Steganography & travel. The Vyazemsky “cauldron” is a little-known page in the history of the war The war does not want to go away
My friend Alexey Kislitsyn, a representative of the international association of public search movements, has long and successfully worked in the German archives in Germany with documents relating to the Second World War.
I always look forward to hearing from him with great interest. Each news is another previously unknown, but now discovered and documented page from the military history of our city.
These are unique documents that we did not know about before. I hope they will shed light on some historical points and will serve as a reason for further research on this topic.
Some historians are still arguing how many of our soldiers and officers died in the Vyazemsky cauldron in October 1941? How many were captured?
It was a big shock for me to study a previously classified document from the German Army Headquarters dated October 15, 1941. This is the “Final report on the position of the enemy surrounded near Vyazma.” I have never read documents about the war from the perspective of the opposing side. I was offended by the very thought that in documents someone could call not the fascists, but our soldiers and officers, enemies.
However, I read this seventy-five year old German archival document and discovered amazing details and facts:
“In the 12-day breakthrough and encircling battle west of Vyazma, the 4th Army with its subordinate 4th Tank Group in close cooperation with the 9th Army and 3rd Tank Group, actively supported by aviation, during the battle and reconnaissance of the Red Army forces completely destroyed a mass of Soviet troops of the Western, Central (Reserve) fronts consisting of: the 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th and 43rd armies, as well as the 32nd, 33rd, 49th reserve armies .
In total, 45 rifle divisions, 2 tank divisions, 3 tank brigades, 2 cavalry divisions, as well as many army ground formations were destroyed.
Most of the divisions were forced to surrender to the 4th Army as a result of active attacking actions by the 9th Army:
332,474 prisoners of war
310 tanks
1,653 guns, as well as many anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, grenade launchers, machine guns, vehicles and other equipment were captured as trophies or destroyed.
The destruction of the enemy forces imprisoned in the cauldron near Vyazma is over. All forces were destroyed with the exception of small “burrs” that made their way through the ring to the east. The total mass of captured equipment is not yet calculable and is collected from battlefields and forests.
Enemy losses are estimated at a total of 500,000 - 600,000 people killed, captured and wounded. Many units fought to the last man...
In addition, 53 loaded trains, 7 locomotives, 1 armored train, 2 warehouses with supplies, 1 warehouse with 6 thousand aerial bombs and 3 warehouses with food were captured
The numbers are not final and will be updated once the cleanup is completed.”
In this dry and German-pedantic document, I was surprised by the exact number of Soviet prisoners of war - 332,474 people. And our losses - dead, prisoners, wounded - amounted to 500,000 - 600,000 people.
And, of course, I paid special attention to the phrase: “Many units fought to the last man...”. Honor and praise to our valiant Defenders of the Fatherland.
* * *
Once again I draw attention to the fact that in this case Lukin already deserved to be shot in front of the army. Both for the actual refusal to attempt to break out of encirclement, for the disintegration of military discipline and the unauthorized dissolution of units, and for failure to comply with the order of Headquarters on leading a breakthrough from encirclement by four armies, order No. 270 of August 16, 1941, etc. I personally am very It is difficult to understand one thing - is it really possible that among the entire command staff there was not a single more or less decent person to immediately shoot Lukin and his entire camarilla as real traitors and traitors to the Motherland?! Where were the Special Department, the military prosecutor, and the military tribunal looking?! After all, the lives of a whole million people entrusted to them, and especially the fate of the capital, were at stake!
So the question arises: is it not this genuine, extremely unsightly truth about the true origin of the tragedy of the Vyazemsky “cauldron” that Lukin had in mind, who had become considerably emboldened after the murder of Stalin, who, in the euphoria of victory and due to Lukin’s disability - his leg was amputated in captivity - simply took pity above him and didn’t put him against the wall?! Is this why Lukin so famously shifted all the blame onto Konev and Budyonny?! After all, the best way to hide your betrayal is to blame others for the tragedy! No one argues that they were to blame, but they were to blame for the clumsy leadership of the hostilities. But for what happened in the encirclement, Lukin had to personally answer for this and only at the execution wall. After all, only near Vyazma 37 divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the High Command reserve and field departments of four armies were destroyed! The Germans, with only 28 divisions, surrounded 37 of our divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the High Command reserve and field departments of four armies! And a few days later the Teutons left only 14 divisions and our 37 divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the High Command reserve and field departments of four armies surrendered without a murmur, like sheep, without being defeated! Moreover. Can anyone intelligibly explain what Stalin and Headquarters have to do with it, if the decision expressed in Lukin’s order was not even communicated to Headquarters, if Lukin did not find it necessary to respond to the latest requests from Headquarters?!
