankind indisputably testifies to this.

After all, there were no socio-economic prerequisites for the ancient Macedonians to enter the historical arena, if not for the outstanding personal qualities of kings Philip and Alexander.

The French would never have brought most of Europe to their knees if Napoleon had not been their emperor. And there would not have been an October coup in Russia, the most shameful in the history of the country of the Brest Peace, just as the Bolsheviks would not have won the Civil War, if not for the personality of Vladimir Lenin.

All these are just the most striking examples, indisputably testifying to the decisive role of the individual in history.

There is no doubt that nothing similar to the events of the early 90s could have happened in Eastern Europe if Yuri Andropov had been at the head of the Soviet Union. A man with a strong will, in the field of foreign policy he invariably proceeded from the geopolitical interests of the country, and they demanded the preservation of a military presence in Central Europe and the comprehensive strengthening of the combat power of the NPA, regardless of the attitude of the Americans and their allies to this.

The scale of Gorbachev’s personality, as well as that of his immediate circle, objectively did not correspond to the complex of complex domestic and foreign policy problems that the Soviet Union faced.

The same can be said about Egon Krenz, who replaced Honecker as General Secretary of the SED and was not a strong and strong-willed person. This is the opinion of General Markus Wolf, who headed the foreign intelligence of the GDR, about Krenz.

One of the characteristics of weak politicians is inconsistency in following the chosen course. This happened with Gorbachev: in December 1989, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he unequivocally stated that the Soviet Union would not abandon the GDR to its fate. A year later, the Kremlin allowed West Germany to carry out the Anschluss of its eastern neighbor.

Kohl also felt the political weakness of the Soviet leadership during his visit to Moscow in February 1990, since it was after this that he began to more energetically pursue a course towards the reunification of Germany and, most importantly, began to insist on maintaining its membership in NATO.

And as a result: in modern Germany the number of American troops exceeds 50 thousand soldiers and officers, stationed including on the territory of the former GDR, and the NATO military machine is deployed near the Russian borders. And in the event of a military conflict, the perfectly prepared and trained officers of the former NPA will no longer be able to help us. And they’re unlikely to want to...

As for England and France, their fears regarding the unification of Germany were not in vain: the latter quickly took leading positions in the European Union, strengthened its strategic and economic position in Central and Eastern Europe, gradually displacing British capital from there.

Igor KHODAKOV

An old photograph: November 1989, the Berlin Wall, literally saddled by a jubilant crowd of thousands. Only the group of people in the foreground - the GDR border guards - have sad and confused faces. Until recently, formidable to their enemies and rightly aware of themselves as the elite of the country, they overnight turned into extraneous extras at this holiday. But this was not the worst thing for them...

“Somehow I accidentally ended up in the house of a former captain of the National People's Army (NPA) of the GDR. He graduated from our higher military school, is a good programmer, but has been unemployed for three years now. And around the neck is a family: a wife, two children.

From him for the first time I heard what I was destined to hear many times.

You betrayed us... - the former captain will say. He will say it calmly, without strain, gathering his will into a fist.

No, he was not a “political commissar”, did not collaborate with the Stasi, and yet he lost everything.”

These are lines from the book by Colonel Mikhail Boltunov “ZGV: The Bitter Road Home.”

The problem, however, is much deeper: having abandoned the soldiers and officers of the army we created to the mercy of fate, have we not thereby betrayed ourselves? And was it possible to preserve the NPA, albeit under a different name and with a changed organizational structure, but as a loyal ally of Moscow?

Let’s try to figure it out, of course, as far as possible, within the framework of a short article, especially since these issues have not lost their relevance to this day, especially against the backdrop of NATO’s expansion to the east and the spread of US military-political influence in the post-Soviet space.

Disappointment and humiliation.

So, in 1990, the reunification of Germany occurred, causing euphoria on the part of both West and East Germans. It's finished! The great nation regained its unity, and the much-hated Berlin Wall finally came down. However, as often happens, unbridled joy gave way to bitter disappointment. Of course, not for all residents of Germany, no. Most of them, as sociological surveys show, do not regret the unification of the country.

Disappointment affected mainly some of the residents of the GDR, which had sunk into oblivion. Quite quickly they realized: in essence, an Anschluss had occurred - the absorption of their homeland by its western neighbor.

