The first blow of the Nazis on the USSR. German attack on the USSR

Part 1.

Seventy-six years ago, on June 22, 1941, the peaceful life of the Soviet people was interrupted, Germany treacherously attacked our country.
Speaking on the radio on July 3, 1941, J.V. Stalin called the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany the Patriotic War.
In 1942, after the establishment of the Order of the Patriotic War, this name was officially established. And the name “Great Patriotic War” appeared later.
The war claimed about 30 million lives (now they are already talking about 40 million) of Soviet people, brought grief and suffering to almost every family, cities and villages were in ruins.
The question of who is responsible for the tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War, for the colossal defeats that our army suffered at the beginning and for the fact that the Nazis ended up at the walls of Moscow and Leningrad are still being debated. Who was right, who was wrong, who did not do what they were obliged to do because they took the oath of allegiance to the Motherland. You need to know the historical truth.
As almost all veterans recall, in the spring of 1941, the approach of war was felt. Informed people knew about its preparation; ordinary people were wary of rumors and gossip.
But even with the declaration of war, many believed that “our indestructible and best army in the world,” which was constantly repeated in newspapers and on the radio, would immediately defeat the aggressor, and on his own territory, who had encroached on our borders.

The existing main version about the beginning of the War of 1941-1945, born during the time of N.S. Khrushchev, decisions of the 20th Congress and the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, reads:
- “The tragedy of June 22 occurred because Stalin, who “feared” Hitler, and at the same time “believed” him, forbade the generals to put the troops of the western districts on combat readiness before June 22, thanks to which, as a result, the Red Army soldiers met the war sleeping in their barracks ";
“The main thing, of course, that weighed on him, on all his activities, which also affected us, was the fear of Hitler. He was afraid of the German armed forces" (From the speech of G.K. Zhukov in the editorial office of the Military Historical Journal on August 13, 1966. Published in the Ogonyok magazine No. 25, 1989);
- “Stalin made an irreparable mistake by trusting false information that came from the relevant authorities.....” (G.K. Zhukov, “Memories and Reflections.” M. Olma -Press. 2003.);
- “…. Unfortunately, it must be noted that I.V. Stalin, on the eve and at the beginning of the war, underestimated the role and importance of the General Staff.... took little interest in the activities of the General Staff. Neither my predecessors nor I had the opportunity to comprehensively report to I. Stalin on the state of the country’s defense and on the capabilities of our potential enemy...” (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”. M. Olma - Press. 2003).

It still sounds in different interpretations that the “main culprit,” of course, was Stalin, since “he was a tyrant and despot,” “everyone was afraid of him,” and “nothing happened without his will,” “he did not allow the troops to be brought into combat.” readiness in advance,” and “forced” the generals to leave soldiers in “sleeping” barracks before June 22, etc.
In a conversation that took place in early December 1943 with the commander of long-range aviation, later Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, unexpectedly for the interlocutor, Stalin said:
“I know that when I’m gone, more than one bucket of dirt will be poured on my head, a heap of garbage will be placed on my grave. But I’m sure that the winds of history will blow all this away!”
This is also confirmed by the words of A.M. Kollontai, written in her diary, back in November 1939 (on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war). According to this evidence, even then Stalin clearly foresaw the slander that would fall on him as soon as he passed away.
A. M. Kollontai recorded his words: “And my name will also be slandered, slandered. Many atrocities will be attributed to me.”
In this sense, the position of Marshal of Artillery I.D. Yakovlev, who was repressed at one time, is characteristic, who, speaking about the war, considered it most honest to say this:
“When we undertake to talk about June 22, 1941, which covered our entire people with a black wing, then we need to abstract ourselves from everything personal and follow only the truth; it is unacceptable to try to place all the blame for the surprise attack of Nazi Germany only on I.V. Stalin.
In the endless complaints of our military leaders about “suddenness,” one can see an attempt to absolve themselves of all responsibility for failures in the combat training of troops and in their command and control during the first period of the war. They forget the main thing: having taken the oath, commanders of all levels - from front commanders to platoon commanders - are obliged to keep their troops in a state of combat readiness. This is their professional duty, and explaining failure to fulfill it with references to I.V. Stalin does not suit the soldiers.”
Stalin, by the way, just like them, took a military oath of allegiance to the Fatherland - below is a photocopy of the military oath given in writing by him as a member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on February 23, 1939.

The paradox is that it was precisely those who suffered under Stalin, but even under him, the rehabilitated people subsequently showed exceptional decency towards him.
Here, for example, is what former People's Commissar of the USSR Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin said:
“You can’t blame everything on Stalin! The minister must also be responsible for something... For example, I did something wrong in aviation, so I certainly bear responsibility for this. Otherwise it’s all about Stalin...”
The same were the great Commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky and the Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov.

Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, one might say, “sent” Khrushchev very far with his proposal to write something nasty about Stalin! He suffered for this - he was very quickly sent into retirement, removed from his post as Deputy Minister of Defense, but he did not renounce the Supreme. Although he had many reasons to be offended by I. Stalin.
I think that the main one is that he, as the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, who was the first to reach the distant approaches to Berlin and was already preparing for its future assault, was deprived of this honorable opportunity. I. Stalin removed him from the Command of the 1st Belorussian Front and assigned him to the 2nd Belorussian Front.
As many said and wrote, he did not want Polyak to take Berlin, and G.K. became Marshal of Victory. Zhukov.
But K.K. Rokossovsky showed his nobility here too, leaving G.K. Zhukov gave almost all of his Front Headquarters officers, although he had every right to take them with him to the new front. And the staff officers at K.K. Rokossovsky was always distinguished, as all military historians note, by the highest staff training.
The troops led by K.K. Rokossovsky, unlike those led by G.K. Zhukov, were not defeated in a single battle during the entire war.
A. E. Golovanov was proud that he had the honor of serving the Motherland under the command of Stalin personally. He also suffered under Khrushchev, but did not renounce Stalin!
Many other military leaders and historians talk about the same thing.

This is what General N.F. Chervov writes in his book “Provocations against Russia” Moscow, 2003:

“... there was no surprise of the attack in the usual sense, and Zhukov’s formulation was invented at one time in order to blame Stalin for the defeat at the beginning of the war and justify the miscalculations of the high military command, including their own during this period... "

According to the long-term head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Army General P. I. Ivashutin, “neither in strategic nor in tactical terms was Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union sudden” (VIZH 1990, No. 5).

In the pre-war years, the Red Army was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in mobilization and training.
Hitler announced universal conscription on March 1, 1935, and the USSR, based on the state of the economy, was able to do this only on September 1, 1939.
As we see, Stalin first thought about what to feed, what to dress and how to arm the conscripts, and only then, if calculations proved this, he drafted into the army exactly as many as, according to calculations, we could feed, clothe and arm.
On September 2, 1939, the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars No. 1355-279ss approved the “Plan for the Reorganization of the Ground Forces for 1939 - 1940,” developed by its leader since 1937. General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.

In 1939, the Wehrmacht numbered 4.7 million people, the Red Army had only 1.9 million people. But by January 1941. the number of the Red Army increased to 4 million 200 thousand people.

It was simply impossible to train an army of such size and rearm it in a short time to wage a modern war against an experienced enemy.

J.V. Stalin understood this very well, and very soberly assessing the capabilities of the Red Army, he believed that it would be ready to fully fight the Wehrmacht no earlier than the middle of 1942-43. That is why he tried to delay the start of the war.
He had no illusions about Hitler.

I. Stalin knew very well that the Non-Aggression Pact, which we concluded in August 1939 with Hitler, was considered by him as a disguise and a means to achieve the goal - the defeat of the USSR, but he continued to play a diplomatic game, trying to delay time.
All this is a lie that I. Stalin trusted and feared Hitler.

Back in November 1939, before the Soviet-Finnish War, an entry appeared in the personal diary of the USSR Ambassador to Sweden A.M. Kollontai, which recorded the following words of Stalin that she personally heard during an audience in the Kremlin:

“The time for persuasion and negotiations is over. We must practically prepare for resistance, for war with Hitler.”

As to whether Stalin “trusted” Hitler, his speech at a Politburo meeting on November 18, 1940, summing up the results of Molotov’s visit to Berlin, is very clear:

“….As we know, Hitler, immediately after our delegation left Berlin, loudly declared that “German-Soviet relations have been finally established.”
But we know the value of these statements well! It was clear to us even before meeting Hitler that he would not want to take into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, dictated by the security requirements of our country...
We viewed the Berlin meeting as a real opportunity to test the position of the German government....
Hitler's position during these negotiations, in particular his persistent reluctance to take into account the natural security interests of the Soviet Union, his categorical refusal to end the actual occupation of Finland and Romania - all this indicates that, despite demagogic assurances about the non-infringement of the "global interests" of the Soviet Union, in fact, preparations are underway for an attack on our country. In seeking the Berlin meeting, the Nazi Fuhrer sought to disguise his true intentions...
One thing is clear: Hitler is playing a double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, he is at the same time trying to gain time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the issue of further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations...
It was at this time that we managed to prevent an attack by Nazi Germany. And in this matter, the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with her played a big role...

