The fate of the last bullet was decided by the civil war. Collapse of the White Movement in the South

By the time the front retreated beyond the Kuban, the question of the army's future prospects had acquired extremely serious importance. In accordance with my decision - in case of failure on the line of the Kuban River to withdraw troops to the Crimea - a number of measures were taken: the new main base in Feodosia was intensively supplied; from January, work began on organizing food bases on the Black Sea coast, including floating ones - for ports to which troops could retreat; The unloading of Novorossiysk from the refugee element, the sick and wounded was quickly completed by evacuating them abroad. Given the tonnage and morale of the troops, their simultaneous, systematic evacuation through the Novorossiysk port was unthinkable: there was no hope for the possibility of loading all the people, not to mention the artillery, convoy, horses and supplies that had to be abandoned. Therefore, in order to preserve the combat effectiveness of the troops, their organization and equipment, I outlined another route - through Taman. Even in the directive of March 4, when retreating beyond the Kuban River, the Volunteer Corps was entrusted, in addition to defending its lower reaches, with covering part of the forces of the Taman Peninsula near Temryuk. Reconnaissance of the route between Anapa and Tamanskaya station gave quite favorable results; the peninsula, enclosed by water barriers, provided great convenience for defense; the entire route there was under the cover of naval artillery, the width of the Kerch Strait is very small, and the transport flotilla of the Kerch port is quite powerful and could easily be reinforced. I ordered the vehicles to be hastily pulled together to Kerch.

At the same time, it was ordered to prepare riding horses for the operational unit of Headquarters, from which I intended to move to Anapa and then follow the coastal road with the troops to Taman. On March 5, I shared my assumptions with General Sidorin, who arrived at Headquarters, and was skeptical about them. According to his report, the Don units have lost their combat effectiveness and obedience and are unlikely to agree to go to Crimea. But in Georgie-Afipskaya, where the Don headquarters was located, a series of meetings took place, and the Don faction of the Supreme Circle, as I already mentioned, invalidated the decision to break with the commander-in-chief, and the meeting of Don commanders eventually joined the decision to lead troops to Taman. Although the transition to Taman was intended only in the future, and the Headquarters directive required holding the line of the Kuban River for now, the 4th Don Corps, stationed across the river above Ekaterinodar, immediately quickly withdrew and began to go west. On March 7, I gave my last directive at the Caucasian theater: the Kuban army, which had already abandoned the line of the Belaya River, to hold on to the Kurga River; The Don Army and the Volunteer Corps defend the line of the Kuban River from the mouth of Kurga to the Akhtanizovsky estuary; The Volunteer Corps now, with part of its forces, taking a roundabout route, occupied the Taman Peninsula and covered the northern road from Temryuk from the Reds (during the retreat beyond the Kuban, the corps did not cover it). None of the armies complied with the directive. The Kuban troops, completely disorganized, were in complete retreat, making their way along the mountain roads to Tuapse. Contact with them was lost not only operationally, but also politically: the Kuban Rada and the ataman, on the basis of the latest resolution of the Supreme Circle, in addition to the senior military commanders who remained loyal to the commander-in-chief, encouraged the troops to break with Headquarters. The Bolsheviks easily crossed the Kuban with insignificant forces and, encountering almost no resistance, reached its left bank near Yekaterinodar, cutting the front of the Don Army. The corps of General Starikov, which broke away from it to the east, went to join the Kuban. The other two Don corps, almost without stopping, moved in discordant crowds towards Novorossiysk. Many Cossacks threw down their weapons or entire regiments went over to; everything was confused, mixed up, all communication between the headquarters and the troops was lost, and the train of the commander of the Don Army, already powerless to control the troops, daily exposed to the danger of being captured, slowly made its way to the west through a sea of ​​people, horses and carts.

That distrust and that hostile feeling, which, due to previous events, lay between the volunteers and the Cossacks, now flared up with particular force. The moving Cossack avalanche, threatening to flood the entire rear of the Volunteer Corps and cut it off from Novorossiysk, caused great excitement in its ranks. Sometimes it broke out in very sharp forms. I remember how the chief of staff of the Volunteer Corps, General Dostovalov, said during one of the meetings on the General Headquarters train: “The only troops willing and able to continue the fight are the Volunteer Corps.” Therefore, he must be provided with all the necessary means of transport, without taking into account anyone’s claims and without stopping, if necessary, before using weapons. I abruptly stopped the speaker. The movement to Taman with the prospect of new battles in the cramped space of the peninsula, together with the wavering Cossack masses, confused the volunteers. The Novorossiysk port attracted people irresistibly, and it turned out to be impossible to overcome this desire. The corps greatly weakened its left flank, turning its main attention to Krymskaya - Tonnelnaya, in the direction of the railway line to Novorossiysk. On March 10, they raised an uprising in Anapa and Gostogaevskaya village and captured these points. The actions of our cavalry against were indecisive and ineffective. On the same day, the Bolsheviks, having thrown back the weak unit covering the Varenikovsky crossing, crossed the Kuban. During the day, their cavalry units appeared at Gostogaevskaya, and in the evening, columns of enemy infantry were already moving from the crossing in the direction of Anapa. Repeated on March 11, the cavalry offensive of generals Barbovich, Chesnokov and Dyakov against Gostogaevskaya and Anapa was even less energetic and was not successful. The routes to Taman were cut off... And on March 11, the Volunteer Corps, two Don and the Kuban division that joined them, without a directive, under light enemy pressure, concentrated in the area of ​​​​the Krymskaya station, heading with their entire solid mass towards Novorossiysk. The catastrophe became inevitable and inevitable.

