Five facts about the world's first nuclear submarine. "Nautilus" and others You might be interested

The submarine was laid down on September 24, 1955 in Severodvinsk, at plant No. 402 (now Sevmash), factory No. 254. In August 1955, captain 1st rank L. G. Osipenko was appointed commander of the boat. The reactors were launched in September 1957 and launched on October 9, 1957. It entered service (the Navy flag was raised) on July 1, 1958, on July 4, 1958, for the first time in the USSR, it began running under a nuclear power plant, and on December 17, 1958, it was accepted from industry under a guarantee that defects would be eliminated.
At the same time, with a noticeable lag, the new coastal infrastructure required to support the nuclear submarines was designed and built. On March 12, 1959, it became part of the 206th separate BrPL based in Severodvinsk.

The submarine inherited the name “Leninsky Komsomol” from the diesel submarine “M-106” of the same name of the Northern Fleet, which was lost in one of the military campaigns in 1943.

In 1961 - first combat service in the Atlantic Ocean. In July 1962, for the first time in the history of the Soviet Navy, she made a long voyage under the ice of the Arctic Ocean, during which she passed the North Pole twice. Under the command of Lev Mikhailovich Zhiltsov, on July 17, 1962, for the first time in the history of the Soviet submarine fleet, she surfaced near the North Pole. The crew of the ship, not far from the pole, in the ice of the Central Arctic, hoisted the State Flag of the USSR. After returning to the base in Yokanga, the boat was met at the pier by N. S. Khrushchev and Minister of Defense R. Ya. Malinovsky. The leader of the campaign, Rear Admiral A.I. Petelin, the commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank L.M. Zhiltsov, and the commander of the warhead-5 (power plant), Captain 2nd Rank Engineer R.A. Timofeev, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. All ship personnel were awarded orders and medals.

Chief designer of the first nuclear submarine of the USSR “K-3” Vladimir Nikolaevich Peregudov. Chief designer of the submarine K-3

Since the boat was fundamentally new, and was also designed and built in great haste, it almost constantly required repairs, improvements and alterations, which was hidden under the words “trial operation.” In the first years of service and the trip to the Pole, the maintenance of the boat, often in actual emergency, in working order was ensured, among other things, by a very qualified crew capable of performing complex repairs independently.
The weak point of the boat was the poorly designed and manufactured steam generators, in which microscopic, difficult to recognize cracks and water leaks constantly appeared in the primary (radioactive) circuit. A large number of alterations, modifications, and new welds also had an effect. For this reason, overexposure of the crew was not uncommon, but it was considered a necessary evil for such a revolutionary new ship. To reduce the radiation dose received by the crew in the “dirty” compartments, in a submerged position, periodic mixing of the air between the compartments was practiced for a more uniform distribution of contamination, and, accordingly, doses throughout the crew as a whole. Radiation sickness and its consequences among crew members were almost commonplace. There are known cases when an ambulance was waiting on the pier for a returning boat. A number of officers underwent bone marrow transplants, and many crew members subsequently died prematurely. At the same time, due to secrecy, false diagnoses were indicated in medical histories, which ruined the careers of many.

On September 8, 1967, a fire occurred in compartments I and II while on combat duty in the Norwegian Sea, killing 39 people. However, the boat returned to base on its own. The probable cause of the accident was the unauthorized replacement of the sealing gasket in the fitting of the hydraulic machine. A leak occurred, the leaked hydraulic fluid was not completely collected, and its remains ignited.

In 1991, it was withdrawn from the Northern Fleet. Then, by decision of the Maritime Board under the Government of the Russian Federation, chaired by Minister of Transport Igor Levitin, the first Soviet nuclear submarine should be converted into a museum. The Malachite Design Bureau has developed a project for converting it into a floating museum. At the moment, the submarine has been on the slipway of the Nerpa ship repair plant for many years, awaiting its fate. According to the latest information, there will be no conversion into a museum. The money will no longer be found, and I think the issue with the museum will soon be closed, the ship will not last forever, the hull will soon be 55 years old.

Next week I will tell you about one Sevmash veteran, a participant in the construction of the K-3 submarine.

Zhiltsov: - You have been appointed senior assistant to the commander of the first experimental nuclear submarine. I also learned that the commander of the boat has not yet been selected and all the work of selecting, calling, arranging and organizing crew training will have to be led by me. I admit, I was taken aback. I, a twenty-six-year-old lieutenant commander, had to resolve all issues in departments where any officer was senior to me both in rank and age. The documents necessary for the formation of the crew will have to be signed by high-ranking managers. But I didn’t know how to click my heels on the parquet floor, and my favorite uniform was an oiled work jacket.

Seeing my confusion, the new boss hastened to “encourage” me: upon completion of testing of the new submarine, the best officers will be presented with high state awards. There was, however, an alarming nuance: testing a boat of a fundamentally new design that had not yet been built with a crew that had not yet been selected and trained was supposed to take place in six to eight months!

Since there was no question of In order to tell someone about my new appointment, I had to urgently come up with an intelligible legend even for those closest to me. The hardest thing was to fool my wife and brother, also a sailor. I told them that I had been assigned to the non-existent “submarine crewing department.” The wife did not fail to insert the pin: “Where is your determination to sail the seas and oceans? Or did you mean the Moscow Sea?” My brother gave me a briefcase without a word - in his eyes I was a complete loser.

Commentary by nuclear submarine commander L.G. Osipenko: A natural question is: why was Lev Zhiltsov chosen from among many young, capable, disciplined officers for the key position of chief mate of a nuclear submarine, in the creation of which every step was a pioneering step? Meanwhile, there were enough reasons for such an appointment.