Maybe stop blaming everything on Stalin and Headquarters with manic fanaticism?! Maybe it’s time to finally ask at least something from our “valiant” wartime generals and marshals?! How long can you denigrate the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Headquarters and the General Staff, led by the wisest ace Marshal Shaposhnikov, and make them guilty for any reason, and most often, for no reason?!
Notes:
Halford J. MacKinder. The Round World and the Winning of the Peace. Foreign Affairs, July 1943.
For more details on this issue, see the excellent book, superbly argued with declassified documents from the SVR, GRU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Stalin Foundation, the Comintern and other previously completely unknown documentary materials Yuri Tikhonov"Stalin's Afghan War. The Battle for Central Asia." M., 2008.
Lopukhovsky L. Vyazma disaster of 1941. M., 2007, p. 557.
Mukhin Yu. I. If it weren't for the generals. Problems of the military class. M... 2006. pp. 198–204.
bag for vacuum packaging.
The Fuhrer felt that precious time was slipping away from him like sand between his fingers. Moscow was the most important goal of Barbarossa. However, the resistance of the Red Army forced us to forget about it for a while and focus on the flanks of the Soviet-German front. Even in the midst of the battle for Kyiv, Directive No. 35 of the Wehrmacht High Command was born. It determined the form and objectives of the operation to defeat Soviet troops in the Moscow direction. The document was signed by Hitler on September 6, 1941. Hitler demanded “as quickly as possible (end of September)” to go on the offensive and defeat the Soviet troops of the Western direction, called “Timoshenko’s Army Group” in Directive No. 35. This problem was supposed to be solved by “double encirclement in the general direction of Vyazma in the presence of powerful tank forces concentrated on the flanks.” Since the outcome of the battles for Kyiv was still unknown, there was still no talk of using Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group in this operation in the Moscow direction. The Fuhrer's directive only vaguely promised “as large a force as possible from Army Group North,” i.e., mobile formations of the 4th Panzer Group.
However, as the new operation was being prepared, the number of forces needed to carry it out increased. Ten days after Directive No. 35, on September 16, the command of Army Group Center moved from the general concept of an operation against “Timoshenko’s troops” to a more detailed plan. The successful development of events near Kiev for the Wehrmacht allowed the commander of Army Group Center, Fedor von Bock, to plan the entry into battle of not only the 3rd and 4th tank groups, but also the 2nd tank group. On September 19, 1941, the operation received the code name “Taifun”.
The German command had already gained some experience in fighting the Red Army. Therefore, the actions of the Soviet command were predicted quite accurately: “ the enemy will, as before, most strongly cover and defend with large forces the road to Moscow, that is, the Smolensk-Moscow highway, as well as the Leningrad-Moscow road. Therefore, the advance of German troops along these main roads will meet with the strongest opposition from the Russians" Accordingly, it was decided to attack in areas poor in roads to the north and south of the Smolensk-Moscow highway.
The scale of the planned environment became a topic of lively discussion. Von Bock insisted on closing the ring of encirclement of Soviet troops on the distant approaches to Moscow in the Gzhatsk region. However, in the end, the OKH decided to close the encirclement ring in the area of Vyazma, and not Gzhatsk. That is, the scale of the “cauldron” was reduced.
"Typhoon" became the most ambitious operation of the German armed forces carried out in one direction. Neither before nor after this were three tank group (tank army) class formations concentrated in one army group at once. Typhoon involved three armies and three tank groups, numbering a total of 78 divisions, including 46 infantry, 14 tank, 8 motorized, 1 cavalry, 6 security divisions and 1 CC cavalry brigade. In the armies and three tank groups alone, von Bock had 1,183,719 men under his command. The total number of personnel in the combat and auxiliary units of Army Group Center at the beginning of October was 1,929,406 people.
Aviation support for the Typhoon was provided by the 2nd Air Fleet under the command of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. It consisted of the II and VIII air corps and the anti-aircraft corps. By transferring air formations from Army Groups North and South, the German command brought the number of aircraft of the 2nd Air Fleet to 1,320 aircraft (720 bombers, 420 fighters, 40 attack aircraft and 140 reconnaissance aircraft) by the start of Operation Typhoon.