Novorossiysk of those days, already largely cleared of the refugee element, was a military camp and a rear den. Its streets were literally crowded with young and healthy warrior deserters. They rioted, organized rallies reminiscent of the first months of the revolution, with the same elementary understanding of events, with the same demagoguery and hysteria. Only the composition of the protesters was different: there were officers instead. Hiding behind high motives, they began to organize, the hidden goal of which was to capture ships if necessary... And at the same time, the official stated with satisfaction: At first, due to the lack of a reliable garrison in Novorossiysk, it was difficult. I called volunteer officer units to the city and gave the order to close all those that arose due to the collapse of the military, to establish field courts for their leaders and deserters, and to register those liable for military service. These measures, due to the limited number of ships in the Novorossiysk roadstead, somewhat defused the atmosphere. And typhus reigned in the city, and death decimated. On the 10th I accompanied the head of the Markov division, the bravest officer, Colonel Bleisch, to the grave. The second Markovite left in recent weeks... Recently in Bataysk, among a string of retreating convoys, I met a cart, worn out in their mass, carrying a coffin with the body of General Timanovsky, who had died of typhus. Iron Stepanych, an associate and friend of General Markov, a man of extraordinary, cold courage, who led regiments to victory so many times, despised death and was struck by it at such an inopportune time... Or at the right time? A wretched cart with expensive luggage, covered with torn tarpaulin, is like a silent and impassive symbol. Stunned by the defeat and poorly understanding the complex reasons, his officer circle was worried and loudly named the culprit. He was already named long ago - a man of duty and impeccable moral integrity, on whom the army and some public circles - some out of ignorance, others for tactical reasons - laid the main burden of common sins. Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, General I.P. Romanovsky. At the beginning of March, Protopresbyter Father Georgy Shavelsky came to me and convinced me to release Ivan Pavlovich from his post, assuring me that, due to the prevailing mood in the officers, his murder was possible. Father Georgy wrote to me about this episode later: Ivan Pavlovich listened calmly, as if dispassionately, and only asked me. Ivan Pavlovich lowered his head into his hands and fell silent. Indeed, everything was heaped on his poor head: he was considered a predator, when I know that in Yekaterinodar and Taganrog, in order to find a means of subsistence, he had to sell his old things taken from Petrograd; he was declared when he had always been the most faithful son of the Orthodox Church; he was accused of selfishness and arrogance when, for the sake of the good of his cause, he tried to completely obscure his self, and so on. I now begged Ivan Pavlovich to retire from business for a while, until minds sober up and anger subsides. He answered me that this was his greatest desire... You know how odious the name of Ivan Pavlovich was in the army at that time; Perhaps you hear that his memory continues to be reviled to this day. It is necessary to dispel the vile slander and hatred associated with it, which pursued this pure man during his life and did not leave him even after death. I would be ready, as his confessor, whom he believed and to whom he opened his soul, to testify to the world that this soul was childishly pure, that he was strengthened in the feat that he carried out by faith in God, that he selflessly loved his Motherland, served to her only out of ardent, boundless love for her, that, without looking for his own, he forgot about himself, that he vividly felt human grief and suffering and always rushed to meet it. It was hard for me to talk with Ivan Pavlovich about these issues. We decided with him that we didn’t have long to endure: after moving to Crimea, he would leave his post. Several times General Holman turned to me and Quartermaster General Makhrov with a convincing request to move the train or persuade General Romanovsky to transfer to an English ship, since. This intention, apparently, was close to being realized: on March 12, a person close to the Kornilov division appeared on my train and declared that a group of Kornilovites was going to kill General Romanovsky today; General Holman also came. In the presence of Ivan Pavlovich, he excitedly asked me again to the chief of staff to transfer to an English ship. “I won’t do this,” said Ivan Pavlovich. - If this is the case, I ask Your Excellency to relieve me of my post. I will take a gun and volunteer for the Kornilov regiment; let them do whatever they want to me. I asked him to at least go to my carriage. He refused. Blind, cruel people, for what? British relations were still ambivalent. While General Keyes' diplomatic mission was inventing new forms of government for the South, the head of the military mission, General Holman, was putting all his strength and soul into helping us. He personally took part with British technical units in the battles on the Donetsk front; with all his energy he sought to strengthen and streamline material assistance; contributed to the organization of the Feodosia base - directly and influencing the French.

General Holman, by the force of British authority, supported the Southern government in its conflict with the Cossacks and made attempts to influence the rise of Cossack sentiment. He identified our interests with his own, warmly took our troubles to heart and worked without losing hope and energy until the last day, presenting a sharp contrast with many Russian figures who had already lost their hearts. He also showed touching attention in his personal relationships with me and the chief of staff. The atmosphere that had gripped Novorossiysk in recent days gave Holman no rest. It was useless to talk to us about this, but not a day passed without him coming to the Quartermaster General with reproaches and advice on this matter. Together with him, he secretly took some precautions, and clearly demonstrated his attention to the commander-in-chief, presenting the English landing force and ship crews to me for inspection. However, to this day I think that for me personally all these precautions were unnecessary. A great disaster befell the South. The situation seemed hopeless and the end was near. London's policy changed accordingly. General Holman still remained in office, but the name of his successor, General Percy, was already being unofficially named... London decided to speed things up. Obviously, such an order was morally unacceptable for General Holman, since on one of the days immediately before the evacuation it was not he, but General Bridge who came to me with the following proposal from the British government: since, in the latter’s opinion, the situation is catastrophic and evacuation to the Crimea is not feasible, then the British offer me their mediation to conclude a truce with the Bolsheviks... I answered: never. This episode continued several months later. In August 1920, the newspaper published a note from Lord Curzon to Chicherin dated April 1. In it, after considering the pointlessness of further struggle, which Curzon stated. It is not known what was more surprising: the lies that Lord Curzon allowed, or the ease with which the British Foreign Office switched from real assistance to the white South to moral support for the Bolsheviks by officially condemning the White movement. In the same page I immediately published a refutation:

I categorically rejected the proposal (of the British military representative for a truce) and, although with the loss of material, transferred the army to the Crimea, where I immediately began to continue the fight. The note from the British government about the start of peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks was, as you know, handed not to me, but to my successor in command of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, General Wrangel. The negative answer of which was at one time published in the press.

My resignation from the post of Commander-in-Chief was caused by complex reasons, but had no connection with the policies of Lord Curzon. As before, so now I consider an armed struggle against the Bolsheviks inevitable and necessary until they are completely defeated. Otherwise, not only Russia, but all of Europe will turn into ruins.

To characterize General Holman, I can add: he asked me to further clarify that it was not General Holman who proposed a truce with the Bolsheviks. I willingly fulfilled the wish of a man who, as he reported to Churchill, was ready. The armies rolled from Kuban to Novorossiysk too quickly, and there were too few ships in the roadstead... Steamships evacuating refugees and wounded stood idle for a long time in foreign ports due to quarantine rules and were very late. The headquarters and the commission of General Vyazmitinov, which was directly in charge of the evacuation, made every effort to collect the ships, encountering great obstacles in this. Both Constantinople and Sevastopol showed extraordinary slowness under the pretext of a lack of coal, malfunctioning mechanisms and other insurmountable circumstances. Having learned about the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief in the East, General Milne and the English squadron, Admiral Seymour, in Novorossiysk, on March 11 I boarded General Holman’s train, where I met both English commanders. Having outlined the general situation to them and pointed out the possibility of a catastrophic fall in the defense of Novorossiysk, I asked for assistance in the evacuation by the English fleet. I was met with sympathy and readiness. Admiral Seymour stated that, according to technical conditions, he could take no more than 5-6 thousand people on board his ships. Then General Holman spoke in Russian and translated his phrase into English: - Be calm. The admiral is a kind and generous person. He will be able to cope with technical difficulties and will take a lot more. “I’ll do everything I can,” Seymour replied.