After the command is given from the center to allocate for the formation of a crew trained, competent, disciplined, without penalties, etc., the search for the right people begins primarily in the Black Sea Fleet. Everyone was eager to serve there: it was warm, and in the summer it was just a resort. It cannot be compared, for example, with the Northern Fleet, where there is winter for nine months of the year and polar night for six. There were no “thieves” at that time, and the most capable people ended up in this blessed place. The best graduates of naval schools had the right to choose the fleet in which they would like to serve. Zhiltsov graduated from the Caspian School 39th out of more than 500 cadets, then with honors from mine and torpedo classes. Of the 90 people, only three, besides him, became assistant commanders. A year later, Zhiltsov was appointed senior officer on the S-61.

The boat was considered exemplary in many respects. This was the first, lead boat of the largest post-war series, which owes much of its technical excellence to the engineers of the Third Reich. At that time, all new types of weapons, new radio engineering and navigation equipment were tested on it. And the people on the boat were chosen accordingly. It is no coincidence that it was the training base for dozens of other crews.

Zhiltsov served without criticism, as did his subordinates and the equipment entrusted to him. Although he did not have access to independent control, the commander trusted him with the boat even during such complex maneuvers as remooring. Both the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet and the brigade commander went to sea when Zhiltsov was in charge. Last but not least, the young officer was awarded an inspection from Moscow for his exemplary conduct of political training. Then it was believed that the better politically savvy you are, the more capable you are of leading people. This is how Lev Zhiltsov was chosen from the many young officers.

The next day began with a joyful event: Boris Akulov, assigned to the same crew, appeared on Bolshoi Kozlovsky. We have known each other since 1951, when a division of new submarines arrived in Balaklava. Akulov then served as commander of the BC-5 (power plant on submarines). He was a little older than me - in 1954 he turned thirty. Boris Akulov graduated from the Naval Engineering School. Dzerzhinsky in Leningrad. On the first day, he went through the same procedure of being introduced to secrecy, only now with my participation. We were allocated a workplace (one for two), and we began to form a crew.

Ironically The department to which we were subordinated was testing nuclear weapons for the Navy. Naturally, there were not only submariners, but also naval engineers in general. Therefore, despite all the desire of the management officers to help us, they were of little use.

We could only rely on our own experience submarine service of the post-war generation. Strictly classified bulletins from the foreign press also helped us. There was practically no one to consult with: in the entire Navy, only a few admirals and officers of the so-called expert group were allowed to see our documentation, who looked down on us, the green lieutenant commanders.

In parallel with work on the staffing table Akulov and I studied personal affairs and called people whose need was already obvious. Weekly, or even more often, we received detailed “field files” from the fleets, which included service and political characteristics, punishment and reward cards. Naturally, nowhere was there a word or hint about a nuclear submarine. Only by looking at the set of military specialties could naval personnel officers guess about forming a crew for an extraordinary ship.

For each vacancy, three candidates were presented who met the strictest requirements for professional training, political and moral qualities and discipline. We studied their cases in the most meticulous way, because we knew that we would be controlled by “another authority” and if she rejected the candidacy, we would have to start all over again. They were screened out based on the most absurd criteria, as I understood even then: some ended up in occupied territory as a child, some had a wife’s father who was captured, and some, even though “Russian” was listed in the “nationality” column, The mother's patronymic is clearly Jewish.

If most of our future colleagues languished in idleness, Akulov and I did not notice how we flew by day after day. In addition to the routine work associated with the arrival of people, interviews, and accommodation, we had to resolve issues on which the operation of the future boat depended. Let me give you one example. The staffing table provided for only three managers for two main power plants with a minimum salary in the fleet of 1,100 rubles per month.

It took several months to prove: only six engineers can provide a full three-shift shift at the power plant. And how right was the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR V. A. Malyshev, who later proposed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov to create an all-officer crew - a forge of qualified personnel for the development of the nuclear fleet. Unfortunately, this turned out to be impossible, including for objective reasons: someone needed to do heavy physical and auxiliary work.

By early October 1954 All the officers were in Moscow, and there was a need to plan specifically who and where to train. It was decided to send officers from navigational, radio engineering and mine-torpedo specialties to the relevant institutes and design bureaus that created equipment for the boat, and then to the Northern Fleet, to Polyarny, for training on diesel submarines.

Another, larger group, which included commanding officers, officers of the electromechanical combat unit and chiefs of the medical service, had to undergo a course of study and practical training in operating a nuclear power plant. By that time, such training could only be carried out at the world's first nuclear power plant (NPP), launched in the summer of 1954 in the village of Obninsky, 105 km from Moscow. At that time, the location of the nuclear power plant was considered a state secret, and the village - later the city of Obninsk - was partially closed to entry, and only those working with special passes were allowed into certain zones.

Directorate of the Navy agreed on our trip to Obninsk to agree on specific plans and deadlines for October 2, 1954. The dress code is civilian. The head of the facility, which was called “Laboratory “B” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” and later became the Institute of Nuclear Research, was Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR Dmitry Ivanovich Blokhintsev. He introduced us to affairs and life in Obninsky, listened attentively to our story about the tasks and desired timing of officer training. We agreed on the time of classes and internship, and then went to see the nuclear power plant.

Its director Nikolai Andreevich Nikolaev was skeptical about our plans to master the control of a nuclear reactor in two to three months. In his opinion, this should take at least a year. And while he explained to us the operating principle of a nuclear reactor using demonstration diagrams, walked us through all the rooms of the station and showed us the work of the operators on the control panel, his words acquired more and more weight. But we continued to do our best and discussed with him the principle of distributing officers into shifts during the internship period, the timing of passing exams for admission to independent management, etc. Nikolai Andreevich no longer objected, but finally remarked, as if jokingly: “Well, well.” , our people haven’t been on vacation for several years. So all hope lies with your engineers.

