Tarutino battle results. Military Observer
Description of the Patriotic War in 1812 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky Alexander Ivanovich
Battle of Tarutino
Battle of Tarutino
Disposition of Murat's troops. - The Cossacks discover his mistake. - Bennigsen's proposal. - Orders for battle. – Cancel the attack. – The army is leaving the Tarutino camp. - Intent to capture Murat. – Attack of Count Orlov-Denisov. - Baggovut's attack. – Slowing down the 4th corps. – Inaction of other buildings. – Reasons for inaction. - Trophies. - View of the enemy camp. - Consequence of the battle. - Report to the Emperor. – Conversation between His Majesty and Colonel Michaud. - The highest rescript.
Prince Kutuzov could not yet know about Napoleon’s preparations for his departure from Moscow. Also, the Highest command to begin offensive actions, sent on October 2, did not reach him. Standing firmly in Tarutino, he limited himself to organizing the army and exterminating the enemy with flying detachments and people, ordering the distribution of as many weapons as possible to the villagers. Opposite our vanguard was Murat with all the reserve cavalry and four infantry divisions, totaling up to 25,000 people. The French stood on the right bank of the Chernishna, from its confluence with the Nara to the villages of Teterinki and Dmitrievsky. Murat's right flank was protected by the steep banks of the Nara and Chernishna, but his left wing stood in open areas, without natural or artificial defense. The forest located at the tip of this flank was not occupied by enemies; They didn’t even stake out the forest and didn’t have posts in it.
Several times the Cossacks of Miloradovich's vanguard made their way through the forest, to the extreme edge, from where they clearly saw the enemy camp and everything that was happening in it. The Cossack party with the centurion Uryupinsky even went to the rear of the French without being noticed by them. The Cossacks informed their commanders about Murat’s mistake, and when the testimony of the Donets was found to be fair, the idea was born of the possibility of secretly bringing part of the army to our forward chain, and with the other part going through the forest and striking the French flank. Bennigsen suggested that Prince Kutuzov attack Murat. The field marshal did not suddenly agree with him, holding different opinions about the image of a real war and ways to triumph over Napoleon. Satisfied with the situation in which he had placed the French army, Prince Kutuzov did not want to bring Napoleon out of inaction; he considered it more useful not to challenge him to battle, not to awaken the lion that had been put to sleep in the Kremlin. “The longer Napoleon remains in Moscow,” said Prince Kutuzov, “the more certain our victory.” Bennigsen based his opinion not only on Murat's misplaced position, but also on the need to attack the French before Victor joined Napoleon. To explain this circumstance, it must be said that we had information about Victor’s march from Minsk to Smolensk, but did not know about the order given to him to stop in Orsha, and therefore believed that Victor was going to Moscow. Bennigsen was not content with mere verbal arguments and on October 5 presented the following written proposal to Prince Kutuzov: “By all indications, it is clear that the reinforcements expected by Napoleon, under the command of Victor, are on the march and are already close. And so, it seems necessary, without wasting time, to attack Murat, who is standing against us, with all his might, before reinforcements arrive to the enemy. Moreover, one should not delay the attack, since, as is heard, Napoleon himself is with the guard in Moscow, and Murat has little artillery, and his entire cavalry does not exceed 8,000 people. If my proposal, the importance of which you would rather discuss with me, receives your approval, then I ask you to order me to submit a disposition to attack for your consideration; the more convenient it is to attack the enemy since there are plains opposite us, with small forests.”
Agreeing with Bennigsen’s opinion, Prince Kutuzov scheduled the attack on October 5, early in the morning. Bennigsen had to manage the main action, that is, the bypass of the French left wing. For this purpose, the field marshal assigned him the 2nd, 3rd and 4th infantry and 1st cavalry corps and 10 Cossack regiments, under the command of Count Orlov-Denisov. The rest of the army was assigned to support the attack, attacking the enemy from the front. Dorokhov was given instructions to attack the French from the rear. These features contained the essence of the orders for the attack; their details were as follows: 1) On October 4, at 7 o’clock in the evening, the army left the camp with the right flank in 6 columns and crossed the Nara along 5 bridges at Spassky and Tarutin. 2) The first column, Count Orlov-Denisov, of 10 Cossack regiments, a company of the Don Artillery, the 20th Jaeger Regiment, is reinforced by Adjutant General Miller-Zakomelsky, with a Guards light cavalry division, a Nizhyn Dragoon Regiment and a half-company of horse artillery. This column is assigned to go to the rear of the enemy’s left wing, take possession of the Moscow highway and stop Murat’s retreat. 3) The second column, Baggovut, consisting of his and Count Stroganov’s corps, strike Murat’s flank and, moving to the right, maintain communication with the first column. 4) Count Osterman's corps form the 3rd column and link Baggovut's action with the rest of the army, to the left. These three columns, or the right wing, will be under the command of Bennigsen. 5) Dokhturov with his corps will form the center of the army and also take command of Count Osterman’s corps when the latter unites with him. 6) Miloradovich, with the guard, the corps of Raevsky and Borozdin, reserve cavalry and artillery, to form the left wing, with which Prince Kutuzov intended to be present. 7) All troops arrive at night behind the chain of leads and stand in a possible camp until dawn, waiting for three signal shots. Then Bennigsen should quickly go through the forest, begin an attack on the enemy’s left wing, and Miloradovich, with the cavalry corps, close to the vedas at night, would attack everything that was in front of him; His infantry should follow the cavalry at a quick pace. 8) Dorokhov, who was operating with a detachment to the left of the army, near the new Kaluga road, go to Voronovo and cut off Murat’s road to Moscow. 9) Leave a large number of musicians and drummers in the camp and beat the dawn in due time. The lights should be laid out no more and no less than usual; do not burn huts and leave in the camp one non-commissioned officer with three privates from each company, and one officer from each regiment to monitor order.