The admiral, with his cordial attitude towards the fate of the white army, fully justified the characterization given to him by Holman. His promise could be trusted, and this help greatly alleviated our difficult situation. Meanwhile the ships were arriving. There is hope that in the next 4-8 days we will be able to raise all the troops who want to continue the fight on the territory of Crimea. Vyazmitinov's commission assigned the first four transports to units of the Volunteer Corps, one steamer for the Kuban, the rest were intended for the Don Army. On the morning of March 12, General Sidorin arrived to see me. He was depressed and looked completely hopeless at the situation of his army. Everything fell apart, everything flowed wherever they looked, no one wanted to fight anymore, obviously they won’t go to Crimea. The Don commander was mainly concerned with the fate of the Don officers, who were lost in the agitated Cossack masses. They were in mortal danger if they surrendered to the Bolsheviks. Sidorin estimated their number at 5 thousand. I assured him that all the officers who could get to Novorossiysk would be put on ships. But as the wave of Don troops approached Novorossiysk, the situation became increasingly clear, and in a sense unexpected for Sidorin: the hesitations gradually dissipated, and the entire Don army rushed to the ships. For what - they were unlikely to have a clear understanding of it at the time. Under the pressure of demands addressed to him from all sides, General Sidorin changed his tactics and, in turn, turned to Headquarters with a demand for ships for all units in sizes that were clearly impossible, just as the systematic evacuation of troops who did not want to fight, led by commanders who had ceased to obey, was generally impossible. Meanwhile, Novorossiysk, overcrowded beyond all measure, becoming literally impassable, flooded with human waves, was buzzing like a ruined beehive. There was a struggle for - a struggle for salvation... Many human dramas played out on the streets of the city in these terrible days. A lot of bestial feeling poured out in the face of impending danger, when naked passions drowned out conscience and man became a fierce enemy to man. On March 13, General Kutepov, appointed chief of defense of Novorossiysk, came to me and reported that the morale of the troops, their extremely nervous mood did not make it possible to stay longer in the city, that it was necessary to leave it at night... The ships continued to arrive, but there were still them not enough to lift everyone up. General Sidorin again made a sharp demand for transport. I offered him three solutions:

1. Occupy the nearest approaches to Novorossiysk with the remaining Don troops in order to gain two days, during which the missing transport will undoubtedly arrive. Sidorin did not want or could not do this. In the same way, he refused to deploy to the position at least a training brigade that had retained its combat capability.

2. Lead your units personally along the coastal road to Gelendzhik - Tuapse (the path was blocked by about 4 thousand deserters), where suitable steamships could be turned down and new ones sent after unloading them in the Crimean ports. Sidorin did not want to do this.

3. Finally, it was possible to surrender to the will of fate, counting on those transports that would arrive on that day and on the night of the 14th, as well as on the help of English ships promised by Admiral Seymour.

General Sidorin settled on this decision, and then told the commanders subordinate to him and then told the press about what had been done by the high command. This version, accompanied by fictitious details, was very convenient, shifting the entire narrative, all personal sins and the consequences of the collapse of the Cossack army onto someone else’s head. On the evening of the 13th, the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, the headquarters of the Don Army and the Don Ataman were put on the ship. After that, General Romanovsky and several staff officers and I transferred to the Russian destroyer. The landing of troops continued throughout the night. Some of the volunteers and several Don regiments who did not get on the ships took the coastal road to Gelendzhik. A sleepless night passed. It's starting to get light. A terrible picture. I climbed onto the bridge of a destroyer standing at the pier. The bay is empty. In the outer roadstead there were several English ships, and even further away one could see the already unclear silhouettes of transports, carrying the Russian army to the last piece of their native land, into the unknown future... Two French destroyers stood peacefully in the bay, apparently unaware of the situation. We approached them. My request was conveyed into the mouthpiece: - Novorossiysk has been evacuated.

The commander-in-chief asks you to take on board as many of the people remaining on shore as possible. The destroyers quickly took off and went to the outer roadstead... (Later they took part in rescuing people walking along the coastal road south of Novorossiysk.) There was only one in the bay. There was a crowd of people on the shore near the piers. People sat on their belongings, broke cans of canned food, warmed them up, and warmed themselves by the fires made right there. These are those who abandoned their weapons - those who were no longer looking for a way out. The majority have a calm, dull indifference - from everything they have experienced, from fatigue, from spiritual prostration. From time to time, the cries of individuals could be heard from the crowd, asking to be taken on board. Who are they, how can we rescue them from the crowd squeezing them?.. Some officer from the northern pier loudly called for help, then rushed into the water and swam to the destroyer. They lowered the boat and raised him safely. Suddenly we notice that some military unit is lined up on the pier in an emphatically orderly manner. The eyes of people with hope and prayer are fixed on our destroyer. I order you to approach the shore. A crowd poured in... - The destroyer takes only armed crews... They loaded as many people as possible and left the bay. Along the road, not far from the shore, in the open sea, a huge barge, taken out and left there by some steamship, was rocking on a fresh wave. Completely, to the point of crushing, crammed to the point of madness with people. They took her in tow and brought her to the English battleship. Admiral Seymour kept his promise: the English ships took significantly more than was promised. The outlines of Novorossiysk stood out sharply and clearly. What was going on there?.. Some destroyer suddenly turned back and flew at full speed towards the piers. The guns boomed, machine guns crackled: the destroyer entered into battle with the advanced units of the Bolsheviks, who had already occupied the city. This was where General Kutepov, having received information that the 3rd Drozdovsky regiment, which was covering the landing, had not yet been loaded, went to the rescue. Then everything became quiet. The contours of the city, coast and mountains were enveloped in fog, stretching into the distance... into the past. So hard, so painful.