Looking ahead, I’ll say: he was ironic in vain. Our internship began at the end of January 1955, and already in March the first officers passed the exam for access to reactor control. In April, they took control of the station themselves, and the station operators went on vacation. To be fair, I note that the nuclear power plant workers and Nikolaev himself did everything in their power to help us.

But for now our task was to dress all the officers in civilian clothes, since the appearance of a group of military sailors in Obninsk would immediately betray the intention of the Soviet Union to create a ship with a nuclear power plant. Since the choice of clothing in the Navy warehouses was not so rich, and the officers tried, no matter what, to follow the requirements of the then modest fashion, we found ourselves dressed in the same hats, coats, suits, ties, not to mention sparkling naval boots. When leaving for Obninskoye in November 1954, on the station platform, our group resembled Chinese students studying in Moscow. This was immediately noticed by the employees of the regime of Laboratory “B”, and even at the pass office we were asked to immediately “protect ourselves” and, above all, not to go in a crowd.

First acquaintance with a nuclear-powered ship. In parallel with the formation of the crew, the creation of the boat itself was in full swing. The time was approaching to convene the mock-up commission and defend the technical design. And then the chief designer, Vladimir Nikolaevich Peregudov, received news about the internship of future officers in Obninsk and those already appointed as the first mate and chief mechanic. The chief designer asked to urgently send both officers to him in Leningrad for ten days.

Even if we had not been assigned to the first nuclear-powered ship, the interest in us was explained by the fact that we served on boats of the latest generation. Our 613th project, unlike wartime ships, was equipped with location, hydraulics, and many other technical innovations. It is no coincidence that so many boats were built according to this project and were actively sold abroad - to Poland and Indonesia. And we, in addition to sailing on this boat, also had experience in testing and training crews.

Top secret design bureau was located on one of the most famous squares of Leningrad on the Petrograd side. We were escorted to him by an employee with pre-prepared passes who met us at the appointed place. Opposite the cozy little park between two shops there was an inconspicuous door without identification marks. Having opened it, we found ourselves in front of a turnstile, manned by two guards who looked more like orderlies, with the only difference being that their white coats bulged on their right sides. And having passed the turnstile, we suddenly found ourselves in the realm of the most advanced technologies at that time, where the first-born of the country’s nuclear fleet was born.

The main difficulty was, to create a boat that would be superior to American nuclear-powered ships in all respects. Already in those years there was an attitude that became widely known during the time of Khrushchev: “Catch up and overtake America!” Our boat had to give a hundred points ahead of the American one, which by that time was already sailing - and sailing well. They have one reactor, we will make two with the highest parameters in mind. In the steam generator, the nominal water pressure will be 200 atm, the temperature will be more than 300 °C.

Responsible managers did not particularly think about the fact that in such conditions, with the slightest cavity in the metal, the slightest fistula or corrosion, a microleak should immediately form. (Subsequently, in the instructions, all these parameters were reduced as unjustified.) This means that tons of lead will have to be driven under water for reliable protection against radiation. At the same time, the advantages of such harsh operating conditions seemed very doubtful.

Yes, high reactor operating parameters made it possible to develop a speed under water not about 20 knots, like the Americans, but at least 25, that is, approximately 48 km/h. However, at this speed, the acoustics stopped working, and the boat rushed forward blindly. When on the surface, it is generally not worth accelerating more than 16 knots, since the nuclear-powered ship can dive and bury itself under the water with the hatch open. Since surface ships try not to sail at speeds exceeding 20 knots, there was no point in increasing the reactor power.

In our first conversation Vladimir Nikolaevich, of course, did not express all the doubts. Only later did I have to think about it myself and understand the unnecessaryness of this race for superiority. By the way, when testing our boat, we reached a design speed of 25 knots somewhere while using 70–75% of the reactor power; at full power we would reach speeds of about 30 knots.

Naturally, there was little help from us for the design bureau on all technical issues.. However, Peregudov wanted to create optimal conditions for submariners to maintain equipment and live on board during long voyages. It was assumed that the boat should be able to not float to the surface for months, so living conditions came to the fore. The purpose of our trip was stated as follows:

- Climb all the compartments on the layouts, all residential and domestic premises and think about how to improve them. Look at how compartments in railway cars, cabins on passenger ships, airplane cabins are equipped, down to the smallest detail - where are the flashlights and ashtrays. (Although there was no smoking on our boat.) Take everything that is most convenient, we will transfer it to the nuclear-powered ship.

In a conversation with the chief designer, we heard concerns and fears for the first time, due to the fact that the boat was created in an emergency manner. The Ministry of Medium Engineering was responsible for the order, many of whose employees had not seen the sea at all. The design bureau was formed from employees of various bureaus, among whom there were many inexperienced young people, and the novelty of the tasks being solved was beyond the capabilities of even many veterans of the design bureau. Finally - and this seems incredible! - in the Peregudov Design Bureau there was not a single observation officer who sailed on submarines of post-war projects or participated in their construction.

The layouts were located in five different locations in the city. They were built life-size mainly from plywood and wooden logs. Pipelines and power cable routes were marked with hemp ropes with appropriate markings. At one of the factories, three end compartments were mocked up at once, and both bow compartments were hidden in a basement in the very center of Leningrad, not far from the Astoria Hotel.

Not for every submariner I had to see my boat in its infancy. As a rule, formation commanders, their deputies, and occasionally flagship specialists, that is, people who will have to sail on these boats from time to time, participate in the work of the mock-up commission. And to be able to manage and arrange the premises as conveniently as possible is the dream of every submariner.

In a week Boris and I We climbed all the accessible and hard-to-reach corners of the future nuclear-powered ship, fortunately our slender figures allowed this. Sometimes we sawed off one “device” in the form of a wooden block right on the model with a hacksaw and moved it to a more convenient place. It was clear that the equipment was placed without really delving into its purpose and the requirements associated with its operation. Everything bore the imprint of the hellish haste in which the nuclear-powered ship was created. Nowadays, any ship takes a good ten years to be created - it manages to become outdated before they begin to build it. But Stalin gave two years for everything. And although he was no longer alive then, like Beria, their spirit still hovered over the country, especially at the top. Malyshev was a Stalinist type: they asked him without discounts, and he asked accordingly.