While the Germans planned to deal with the “Timoshenko Army Group”, this name ceased to correspond to reality. On September 11, S.K. Timoshenko headed the South-Western direction, and on September 16, the Western direction itself was disbanded. Instead, Soviet troops on the approaches to the capital were united into three fronts, directly subordinate to the high command. The Moscow direction was directly defended by the Western Front under the command of Colonel General I. S. Konev. It occupied a strip about 300 km wide along the line Andreapol, Yartsevo, west of Yelnya.
In total, the Western Front consisted of 30 rifle divisions, 1 rifle brigade, 3 cavalry divisions, 28 artillery regiments, 2 motorized rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades. The front's tank forces consisted of 475 tanks (19 KV, 51 T-34, 101 BT, 298 T-26, 6 T-37). The total strength of the Western Front was 545,935.
For the most part, in the rear of the Western Front, and partly adjacent to its left flank, the troops of the Reserve Front were built. Four armies (31st, 32nd, 33rd and 49th) of the Reserve Front occupied the Rzhev-Vyazma defensive line behind the Western Front. The forces of the 24th Army of Major General K.I. Rakutin covered the Yelninsky direction, and the 43rd Army of Major General P.P. Sobennikov covered the Yukhnovsky direction. The total defense front of these two armies was about 100 km. The average strength of a division in the 24th Army was 7.7 thousand people, and in the 43rd Army - 9 thousand people. In total, the Reserve Front consisted of 28 rifle, 2 cavalry divisions, 27 artillery regiments, 5 tank brigades. In the first echelon of the Reserve Front there were 6 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades in the 24th Army, 4 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades in the 43rd Army. The total number of troops of the Reserve Front was 478,508 people.
The troops of the Bryansk Front under the command of Colonel General A.I. Eremenko occupied a front of 330 km in the Bryansk-Kaluga and Oryol-Tula directions. The front's tank forces consisted of 245 tanks (22 KV, 83 T-34, 23 BT, 57 T-26, 52 T-40, 8 T-50). The total number of troops of the Bryansk Front was 225,567 people.
Thus, more than 1,250 thousand people were concentrated on a front of 800 km as part of the Western, Bryansk and Reserve Fronts. It should be noted that the Moscow direction was significantly strengthened shortly before the start of the battle. During September, the fronts of the Western strategic direction received over 193 thousand marching reinforcements to make up for the losses incurred (up to 40% of the total number of people sent to the active army).
The air forces of the three fronts consisted of 568 aircraft (210 bombers, 265 fighters, 36 attack aircraft, 37 reconnaissance aircraft). In addition to these aircraft, already in the first days of the battle, 368 long-range bombers and 423 fighters and 9 reconnaissance fighter aircraft of the Moscow air defense were brought into battle. Thus, the forces of the Red Army Air Force in the Moscow direction as a whole were practically not inferior to the enemy and numbered 1,368 aircraft versus 1,320 in the 2nd Air Fleet. However, the Luftwaffe certainly had a numerical advantage in the early stages of the battle. Also, the German Air Force intensively used its units, carrying out up to six sorties per day per aircraft and ultimately achieving a large number of sorties.
The operational plans of the troops in the western direction provided for the conduct of defense along almost the entire front. Orders for defense in one form or another were received at least three weeks before the German offensive. Already on September 10, the Headquarters demanded that the Western Front “p urgently dig into the ground and, due to secondary directions and strong defenses, withdraw six or seven divisions into reserve in order to create a powerful maneuver group for an offensive in the future" Fulfilling this order, I.S. Konev allocated four rifle, two motorized rifle and one cavalry divisions, four tank brigades and five artillery regiments to the reserve. In front of the main defense line, most armies created a support zone (forefield) with a depth of 4 to 20 km or more. I.S. Konev himself writes in his memoirs: “ After offensive battles, the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts, at the direction of Headquarters, went on the defensive from September 10 to 16" The fronts’ measures to strengthen defense were finally formalized by the Supreme Command Headquarters directive No. 002373 of September 27, 1941.