The officer and non-commissioned officer corps of the former NPA suffered the most from this. It did not become an integral part of the Bundeswehr, but was simply dissolved. The majority of former GDR soldiers, including generals and colonels, were dismissed. At the same time, their service in the NNA was not credited either for military or civilian work experience. Those who were lucky enough to wear the uniform of their recent opponents found themselves demoted in rank.

As a result, East German officers were forced to stand in line for hours at the labor exchange and hang around in search of work - often low-paid and unskilled.

And worse than that. In his book, Mikhail Boltunov quotes the words of the last Minister of Defense of the GDR, Admiral Theodor Hofmann: “With the unification of Germany, the NPA was dissolved. Many professional military personnel have been discriminated against."

Discrimination, in other words, humiliation. It couldn’t have been otherwise, for the famous Latin proverb says: “Woe to the vanquished!” And doubly woe if the army was not crushed in battle, but simply betrayed by both its own and the Soviet leadership.

The GDR army was one of the most professional in Europe.
And it is no coincidence that the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany tried to liquidate it as quickly as possible.

However, many will consider the last statement controversial and will note the irreversibility and even spontaneity of the process of unification of the two Germanys. But the point is not that the FRG and the GDR inevitably had to unite, but how this could happen. And West Germany's absorption of its eastern neighbor was far from the only way.

What was the alternative that would allow the NPA officer corps to take a worthy position in the new Germany and remain loyal to the USSR? And what is more important for us: did the Soviet Union have real opportunities to maintain its military-political presence in Germany, preventing NATO expansion to the east? To answer these questions we need to take a short historical excursion.

In 1949, a new republic appeared on the map - the GDR. It was created as a response to education in the American, British and French occupation zones of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is interesting that Joseph Stalin did not seek to create the GDR, taking the initiative to unify Germany, but on the condition that it did not join NATO.

Heinz Hoffmann - Minister of Defense of the GDR until 1985.
During the Great Patriotic War - anti-fascist

However, the former allies refused. Proposals to build the Berlin Wall came to Stalin at the end of the 40s, but the Soviet leader abandoned this idea, considering it to discredit the USSR in the eyes of the world community.

Remembering the history of the birth of the GDR, one should also take into account the personality of the first chancellor of the West German state, Konrad Adenauer, who, according to the former Soviet ambassador to Germany Vladimir Semenov, “cannot be considered only a political opponent of Russia. He had an irrational hatred of Russians."

Konrad Adenauer is one of the key figures in the history of the Cold War.
First Federal Chancellor of Germany

Birth and formation of the NPA

Under these conditions and with the direct participation of the USSR, the NPA was created on January 18, 1956, which quickly turned into a powerful force. In turn, the GDR navy became the most combat-ready along with the Soviet one in the Warsaw Pact.

This is not an exaggeration, because the GDR included Prussian and Saxon lands, which once represented the most militant German states with strong armies. This is especially true, of course, for the Prussians. It was the Prussians and Saxons who formed the basis of the officer corps of first the German Empire, then the Reichswehr, then the Wehrmacht and, finally, the NNA.

Traditional German discipline and love for military affairs, strong military traditions of Prussian officers, rich combat experience of previous generations, coupled with advanced military equipment and the achievements of Soviet military thought, made the GDR army an invincible force in Europe.

The GDR army really enjoyed popular love in its country.
At least at first.

It is noteworthy that in some way the dreams of the most far-sighted German and Russian statesmen at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, who dreamed of a military alliance of the Russian and German empires, were realized in the NNA.

The strength of the GDR army was in the combat training of its personnel, because the strength of the NPA always remained relatively low: in 1987 it numbered 120 thousand soldiers and officers in its ranks, inferior to, say, the Polish People's Army - the second largest army after the Soviet one in the Warsaw Pact .

However, in the event of a military conflict with NATO, the Poles had to fight on secondary sectors of the front - in Austria and Denmark. In turn, the NPA was given more serious tasks: to fight in the main direction - against troops operating from the territory of Germany, where the first echelon of NATO ground forces was deployed, that is, the Bundeswehr itself, as well as the most combat-ready divisions of the Americans, British and French.

Tank driver of the GDR army under the state flag

East German Army during exercises

The Soviet leadership trusted its German brothers in arms. And not in vain. The commander of the 3rd West Germany Army in the GDR and later the deputy chief of staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, General Valentin Varennikov, wrote in his memoirs: “The National People's Army of the GDR, in fact, before my eyes, grew in 10-15 years from zero to a formidable modern army, equipped with everything necessary and capable of acting no worse than Soviet troops.”