With all the cruelty of this system and the errors it generated, which we encountered so many times in the process of creating a nuclear-powered submarine, it had two undoubted advantages: the manager was indeed endowed with great rights, and there was always a specific person from whom one could ask.

Our proposed changes concerned not only household amenities. For example, in a number of compartments, purely for layout reasons, many specialists found themselves sitting with their backs facing the direction of the boat. Even in the central control room, the control panel faced the stern, therefore, the ship’s commander and navigator also looked there. For them, the left side automatically turned out to be on the right hand, and vice versa. That is, they will have to constantly transform left into right as soon as they sit down at their workplace, and do the opposite operation as soon as they stand up. It is clear that such an arrangement could become a source of constant confusion, and in an emergency, lead to disaster. Of course, first of all, Akulov and I tried to correct such absurdities.

The cabins also underwent significant modifications., as well as an officer's wardroom. It was already clear to us that, in addition to the main crew, the experimental and lead boat would always have nuclear specialists, engineers testing new devices, and, on missions of particular importance, representatives of the command. And there were only eight seats in the wardroom. We refitted one cabin, thus adding four more berths and replacing the otherwise inevitable three-shift meal plan with a two-shift meal plan. But this was not enough. During the tests, we had so many engineers, specialists and command representatives with us that we ate in five shifts.

It also happened that the modifications we required encountered resistance from the compartment designers. For example, it was not easy for us to convince them that three powerful refrigerators in the galley would not replace the refrigerator in the wardroom. It’s quite hot on board, and the appetizer is prepared for everyone at once, which means that by the second shift they’ll have to scoop up the butter with a spoon.

Besides, in order to smooth out the monotony in food, and most importantly in drinks, officers chip in and form a “black cash register”. When sailing, you are allowed one hundred grams of dry wine per person per day. For a strong man - not much, especially since alcohol is considered a good remedy against radiation. Therefore, the wardroom allocates a person in charge who buys “Aligote” in addition to this norm, and on Sunday at least a bottle of vodka for four. Where should I put all this? Of course, in the refrigerator.

Of course, we kept silent about the “black cash register”(although this was not a secret for the people who sailed), and our question was formulated in front of the designers like this: “What if there is a holiday or guests on the boat? Where to put champagne or Stolichnaya? In my opinion, it was the last argument that worked, although the designers did not want to change anything - the compartment was already closed. “Okay,” they told us, “try to find a refrigerator that will fit through the removable sheet to load the battery.”

After work, Akulov and I went to an electrical store, fortunately there was no shortage of refrigerators back then, we tried everything on and found that the Saratov would fit in if the door was removed from it. Those in charge of the compartment had no choice but to agree, and Saratov was solemnly installed in the mock-up wardroom without dismantling the bulkhead.

Looking ahead, I’ll say, that at the mock-up commission we had to endure another battle for the refrigerator. The old submariners who were part of it, who sailed during the war on “little ones”, deprived of the most basic amenities, did not want to come to terms with the idea that for some, a voyage of many months could be combined with a minimum of comfort. For them, our requests to provide an electric meat grinder or a press for flattening cans were unnecessary “lordship” that only dampened the sailors. Victory remained ours, but when the chairman of the commission, who read out the act, reached the part where it was said about the refrigerator, he looked up from the text and added on his own, to the grins and laughter of those present: “So that Stolichnaya is always cold.”

Why, you ask, talk about such a little thing? The fact is that several years later, in the most difficult campaigns, we many times had to note with joy how necessary our perseverance was, and regret the things that we were not able to defend. Moreover, we fought not only for our boat, but for dozens of others that should be built in this series. But the main result of our work turned out to be different. During this trip, the entire concept of the first nuclear-powered submarine was called into question, which, in our opinion, was a pure gamble.

Kamikaze boat. The plan for the combat use of the boat, laid down by the designers, boiled down to the following. The submarine is secretly removed from its home base by tugboats (hence, it does not need an anchor). She is exported to the dive point, from where she continues to swim underwater on her own.

At that time, rockets as carriers of atomic weapons did not yet exist, and only traditional means of delivery were thought of: aerial bombs and torpedoes. So, it was planned to arm our boat with a huge torpedo 28 m long and one and a half meters in diameter. On the model, which we first saw in the basement of one of the residential buildings near Nevsky Prospekt, this torpedo occupied the entire first and second compartments and rested against the bulkhead of the third. Another compartment was allocated for the equipment that controls its launch and movement. There were no electronic devices then, and it all consisted of motors, rods, wires - the design was cumbersome and, by our modern standards, extremely antediluvian.

So, a boat equipped with a giant torpedo with a hydrogen head, had to secretly go out to the initial area and receive an order to fire, entering into the torpedo control devices a program for moving along the approach fairways and the moment of detonation. Large enemy naval bases were seen as the target - this was the height of the Cold War.

Just in case, two more torpedoes with smaller nuclear charges remained on board the boat in two torpedo tubes. But no spare torpedoes on the racks, no torpedoes for self-defense, no countermeasures! Our boat was clearly not intended to be an object of persecution and destruction, as if it were floating alone in the vast oceans of the World.

Having completed the task, the boat had to go to the area where a meeting with the escort was scheduled, from where it was supposed to be towed with honor to its home pier. There were no plans for the nuclear-powered vessel to surface during its entire autonomous voyage (there was even a zinc coffin on board), nor for anchorage. But the most important thing was not even the lack of an anchor and means of protecting the boat itself. Akulov and I, as submariners, immediately became aware of what would happen to the boat when a torpedo of this size was fired. Only the mass of water filling the annular gap in the apparatus (the diameter of which is 1.7 m) will amount to several tons.