The disposition was sent from Prince Kutuzov's main apartment, Letashevka, to Tarutino, along with the order for the army to be ready to march by 6 o'clock in the afternoon. After 6 hours had passed, the Field Marshal drove from Letashevka to Tarutino, confident that he would find the army already armed, but, on the contrary, he met on the road artillery and cavalry regiments of horses being led to watering, and in the camp he saw regiments calmly standing in bivouacs, although it was already time to speak. Having learned about the Prince’s arrival, corps commanders began to gather to him, and each of them was asked: why don’t the regiments set out? - they answered that there was no order. Driven out of patience by these repeated answers, the Field Marshal was quite angry and called off the attack. The reason for the misunderstanding was soon explained. It consisted of untimely receipt in the Tarutino camp of a command sent from Letashevka. Instead of October 5, they planned to attack Murat on the 6th. The field marshal arrived at the camp on the evening of the 5th. Under him, columns crossed the Nara. It was getting dark; clouds covered the sky. The weather was dry, but the ground was wet, so the troops marched without noise, and the movement of artillery could not even be heard. They forbade talking loudly, smoking pipes, lighting fires; the horses were kept from neighing, everything took on the appearance of a mysterious enterprise. Finally, with the light glow of the enemy’s fire, which showed us the location of the French, the columns stopped for the night, where the attack was to be launched the next morning, they put their guns on the goats and lay down on the cold ground.
Count Orlov-Denisov was at the extreme edge of the forest, on the path from Stromilov to Dmitrievskoye. Before dawn, October 6, a Polish non-commissioned officer from Poniatowski’s corps came to him, volunteering, if he was given an escort, to seize Murat, who, he assured, was spending the night in a village behind the camp, with a small guard. One hundred chervonets in case of success, death in case of deception are promised to the changer. Major General Grekov was sent with him, with two Cossack regiments, including Ataman. They had barely set off for some tasty prey when it began to get light. Count Orlov-Denisov came out of the forest and, looking from the hill to the left, from where our columns were supposed to advance, did not see a single one of them. On the contrary, in the enemy camp, behind which he stood, it was noticeable that they were beginning to rise from sleep. Fearing to be discovered by the French and expecting every minute the appearance of our infantry columns, he canceled his intention to seize Murat, sent Grekov back and immediately upon his arrival rushed with 10 Don regiments directly at the French. The suddenness of the attack did not allow the enemies to take up arms; they barely had time to turn the guns and, having fired several shots, ran behind the Ryazanovsky ravine. The entire camp on the right bank of the Chernishna and 58 guns were captured by the Cossacks; a hundred Dontsov, with Platov’s son, galloped through the camp past Teterinka, straight to our infantry.
While Count Orlov-Denisov was gathering the regiments scattered across the French bivouacs in order to lead them further against the enemy, who had begun to line up behind the ravine, Baggovut appeared from the forest, not with his entire corps, but only with Pillar’s ranger brigade and half a company of artillery. Her shots should, according to the disposition, serve as a signal for a general attack, which, for the reasons stated above, had already been carried out by Count Orlov-Denisov, before these shots followed. The march of Baggovut's corps, followed by Count Stroganov's corps, was delayed in the forest by various conflicting orders brought to the troops. Moreover, the regiments of the 4th division, Kremenchug and Volyn, and the 17th division, Olsufiev, which followed behind them, lost their way in the forest in the dark, and therefore neither they nor the corps of Count Stroganov made it on time to their assigned places, but came only the Pillar brigade and the Tobolsk infantry regiment, which was at the head of the 4th division, under which was its divisional commander, Prince Eugene of Württemberg. They came out of the forest with the brigade, Baggovut immediately opened fire from his guns, but was killed by one of the first cannonballs fired from an enemy battery at Teterinka. With the death of this excellent General, the common connection between the actions of his corps ceased. The rangers scattered into arrows, attacked bravely, but were not promptly supported by columns that were late in the forest; their private efforts remained in vain, because Murat had already lined up, changed front and besieged the left flank back. On the left he repelled the attacks of Count Orlov-Denisov with cuirassiers, from the front he opened fire from batteries, and meanwhile sent back the convoys so that they would not interfere with his retreat.
The movement of the 4th Infantry Corps was also slow. Not seeing his appearance at the appointed hour, Bennigsen ordered Count Stroganov’s corps, which was assigned by disposition to bypass to the right, to go, on the contrary, to Baggovut’s left flank, intending to ensure its connection with the army. Finally, the 4th Corps entered the forest and drove out 2 battalions of Poles standing in front of the enemy battle line. Due to the lack of cavalry, it was impossible to pursue them, without which not a single Pole would have been saved. “I myself,” writes Bennigsen in his report, “went to the 4th Corps and found that it had not yet connected with Dokhturov. I don’t know why this could have happened; the instructions were given clear and precise.” When the heads of the columns of the 4th Corps appeared from the forest, communication was formed between all the troops, fire thundered from a long row of batteries, but the moment of the successful attack had already passed, and Murat was in complete retreat. Count Orlov-Denisov’s detachment attempted several times to cut off his road to Spas-Kuplya, but could not succeed, although they were supported by part of Prince Eugene’s division. Other corps, in which the Field Marshal was personally present, stood motionless in place for a long time. According to the disposition, they were assigned to overthrow everything in front of them with a quick offensive, but at the beginning of the battle, Prince Kutuzov did not bring them into action. He hoped that success would immediately be decided in our favor if Bennigsen managed to carry out a surprise attack, and otherwise, if Bennigsen was repulsed, then the corps that did not enter the battle and stood in sight of the enemy in battle formation would be sufficient to warn the consequences that the failure of our right wing could entail. The Generals gathered around the Commander-in-Chief did not think so. Miloradovich asked him several times for permission to go forward. A decisive refusal was Kutuzov's answer. Finally he said: “It’s only on your tongue to attack, but you don’t see that we are not yet mature for complex movements and maneuvers!” Noticing that our right wing began to move forward and the enemy was retreating, the Field Marshal ordered the infantry corps standing in the center, preceded by the Korf cavalry, to move to Chernishna, and sent Vasilchikov with a separate detachment to the enemy’s right flank. The words of Prince Kutuzov, placed in his report to the Emperor, can be attributed to this minute of the battle that the movement of troops near Tarutino was likened to a maneuver at a