This point of view is essentially confirmed by Matvey Burlakov: “The peak of the Cold War was in the early 80s. All that was left was to give the signal and everything would rush forward. Everything is ready for combat, the shells are in the tanks, all you have to do is put them in the barrel - and off you go. They would have burned everything, destroyed everything there. I mean military installations - not cities. I often met with the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Klaus Naumann. He once asked me: “I saw the plans of the GDR army that you approved. Why didn’t you launch an offensive?” We tried to collect these plans, but someone hid them and made copies. And Naumann agreed with our calculation that we should be in the English Channel within a week. I say: “We are not aggressors, why are we going to attack you? We always expected you to be the first to start.” That’s how it was explained to them.”

Please note: Naumann saw the plans of the GDR army, whose tanks would be among the first to reach the English Channel and, as he admitted, no one could effectively stop them.

In the event of a NATO attack, this army would be on the English Channel in a week.
NATO strategists were sincerely perplexed why, with such force at hand,
we didn't hit. They just can’t wrap their heads around a simple thing,
that the Russians really didn't want war.

From the point of view of the intellectual training of its personnel, the NPA also stood at a high level: by the mid-80s, 95 percent of its officer corps had a higher or secondary specialized education, about 30 percent of officers graduated from military academies, 35 percent from higher military schools.

In a word, at the end of the 80s the army of the GDR was ready for any tests, but the country was not. Unfortunately, the combat power of the armed forces could not compensate for the socio-economic problems that the GDR faced by the beginning of the last quarter of the 20th century. Erich Honecker, who headed the country in 1971, was guided by the Soviet model of building socialism, which significantly distinguished him from many leaders of other countries in Eastern Europe.

Honecker's key goal in the socio-economic sphere is to improve the well-being of the people, in particular, through the development of housing construction and increasing pensions.

Alas, good initiatives in this area have led to a decrease in investment in the development of production and the renewal of outdated equipment, the wear and tear of which was 50 percent in industry and 65 percent in agriculture. In general, the East German economy, like the Soviet one, developed along an extensive path.

Defeat without firing a shot

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 complicated relations between the two countries - Honecker, being a conservative, reacted negatively to perestroika. And this is against the backdrop of the fact that in the GDR the attitude towards Gorbachev as the initiator of reforms was enthusiastic. In addition, at the end of the 80s, a mass exodus of GDR citizens to Germany began. Gorbachev made it clear to his East German counterpart that Soviet assistance to the GDR directly depended on Berlin's implementation of reforms.

What happened next is well known: in 1989, Honecker was removed from all posts, a year later the GDR was absorbed by West Germany, and a year later the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The Russian leadership hastened to withdraw from Germany a group of almost half a million, equipped with 12 thousand tanks and armored vehicles, which became an unconditional geopolitical and geostrategic defeat and accelerated the entry of yesterday’s allies of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact into NATO.

But all these are dry lines about relatively recently past events, behind which is the drama of thousands of NPA officers and their families. With sadness in their eyes and pain in their hearts, they looked at the last parade of Russian troops on August 31, 1994 in Berlin. Betrayed, humiliated, useless to anyone, they witnessed the departure of the once allied army, which lost the Cold War with them without firing a single shot.

M.S. Gorbachev lost the Cold War without firing a shot

And just five years earlier, Gorbachev promised not to abandon the GDR to its fate. Did the Soviet leader have grounds for such statements? On the one hand, it would seem not. As we have already noted, at the end of the 80s the flow of refugees from the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany increased. After Honecker's dismissal, the leadership of the GDR demonstrated neither the will nor the determination to save the country and take truly effective measures for this that would allow the reunification of Germany on an equal basis. Declarative statements not supported by practical steps do not count in this case.

But there is another side to the coin. According to Boltunov, neither France nor Great Britain considered the issue of German reunification to be relevant. This is understandable: in Paris they were afraid of a strong and united Germany, which had twice crushed the military power of France in less than a century. And of course, it was not in the geopolitical interests of the Fifth Republic to see a united and strong Germany at its borders.

In turn, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher adhered to a political line aimed at maintaining the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as compliance with the terms of the Final Act in Helsinki, the rights and responsibilities of the four states for post-war Germany.