At the moment of launch, this entire mass of water had to be shot out along with the torpedo, after which an even larger mass, taking into account the vacated space of the torpedo, had to flow back into the boat’s hull. In other words, when fired, an emergency trim will inevitably be created. First the boat will stand on its butt. To level it, submariners will have to blow out the bow tanks of the main ballast. An air bubble will be released to the surface, allowing you to immediately detect the boat. And with the slightest mistake or hesitation by the crew, it could surface off the enemy’s coast, which meant its inevitable destruction.

But, as already said, the submarine project was financed and created by the Ministry of Medium Engineering, and neither the Main Headquarters of the Navy nor research institutes made calculations for the use of its weapons. Although meetings of the mock-up commission had to take place before the technical design was approved, the torpedo compartments were already built in metal. And the giant torpedo itself was tested on one of the most beautiful lakes of our vast country

after with the boat concept The first operating specialists got acquainted and were given tasks to study how realistic the proposed project was. The calculations of the shipbuilding section fully confirmed our and Akulov’s fears regarding the behavior of the boat after the shot. Moreover, operators of the General Staff of the Navy established how many bases and ports there were not only in the United States, but throughout the world, which, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, could be destroyed with sufficient accuracy by a giant torpedo.

It turned out that there are two such bases! Moreover, they had no strategic significance in the future conflict. Thus, it was necessary to immediately develop another version of the boat’s armament. The project for using a giant torpedo was buried, the life-size equipment made was thrown away, and the reconstruction of the bow of the boat, already made in metal, took a whole year. In the final version, the boat was equipped with normal-sized torpedoes with both nuclear and conventional warheads.

Regarding the anchor, then its necessity was recognized, and it was installed on all subsequent boats. However, it technically turned out to be so difficult to equip an already developed nuclear-powered submarine with it that our boat received it only after the first repair. So we sailed for the first time without an anchor. When we had to surface, the boat turned toward the wave with its lag, and the entire time we were on the surface, we were rocking sideways. When anchored, the boat would turn its bow against the wind, and we would not rock.

It was worse when near the shore the boat began to be carried by the wind onto the rocks - the anchor in this case is simply irreplaceable. Finally, at the base, when we couldn’t get to the pier, we had to moor behind a barrel - a huge floating cylinder with a butt, to which the mooring rope is hooked. One of the sailors had to jump on it, and in winter it freezes over. The poor fellow had to cling to it almost with his teeth until the cable was secured.

Leaving Leningrad, Akulov and I assigned work to everyone, including ourselves. It became clear to us that the combat organization of the service and the staff of the submarine should be based on the basic mode of operation of the crew: underwater position and long-term maintenance of a three-shift watch. Consequently, we had to immediately redo the table of command posts and combat posts, as well as the staffing table.

Layout commission, which simultaneously considered the technical project, began work after the October holidays, on November 17, 1954. Representatives of all interested organizations of the Navy and industry gathered in Leningrad. The commission was headed by Rear Admiral A. Orel, Deputy Head of the Submarine Directorate. The heads of the sections were experienced employees of the departments and institutes of the Navy - V. Teplov, I. Dorofeev, A. Zharov.

Our command section was headed by Captain 1st Rank N. Belorukov, who himself commanded a submarine during the war. And yet there were some things he resolutely refused to understand. - Here's another thing, give them potato peelers, refrigerators, smoking rooms! How did we sail during the war without all this and not die? At the section he was often supported by front-line soldiers like him. Heated skirmishes arose, from which we did not always emerge victorious. Sometimes, seeing how several elders were piling on me at once, Akulov disappeared, and I knew: he went to Orel for support.

The commission worked for two weeks. In addition to our comments, which she basically confirmed, more than a thousand proposals were made to improve the design of the boat. For example, despite the fairly good technical parameters of the turbines, they did not meet the requirements for stealth navigation. The misconception about the purpose of the boat has finally been dispelled: to shoot a giant torpedo, swim only under water and enter the base only in tow.

Layout commission gave a conclusion on the need to make changes to the preliminary design. In its existing form, the technical project could not be accepted - the Navy, the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and other organizations expressed a special opinion on it. Their objections were reported at the very top, in any case not below the level of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V. A. Malyshev.

Not only the boat was created by organizations that were not previously connected by industrial relations or had never been involved in the implementation of this type of project. For a long time they did not know who to subordinate her future crew to.

As already stated, at first we belonged to the Navy Personnel Directorate. When we returned from the mock-up commission to Moscow, we learned that our military units had been transferred to the subordination of the Shipbuilding Department. Now we were commanded by engineer-rear admiral M.A. Rudnitsky. Time will pass until we are reassigned to our intended purpose - the Submarine Division in Leningrad. But the Submarine Directorate, then commanded by Rear Admiral Boltunov, had already become interested in us. After working in the layout commission, A. Orel reported to him about us.

Attempt at contract recruitment. V. Zertsalov (senior mate of the second crew) and I were called to the Main Headquarters of the Navy. We arrived from Obninsk in civilian clothes, and at the checkpoint the commandant detained us as suspicious. I had to make a note on my identity card: “Wearing civilian clothes while on duty is permitted.” (For many years, this note helped our officers in the most incredible circumstances. In those years, it was enough, for example, with a mysterious look to show this mark to the administrator of a hotel in which there were no free rooms, so that you were immediately accommodated.)

Boltunov listened carefully to all our considerations regarding personnel training. Our biggest doubts were the possibility of operating nuclear submarines by conscript personnel. A sailor, an eighteen-year-old boy who has barely graduated from school, needs at least two to three years to master a truly new specialty. At that time, they served in the navy for four years, which means that in a year this sailor will leave and give way to a newcomer.