However, as with most defensive operations in 1941, the main problem was the uncertainty of the enemy's plans. It was assumed that the Germans would strike along the highway running along the line Smolensk - Yartsevo - Vyazma. A defense system with good densities was created in this direction. For example, the 112th Infantry Division of K.K. Rokossovsky’s 16th Army, which saddled the highway, occupied a front of 8 km with a strength of 10,091 people with 226 machine guns and 38 guns and mortars. The neighboring 38th Infantry Division of the same 16th Army occupied a 4 km front, unprecedentedly narrow by the standards of the initial period of the war, with a strength of 10,095 people with 202 machine guns and 68 guns and mortars. The average strength of divisions of the 16th Army was the highest on the Western Front - 10.7 thousand people. On a front of 35 km, the 16th Army had 266 guns with a caliber of 76 mm and higher, and 32 85-mm direct-fire anti-aircraft guns. The 19th Army was built even more densely on a 25 km front with three divisions in the first echelon and two in the second. The army had 338 guns with a caliber of 76 mm and above, 90 45 mm guns and 56 (!) 85 mm anti-aircraft guns as anti-aircraft guns. The 16th and 19th Armies were the largest on the Western Front, with 55,823 and 51,983 men respectively.
Behind the line of defense of the 16th and 19th armies on the highway there was also a reserve line of defense. M.F. Lukin later recalled: “Rubezh had a developed defense system, prepared by formations of the 32nd Army of the Reserve Front. There were naval guns on concrete platforms near the bridge, on the highway and on the railway line. They were covered by a detachment of sailors (up to 800 people).” This was the 200th OAS Navy Division of four batteries of 130 mm B-13 guns and three batteries of 100 mm B-24 guns at Izdeshkovo station on the Yartsevo-Vyazma highway. There is no doubt that an attempt to break through along the highway would have cost the German motorized corps dearly. One cannot help but recall the German opinion cited above that the offensive along the highway “ will meet with the strongest opposition from the Russians».
However, the dense, echeloned barrier on the highway had to be paid for with low troop densities in other directions. In the 30th Army, which took the brunt of the 3rd Tank Group, there were 157 guns with a caliber of 76 mm and higher, 4 (!) 45 mm anti-tank guns and 24 85 mm anti-aircraft guns on a 50 km front. . There were no tanks in the 30th Army at all. The situation in the first line of the Reserve Front was approximately the same. Here, on a front of 16–24 km, divisions of 9–12 thousand people defended. The statutory standard for the defense of a rifle division was 8 - 12 km.
According to a similar scheme with a dense barrier on a major highway, the defense of the Bryansk Front was built by A.I. Eremenko. He, simultaneously with Konev, received directive No. 002375 from the Supreme Command Headquarters, similar in content, on the transition to a tough defense. But, as at Vyazma, the direction of the German attack was incorrectly determined. A.I. Eremenko expected an attack on Bryansk and kept his main reserves near Bryansk. However, the Germans struck 120 - 150 km to the south. The Germans planned an operation against the Bryansk Front in the form of “asymmetrical cannons”, when on one flank a deep breakthrough was made by the left wing of the 2nd Tank Group from the Glukhov area, and the LIII Army Corps struck towards it south of Bryansk.
It should also be said that in September 1941 the Red Army did not have independent mechanized formations of the tank division class. The mechanized corps burned down in the flames of the battles of July and August 1941. Individual tank divisions were lost in July and August. In August, tank brigades began to form. By the spring of 1942 they would become the largest tank formation of the Red Army. Those. the front command was deprived of one of the most effective tools for countering deep enemy breakthroughs.
The commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, G. Guderian, decided to attack two days earlier than the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups in order to take advantage of massive air support from aviation, which had not yet been involved in the operations of other formations of Army Group Center. Another argument was to make maximum use of the period of good weather; there were few paved roads in the offensive zone of the 2nd Panzer Group. The offensive of Guderian's troops began on September 30. Typhoon has started! Already on October 6, the German 17th Panzer Division howled towards Bryansk from the rear and captured it, and Karachev was captured by the 18th Panzer Division in the morning of the same day. A.I. Eremenko was forced to give the order to the armies of the front to fight “with an inverted front”, that is, to fight their way to the east.