But, of course, this is only a temporary respite; the immediate threat of armed aggression against us has only been somewhat weakened, but has not been completely eliminated.

But by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany, we have already gained more than a year to prepare for a decisive and deadly struggle against Hitlerism.
Of course, we cannot consider the Soviet-German Pact as the basis for creating reliable security for us.
Issues of state security are now becoming even more acute.
Now that our borders have been pushed to the west, we need a powerful barrier along them, with operational groupings of troops brought into combat readiness in the near, but... not in the immediate rear.”
(The final words of I. Stalin are very important for understanding who is to blame for the fact that our troops of the Western Front were taken by surprise on June 22, 1941).

On May 5, 1941, at a reception in the Kremlin for graduates of military academies, I. Stalin said in his speech:

“….Germany wants to destroy our socialist state: exterminate millions of Soviet people, and turn the survivors into slaves. Only a war with Nazi Germany and victory in this war can save our Motherland. I propose to drink to the war, to the offensive in the war, to our victory in this war...."

Some saw in these words of I. Stalin his intention to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. But this is not so. When Marshall S.K. Tymoshenko reminded him of the statement about the transition to offensive actions, he explained: “I said this in order to encourage those present, so that they would think about victory, and not about the invincibility of the German army, which newspapers around the world are trumpeting.”
On January 15, 1941, speaking at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin spoke to the commanders of the district troops:

“War creeps up unnoticed and will begin with a sudden attack without declaring war” (A.I. Eremenko “Diaries”).
V.M. In the mid-1970s, Molotov recalled the beginning of the war as follows:

“We knew that war was just around the corner, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The whole question was where we would have to retreat - to Smolensk or to Moscow, we discussed this before the war... We did everything to delay the war. And we succeeded in this for a year and ten months... Even before the war, Stalin believed that only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on equal terms. …. Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov told me that after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, Stalin said: “God grant that we end this war in 1946.
Yes, no one could be prepared for the hour of attack, not even the Lord God!
We were expecting an attack, and we had a main goal: not to give Hitler a reason to attack. He would have said: “Soviet troops are already gathering on the border, they are forcing me to act!”
The TASS message of June 14, 1941 was sent to not give the Germans any reason to justify their attack... It was needed as a last resort... It turned out that Hitler became the aggressor on June 22 in front of the whole world. And we had allies.... Already in 1939, he was determined to start a war. When will he untie her? The delay was so desirable for us, for another year or several months. Of course, we knew that we had to be prepared for this war at any moment, but how to ensure this in practice? It’s very difficult...” (F. Chuev. “One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov.”

They say and write a lot about the fact that I. Stalin ignored and did not trust the mass of information on Germany’s preparation for an attack on the USSR, which was presented by our foreign intelligence, military intelligence and other sources.
But this is far from the truth.

As one of the heads of foreign intelligence at that time, General P.A., recalled. Sudoplatov, “although Stalin was irritated by intelligence materials (why will be shown below - sad39), nevertheless, he sought to use all the intelligence information that was reported to Stalin to prevent war in secret diplomatic negotiations, and our intelligence was entrusted with bringing it to the German military circles of information about the inevitability of a long war with Russia for Germany, emphasizing the fact that we have created a military-industrial base in the Urals that is invulnerable to German attack.”

For example, I. Stalin ordered that the German military attache in Moscow be acquainted with the industrial and military power of Siberia.
At the beginning of April 1941, he was allowed to tour new military factories that produced tanks and aircraft of the latest designs.
And about. German attaché in Moscow G. Krebs reported on April 9, 1941 to Berlin:
“Our representatives were allowed to see everything. Obviously, Russia wants to intimidate possible aggressors in this way.”

Foreign intelligence of the People's Commissariat of State Security, on the instructions of Stalin, specifically provided the Harbin station of German intelligence in China with the opportunity to “intercept and decipher” a certain “circular from Moscow”, which ordered all Soviet representatives abroad to warn Germany that the Soviet Union had prepared to defend its interests.” (Vishlev O.V. “On the eve of June 22, 1941.” M., 2001).

Foreign intelligence received the most complete information about Germany's aggressive intentions against the USSR through its agents (the "magnificent five" - ​​Philby, Cairncross, Maclean and their comrades) in London.