We thought, that it was necessary to recruit over-conscripts to fill the jobs or sign contracts with the most promising sailors in their first or second year of military service. These people would spend, if not their entire lives, then at least many years with their new profession. Then professional competence, the desire to improve skills, and actions in emergency situations would become automatic.

Boltunov instructed me and Zertsalov As soon as possible, develop a special regulation on the contractual hiring of conscript personnel for nuclear submarines. We dealt with it quickly, but the regulation was introduced... several years later and lasted about ten years. The highest military, including naval, apparatus resisted with all its might the introduction of the contract system at the most critical military installations. The result of this persistence was, in particular, a high accident rate on nuclear submarines. Only in May 1991 was it allowed, as an experiment, to recruit sailors into the Navy under a contract for a period of 2.5 years who had served for at least six months.

Our preparation schedule moved towards advance: instead of two months, a little more than a month was enough for the theory. Already during the January holidays of 1955, we were transferred to an internship directly at the reactor, assigning three to four people to each of the four shifts of nuclear power plant personnel.

58 years ago, on January 21, 1954, the nuclear submarine Nautilus was launched. It was the first submarine with a nuclear reactor, allowing it to sail autonomously for months without rising to the surface. A new page was opening in the history of the Cold War...

The idea of ​​using a nuclear reactor as a power plant for submarines originated in the Third Reich. Professor Heisenberg’s oxygen-free “uranium machines” (as nuclear reactors were called then) were intended primarily for the “submarine wolves” of the Kriegsmarine. However, German physicists failed to bring the work to its logical conclusion and the initiative passed to the United States, which for some time was the only country in the world that had nuclear reactors and bombs.

In the early years of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA, American strategists envisioned long-range bombers as carriers of the atomic bomb. The United States had extensive experience in the combat use of this type of weapon, American strategic aviation had a reputation as the most powerful in the world, and finally, US territory was considered largely invulnerable to an enemy retaliatory strike.

However, the use of aircraft required their basing in close proximity to the borders of the USSR. As a result of diplomatic efforts, already in July 1948 the Labor government agreed to the deployment in Great Britain of 60 B-29 bombers with atomic bombs on board. After the signing of the North Atlantic Pact in April 1949, all of Western Europe was drawn into the US nuclear strategy, and the number of American bases abroad reached 3,400 by the end of the 1960s!

However, over time, the American military and politicians came to understand that the presence of strategic aviation in foreign territories is associated with the risk of changing the political situation in a particular country, therefore The fleet was increasingly seen as the carrier of atomic weapons in a future war. This trend was finally strengthened after the convincing tests of atomic bombs at Bikini Atoll.

In 1948, American designers completed the development of a nuclear power plant project and began designing and building an experimental reactor. Thus, there were all the prerequisites for creating a fleet of nuclear submarines, which not only had to carry nuclear weapons, but also have a nuclear reactor as a power plant.

Construction of the first such boat, named after the fantastic submarine invented by Jules Verne, the Nautilus and designated SSN-571, began on June 14, 1952 in the presence of US President Harry Truman at the shipyard in Groton.

On January 21, 1954, in the presence of US President Eisenhower, the Nautilus was launched, and eight months later, on September 30, 1954, it was accepted into service with the US Navy. On January 17, 1955, the Nautilus began sea trials in the open ocean, and its first commander, Eugene Wilkinson, broadcast in clear text: “We are going under atomic propulsion.”

Apart from the completely new Mark-2 power plant, the boat had a conventional design. With a Nautilus displacement of about 4,000 tons, the two-shaft nuclear power plant with a total power of 9,860 kilowatts provided a speed of more than 20 knots. Submerged cruising range was 25 thousand miles with a consumption of 450 grams of U235 per month. Thus, the duration of the voyage depended only on the proper operation of air regeneration means, food supplies and the endurance of the personnel.

At the same time, however, the specific gravity of the nuclear installation turned out to be very large, because of this, it was not possible to install some of the weapons and equipment provided for by the project on Nautilus. The main reason for the weight was biological protection, which includes lead, steel and other materials (about 740 tons). As a result, all the weapons of the Nautilus were 6 bow torpedo tubes with an ammunition load of 24 torpedoes.

As with any new business, it was not without problems. Even during the construction of the Nautilus, and specifically during testing of the power plant, a rupture occurred in the secondary circuit pipeline, through which saturated steam with a temperature of about 220 ° C and under a pressure of 18 atmospheres came from the steam generator to the turbine. Fortunately, it was not the main, but an auxiliary steam line.

The cause of the accident, as established during the investigation, was a manufacturing defect: instead of pipes made of high-quality carbon steel grade A-106, pipes made of the less durable material A-53 were included in the steam pipeline. The accident caused American designers to question the feasibility of using welded pipes in submarine pressure systems. Elimination of the consequences of the accident and the replacement of already installed welded pipes with seamless ones delayed the completion of the construction of the Nautilus for several months.

After the boat entered service, rumors began to circulate in the media that Nautilus personnel had received serious doses of radiation due to deficiencies in the bioprotection design. It was reported that the naval command had to quickly carry out a partial replacement of the crew, and dock the submarine to make the necessary changes to the protection design. How accurate this information is is still unknown.

On May 4, 1958, a fire occurred in the turbine compartment of the Nautilus, traveling submerged from Panama to San Francisco. The fire of oil-soaked port turbine insulation was determined to have started several days before the fire, but its signs were ignored.

The slight smell of smoke was mistaken for the smell of fresh paint. The fire was discovered only when it became impossible for personnel to remain in the compartment due to smoke. There was so much smoke in the compartment that the submariners wearing smoke masks could not find its source.