training site. The entire line of columns of the center and left wing marched orderly forward. Murat repeatedly tried to stop, not to fight back, but to organize the troops and remove burdens, but each time he was overturned. Several of his regiments fled; cavalrymen, without saddles or cigarette holders, rushed hither and thither at the will of their skinny nags. The pursuit continued 7 miles, to Spas-Kupli, where Murat took up a position and covered it with batteries; but they would not have prevented further persecution of him if it had been the will of Prince Kutuzov. In the evening, Murat reached out to Voronov, worried about our light troops. The regular cavalry and infantry corps of Count Osterman and the former Baggovut were ordered to stop before reaching Spas-Kupli, and all other corps without crossing Chernishnya. The reason for the order not to go further was the following. During the general offensive movement, a sergeant of the Zhirov regiment brought from Colonel Prince Kudashev, who was with the party on the Podolsk road, an intercepted order from Marshal Berthier to a French general to send all the heavy loads to the Mozhaisk road. Having read the order, Prince Kutuzov concluded that Napoleon intended to leave Moscow, but where, when, for what purpose was unknown. The field marshal walked back and forth for several minutes and, in secret consultation, alone with himself, decided not to pursue the French, having in mind not just Murat’s defeat, but the beginning, so to speak, of the embryo of a new campaign that was to follow very soon. He foresaw that from hour to hour he would have to withstand a series of bloody battles against the main enemy army, in which, of course, Napoleon would fight for life and death. Displeasure that they were not going further to reap the fruits of the victory over Murat was on all faces, but in the presence of Prince Kutuzov no one dared to give an opinion without being asked. When they again began to ask him for permission to pursue the enemies, he replied: “If we did not know how to take Murat alive in the morning and arrive at the place on time, then the pursuit will be useless. We can’t move away from the position.” Prince Kutuzov sat down on the spread carpet. Bennigsen has arrived. The field marshal took a few steps towards him and said: “You have won; I owe you gratitude, and the Emperor will reward you.” Bennigsen seemed dissatisfied, having the strange thought that the Commander-in-Chief had left half the army inactive out of ill will towards him, as if wanting to deprive him of success in the battle he had proposed and conducted at his order. He did not get off his horse, bowed coldly to the Field Marshal, reported in a few words about the progress of the case on the left wing and added that, having received a shell shock from a cannonball, he needed rest for several days. From that time on, his enmity towards Kutuzov began and went with him to the grave.
The spoils consisted of 38 guns, one banner, 40 charging boxes, 1,500 prisoners and a large number of convoys. Among those killed were Generals Fischer and Deri. Murat was friendly with Deri and sent him to ask for the return of his body, or at least his heart. Many things and luxury items looted from Moscow were found in the enemy camp and recaptured convoys.
They constituted a striking contrast to the lack of vital supplies suffered by the enemy during his long stay at Chernishna. Horses and skinned cats, slaughtered for food or already eaten, lay scattered around the dying camp fires.
On the smoking hearths stood teapots and cauldrons with horse broth; Here and there cereals and peas were visible, but there were no traces of flour, bread or beef. Wine, loaves of sugar and other delicacies brought from Moscow were thrown next to fried horse meat and steamed rye. The sick, deprived of all charity, lay on the cold ground. Between them were children and women, French, German, and Polish women. Scattered around the huts were icons stolen from neighboring churches and used by the sacrileges instead of firewood. In the churches located near the enemy camp, the thrones were destroyed, the faces of the saints were overthrown, trampled underfoot by horses, which even stood in the altars, neighing the sacred walls, where from time immemorial songs of praise to the Divine were sung. The Tarutino battle, which cost us 500 killed and wounded, had a great moral influence on the fighting troops. From the very beginning of the campaign, it was the first offensive action of our main army and was crowned, although imperfect, as one would expect, but at least with significant success. It deprived the enemies of the gratifying hope of peace, which, since the time they occupied Moscow, had been the object of the beloved dream of their army, from Napoleon to the last soldier. This battle drew a sharp line between the past and the future, showing that the Russians did not think about ending the war. Napoleon wanted to cover up the mistake of Murat, who allowed himself to be attacked by surprise, and printed in the bulletins that Murat could not expect an attack on himself, because our and the French advanced troops agreed to precede each other three hours in advance about the resumption of hostilities and that the Russians were shameless with a surprise attack violate these conditions. The slander must be refuted: both the honor of Russian weapons and the sanctity of the people’s morals, which we deeply respect, demand this. The condition never existed and could not exist, as it was contrary to the will of the Sovereign. It was only ordered at the forward posts not to exchange fire in vain, but at the same time it was strictly forbidden to have any meetings or conversations with enemy leaders. Consequently, Murat had to attribute his defeat not to the treachery of Prince Kutuzov, but to his own carelessness. In the evening the army returned to Tarutino. Halfway along the road there was a line of enemy guns. Prince Kutuzov was there, sitting on the porch of a dilapidated hut. Pointing to the trophies, he greeted the columns with these words: “Today is your gift to the Emperor and Russia. I thank you in the name of the Tsar and the Fatherland!” “Hurray,” mixed with cheerful songs, echoed joyfully to our camp. The troops entered it noisily and cheerfully. Peace did not come to their minds, as if they were celebrating the resurrection of Russian glory, which had fallen silent for a while. Miloradovich settled down at Vinkovo, where our troops stood for the first time on land recaptured from the enemy. Under the command of Miloradovich there were cavalry corps: Korf and Vasilchikov, who took the place of Count Sivers; infantry: Count Osterman and the former Baggovut, whose place was taken by Prince Dolgorukov, who had recently arrived in the army and had previously been Envoy to Naples. The next day a thanksgiving prayer service was served. Prince Kutuzov listened to him in the camp church of the Guards Corps, where the image of the Smolensk Mother of God was brought. Curiosity attracted many to French cannons, because since 1805, when our wars with Napoleon began, nowhere have such a large number of guns been recaptured from his army as near Tarutino. The honor of taking possession of them belonged to Count Orlov-Denisov, about whom Bennigsen, the culprit and manager of the battle, reported to Prince Kutuzov: “Count Orlov-Denisov behaved in the most brilliant manner; his courage is a credit to Russian weapons. He was the first to suggest the idea of going around the enemy’s left wing, based on the observations he made, and upon his report of this, I decided in writing to propose to Your Lordship to attack the enemy.”