On October 2, 1941, it was the turn of the Western Front to receive a crushing blow. The effect of surprise was aggravated by the fact that the transfer of mobile formations from Army Group North was carried out at the last moment. Soviet intelligence simply did not have time to track her. Near Leningrad, the group's radio operator was even left with the characteristic style of working with a key. This misled Soviet radio intelligence. In fact, the headquarters of the 4th Tank Group was transferred to the area south of the Smolensk-Moscow highway. On a 60-kilometer front at the junction of the 43rd and 50th armies, a strike force of 10 infantry, 5 tank and 2 motorized divisions of the subordinate 4th Field Army of the 4th Tank Group was concentrated. The first echelon contained three tank and five infantry divisions. For the Soviet divisions occupying the defensive on a wide front, the blow of such large forces was fatal.
At 6 a.m. on October 2, after a relatively short 40-minute artillery preparation, the strike force of the 4th Panzer Group went on the offensive against the 53rd and 217th Rifle Divisions. The large aviation forces assembled for the offensive allowed the Germans to prevent the approach of the reserves of the 43rd Army. The defense front was breached, and the rifle division and tank brigade that were in reserve found themselves in local encirclement. It became a harbinger of a big “cauldron”. The advance of the tank group developed along the Warsaw Highway, and then the tank divisions turned to Vyazma, stopping for some time in a difficult wooded area near Spas-Demensk.
The offensive of the 3rd Tank Group developed in a similar pattern along a 45-kilometer sector at the junction of the 30th and 19th armies of the Western Front. Here the Germans placed all three tank divisions intended for attack in this direction in the first echelon. Since the blow hit an area where no attack was expected, its effect was deafening. In the report on the combat operations of the 3rd Panzer Group from October 2 to October 20, 1941 it was written: “n The offensive that began on 2.10 turned out to be a complete surprise for the enemy. […] Resistance... turned out to be much weaker than expected. Artillery resistance was especially weak».
For a flank counterattack against the advancing group of German troops, the so-called “Boldin group” was created. It included one rifle (152nd), one motorized rifle (101st) division, 128th and 126th tank brigades. On October 1, 1941, the tank regiment of the 101st Motorized Rifle Division included 3 KV, 9 T-34, 5 BT and 52 T-26 tanks, the 126th Tank Brigade consisted of 1 KV, 19 BT and 41 T-26 on the same date. 26, 128th Tank Brigade - 7 KV, 1 T-34, 39 BT and 14 T-26. The forces, as we see, are small in number, with a large proportion of light tanks.
Having advanced to Kholm-Zhirkovsky, the formations of Boldin’s group entered into a tank battle with the XXXXI and LVI motorized corps of the Germans. In one day, October 5, the 101st Division and 128th Tank Brigade claimed the destruction of 38 German tanks. The report on the operations of the 3rd Panzer Group in October 1941 describes these battles as follows: “ To the south of Kholm [-Zhirkovsky], a tank battle broke out with Russian tank divisions approaching from the south and north, which suffered significant losses under the attacks of units of the 6th Tank and 129th Infantry Divisions, as well as from air raids by formations of the VIII Air Corps. The enemy was defeated here during multiple battles».
When the directions of the main attacks of the German troops were determined, front commander I. S. Konev decided to advance a strong group of troops under the command of an energetic commander to the convergence point of the tank wedges. On the evening of October 5, Konev removes control of the 16th Army from the highway and directs it to Vyazma. Thus, I. S. Konev planned to hold back one wing of the German troops entering Vyazma with a counterattack from I. V. Boldin’s group, and the second - with the defense of the front reserves under the control of K. K. Rokossovsky.
However, by October 6, German infantry reached Kholm-Zhirkovsky, pushing Boldin’s group from the flank of the German tank wedge. The 7th Panzer Division quickly broke through first through the Dnieper defensive positions of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line, and then to the highway west of Vyazma. With this maneuver, the 7th Panzer Division for the third time during the 1941 campaign became the “closer” of a large encirclement (previously there were Minsk and Smolensk). On one of the darkest days of Russian history, October 7, 1941, the 7th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Group and the 10th Panzer Division of the 4th Panzer Group united and closed the encirclement of the Western and Reserve Fronts in the Vyazma region.
Signs of an approaching catastrophe appeared already on the third day of the German offensive in the Vyazma direction. On the evening of October 4, the commander of the western front, I.S. Konev, reported to I.V. Stalin “about the threat of a large enemy group reaching the rear of the troops.” The next day, a similar message came from the commander of the Reserve Front, S.M. Budyonny. Semyon Mikhailovich reported that “ there is nothing to cover the gap that has formed along the Moscow highway».