Without finding out the reasons for the appearance of smoke, the ship's commander gave the order to stop the turbine, float to periscope depth and try to ventilate the compartment through a snorkel. However, these measures did not help, and the boat was forced to surface. Increased ventilation of the compartment through an open hatch with the help of an auxiliary diesel generator finally brought results. The amount of smoke in the compartment decreased, and the crew managed to find the location of the fire.

Two sailors in smoke masks (there were only four such masks on the boat) using knives and pliers began to tear off the smoldering insulation from the turbine body. A column of flame about a meter high emerged from under a torn piece of insulation. Foam fire extinguishers were used. The flames were extinguished and work to remove the insulation continued. People had to be changed every 10-15 minutes, as the acrid smoke penetrated even into the masks. Only four hours later, all the insulation from the turbine was removed and the fire was extinguished.

After the boat arrived in San Francisco, its commander implemented a number of measures aimed at improving the fire safety of the ship. In particular, the old insulation was removed from the second turbine. All submarine personnel were provided with self-contained breathing apparatus.

In May 1958, while preparing the Nautilus for a trip to the North Pole by boat, a water leak occurred in the main condenser of the steam turbine unit. Sea water seeping into the condensate-feeding system could cause salinization of the secondary circuit and lead to failure of the entire power system of the ship.

Repeated attempts to find the location of the leak were unsuccessful, and the submarine commander made an original decision. After the Nautilus arrived in Seattle, sailors in civilian clothes—preparations for the voyage were kept strictly secret—bought all the proprietary fluid from automobile stores to be poured into car radiators to stop leaks.

Half of this liquid (about 80 liters) was poured into the condenser, after which the problem of condenser salinization did not arise either in Seattle or later during the trip. Probably the leak was in the space between the double tube plates of the condenser and stopped after filling this space with a self-hardening mixture.

On November 10, 1966, during NATO naval exercises in the North Atlantic, the Nautilus, which was launching a periscope attack on the American aircraft carrier Essex (displacement 33 thousand tons), collided with it. As a result of the collision, the aircraft carrier received an underwater hole, and the fencing of the retractable devices on the boat was destroyed. Accompanied by the destroyer, the Nautilus traveled under its own power at a speed of about 10 knots to the naval base in New London, America, covering a distance of about 360 miles.

On July 22, 1958, the Nautilus, under the command of William Andersen, set sail from Pearl Harbor with the goal of reaching the North Pole. It all started when, at the end of 1956, the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Burke, received a letter from Senator Jackson. The senator was interested in the possibility of nuclear submarines operating under the pack ice of the Arctic.

This letter was the first sign that forced the command of the American fleet to seriously think about organizing a trip to the North Pole. True, some American admirals considered the idea reckless and were categorically against it. Despite this, the commander of the submarine forces of the Atlantic Fleet considered the polar campaign a decided matter.

Anderson began to prepare for the upcoming campaign with triple zeal. The Nautilus was equipped with special equipment that made it possible to determine the state of the ice, and a new compass MK-19, which, unlike conventional magnetic compasses, operated at high latitudes. Just before the trip, Anderson obtained the latest maps and directions to the depths of the Arctic and even made an air flight, the route of which coincided with the planned route of the Nautilus.

On August 19, 1957, the Nautilus headed for the area between Greenland and Spitsbergen. The first test run of the submarine under the pack ice was unsuccessful. When the echometer recorded zero ice thickness, the boat tried to float. Instead of the expected ice hole, the Nautilus encountered a drifting ice floe. The boat's collision with it severely damaged its only periscope, and the commander of the Nautilus decided to return back to the edge of the packs.

The mangled periscope was repaired on the field. Anderson was quite skeptical about how stainless steel welders worked - even in ideal factory conditions, such welding required a lot of experience. However, the crack that had formed in the periscope was repaired, and the device began to operate again.

The second attempt to reach the pole did not bring results either.. A couple of hours after the Nautilus crossed the 86th parallel, both gyrocompasses failed. Anderson decided not to tempt fate and gave the order to turn - in high latitudes, even a slight deviation from the correct course could be fatal and lead the ship to a foreign shore.

At the end of October 1957, Anderson gave a short report at the White House, which he dedicated to his recent trip under the Arctic ice. The report was listened to with indifference, and William was disappointed. The stronger the desire of the Nautilus commander to go to the Pole again.

While contemplating this voyage, Anderson prepared a letter to the White House in which he convincingly argued that crossing the pole would become a reality as early as next year. The presidential administration made it clear that the Nautilus commander could count on support. The Pentagon also became interested in the idea. Soon after this, Admiral Burke reported the impending campaign to the president himself, who reacted to Anderson's plans with great enthusiasm.

The operation had to be carried out in an atmosphere of strict secrecy - the command was afraid of another failure. Only a small group of people in the government knew about the details of the campaign. To hide the true reason for installing additional navigation equipment on the Nautilus, it was announced that the ship would participate in joint training maneuvers along with the Skate and Halfbeak boats.

On June 9, 1958, the Nautilus set off on its second polar voyage.. When Seattle was far behind, Anderson ordered the submarine's number to be painted over the wheelhouse fence to maintain incognito. On the fourth day of the journey, the Nautilus approached the Aleutian Islands.

Knowing that they would have to go further in shallow water, the ship’s commander ordered the ascent. The Nautilus maneuvered in this area for a long time - looking for a convenient gap in the chain of islands to get to the north. Finally, navigator Jenkins discovered a sufficiently deep passage between the islands. Having overcome the first obstacle, the submarine entered the Bering Sea.

Now the Nautilus had to slip through the narrow and ice-covered Bering Strait. The route west of St. Lawrence Island was completely covered by pack ice. The draft of some icebergs exceeded ten meters. They could easily crush the Nautilus, pinning the submarine to the bottom. Despite the fact that a significant part of the path had been covered, Anderson gave the order to follow the opposite course.