Against this background, it does not seem accidental that London wanted to develop cultural and economic ties with the GDR in the second half of the 1980s, and when it became obvious that the unification of Germany was inevitable, the British leadership proposed extending this process for 10-15 years.

And perhaps most importantly: in containing the processes aimed at the unification of Germany, the British leadership counted on the support of Moscow and Paris. And even more than that: German Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself was not initially the initiator of West Germany’s absorption of its eastern neighbor, but advocated the creation of a confederation, putting forward a ten-point program to implement his idea.

Thus, in 1990, the Kremlin and Berlin had every chance to realize the idea once proposed by Stalin: the creation of a united, but neutral and non-NATO Germany.

The preservation of a limited contingent of Soviet, American, British and French troops on the territory of a united Germany would become a guarantor of German neutrality, and the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany created on an equal basis would not allow the spread of pro-Western sentiments in the army and would not turn former NPA officers into outcasts.

Soviet and German brothers in arms. Photo from the 1950s
The day will come when the descendants of some will renounce both their country and their allies.
And the heirs of others will suddenly find themselves without a livelihood

Personality factor

All this was quite feasible in practice and met the foreign policy interests of both London and Paris, and Moscow and Berlin. So why did Gorbachev and his circle, who had the opportunity to rely on the support of France and England in defending the GDR, did not do this and easily went for the absorption of their eastern neighbor by West Germany, ultimately changing the balance of power in Europe in favor of NATO?

From Boltunov’s point of view, the determining role in this case was played by the personality factor: “...Events took an unexpected turn after the meeting of foreign ministers, at which E. A. Shevardnadze (USSR Foreign Minister) went into direct violation of Gorbachev’s directive.

The reunification of two independent German states is one thing, the Anschluss, that is, the absorption of the GDR into the Federal Republic, is another. It is one thing to overcome the division of Germany as a cardinal step towards eliminating the division of Europe. Another is the transfer of the leading edge of the continental split from the Elbe to the Oder or further to the east.

Shevardnadze gave a very simple explanation for his behavior - I learned this from the assistant to the President (USSR) Anatoly Chernyaev: “Genscher asked for this. And Genscher is a good person.”

"Good man" Eduard Shevardnadze - one of the main culprits of the GDR tragedy

Perhaps this explanation oversimplifies the picture associated with the unification of the country, but it is obvious that such a rapid absorption of the GDR by West Germany is a direct consequence of the short-sightedness and weakness of the Soviet political leadership, which, based on the logic of its decisions, was more focused on the positive image of the USSR in the West world rather than the interests of one’s own state.

Ultimately, the collapse of both the GDR and the socialist camp as a whole, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union, provides a clear example of the fact that the determining factor in history is not some objective processes, but the role of the individual. The entire past of mankind indisputably testifies to this.

After all, there were no socio-economic prerequisites for the ancient Macedonians to enter the historical arena, if not for the outstanding personal qualities of kings Philip and Alexander.

The French would never have brought most of Europe to their knees if Napoleon had not been their emperor. And there would not have been an October coup in Russia, the most shameful in the history of the country of the Brest Peace, just as the Bolsheviks would not have won the Civil War, if not for the personality of Vladimir Lenin.

All these are just the most striking examples, indisputably testifying to the decisive role of the individual in history.

There is no doubt that nothing similar to the events of the early 90s could have happened in Eastern Europe if Yuri Andropov had been at the head of the Soviet Union. A man with a strong will, in the field of foreign policy he invariably proceeded from the geopolitical interests of the country, and they demanded the preservation of a military presence in Central Europe and the comprehensive strengthening of the combat power of the NPA, regardless of the attitude of the Americans and their allies to this.

Heinz Kessler - Minister of Defense of the GDR after 1985 - did everything that depended on him,
to keep the country from dying. But he could not do anything about the growing
a clump of social problems, nor with the betrayal of the Soviet elite.
Others had to solve these problems - but they lacked the will.

The scale of Gorbachev’s personality, as well as that of his immediate circle, objectively did not correspond to the complex of complex domestic and foreign policy problems that the Soviet Union faced.

The same can be said about Egon Krenz, who replaced Honecker as General Secretary of the SED and was not a strong and strong-willed person. This is the opinion of General Markus Wolf, who headed the foreign intelligence of the GDR, about Krenz.

One of the characteristics of weak politicians is inconsistency in following the chosen course. This happened with Gorbachev: in December 1989, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he unequivocally stated that the Soviet Union would not abandon the GDR to its fate. A year later, the Kremlin allowed West Germany to carry out the Anschluss of its eastern neighbor.