On October 8, the commander of the Western Front ordered the encircled troops to fight their way to the Gzhatsk area. But it was already too late. At Vyazma, 37 divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the RGK and the departments of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies of the Western and Reserve Fronts were encircled. Organizationally, these troops were subordinate to the 22nd, 30th, 19th, 19th, 20th, 24th, 43rd, 31st, 32nd and 49th armies and Boldin’s operational group. The command of the 16th Army was evacuated already in the first days of the battle to unite troops in the northern sector of the Mozhaisk defense line. Near Bryansk, 27 divisions, 2 tank brigades, 19 artillery regiments of the RGK and the commands of the 50th, 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front were surrounded. In total, seven army directorates were surrounded (out of 15 in total in the western direction), 64 divisions (out of 95), 11 tank brigades (out of 13) and 50 artillery regiments of the RGK (out of 64). These formations and units were part of 13 armies and one operational group. Attempts to relieve the encircled forces, although initially planned, were not actually undertaken due to lack of forces. A more important task was the restoration of the front on the Mozhaisk defense line. Therefore, all breakthroughs were made only from within the “cauldron”. Until October 11, the encircled armies tried several times to break through, but were unsuccessful. Only on October 12 was it possible to briefly make a breach, which was soon sealed again. One way or another, the remnants of 16 divisions made their way out of the Vyazma “cauldron”.
Despite the lack of significant amounts of air supply, the encircled troops resisted for a week after the “cauldron” closed. Only on October 14 did the Germans manage to regroup the main forces of the formations of the 4th and 9th armies operating near Vyazma for the pursuit, which began on October 15. In the Vyazma “cauldron” the commander of the 19th Army, Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, the commander of the 20th Army, Lieutenant General F.A. Ershakov, and the commander of the 32nd Army, S.V. Vishnevsky, were captured. The commander of the 24th Army, Major General K.I. Rakutin, died near Vyazma.
On October 19, 1941, the commander of Army Group Center, General Field Marshal Feodor von Bock, wrote in a daily order to his troops:
« The battle for Vyazma and Bryansk led to the collapse of the echeloned Russian front. Eight Russian armies, consisting of 73 rifle and cavalry divisions, 13 tank divisions and brigades, and strong army artillery, were destroyed in a difficult struggle against a vastly superior enemy.
Total trophies were: 673,098 prisoners, 1,277 tanks, 4,378 artillery pieces, 1,009 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, 87 aircraft and huge quantities of military supplies».
The first thing that catches your eye is the discrepancy between the number of tanks available on the three fronts (1,044 units) and the figure stated in von Bock’s order - 1,277 tanks. Theoretically, the number 1,277 could include tanks at the repair bases of the fronts. However, such a discrepancy undoubtedly undermines the credibility of the figures stated by the enemy.
What were the real losses? According to official data, the losses of Soviet troops in the Moscow strategic defensive operation from September 30 to December 5, 1941 amounted to 658,279 people, including 514,338 people were lost forever. Let’s try to isolate the Vyazemsky and Bryansk “cauldrons” from these figures. You can immediately subtract the losses of the Kalinin Front “cauldron” created after the formation. There will be 608,916 people left. According to Krivosheev, the Western Front lost 310,240 people from September 30 to December 5. For obvious reasons, it was impossible to obtain accurate information about losses from the encircled armies. However, we have data on the losses of those troops who defended Moscow after the collapse of the front near Vyazma. According to reports from the organizational and staffing department of the Western Front, from October 11 to November 30, front troops lost 165,207 people killed, missing, wounded and sick. Losses from December 1 to December 10 amounted to 52,703 people. This figure includes losses suffered in the first days of the counter-offensive. In this regard, we have to admit that the figure of 310,240 casualties declared by Krivosheev’s team for the entire defensive period looks underestimated. 310,240 - 165,207 = 145,033. Let half of the losses from December 1 to December 10 be in defense, i.e., for the period from December 1 to December 5. In total, only 120-130 thousand people remain in the Vyazma “cauldron”. Such low losses in a large environment seem extremely unlikely.