The choice of officer with whom to send a report of victory to St. Petersburg was already indicated to Prince Kutuzov several weeks ago by the Emperor himself in the following rescript: “Colonel Michaud, known for his zealous service, was sent with the sad news of the enemy’s admission into the capital city of Moscow. The sadness of this worthy officer to be the bearer of such a report was obvious. I find it fair, to console him, to order you to send him with the first good news, followed by subsequent ones after his arrival.” This rescript sheds a new ray of light on the goodness of Emperor Alexander. We see the Monarch, in the difficult hour of His Power, during the invasion of enemies into the capital, even thinking about how to sweeten the fate of the officer on whom the lot had fallen to announce to Him that Moscow, the crown of the Russian Kingdom, was disgraced by the presence of foreigners. Having depicted the details of the Tarutino battle to the Emperor, Michaud asked permission to report to His Majesty about the desire of the army. "What's happened?" - asked the Emperor. “The victory we have won,” answered Michaud, “the excellent condition of the troops, their enlivening spirit, their devotion to your person, the reinforcements coming to the army from everywhere, the plight of Napoleon, the orders sent by Your Majesty will make it difficult for him to retreat, in a word, everything gives undoubted hope that Napoleon will be expelled from Russia in disgrace. The troops are confident that the happiest campaign is coming, but they also know that they owe everything to the efforts of Your Majesty. They know how much your soul has endured until now, and now they ask for the only mercy that Your Majesty personally take command of the army: your presence will make it invincible.” The Emperor answered with noticeable pleasure: “All people are ambitious; I admit frankly that I am no less than others, and if now I heeded only this one feeling, I would get into the carriage with you and go to the army. Considering the disadvantageous situation into which we have drawn the enemy, the excellent spirit of the army, the inexhaustible sources of the Empire, the numerous reserve troops I have prepared, the orders sent by Me to the Danube army, I am undoubtedly confident that victory is inevitable for us and that only, as you say, remains: reap laurels. I know that if I am with the army, then all the glory will be attributed to Me and that I will take a place in History.
But when I think how little experience I have in the art of war in comparison with Napoleon and that, despite My good will, I can make a mistake that will shed the precious blood of My children, then, despite My pride, I willingly sacrifice my personal glory for the well-being army. Let him reap the laurels who is more worthy of them than Me. Return to the Field Marshal, congratulate him on the victory and tell him to drive the enemies out of Russia.” The Emperor awarded Prince Kutuzov a golden sword, with diamonds and a laurel wreath, and honored him with the following handwritten rescript: “The victory you won over Murat made Me incredibly happy. I flatter myself with the hope that this is a beginning that should have even more important consequences. The glory of Russia is inseparable from your own and from the salvation of Europe.”
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Everything that happens has serious consequences. But there are events that radically change the course of history. The Tarutino maneuver of the Russian army in the War of 1812 is one of such episodes. It became the second turning point after the Battle of Borodino and forced the army of Napoleon I to retreat from their intended goal.
War of 1812
Throughout its thousand-year history, Russia has had to defend itself more than once from enemies who want to enslave it. The beginning of the 19th century was no exception. The Great French Revolution, and then the rise to power in the country of Napoleon Bonaparte, who proclaimed himself emperor, spoiled relations between the two once friendly countries. The Russian authorities, represented by Alexander I, were afraid of the impact of what happened on the situation within the Russian Empire. But the relationship was finally spoiled by the aggressive policy that Napoleon I began to pursue against European countries, especially England, which was a long-time ally of Russia.
In the end, the actions of France led to a war with Russia, which in Russian historiography received the name of the year.
Causes of military conflict
By 1812, all of Europe, with the exception of France's ancient enemy, England, had been conquered by Napoleon's army. Of the other world powers, only the Russian Empire continued to pursue an independent foreign policy, which did not suit the French emperor. In addition to this, Russia actually violated the continental blockade, which it was forced to take against England as the main condition of the Tilsit Agreement between the Russian Empire and France. The blockade caused serious damage to the country's economy, so Russia began to trade with England through neutral states. At the same time, she did not formally violate the conditions. France was indignant, but could not express a protest.
Russia, with its independent policy, prevented Napoleon's dreams of world domination from being realized. Starting the war with her, he planned to deal a crushing blow to the Russian army in the first battle and then dictate his peace terms to Alexander I.
Balance of power
The Russian army numbered from 480 to 500 thousand people, and France - about 600 thousand. This is the number, according to most historians, that both countries were able to field for military operations. In such difficult conditions, knowing that Napoleon expected to finish off the enemy with one blow, the leadership of the Russian army decided in every possible way to avoid the decisive battle with the enemy. This tactic was also approved by Alexander I.
battle of Borodino
Following the approved plan not to engage in a general battle with the enemy, after the invasion of Napoleon's troops in June 1812, the Russian armies began a slow retreat, trying to unite with each other. They managed to do this near Smolensk, where Napoleon again tried to give a decisive battle. But the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Barclay de Tolly, did not allow this and withdrew the army from the city.
It was decided to fight a general battle in the position chosen by the army leadership itself. By that time, Mikhail Kutuzov had taken command of it. It was decided to fight not far from Mozhaisk, on a field near the village of Borodino. This is where one of the events took place during the war. The Tarutino maneuver that would follow later would finally change its history.
Although the battle was not won, and both sides remained in their positions, it inflicted severe damage on the French army, which is what Kutuzov sought.
and the surrender of Moscow
After the Battle of Borodino, the Russian army retreated to Mozhaisk. Here, in the village of Fili, Kutuzov held a military council, at which the fate of the Russian capital was to be decided. The overwhelming majority of officers were in favor of giving another battle near Moscow. But some generals, who had inspected the future combat position the day before, strongly spoke out in favor of preserving the army at the cost of surrendering Moscow to the enemy. Kutuzov gave the order to leave the capital.