The fate of the troops remaining in the North Caucasus and the Caspian flotilla

The recently formidable Southern Armed Forces disintegrated. The units that moved along the seashore to Gelendzhik, at the first collision with a detachment of deserters occupying Kabardinskaya, could not stand it, held a meeting and dispersed. A small part of them were picked up by ships, the rest went to the mountains or were handed over to the Bolsheviks. Units of the Kuban Army and the 4th Don Corps, which reached the mountains to the Black Sea coast, settled down between Tuapse and Sochi, deprived of food and fodder, in an extremely difficult situation. The hopes of the Kuban residents for and for the help of the Georgians were not justified. The Kuban Rada, the government and Ataman Bukretov, who sought command of the troops (the command was united in the hands of the commander of the Kuban Corps, General Pisarev, to whom the 4th Don Corps was also subordinate), demanded a complete break with and were inclined to conclude peace with the Bolsheviks; military commanders categorically opposed this. This discord and the complete disorganization of the top brought even greater confusion to the Cossack masses, who were completely confused in search of a way out and ways to salvation. Information about disintegration, fluctuations and clashes in the units gathered on the Black Sea coast came to Feodosia and raised painful doubts: what to do with them next? These doubts worried Headquarters and were shared by Cossack circles. The headquarters indicated that only those armed and willing to fight should be transported. The Don rulers looked more pessimistic: at their stormy meeting in Feodosia, it was decided to refrain completely from transporting the Don people to the Crimea. The motives for this decision were: on the one hand, the collapse of units, on the other, fear for the strength of Crimea.

This uncertain situation of the Don-Kuban corps on the coast lasted for about a month after my departure, ending tragically: the Kuban ataman Bukretov, through General Morozov, concluded an agreement with the Soviet command on the surrender of the army to the Bolsheviks and himself fled to Georgia. Most of the troops actually surrendered, the smaller number managed to cross to the Crimea (according to General Wrangel’s Headquarters, out of 27 thousand, about 12 thousand were transported). At the beginning of March, the exodus from the North Caucasus began. Troops and refugees flocked to Vladikavkaz, from where on the 10th of March they crossed into Georgia along the Georgian Military Road. The troops and refugees disarmed by the Georgians (about 7 thousand troops, 3-5 thousand refugees) were later interned in the Poti camp. Even further east, along the shore of the Caspian Sea, the Astrakhan detachment of General Dratsenko was retreating to Petrovsk. This detachment boarded ships on March 16 in Petrovsk and, together with the Caspian flotilla, went to Baku. General Dratsenko and the commander of the flotilla, Admiral Sergeev, entered into a condition with the Azerbaijani government, by virtue of which, at the cost of transferring weapons and equipment to Azerbaijan, the troops were allowed passage to Poti. The military flotilla, without raising the Azerbaijani flag and maintaining its internal control, took over coastal defense. But when the ships began to enter the harbor, a deception was revealed: the Azerbaijani government stated that the person who signed the treaty did not have the authority to do so, and demanded unconditional surrender. On this basis, unrest began in the fleet; Admiral Sergeev, who went to Batum in order to get in touch with Headquarters from there, was declared deposed by the officers, and the ships under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Bushen went to Anzeli with the goal of surrendering there under the protection of the British. The British command, not wanting a clash with the Bolsheviks, invited the ship crews to be considered interned and ordered the removal of parts of the guns and vehicles. And when the Bolsheviks subsequently made a sudden landing, the strong English detachment occupying Anzali turned into a hasty retreat; Our naval teams were forced to join the British. One of the participants in this retreat, a Russian officer, subsequently wrote about the feeling of some moral satisfaction that was experienced at the sight of how. The state formation of the South collapsed, and its fragments, scattered far, rolled from the Caspian to the Black Sea, carrying away the human waves.

The stronghold that covered the ephemeral forces of the South from the north, which was tirelessly eroding the forces of the South, collapsed, and all their weakness and non-viability was revealed strikingly clearly... It fell in a few days, existed for no more than a week, and Azerbaijan was soon swept away. The turn of the Georgian Republic was coming, the existence of which, for reasons of general policy, was allowed by the Soviet government for some time. All that remained of the Armed Forces of the South was concentrated on the small Crimean peninsula. The army that came under my direct command was consolidated into three corps (Crimean, Volunteer, Donskoy), a Combined Cavalry Division and a Combined Kuban Brigade. All other units, commands, headquarters and institutions that had gathered in Crimea from the entire former territory of the South were subject to disbandment, and all their combat-ready personnel went to staff the active troops. The Crimean Corps, with a force of about 5 thousand, still covered the isthmuses. The Kerch region was protected from landings from Taman by a consolidated detachment of 11/2 thousand (consolidated Kuban brigade, consolidated Alekseevskaya brigade, Kornilov cadet school). All other units were located in reserve, on vacation: the Volunteer Corps in the Sevastopol-Simferopol area, the Donets in the vicinity of Evpatoria. I located my headquarters temporarily in quiet Feodosia, far from Sevastopol seething with passions. The immediate task assigned to the army was the defense of Crimea. The army numbered 35-40 thousand soldiers in its ranks, was armed with 100 guns and up to 500 machine guns. But she was morally shocked, and the troops arriving from Novorossiysk were deprived of equipment, horses, carts and artillery. The volunteers came fully armed, bringing with them all the machine guns and even several guns; The Donets arrived unarmed. From the very first day, urgent work began on reorganizing, manning and supplying units. Some rest calmed the nerves that were extremely excited. Until then, for a year and a half, units were scattered along the front over vast distances, almost never leaving the battle. Now the concentrated location of large military formations opened up the possibility of direct and close influence of senior commanders on the troops.

The enemy occupied the northern exits from the Crimean isthmuses along the line Genichesk - Chongarsky Bridge - Sivash-Perekop. His forces were small (5-6 thousand), and the presence of Makhno’s troops and other rebel bands in the rear restrained his offensive impulse. On the Taman Peninsula side, the Bolsheviks did not show any activity. The movement of the main forces of the South to the shores of the Black Sea was regarded by the Soviet command as the last act of the struggle. Information about the state of our troops, about the mutinies raised by troops and commanders, very exaggerated, strengthened the Bolsheviks in the conviction that the White army, pinned to the sea, would face inevitable and final death. Therefore, the operation of transferring significant forces to Crimea, the readiness and ability to continue the fight there, came as a complete surprise to the Soviet command. Not enough attention was paid to Crimea, and the Soviet government subsequently paid a heavy price for this oversight. It was necessary to streamline and reorganize civil administration, which was too cumbersome for Crimea. Melnikov, having arrived in Sevastopol, immediately found himself in an atmosphere of deep and organic hostility, which paralyzed all his activities. The government - by its genesis, as created as a result of an agreement with the Supreme Circle - for this reason alone was odious and caused great irritation, ready to spill over into wild forms. Therefore, in order to prevent unwanted excesses, I decided to abolish the government even before I left. On March 16, I gave the order to abolish the Council of Ministers. In return, M.V. Bernatsky was entrusted with organizing it.