Kohl also felt the political weakness of the Soviet leadership during his visit to Moscow in February 1990, since it was after this that he began to more energetically pursue a course towards the reunification of Germany and, most importantly, began to insist on maintaining its membership in NATO.

And as a result: in modern Germany the number of American troops exceeds 50 thousand soldiers and officers, stationed including on the territory of the former GDR, and the NATO military machine is deployed near the Russian borders. And in the event of a military conflict, the perfectly prepared and trained officers of the former NPA will no longer be able to help us. And they’re unlikely to want to...

As for England and France, their fears regarding the unification of Germany were not in vain: the latter quickly took leading positions in the European Union, strengthened its strategic and economic position in Central and Eastern Europe, gradually displacing British capital from there.

Among the former Wehrmacht officers who stood at the origins of the creation of the National People's Army of the GDR, General Vinzenz Müller occupies a special place. During World War II, he headed the operations department at the headquarters of Army Group C, which took part in the final phase of the breakthrough of the Maginot Line. Later, as chief of staff of the 17th Army, Müller fought in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The lieutenant general spent his last battle in the early summer of 1944 near Minsk as commander of the 4th Army, after which he was forced to capitulate to the advancing units of the Red Army.
Until 1948, Vinzenz Müller was in Soviet captivity, where he radically changed his political views, becoming a consistent anti-fascist. In 1952, he returned to military activity, taking an active part in the creation of the professional army of the GDR.
Occupying the highest positions in the NPA structure, Müller maintained contacts with his former comrades who served in Bavaria. It is known that the general secretly met several times with German Finance Minister Fritz Schaeffer, trying to improve relations between the two Germanys. In 1958, Müller fell into disgrace and was dismissed.
In March 1956, Willi Stoff, who had received the rank of Colonel General the year before, began his work as head of the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR. Shtof had been a member of the German Communist Party since 1931, but could not avoid serving in the Wehrmacht. Since 1941, he fought on the Eastern Front, was wounded, and was awarded the Iron Cross. The war ended for him only in 1945 when he was captured, where he began fruitful cooperation with the Soviet authorities.
Hans von Witsch devoted the entire war to aviation, leading various air units. He was captured by the Soviets in Carlsbad on the last day of the war. Like most German military personnel, he returned to his homeland only in 1948, where he was immediately accepted into the border guard of the eastern occupation zone as head of the supply department. Later he held a similar post in the Barracks People's Police of the GDR.
Another interesting figure in the former leadership of the Wehrmacht is Colonel Wilhelm Adam, who at the last stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was part of the headquarters of Paulus’s 6th Army. After surrender, he was in Suzdal, Krasnogorka and Voikovo. He actively participated in the activities of the pro-Soviet Union of German Officers.
After returning to Germany, Adam worked in educational and financial institutions. He was one of the first to be involved in the construction of the armed forces of the GDR. First, he was appointed to the position of head of the educational institutions management department, then he headed the Higher Officer School in Dresden. Until Paulus's death, Adam maintained friendly relations with him. He rose to the rank of major general of the NPA.
Colonel Rudolf Bamler is an artilleryman by profession. During the war he served as chief of staff of various armies. He was captured during the Belarusian offensive operation near Mogilev, immediately disowned his Nazi past and began to work closely with the Soviet state security agencies.
Upon returning to Germany, he taught at military educational institutions, and later took the post of chief inspector of the Barracks Police. Health problems forced him to find a quieter place of work - the position of head of the military-technical school in Erfurt. Bamler often made accusatory speeches against the leadership of Germany. According to rumors, since 1959 he held an unofficial post in the East German intelligence service Stasi.
Arno von Lenski, along with Vincent Müller, was another Wehrmacht general who was entrusted with the construction of the NNA. He finished World War II at Stalingrad with the rank of lieutenant general. Just like Paulus, he was kept in Krasnogorsk, Suzdal, Voikovo, and participated in the activities of anti-fascist organizations.
In the GDR, on the recommendation of Marshal Chuikov, Lenski resumed his military career in the NNA structures. His responsibilities included the formation and development of the tank forces of the East German state. The general soon fell into disgrace: he was accused of unreliability and criticized for neglecting discipline. Since the late 1950s, East German and Soviet authorities have decided to gradually remove former Wehrmacht officers from service.