Tarutino march-maneuver: date and main participants
To understand the complexity and tragedy of the situation, one must understand the following: never before has the army continued to fight after the fall of the capital. Napoleon did not fully believe that the loss of Moscow would not force Alexander I to negotiate. But Russia did not lose anything by surrendering the capital to the enemy, and the death of the army meant final defeat.
For Napoleon, from the very beginning of the Russian campaign, it was vital to force a general battle on the enemy army. The leadership of the Russian army did everything possible to avoid this while the forces were unequal.
Having withdrawn the army from Moscow on September 14 (new style), the field marshal sent it along the Ryazan road, first to the village and a little later chose the village of Tarutino as the location of the army. Here the Russian troops received, albeit short-lived, much-needed rest. At the same time, the army was being supplied with food and volunteers.
Kutuzov's brilliant plan
What was Kutuzov's plan? The Tarutino maneuver, the start date of which was September 17 and the end date of October 3, was supposed to confuse Napoleon and give the Russian army time to rest. It was necessary to hide your location from the enemy. The Russian rearguards and Cossacks helped in the implementation of this plan. The Tarutino maneuver can be briefly described as follows.
On September 14, in the late afternoon, when Napoleon’s army was already entering Moscow, the last units of the Russian army under the command of General Miloradovich were just leaving it. In such a situation, the Russian troops, pursued by the vanguard of the French cavalry, had to hide their movements.
Kutuzov led the army along the Ryazan road, but then ordered it to turn onto the old Kaluga road. Here the implementation of the plan to hide Russian forces from Napoleon began - the famous Tarutino maneuver of Kutuzov. The retreat along the new road and the crossing of the Moscow River was covered by cavalry rearguards under the command of generals Vasilchikov, Raevsky and Miloradovich. The crossing of the Russian army was monitored by the French vanguard. Russian troops left in two columns.
After the crossing, the army accelerated its movement and broke away from the French. Raevsky's corps, which was among the last to leave, burned all the bridges at the crossing. So on September 17, the Tarutino maneuver of the Russian army was successfully launched.
Cover operation
Breaking away from the pursuit of the French avant-garde was not enough. Immediately after arriving in Moscow, Napoleon sent his best Marshal Murat to search for the Russian army. The Russian rearguards of Raevsky and Miloradovich, as well as detachments of Cossacks, created the appearance of the army retreating to Ryazan, misleading Napoleon. They managed to completely disorient the French regarding the location of the Russian army for several precious days for Kutuzov. During this time, she safely reached the village of Tarutino and set up a rest camp there. So Kutuzov’s plan was brilliantly implemented.
The peasants of the surrounding villages also helped cover the army's retreat. They organized partisan detachments and, together with the Cossacks, attacked the French vanguards, causing them significant damage.
Tarutino fight
For almost two weeks, Napoleon did not know the whereabouts of the Russian army, until its location was revealed by Murat's corps. This time was used to maximum advantage. The soldiers received a long-awaited rest, food supplies were organized, and fresh reinforcements arrived. New weapons arrived from Tula, and the rest of the provinces, by order of the commander-in-chief, began supplying winter uniforms for the army.
At the same time, Kutuzov’s army covered the roads to the rich southern provinces and to Tula with its military industry. Being in the rear of the French army, Kutuzov created a serious threat.
Napoleon's army found itself in a real trap in Moscow. The road to the rich southern provinces was covered by the strengthened Russian army, and the capital was actually encircled by partisan detachments of Cossacks and peasants.
On September 24, Murat discovered the location of the Russian army and set up an observation camp near it on the Chernishna River. The number of his troops was about 27 thousand people.
At the beginning of October, Napoleon tried to enter into negotiations with Kutuzov, but he refused. It was decided to attack Murat’s group, since, according to reports from the partisans, he had no reinforcements. On October 18, the French camp was suddenly attacked by Russian troops. It was not possible to completely defeat Murat's army; he managed to organize a retreat. But the Tarutino battle showed that the Russian army had become stronger and now poses a serious threat to the enemy.
The meaning of the Tarutino March
The Tarutino maneuver of 1812, brilliantly conceived and brilliantly implemented by Kutuzov with the help of his generals and officers, was decisive for the victory over the invader. Having managed to break away from the enemy and won several weeks, the Russian army received the necessary rest, and supplies of weapons, provisions and uniforms were established. The army was also replenished with a new reserve amounting to more than 100 thousand people.
The ideal location of the Russian camp did not allow Napoleon to continue the offensive and forced the French army to leave along the old Smolensk road, which led through completely plundered territories.
Tarutino. 1812. Electronic reproduction from the Wikimedia Foundation repository.
Tarutino maneuver (Patriotic War, 1812). Transition of the Russian army under the command of Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzova from Moscow to the village of Tarutino September 5-21, 1812. After Battle of Borodino Kutuzov took upon himself the responsibility of surrendering Moscow to the French in order to preserve the army. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost... But if the army is destroyed, both Moscow and Russia will perish”, - Kutuzov told the generals at the military council in Fili. So the Russians left their ancient capital, which for the first time in 200 years found itself in the hands of foreigners.
Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov began to retreat in a south-eastern direction, along the Ryazan road. At the same time, Cossack units and corps N.N. Raevsky continued their retreat to Ryazan, and then “dissolved” in the forests. By this they misled the French vanguard of the marshal I. Murat , which followed on the heels of the retreating army, and the Russians broke away from the pursuit. Murat overtook the Russian army for the second time in the Podolsk region. However, attempts to attack it were stopped by the general's rearguard M.A. Miloradovich . He withstood a number of battles, not allowing the French cavalry to disrupt the ranks of the retreating army (see. Spas Kuplya ).
During the retreat, Kutuzov introduced strict measures against desertion, which began in his troops after the surrender of Moscow. Having reached the Old Kaluga Road, the Russian army turned to Kaluga and, crossing the Nara River, set up camp in the village of Tarutino. Kutuzov brought 85 thousand people there. available personnel (together with the militia). As a result of the Tarutino maneuver, the Russian army escaped the attack and took an advantageous position.