The order confirmed that... This unexpected order made a very painful impression on the members of the government... I don’t justify the form, but the essence of the reorganization was dictated by obvious necessity and the personal safety of the ministers. On the same day, the 16th, members of the government left Sevastopol on a steamship provided to them and, before leaving for Constantinople, stopped in Feodosia to say goodbye to me. After a brief word from N.M. Melnikov, N.V. Tchaikovsky turned to me: - Let me ask you, General: what prompted you to carry out a coup d'état? I was surprised by this formulation of the question - after the break with the Supreme Circle and, most importantly, after the catastrophic event that broke out over the entire white South... - What a coup there! I appointed you and I relieved you of your duties - that’s all. After this, F. S. Sushkov pointed out: during the few days of his stay in Crimea, the government, according to him, earned recognition not only from public circles, but also from the military environment. So everything foreshadowed the possibility of his fruitful work... - Unfortunately, I have completely opposite information. You apparently don't know what's going on around you. In any case, in a few days everything that happened will become clear to you... General Holman, the constant well-wisher of the army, was leaving his post. In his farewell speech he said: Under London's new policy, General Holman would really be out of place. I also parted with my faithful friend I.P. Romanovsky. When releasing him from the post of chief of staff, I wrote in the order: History will brand with contempt those who, for selfish reasons, weaved a web of vile slander around his honest and pure name. May God give you strength, dear Ivan Pavlovich, to continue the hard work of state building in a healthier environment.

In place of General Romanovsky, I appointed General Makhrov, who was serving as Quartermaster General, as chief of staff. Holman, who planned to leave for Constantinople the next day, invited Ivan Pavlovich to go with him. The threads connecting with the past were torn, it became empty all around... Late in the evening of the 19th, General Kutepov arrived in Feodosia on important business. He reported: To this I answered him that he was mistaken regarding the mood of my corps. I will not participate in any meeting without the permission of the commander-in-chief and, attaching great importance to everything that he told me, I consider it necessary to immediately report all this to General Denikin. After these words of mine, I got up and left. Walking out onto the platform, I boarded the train and ordered them to take me to Feodosia. What I heard did not surprise me. General Slashchov carried out this work not for the first day and not in one direction, but in four at once. He sent messengers to Baron Wrangel, convincing him (that is, Wrangel and Slashchov), and through the mediation of Duke S. of Leuchtenberg, he entered into contact on this issue with officer naval circles. In his relations with the right, mainly the public, he tried to direct its choice to his personal benefit. At the same time, through General Borovsky, he entered into contact with generals Sidorin, Pokrovsky, Yuzefovich and agreed with them on the day and place of the meeting to eliminate the commander-in-chief. In whose favor - it was kept silent, since the first two were antagonists of Wrangel and also did not have the desire to lead themselves with Slashchov. Finally, at the same time, almost every day, Slashchov telegraphed to Headquarters with a request to allow him to come to me for a report and expressed that he was not allowed in. General Sidorin intensely looked at him and telegraphed to the Don Ataman that this view was shared. He decided and demanded the immediate arrival of the ataman and the government in Yevpatoria (Sidorin’s telegram to General Bogaevsky dated March 18).

I already knew about the role that Bishop Benjamin, who led the opposition of the extreme right, played in the rising turmoil, but the extent to which his zeal reached became known to me only a few years later... The next day after his arrival in Sevastopol, the Right Reverend appeared to the chairman his. N. M. Melnikov says about this visit: it is necessary to force General Denikin to relinquish power and transfer it to General Wrangel, because only he, in the opinion of the bishop and his friends, can save the Motherland in these conditions. The bishop added that they, in essence, have everything ready to carry out the intended change, and that he considers it his duty to turn to me on this matter only in order, if possible, not to introduce unnecessary temptation into the masses and to provide legal support under the enterprise, for if he authorizes the planned change, everything will go smoothly... Bishop Benjamin added that, whether he agrees or disagrees, the matter will still be done... This invitation to take part in the coup, made by the bishop, moreover, was like this unexpected for me, then seeing the conspirator in a cassock for the first time, and I was so outraged that I stood up and stopped the bishop’s further outpourings. Bishop Veniamin then visited the Minister of Internal Affairs V.F. Seeler, who also spent an hour and a half instilling in him the idea of ​​the need for a coup. , and this now fully matured impulse should not be interfered with. We need to promote this in every possible way - it will be a thing pleasing to God. Everything is ready: General Wrangel and the entire party of patriotically minded real sons of their Motherland, which is in connection with General Wrangel, are ready for this. Moreover, General Wrangel is the dictator, by the grace of God, from whose hands the anointed one will receive power and the kingdom...

The bishop was so carried away by maintaining the conversation that he ceased to maintain restraint and simple caution and reached the point that he was ready to immediately expect immediate decisions from the government (from a note by V. F. Seeler). Sidorin, Slashchov, Veniamin... All this, in essence, was of little interest to me. I asked General Kutepov about the mood of the volunteer units. He replied that one division was quite strong, in another the mood was satisfactory, in two - unfavorable. Criticizing our failures, the troops mainly blame General Romanovsky for them. Kutepov expressed his opinion that it was necessary to take urgent measures against the gathering meeting and it would be best to call the senior commanders to me so that they themselves would report to me about the mood of the troops. I looked at the matter differently: the time had come to carry out my decision. Enough. That same night, together with the chief of staff, General Makhrov, I drafted a secret telegram - an order to gather commanders on March 21 in Sevastopol for the Military Council chaired by General Dragomirov. Among the participants I included those who were out of work, candidates for power known to me, and the most active representatives of the opposition. The council was to include: commanders of the Volunteer (Kutepov) and Crimean (Slashchov) corps and their division chiefs. Of the number of commanders of brigades and regiments - half (from the Crimean Corps, due to the combat situation, the norm may be less). The following should also arrive: the commandants of the fortresses, the commander of the fleet, his chief of staff, the heads of the naval departments, and four senior combat commanders of the fleet.