The commander of the Nautilus did not despair - perhaps the eastern passage through the strait would be more welcoming to rare guests. The boat emerged from the Siberian ice and headed south from St. Lawrence Island, intending to sail into deep waters past Alaska. The next few days of the voyage passed without incident, and on the morning of June 17, the submarine reached the Chukchi Sea.

And then Anderson’s rosy expectations collapsed. The first alarming signal was the appearance of an ice floe nineteen meters thick, which went straight towards the submarine ship. A collision with it was avoided, but the instrument recorders warned: there was an even more serious obstacle in the boat’s path.

Pressed close to the very bottom, the Nautilus slipped under a huge ice floe at a distance of only one and a half meters from it. It was possible to avoid death only by a miracle. When the recorder pen finally went up, indicating that the boat missed the ice floe, Anderson realized: the operation was a complete failure...

The captain sent his ship to Pearl Harbor. There was still hope that at the end of summer the ice boundary would move to deeper areas, and it would be possible to make another attempt to get closer to the pole. But who will give permission for it after so many failures?

The reaction of the highest US military department was immediate - Anderson was summoned to Washington for an explanation. The commander of the Nautilus carried on well, showing perseverance. His report to senior Pentagon officers expressed his firm confidence that the next, July, campaign would undoubtedly be crowned with success. And he was given another chance.

Anderson immediately took action. To monitor the ice conditions, he sent his navigator Jenks to Alaska. A legend was created for Jenks, according to which he was a Pentagon officer with special powers. Arriving in Alaska, Jenks took into the air almost the entire patrol aircraft, which carried out daily observations in the area of ​​​​the future route of the Nautilus. In mid-July, Anderson, still in Pearl Harbor, received the long-awaited news from his navigator: ice conditions had become favorable for the transpolar crossing, the main thing was not to miss the moment.

On July 22, a nuclear submarine with obliterated numbers left Pearl Harbor. The Nautilus was moving at top speed. On the night of July 27, Anderson took the ship into the Bering Sea. Two days later, having traveled a 2,900-mile journey from Pearl Harbor, the Nautilus was already cutting through the waters of the Chukchi Sea.

On August 1, the submarine sank under the Arctic pack ice, which in some places went into the water to a depth of twenty meters. Navigating the Nautilus under them was not easy. Anderson himself was on watch almost all the time. The ship's crew was excited about the upcoming event, which they wanted to celebrate properly. Some, for example, proposed to describe twenty-five small circles around the pole. Then the Nautilus could enter the Guinness Book of Records as the ship that was the first in the history of navigation to make 25 trips around the world in one voyage.

Anderson rightly believed that such maneuvers were out of the question - the likelihood of going off course was too great. The commander of the Nautilus was worried about completely different problems. To cross the pole as accurately as possible, Anderson did not take his eyes off the indicators of the electronic navigation devices. On August 3, at twenty-three hours and fifteen minutes, the goal of the campaign - the North Geographic Pole of the Earth - was achieved.

Without staying in the area of ​​the pole longer than required to collect statistical information on the state of ice and sea water, Anderson sent the submarine into the Greenland Sea. The Nautilus was to arrive in the Reykjavik area, where a secret meeting was to take place. The helicopter, which was waiting for the submarine at the rendezvous point, removed only one person from the submarine - Commander Anderson.

Fifteen minutes later, the helicopter landed in Keflavik next to a transport plane ready to depart. When the plane's wheels touched the landing path of the airfield in Washington, a car sent from the White House was already waiting for Anderson - the president wanted to see the commander of the Nautilus. After the report on the operation, Anderson was again returned aboard the boat, which by this time managed to reach Portland. Six days later, the Nautilus and its commander entered New York with honor. A military parade was organized in their honor...

On March 3, 1980, Nautilus was retired from the fleet after 25 years of service and declared a National Historic Landmark. Plans were drawn up to convert the submarine into a museum for public display. Upon completion of decontamination and a large amount of preparatory work, on July 6, 1985, the Nautilus was towed to Groton (Connecticut). Here at the US Submarine Museum, the world's first nuclear submarine is open to the public.

HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF THE FIRST SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE

V.N. Peregudov

In 1948, future academician and three times hero of labor Anatoly Petrovich Aleksandrov organized a group with the task of developing nuclear energy for submarines. Beria closed the work so as not to be distracted from the main task - the bomb.

In 1952, Kurchatov instructed Alexandrov, as his deputy, to develop a nuclear reactor for ships. 15 options were developed.

Engineer-captain 1st rank Vladimir Nikolaevich Peregudov was appointed chief designer of the first Soviet nuclear submarines.

For a long time, the issue of reliability of steam generators (Design Bureau of Genrikh Hasanov) was on the agenda. They were designed with some overheating and gave an efficiency advantage over the American ones, and therefore a gain in power. But the survivability of the first steam generators was extremely low. The steam generators began to leak after only 800 hours of operation. The scientists were demanded to switch to the American scheme, but they defended their principles, including from the then commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Chabanenko.

Military, D.F. Ustinov and all doubters were convinced by carrying out the necessary modifications (replacing the metal). Steam generators began to operate for tens of thousands of hours.

The development of reactors went in two directions: water-water and liquid metal. An experimental boat with a liquid metal carrier was built and showed good performance, but low reliability. The Leninsky Komsomol (K-8) type submarine was the first among the lost Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. On April 12, 1970, she sank in the Bay of Biscay as a result of a cable fire. 52 people were lost during the disaster.

Electric submarines U-2321 (Type XXIII). Laid down 10.3. 1944 at the Deutsche Werft AG shipyard (Hamburg). Launched 12.6.1944. It was part of the 4th (from 12.6.1944), 32nd (from 15.8.1944) and 11th (from 1.2.1945) flotillas. She made 1 military campaign, during which she sank 1 ship (with a displacement of 1406 tons). Surrendered in Yuzhny