While in Tarutino, Kutuzov covered the southern regions of Russia, rich in human resources and food, the Tula military-industrial complex, and at the same time could threaten the communications of the French on the Smolensk road. The French could not freely advance from Moscow to St. Petersburg, having the Russian army in the rear. Kutuzov actually imposed the further course of the campaign on Napoleon. The main thing is that the Russian commander, having preserved the army, received all the advantages of his position - the owner of his own land.
In the Tarutino camp, the Russian army received reinforcements and increased its strength to 120 thousand people. One of the most significant additions was the arrival of 26 Cossack regiments from the Don region. The share of cavalry in the Kutuzov army increased significantly, reaching a third of its strength, which played an extremely important role during the period of persecution of Napoleonic troops. The issue of providing the cavalry with everything necessary was thought out in advance; in particular, more than 150 thousand horseshoes were delivered to the army.
In addition to human reserves, the army received significant logistical support in a short time. In August-September alone, the country's main weapons forge, the Tula Plant, produced 36 thousand guns for the army. Kutuzov also entrusted the Tula, Kaluga, Oryol, Ryazan and Tver governors with the responsibility of procuring 100 thousand sheepskin coats and 100 thousand pairs of boots for the army.
Despite all its tactical achievements, the French army in Moscow found itself in a strategic blockade. In addition to the Tarutino camp, where Kutuzov’s troops were stationed, a second army was actually created around Moscow, consisting of partisans and militias. Its number reached 200 thousand people. Having reached the ancient Russian capital, Napoleon's army found itself in a tight blockade ring. Napoleon, who came to a country deeply alien to him, was unable to create his base here and found himself in isolation. The only thread connecting the French with the familiar world was the Smolensk road, along which they carried out a constant supply of provisions, ammunition and fodder to Moscow. But it was under the control of partisan detachments and could be tightly blocked at any moment by an attack from Tarutino. At the same time, Napoleon's hopes that the capture of Moscow would force the Russians to make peace were not justified due to the tough position of Alexander I, who was determined to continue the fight.
During his stay in Moscow, Napoleon lost 26 thousand people. killed, missing, died from wounds and diseases, i.e. suffered losses comparable to a major battle. Gradually, the illusory nature of success from the French occupation of Moscow became quite obvious. All this forced Napoleon to leave Moscow. In 1834, in Tarutino, using funds raised by peasants, a monument was erected with the inscription: “In this place, the Russian army under the leadership of Field Marshal Kutuzov, strengthened, saved Russia and Europe” (see Chernishnya, Maloyaroslavets).
Book materials used: Nikolay Shefov. Battles of Russia. Military-historical library. M., 2002.
Tarutino maneuver of 1812, a march maneuver of the Russian army during the Patriotic War of 1812 from Moscow to Tarutino (a village on the Nara River, 80 km southwest of Moscow), carried out under the leadership of Field General. M.I. Kutuzova September 5-21 (Sept. 17 - Oct. 3). After the Battle of Borodino in 1812, when it became obvious that it was impossible to hold Moscow with the remaining forces, M.I. Kutuzov outlined a plan, which was to break away from the Napoleonic army and take a flank position in relation to it, to create a threat to the French. communications, prevent the enemy from entering the south. districts of Russia (not devastated by war) and prepare Russian. army to launch a counteroffensive. Kutuzov kept his plan a great secret. 2(14) September, leaving Moscow, Russian. the army headed to the south-east. along the Ryazan road. 4(16) Sept. after crossing the Moscow River at the Borovsky transportation of Kutuzov, under the cover of the rearguard of General. H.H. Raevsky unexpectedly turned the chapter. Russian forces army by 3. The Cossacks of the rearguard managed to carry away the French vanguard with a demonstrative retreat to Ryazan. army. 7(19) Sept. rus. the army arrived in Podolsk, and two days later, continuing the flank march-maneuver, in the region of the village of Krasnaya Pakhra. Riding the Old Kaluga Road, Russian. The army set up camp and stayed here until September 14 (26). The vanguard of the general was advanced towards Moscow. M.A. Miloradovich and the detachment of H.H. Raevsky; detachments were allocated for the partisans. actions. Having lost the Russian army out of sight, Napoleon sent strong detachments along the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads. They searched for Kutuzov for several days, and only on September 14 (26). Marshal I. Murat's cavalry discovered the Russians. troops in the Podolsk region. Subsequently, Kutuzov secretly (mostly at night) retreated along the Old Kaluga Road to the river. Nara. 21 Sep. (Oct 3) rus. The troops stopped in the vicinity of the village. Tarutino, where they took a new fortified position (see Tarutino camp). The brilliantly organized and conducted T. m. allowed the Russian. army to break away from Napoleon's army and occupy an advantageous strategic position, which ensured its preparation for a counter-offensive. As a result, T. m. Kutuzov retained communication from the south. regions of Russia, which made it possible to strengthen the army, cover the arms factory in Tula and the supply base in Kaluga, and maintain contact with the armies of A.P. Tormasov and P.V. Chichagov. Napoleon was forced to abandon the attack on St. Petersburg and ultimately, leaving Moscow, retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, i.e. through the districts already devastated by the war. Kutuzov’s outstanding military leadership talent was revealed in T. m., his ability to impose his will on the commander, put him in unfavorable conditions, and achieve a turning point in the war.
D. V. Pankov
Materials from the Soviet Military Encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 7 were used.
Read further:
Patriotic War of 1812
(chronological table).Tyrion. Tarutino. (memoirs of a participant).
Griois. Tarutino. (memoirs of a participant).
The Battle of Tarutino is a battle that took place on October 6 (October 18), 1812 in the area of the village of Tarutino, Kaluga region, between Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal Kutuzov and the French troops of Marshal Murat. The battle is also called the Battle of the Chernishneya River, the Tarutino Maneuver or the Battle of Vinkovo. The victory at Tarutino was the first victory of Russian troops in the Patriotic War of 1812. The success strengthened the spirit of the Russian army, which launched a counteroffensive.