From the Don Corps - generals Sidorin, Kelchevsky and six persons consisting of generals and regiment commanders. From the headquarters of the commander-in-chief - the chief of staff, the general on duty, the head of the Military Directorate and personally the generals: Wrangel, Bogaevsky, Ulagai, Shilling, Pokrovsky, Borovsky, Efimov, Yuzefovich and Toporkov. I addressed the Chairman of the Military Council with a letter (March 20, No. 145/m): For three years of Russian unrest I fought, giving it all my strength and bearing power like a heavy cross sent down by fate. God did not bless the troops I led with success. And although I have not lost faith in the viability of the army and in its historical calling, the internal connection between the leader and the army is broken. And I can no longer lead her. I propose that the Military Council elect a worthy person to whom I will successively transfer power and command. Dear A. Denikin. The next two or three days were spent in conversations with people devoted to me, who came to prevent my departure. They tormented my soul, but they could not change my decision. The military council met, and on the morning of the 22nd I received a telegram from General Dragomirov: Dragomirov. I considered it impossible to change my mind and make the fate of the South dependent on temporary, changing, as it seemed to me, moods. I answered General Dragomirov: I repeat that the number of representatives is completely indifferent. But, if the Don people consider it necessary, allow the number of members in accordance with their organization. On the same day I received a telegram from General Dragomirov in response. I ordered to find out whether General Wrangel was at this meeting and whether he knew about this resolution, and, having received an affirmative answer, gave my last order to the Armed Forces of the South: Lieutenant General Baron Wrangel is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. 2. To everyone who walked honestly with me in a difficult struggle, a low bow. Lord, give victory to the army and save Russia. General Denikin. Military Council. My departure. Constantinople drama. I learned about what happened at the Military Council only a long time later. I think that at that time both General Kutepov and I did not quite correctly assess volunteer sentiment. I will give a description of these events, compiled by one of the participants and confirmed by other members of the council (from a note by General Polzikov): note by General Kutepov :). General Kutepov, leaving a meeting with General Vitkovsky, ordered to gather in the palace for the Military Council appointed that evening 11/2 hours earlier, in order to arrange a preliminary meeting of the senior commanders of the Volunteer Corps before the start of the Military Council. By the way, I will say that since there was anxiety in the air, it was decided to take some measures, which were expressed in the following: reinforced patrols were assigned from our regiments and the artillery brigade, especially on the streets adjacent to the palace. Duty units were appointed at the quartering sites, which had to remain awake in full readiness and had fast liaison officers in the palace. Teams of machine gunners stood at the main entrance of the palace. The same teams were secretly placed inside neighboring courtyards. An officer company was secretly stationed in the palace courtyard. At a preliminary meeting chaired by General Kutepov, all the commanders unanimously expressed the idea that General Denikin should not leave his post, insisted on expressing full confidence in him and taking all measures to persuade him not to leave his post.

It was decided to exert appropriate influence on the remaining participants in the Military Council, so that the Military Council would ask and even beg General Denikin not to leave his post. General Kutepov sat sad, as if depressed, and repeatedly stated General Denikin’s firm decision. Accustomed to seeing General Kutepov as an energetic, persistent and decisive boss, we were perplexed by his passivity. I couldn’t help but remember the rumors about his disagreements with General Denikin and Fr. This was completely implausible, but nevertheless there was no explanation for the silent, passive, and therefore incomprehensible behavior of General Kutepov. None of us understood then how hard it was for him. We could not understand that he really knew the firm and unyielding decision of General Denikin, we did not understand that General Kutepov, always honest and straightforward, knew that he could not give us hope, and, experiencing much more acutely and deeply everything that we were worried, he could not tell us anything other than General Denikin’s firm decision to leave his post (note by General Kutepov:). It was decided, in the event of General Denikin’s inflexibility, to express full confidence in him and ask him to appoint a deputy for himself, whose recognition, naturally, would be mandatory for everyone. Opening the meeting, General Dragomirov read the order of the Commander-in-Chief on the appointment of the Military Council. Then, those present at the meeting were verified and their right to participate in it was established. Now, after the verification was completed, General Slashchov announced that his corps was at the front, and therefore he could not send all the senior commanders who had the right to take part in the meeting to the meeting. General Dragomirov announced that this was provided for and stipulated in the order of the commander-in-chief. General Slashchov continued to insist that his corps did not have a sufficient number of representatives at the meeting to identify the desires and decisions of the corps, that this was an injustice to the valiant corps, which had been defending the last piece of white Russian land for the longest time, and so on. General Dragomirov again stated that he did not have the right to change the order of the commander-in-chief, that fair representation had been appointed for all units, that the number of those present from a particular military unit was not significant, since there was still representation from it, and in particular, regarding 2 corps, it is clear that his voice will be sufficiently strong in the person of the corps commander and the representatives present from the corps. General Slashchov again tried with great excitement to prove the unfavorable and bypassed position of his corps while the 1st Corps had a large presence of its representatives at the meeting. General Kutepov stated that he agrees to reduce the number of representatives from his corps if their presence causes such a protest about a violation of justice. General Dragomirov again stated that he did not see a violation of justice in relation to any of the military formations, he did not dare change the order of the commander-in-chief, and he stopped further discussion of the issue of representation at the meeting of the Military Council. Following this, General Dragomirov announced that, in pursuance of the order of the commander-in-chief, it was necessary to elect his deputy. General Slashchov was the first to ask to speak and spoke at great length about the need to establish order. In addition to General Slashchov, as I remember, General Makhrov and Vyazmitinov spoke, declaring that they were well aware of General Denikin’s adamant decision to leave power. General Slashchov spoke several times. He spoke about the inadmissibility of elections, referring to the comparison with the Red Army, after the elders set an example.