On the other hand, estimates of Soviet losses of a million people or more seem equally far-fetched. This figure was obtained by simply subtracting from the total number of troops of two (or even three) fronts the number of people who occupied the fortifications on the Mozhaisk line (90-95 thousand people). It should be remembered that out of 16 formations of three fronts, 4 armies (22nd and 29th Western Front, 31st and 33rd Reserve) and the task force of the Bryansk Front were able to avoid encirclement and complete defeat. They simply found themselves outside the German "pincers". Their number was approximately 265 thousand people. Some of the rear units also had the opportunity to go east and avoid destruction. A number of units of the 30th, 43rd and 50th armies were also cut off from the “cauldrons” by breakthroughs of German tank groups. A number of units from the 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front retreated to the neighboring Southwestern Front (to which these armies were eventually transferred). Breakthrough was not such a rare occurrence. 10 thousand people from the 13th Army left the encirclement in an organized manner, and 5 thousand people from the 20th Army, as of October 17, 1941.
One should also not discount the small groups of Soviet soldiers making their way to their own from the “cauldrons”. Through forests and roundabout paths they could fight their way to their own for weeks. Taking this component into account seems to be the most difficult task. Documentation in 1941 left much to be desired, and accurate screening of troop reinforcements from soldiers and commanders who escaped encirclement was almost impossible. Moreover, some of the encirclement switched to partisan actions and remained in the forests near Vyazma until the winter of 1941–42. From these encirclements, in February-March 1942, parts of Belov's cavalry corps isolated near Vyazma were replenished. In a word, even the estimated 800 thousand difference between the initial strength of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts and the number of troops remaining outside the “cauldrons” does not give us an unambiguous loss figure.
Large losses make the Vyazemsky and Bryansk “cauldrons” the most terrible tragedies of 1941. Could it have been avoided? Unfortunately, you have to answer “no”. There were no objective prerequisites for timely unraveling the enemy’s plan at the front headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army. This was generally a typical mistake of a side that had lost its strategic initiative. In the same way, in the summer of 1944 in Belarus, the German command misjudged the plans of the Red Army (the main attack was expected on Army Group Northern Ukraine) and Army Group Center suffered the largest defeat in the history of the German army.
In any case, his death surrounded by troops on three fronts on the distant approaches to Moscow in October 1941 was not in vain. For a long time they chained large forces of German infantry and even tank formations of Army Group Center to themselves. The attack on Moscow could only be continued by mobile formations of tank groups, and even then not in full force. This made it possible to restore the collapsed front with support for the Mozhaisk defense line. When the German infantry reached this line, the Soviet defense had already been significantly strengthened by reserves. The quick capture of Moscow did not take place on the move.
______________________________________
S.K. Timoshenko was indeed the commander of the Western direction at that time.
With a staff of 10-14 thousand people
Reports of losses in both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were submitted in 10-day increments
On October 2, the forces of Army Group Center went on the offensive in the Dukhovshchina - Vyazma and Roslavl - Vyazma directions. On the very first day, the Germans broke through the Red Army’s defenses in both of these directions and penetrated to a depth of 30 kilometers. By evening, German tank divisions attacked the second line of defense of the Reserve Front. Air strikes were carried out on the headquarters of the Western Front, which led to the loss of command and control of the troops.
On October 3, the Germans advanced 50 kilometers in the defense zone of the Western Front and 80 kilometers in the Reserve Front. The command of the Western Front tried to eliminate the breakthrough by launching a counterattack with the forces of the created task force, but it was repelled and did not achieve results.
On October 4, in the Roslavlev direction, German tank armies defeated formations of the Reserve Front and reached the line Yelnya - Spas-Demensk - Mosalsk. By evening, the enemy deeply engulfed the grouping of the Western and Reserve Fronts from the north and south.
On October 5, the Headquarters approved the decision of the commander of the Western Front to withdraw troops to the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line.
On October 6, the order to withdraw was given. However, it was not possible to completely withdraw the troops in an environment of continuous fighting and the chaos of loss of control.
On October 7, the encirclement of parts of the Western and Reserve Fronts was completed. 19 rifle divisions and 4 tank brigades of the 19th, 20th, 24th, and 32nd armies fell into the cauldron. The losses of the Red Army in killed and wounded exceeded 380 thousand people; Over 600 thousand people were captured.
The encircled troops fought fierce battles until October 13. Some of them were able to break out of encirclement on October 12 and fought to the Mozhaisk defense line. The heroic resistance of our troops pinned down significant enemy forces, preventing him from advancing towards Moscow. Thus, the losses of our armies cannot be considered completely meaningless, but the Vyazemsky cauldron became one of the most serious disasters for the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War.