Background
After leaving Moscow, Kutuzov's army by early October settled in a fortified camp near the village of Tarutina across the Nara River (approximately on the border of the Moscow region southwest of Moscow). The Russian army received rest and the opportunity to replenish material and manpower. Napoleon, having occupied Moscow, found himself in a difficult situation. The French troops could not fully provide themselves with what they needed in Moscow. The unfolding guerrilla war interfered with the normal supply of the army. To forage, the French had to send large detachments, which rarely returned without losses. To facilitate the collection of provisions and the protection of communications, Napoleon was forced to maintain large military formations far beyond the borders of Moscow. Since September 24, Murat's vanguard has been stationed watching the Russian army, not far from Tarutin on the Chernishna River (a tributary of the Nara) 90 km from Moscow. The group consisted of the following units: Poniatowski's 5th Corps, two infantry and two cavalry divisions, all 4 of Napoleon's cavalry corps. The total strength of the group, according to army reports as of September 20, numbered 26,540 people (according to Chambray); Chambray himself, taking into account the losses over the previous month, estimated the strength of the vanguard by October 18 at 20 thousand. The vanguard had strong artillery of 197 cannons, which, according to Clausewitz, “were rather a burden to the vanguard than could be useful to it.” The front and right flank of Murat's extended position were covered by the Nara and Chernishnaya rivers, the left flank went out into the open, where only a forest separated the French from the Russian positions. The opposing armies coexisted for some time without military clashes. From the notes of A.P. Ermolov: “Gr. generals and officers gathered at the front posts with expressions of politeness, which was the reason for many to conclude that there was a truce.” Both sides remained in this situation for two weeks. - Tarle E.V. Napoleon. - M.: Gosizdat, 1941. - P. 304, 305. The partisans reported that Murat did not have reinforcements closer than in Moscow in case of an attack. It was decided to attack the French, taking advantage of a successful disposition, and defeat Murat.
On the eve of the battle
The attack plan was developed by Cavalry General Bennigsen, Kutuzov’s chief of staff. A large forest approached the French left flank almost closely, which made it possible to secretly approach their location. It was decided to use this feature. The army attacked in two parts according to plan. One, under the personal command of Bennigsen, was supposed to secretly go around the forest...
8 kilometers north of the Tarutino camp and at a considerable distance from the main forces of the Great Army there was a 27,000-strong vanguard of the French army under the overall command of Marshal Murat. The main forces of Murat (in the valley of the Chernishni River) and the Russian army (in the valley of the Nara River) were located along the Old Kaluga Road that passed here; between them there was an unguarded forest.
Battle of Tarutino
Peter von HESS
After cavalry general Bennigsen, with the support of Miloradovich, proposed in writing to Kutuzov to attack Murat, the field marshal was forced to agree and scheduled a battle that took place on October 18, 1812 and went down in history as the Battle of the Chernishna River or the Battle of Vinkovo ( in French historiography), and now most often referred to as the battle of Tarutino.
The enemy's most vulnerable was the left flank of General Sebastiani's cavalry corps, since it was located in the open, unlike the right, protected by the steep banks of the Nara and Chernishni rivers. Quartermaster General Karl Fedorovich Tol drew up a disposition for battle. The Russian troops were divided into two groups: the left wing under the command of Miloradovich and the right wing under the command of Bennigsen, which delivered the main blow. They advanced in three columns: the column of Colonel Orlov-Denisov attacked the enemy’s left flank, the columns of the infantry corps of Generals Baggovut and Osterman-Tolstoy, who followed, attacked the village of Teterinki, the center of the combat formation of Murat’s vanguard.
Tarutino fight
Alexander DMITRIEV-MAMONOV
The plan called for a surprise attack, encirclement and destruction of the enemy, but the attack, scheduled for October 17, was postponed to another day due to the fault of staff officers. The movement of the columns to their original positions was to take place at night: in complete silence, the troops were ordered to cross the Nara, advance through the forest and take their initial positions for the attack by dawn. However, troop maneuvers in the night forest were extremely difficult, which led to the fact that only the Orlov-Denisov column completed the task. The columns of Osterman-Tolstoy and Baggovut were late, and some of the regiments got lost altogether.
Colonel V.V. Orlov-Denisov and the Cossacks of the Life Guards in the battle of Tarutino. Cossack lava.
Vladimir DORONIN
At dawn, around 7 o'clock in the morning, Orlov-Denisov, not wanting to be noticed and without waiting for a general signal, launched an attack on Sebastiani's left flank. The attack was so swift and sudden that the French, abandoning their convoys and artillery, began to hastily retreat behind the nearest ravine. The entire camp of Sebastiani's corps and over 30 guns and the standard ended up in the hands of the Cossacks.
Vasily Vasilievich Orlov-Denisov
Yuri IVANOV
Battle of Tarutino. 1812
Alexey FYODOROV
There was a threat of complete defeat of Murat's left flank and encirclement of his main forces. But the impunity of the Cossack freemen saved the enemy: the Cossacks, seeing the carts overflowing with goods, began to capture them... And Orlov-Denisov was not able to deal with them right away. And then Murat himself arrived in time, and with his decisive actions he was quickly able to restore order, quickly organize a response and stop the retreat and flight of his troops that had begun.
Portrait of Karl Fedorovich Baggovut
George DOW
The late General Baggovut, who came out to the noise of the battle, also did not wait for the main forces of his corps to approach, seeing the French waiting for them. He and the rangers rushed to attack the village of Teterinka and were killed by the very first cannonball from the batteries that Murat had already managed to transfer here. The death of the commander brought confusion to our ranks, the offensive stopped. The third column under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy was forced to wait for the second column and therefore did not intensify her actions. Bennigsen, not knowing what was happening at Osterman-Tolstoy, gave the order to withdraw before the rest of the detachments arrived. The favorable moment for a general attack was missed.