General Toporkov spoke warmly, straightforwardly, sincerely, honestly and well. Nobody from the Volunteer Corps has spoken yet. General Dragomirov ordered the distribution of paper and pencils for the secret planning of the deputy commander-in-chief. Then captain 1st rank (chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet Ryabinin, who later went over to the Bolsheviks) asked to speak, beginning with the words: , made a pathetic speech about the need to carry out the order of the commander-in-chief and name his deputy, which, according to the Black Sea Fleet officials, is General Wrangel . The name of General Wrangel was officially announced at the council meeting, but in private conversations it had already been mentioned. At this time, there was a private discussion around General Vitkovsky, who, after General Dragomirov’s order to distribute the paper, asked for words through General Kutepov (note by General Kutepov:) and energetically and persistently declared that he and the ranks of the Drozdov division found it impossible for themselves to take part in the elections and categorically refuse this. After the words of General Vitkovsky, the chiefs of the Kornilov, Markov and Alekseev divisions and other units of the Volunteer Corps immediately joined his statement. Representatives from the divisions supported their superiors by the fact that everyone stood up when they made their statements. General Dragomirov sternly drew attention to the inadmissibility of such a statement, since it constitutes a failure to comply with the order of the commander-in-chief. Then General Vitkovsky objected that we have always carried out the orders of the commander-in-chief and will carry them out now, that we completely trust him, and if the commander-in-chief decided to relinquish power, then we obey his decision and his appointment of a deputy. But first it is necessary to express confidence in the commander-in-chief and ask him to remain in power and immediately bring to his attention such a decision of the Military Council. After these words, one of the ranks of the Volunteer Corps shouted. The palace building was loud and friendly for a long time. After it ended and everyone sat down, General Dragomirov again tried to prove the need to carry out the order of the commander-in-chief, which cannot be changed by the Military Council. Then General Vitkovsky and other ranks of the Volunteer Corps argued for the need to report via direct wire to General Denikin about the mood of the Military Council, about expressing confidence in him and asking him to remain in power. General Dragomirov objected to all these arguments and did not agree with them. Everyone was pretty tired, and therefore many others willingly joined our request to take a short break, and, to our pleasure, General Dragomirov agreed to this, declaring a break. Now we (the Volunteer Corps) occupied one of the secluded and downstairs rooms and decided to send an urgent telegram to General Denikin, in which we express our complete trust and gratitude to him and ask him to remain in power. Some commanders who did not belong to the Volunteer Corps, but who completely shared our views, came to the room we occupied. I don’t remember who compiled the telegram, in general it was compiled collectively (text of the telegram:). The telegram was immediately sent to the city telegraph with one of our contacts with the order to ensure that it was immediately sent to General Denikin. The telegram was accepted, but was not sent in a timely manner, because, as it turned out later, the line with Headquarters was busy and General Dragomirov had an order not to transmit any telegrams without his permission. Upon the resumption of the meeting of the Military Council, General Dragomirov agreed to send a telegram to General Denikin and asked to draw up its text. To the request addressed to General Dragomirov to speak with General Denikin immediately via direct wire in order to then end the meeting of the Military Council, General Dragomirov categorically refused. The next day, the meeting did not start for a long time, and we walked along the corridors in bewilderment and with various assumptions, went into the large meeting room, but constantly saw the doors to the senior leaders’ room tightly closed; entry into this room without the permission of General Dragomirov was not allowed. They repeatedly tried to find out when the council meeting would start and whether it would take place at all. The answers were the most vague and uncertain. It was not possible to call General Kutepov from the room of the senior commanders. General Vitkovsky was not allowed into this room. There was no information about General Denikin’s response to the telegram sent to him the day before. One got the impression that the Military Council consisted of the highest commanders, and the rest were ignored. The complete unknown and uncertainty of the current situation and the absence of any explanations greatly unnerved and aroused dissatisfaction with General Dragomirov, whose persistence at the previous meeting gave rise to many enemies against him. Therefore, after some time, the mood from nervous turned definitely into hostility against the room of senior bosses. But it was soon dispelled by the unexpected arrival of a group of new officers accompanying several English officers. The afternoon meeting was not open, and General Denikin's response was not announced to us. We were told that a delegation from the British had arrived, that the proposals they had made were so extraordinary and important that they completely obscured the severity of the events being experienced, and therefore the top commanders would begin discussing the English proposals, and the council meeting was scheduled for 8 o’clock in the evening of the same day. There was also a rumor that General Wrangel had arrived in Sevastopol and would attend the evening meeting of the Military Council. When we arrived at this meeting and, waiting for its opening, wandered through the corridors and rooms of the palace, after a while we noticed the presence of General Wrangel, who was nervously walking along the corridor near the large hall. The doors to the senior leaders' room were still closed, and a meeting was in progress. General Wrangel was invited there several times, and after a short time he came out even more excited. As it turned out, General Wrangel brought with him to Sevastopol an English ultimatum, addressed to me, but handed to him on March 20 in Constantinople; In its note, the British government proposed, through its mediation, to enter into negotiations with the Soviet government. If this proposal was rejected, England threatened to stop any further assistance. For unknown reasons, this ultimatum was not communicated to me in Feodosia, and I only learned about it abroad. General Bogaevsky writes about what happened at the meeting - senior commanders, up to and including corps commanders: In addition, there was no one who could at that time become the successor of General Denikin without objections from anyone. No names were mentioned. The next day, General Dragomirov convened a meeting again and read the response telegram of General Denikin, who ordered the elections to be held after all. Despite this, many protested against this, and all the firmness and persistence of General Dragomirov was needed so that the meeting did not take the form of a rally and passed calmly (note by General Bogaevsky)... After much debate, it was decided to hold two meetings: one of the senior commanders and another - from all the others. The first was to identify a successor, the second to support or reject the elected official. I was among the senior leaders. We sat in a large corner office, the rest - in the hall. Our meeting dragged on. Everyone was still arguing and couldn't settle on anyone's name. From the hall, where the tired and hungry commanders of the military units had been languishing for several hours, people were sent more than once with the request, what have we decided? It was necessary to finish it somehow; it was no longer possible to put it off until another day: this would inevitably immediately undermine the authority of the future commander-in-chief. Then I made a speech in which, outlining the current situation and the need to end the issue as soon as possible at all costs, I named General Wrangel as the new commander-in-chief. There were no objections, and, as it seemed to me then, not out of sympathy for him, but simply because it was necessary to elect someone and put an end to the difficult issue. At that time, hardly anyone thought about continuing the fight against the Reds outside of Crimea: they had to sit it out, get themselves in order and go abroad if they couldn’t hold Crimea. They believed that Wrangel could handle this. They invited him to our office (he had just arrived from Constantinople), and here the chairman gave him something like an examination: His answers were in a sharp, decisive tone, which in general boiled down to the fact that he did not think about continuing a serious struggle and would consider it his duty , if he becomes the head of the army, not everyone in the meeting was satisfied. General Wrangel was asked to temporarily retire, which apparently left him very dissatisfied, and they began to discuss his candidacy again. Finally, it was decided to stop there. They called him again, and General Dragomirov announced our decision to him. General Wrangel accepted this outwardly calmly, but many of us - and probably him too - still had doubts whether General Denikin would approve our choice. We did not know the details, but everyone knew that there were bad relations between them and the blame for them did not fall on General Denikin... Having agreed to our choice, General Wrangel surprised us all with his decisive demand - to give him a signature that the condition His acceptance of the post of commander-in-chief will not mean going on the offensive against the Bolsheviks, but only withdrawing the army with honor from the difficult situation that has arisen. When we asked why this subscription was needed, General Wrangel replied that he wanted everyone - and above all his own son - not to reproach him in the future for not fulfilling his duty. All this was not entirely clear to us - such foresight, but in view of the insistent demand of General Wrangel - almost under the threat of refusal to choose - the subscription was given (the text of this act: Under these conditions, the meeting expressed the desire to ask the commander-in-chief to appoint General Wrangel as his deputy , so that he, having assumed the main command, would achieve immunity for all persons who fought against the Bolsheviks, and would create the most favorable conditions for the personnel of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, precisely for those who would not find it possible for themselves to accept security from the Soviet government. I became acquainted with the contents of this act only abroad). After this, a telegram was sent to General Denikin. The meeting ended. General Dragomirov read the text of the telegram he had sent the day before to General Denikin. Many of us noticed that the contents of the telegram were not exactly the same as what was read to us the day before in its final form. Then General Dragomirov read General Denikin’s response order to her, appointing General Wrangel as his deputy. After reading this order, General Dragomirov proclaimed in honor of the commander-in-chief General Wrangel (from a note by General Polzikov). Evening of March 22. A painful farewell to my closest colleagues at Headquarters and the convoy officers. Then he went downstairs to the premises of the security officer company, which consisted of old volunteers, most of them wounded in battle; I was connected with many of them by the memory of the difficult days of the first campaigns. They are excited, muffled sobs can be heard... Deep excitement overcame me too; a heavy lump in my throat made it difficult to speak. They ask: - Why? - Now it's hard to talk about it. Someday you will find out and understand... We went with General Romanovsky to the English mission, from where we went to the pier with Holman. Honor guards and representatives of foreign missions. Brief farewell. We switched to an English destroyer. The officers accompanying us, including former adjutants of General Romanovsky, went on another destroyer - a French one, which arrived in Constantinople 6 hours later than us. Fatal accident... When we went out to sea, it was already night. Only bright lights dotting the thick darkness still marked the shore of the abandoned Russian land. They fade and go out. Russia, my Motherland. In Constantinople, on the pier, we were met by our military agent, General Agapeev, and an English officer. The Englishman reports something to Holman with an alarmed look. The latter says to me: - Your Excellency, let's go straight to the English ship... The British suspected. Did our people know? I turned to Agapeev: “Won’t our stay at the embassy bother you... regarding the premises?” - Not at all. - And in... political terms? - No, have mercy... We said goodbye to Holman and went to the Russian embassy house, partially converted into a refugee hostel. My family is there. A diplomatic representative appeared. I go out to him in the corridor. He apologizes that due to the cramped space he cannot provide us with premises. I cut off the conversation: we don’t need his hospitality... Returning to the room, I wanted to talk with Ivan Pavlovich about leaving this inhospitable shelter right away. But General Romanovsky was not there. The adjutants had not yet arrived, and he himself walked through the enfilade of embassy halls into the lobby to make orders regarding the car. The door opened, and Colonel Engelhardt, pale as death, appeared in it: “Your Excellency, General Romanovsky has been killed.” This blow finished me off. My consciousness became clouded and my strength left me - for the first time in my life. I know Romanovsky’s moral killers well. The physical killer, wearing the uniform of a Russian officer, escaped. I don’t know if he is alive, or if the rumor is true that he was drowned in the Bosphorus to hide traces of the crime. General Holman, shocked by the event, unable to forgive himself for not protecting Romanovsky, without insisting on our transfer directly to an English ship, brought an English detachment into the embassy to guard the former Russian commander in chief... Fate was willing to put us through this test as well. Then, however, nothing could worry me anymore. The soul is dead. A small room, almost a closet. In it is a coffin with precious ashes. The face is mournful and calm. That evening, with the family and children of General Kornilov, I transferred to an English hospital ship, and the next day on a dreadnought we left the hateful shores of the Bosphorus, carrying inescapable sorrow in our souls.

With this name, the final act of the tragic cooperation of the Cossacks with the unsuccessful commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of southern Russia, General Denikin, entered into Cossack history. In the sad days of March 1920, the generals of the Dobrarmiya showed neither coordination of actions, nor perseverance in the defense of the approaches to Novorossiysk, nor restraint and fair distribution of transport tonnage during the evacuation to the Crimea. Gene. Denikin arrived in Novorossiysk with his headquarters before everyone else, but did not create a coherent plan for defending the city there, and did not prepare enough transport ships to transport all the troops to Crimea. At the same time, the Volunteer Corps (the remnants of the Volunteer Army), led by its commander, General Kutepov, refused to obey the orders of the commander-in-chief, hastened to retreat to the port and took possession of almost all the ships there. At the same time, the volunteers showed their usual perseverance and acted certainly more energetically than the disciplined Cossacks, who were accustomed to a fair order and were not in a hurry to the piers. As a result, only a few of them ended up in Crimea. Chairman of the Don Government and a great admirer of General. Denikin N.M. Melnikov nevertheless admitted that “During the Novorossiysk Kutepov evacuation, three quarters of the Don Army were abandoned, not to mention a colossal mass of refugees.” “Cossack officers were not allowed onto ships captured by volunteers; barricades were erected near the ships, guarded by guards with machine guns.” “As it turned out at the meeting on March 15 in Feodosia, about 10,000 of all the Donets were taken out of Novorossiysk, while there were about 10,000 volunteers at the front, about 55,000 were taken out - all volunteer institutions with all their personnel and property were taken out” (N.M. Melnikov, Novorossiysk catastrophe. Rodimy Krai No. 35). It should be added to these words that the gene itself. Denikin promptly embarked with his headquarters on the English destroyer and safely departed for the Crimea, little worrying about the fate of those very Cossacks, from whom for two years he demanded obedience and fulfillment of not always wise orders and measures. Up to 40 thousand combatant Cossacks retreated to Novorossiysk, with volunteers - 50 thousand. This army, armed with artillery, armored trains and infantry defense equipment, would be quite enough for the long-term defense of the small Novorossiysk bridgehead surrounded by mountains. All that was needed was clear guidance. And he, as a matter of fact, was not there. Head of the Don Rearguard Consolidated Partisan Division, General. PC. Colonel Yatsevich reported to the Commander of the Don Army: “the hasty, shameful additional loading on March 13 was not caused by the real situation at the front, which was obvious to me, as the last one to leave. No significant forces “attacked.” But squabbles at the top of the volunteer leadership among people who believed in their calling to lead the great cause of “saving Russia,” as well as the shameful observance of the private benefits of the Volunteer Corps, to the detriment of the interests of the Cossacks, to the detriment of the interests of further struggle, tens of thousands of Cossacks and Kalmyks were betrayed into the hands of the Bolsheviks . They all had to endure the terrible days of captivity. Some were shot, some were tortured in the dungeons of the Cheka, many were put behind the wire to die on starvation rations, and the happiest were immediately mobilized, placed in their ranks and sent to the Polish front to “defend the Motherland,” the same united and indivisible, but now not “ white" and "red".

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