Battle of Tarutino
The battle near Tarutino, fragment: on the left, General Bennigsen on a black horse, with a standard in his hands - Colonel Orlov-Denisov,
in the foreground on a white horse is Colonel Karl Toll
Engraving from a painting by Peter von HESS
To fight
Ekaterina KAMYNINA
But the commander of the 20th Jaeger Regiment, Major Gorikhvostov, together with his soldiers, nevertheless rushed into a bayonet attack, put the enemy infantry to flight, repelled the cavalry attack and captured several guns. The rangers advanced bravely, but the main forces of the Russian infantry were unable to support them in time. There was no surprise.
The omnipresent Marshal Murat managed to do everything that day. According to officer Tyrion: King Murat immediately rushed to the attacked point and, with his presence of mind and courage, stopped the retreat that had begun. He rushed to the bivouacs, collected all the horsemen he came across and, as soon as he managed to recruit them from the squadron, he instantly rushed with them to the attack This tactic proved effective against significant, but scattered, uncontrollable Cossack forces.
1812
Oleg AVAKEMYAN
And the Cossacks who broke through to Spas-Kupla were stopped by the reserve cavalry of Latour-Mobourg. Murat, who retreated with the main forces to Spas-Kupla, strengthened the position with batteries and opened frontal fire, which stopped our advance.
On the right flank of the French, Miloradovich’s troops and Vasilchikov’s cavalry moved along the Old Kaluga Road from Tarutino to Vinkovo in a parade march. The blow that Miloradovich was supposed to deliver, which could have led to the destruction of Murat’s vanguard, was stopped by Kutuzov’s orders, and Miloradovich himself was recalled to headquarters in the morning and detained there until the evening. As a result, General Vasilchikov was marking time and no one attacked Claparède’s column of Polish infantry on the right flank; it calmly reached the forest and scattered in it. Outraged by Miloradovich's passivity, Leonty Leontievich Bennigson, arriving on the flank, did not find his like-minded person.
Thus, the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian troops and the courage of Murat’s cavalrymen, although at the cost of significant losses, allowed the French marshal to preserve the main forces of the vanguard and withdraw them from Vinkovo through forests, ravines and the Old Kaluga road, which was not captured by the Russians, to the village of Voronovo, which is 18 versts from Tarutino.
Victory at Tarutino October 6 (18), 1812
Copper engraving by Sergei FYODOROV based on a drawing by Dominico SCOTTI
The Russian regiments returned to their camp in the evening with songs and drumming. Wounded in the leg, General Bennigsen, who believed that the incomplete success of his plan was ensured by the ill will and interference of Kutuzov, did not get off his horse, which he was later reminded more than once. Bennigsen, Miloradovich, Tol and others persistently asked Kutuzov to bring additional troops into battle for the final defeat of Murat, but the Field Marshal resolutely refused them: If we did not know how to capture him alive yesterday and today arrive on time at the places where we were assigned, this pursuit will not bring any benefit and therefore is not necessary - it will distance us from the position and from our line of operations.
General Ermolov assessed this battle in this way: The battle could have ended with an incomparably greater benefit for us, but in general there was little connection in the actions of the troops. The field marshal, confident of success, remained with the guard and did not see it with his own eyes; private bosses gave orders arbitrarily. A huge number of our cavalry close to the center and on the left wing seemed more assembled for the parade, showing off their harmony more than their speed of movement. It was possible to prevent the enemy from uniting his scattered infantry, to bypass and stand in the way of his retreat, for there was a considerable space between his camp and the forest. The enemy was given time to gather troops, bring in artillery from different sides, reach the forest unhindered and retreat along the road running through it through the village of Voronovo. The enemy lost 22 guns, up to 2000 prisoners, the entire convoy and crews of Murat, the King of Naples. Rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks: they took up robbery, got drunk and did not think of preventing the enemy from retreating.
1812 Trophies of Russian weapons
Evgeniy LANCERE
And yet, the battle ended with the victory of Russian weapons over Murat’s vanguard. Enthusiastic dispatches flew to St. Petersburg, in which the field marshal, as usual, exaggerated the strength and losses of Murat, downplayed the Russian losses and did not say a word about the poor interaction of the troops in battle. In his letter dated October 7 to his wife Ekaterina Ilyintchna Kutuzova regarding the victory at Chernishna, the Field Marshal wrote: It was not surprising to defeat them, but it was necessary to defeat them cheaply for us and we lost only up to three hundred people with wounded... This is the first time the French have lost so many guns and the first time they ran like hares...
Alexander I and Michaud
Illustration for Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace
Andrey NIKOLAEV
And for greater effect, Mikhail Illarionovich sent a military engineer, Colonel Alexander Frantsevich Michaud-de-Boretour, to St. Petersburg to the emperor to personally testify to the victory at Tarutino.
Generous awards showered from Alexander I: Kutuzov received a golden sword with diamonds and a laurel wreath, Bennigsen (with all his desire not to mention the merits of the main initiator of the attack, the commander-in-chief could not) received diamond insignia of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and 100,000 rubles. Many officers and generals were awarded awards and promotions. The lower ranks of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th infantry corps and cavalry who were in battle received 5 rubles per person.
However, the brilliance of the awards could not obscure the fact that due to the uncoordinated actions of the columns, the intervention of the commander-in-chief, and poor control of the troops, the main goal of this battle - the defeat of Murat's corps - was not achieved. Murat's losses amounted to more than 2.5 thousand people killed and wounded (including the deaths of two generals - Per-Cesar Dery and Stanislav Fischer), more than a thousand prisoners, a third of the artillery, most of the convoy and the standard of the first cuirassier regiment. After the battle, the Russian troops were missing about 1.5 thousand people in their ranks, General Baggovut was killed, General Bennigsen was wounded.
Be that as it may, the battle on the Chernishna River was the first purely offensive battle won by Russian troops, which could not but have a positive effect on the morale of the army.
Portrait of Leonty Leontievich Bennigsen
George DOW
To finish about the cavalry general L.L. Bennigsene, I will say that in November 1812 he was removed from the army by Field Marshal Kutuzov, allegedly for health reasons. Later, again, like Barclay de Tolly, he was called up to serve the fatherland and took part in the Foreign Campaign of the Russian Army.