Intelligence obtained the most secret information about the negotiations conducted with Hitler by the British Foreign Ministers Simon and Halifax in 1935 and 1938, respectively, and by Prime Minister Chamberlain in 1938.
We learned that England agreed with Hitler’s demand to lift part of the military restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany’s expansion to the East was encouraged in the hope that access to the borders of the USSR would remove the threat of aggression from Western countries.
At the beginning of 1937, information was received about a meeting of senior representatives of the Wehrmacht, at which issues of war with the USSR were discussed.
In the same year, data was received on the operational-strategic games of the Wehrmacht, conducted under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt, which resulted in the conclusion (“Seekckt’s testament”) that Germany would not be able to win the war with Russia if the fighting dragged on for a period of time more than two months and if during the first month of the war it is not possible to capture Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, simultaneously occupying the main centers of military industry and raw materials production in the European part of the USSR.”
The conclusion, as we see, was completely justified.
According to General P.A. Sudoplatov, who oversaw the German intelligence department, the results of these games were one of the reasons that prompted Hitler to take the initiative to conclude the 1939 non-aggression pact.
In 1935, data was received from one of the sources of our Berlin residency, agent Breitenbach, about testing a liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a flight range of up to 200 km, developed by engineer von Braun.

But the objective, full-fledged description of Germany’s intentions towards the USSR, specific goals, timing, and the direction of its military aspirations remained unclear.

The obvious inevitability of our military clash was combined in our intelligence reports with information about a possible German armistice agreement with England, as well as Hitler’s proposals for delimiting the spheres of influence of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR. This naturally caused a certain distrust in the reliability of the intelligence data received.
We must also not forget that the repressions that took place in 1937-1938 did not escape intelligence. Our residency in Germany and other countries was greatly weakened. In 1940, People's Commissar Yezhov said that he “purged 14 thousand security officers”

On July 22, 1940, Hitler decides to begin aggression against the USSR even before the end of the war with England.
On the same day, he instructs the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht ground forces to develop a plan for war with the USSR, completing all preparations by May 15, 1941, in order to begin military operations no later than mid-June 1941.
Hitler's contemporaries claim that he, as a very superstitious person, considered the date of June 22, 1940 - the surrender of France - to be very happy for himself and then set June 22, 1941 as the date of the attack on the USSR.

On July 31, 1940, a meeting was held at Wehrmacht headquarters, at which Hitler justified the need to start a war with the USSR, without waiting for the end of the war with England.
On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa.

“For a long time it was believed that the USSR did not have the text of Directive No. 21 - “Plan Barbarossa”, and it was indicated that American intelligence had it, but did not share it with Moscow. American intelligence did have information, including a copy of Directive No. 21 “Plan Barbarossa”.

In January 1941, it was obtained by the commercial attache of the US Embassy in Berlin, Sam Edison Woods, through his connections in government and military circles in Germany.
US President Roosevelt ordered that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, K. Umansky, be familiarized with the materials of S. Woods, which was carried out on March 1, 1941.
At the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, his deputy, Semner Welles, handed over these materials to our Ambassador Umansky, indicating the source.

The information from the Americans was a very significant, but nevertheless an addition to the information from the intelligence department of the NKGB and military intelligence, which at that time had much more powerful intelligence networks in order to independently be aware of the German plans of aggression and inform the Kremlin about it.” (Sudoplatov P.A. “Different days of the secret war and diplomacy. 1941.” M., 2001).

But the date - June 22nd - is not and never was in the text of Directive No. 21.
It contained only the date of completion of all preparations for the attack - May 15, 1941.

First page of Directive No. 21 - Plan Barbarossa

The long-time head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSH), Army General Ivashutin, said:
“The texts of almost all documents and radiograms concerning Germany’s military preparations and the timing of the attack were reported regularly according to the following list: Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, People’s Commissar of Defense and Chief of the General Staff.”

Therefore, G.K.’s statement looks very strange. Zhukov that “... there is a version that on the eve of the war we allegedly knew the Barbarossa plan... Let me declare with full responsibility that this is pure fiction. As far as I know, neither the Soviet government, nor the People’s Commissar of Defense, nor the General Staff had any such data” (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections” M. APN 1975 pp. vol. 1, p. 259.).

It is permissible to ask what data did the Chief of the General Staff G.K. have at his disposal then? Zhukov, if he did not have this information, and also was not even familiar with the memorandum of the head of the Intelligence Directorate (from February 16, 1942, the Intelligence Directorate was transformed into the Main Intelligence Directorate - GRU) of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, who was subordinate to directly G.K. Zhukov, dated March 20, 1941 - “Options for military operations of the German army against the USSR,” compiled on the basis of all the intelligence information obtained through military intelligence and which was reported to the country’s leadership.

This document outlined options for possible directions of attacks by German troops, and one of the options essentially reflected the essence of the “Barbarossa Plan” and the direction of the main attacks of German troops.

So G.K. Zhukov answered a question asked to him by Colonel Anfilov many years after the war. Colonel Anfilov subsequently cited this answer in his article in Krasnaya Zvezda dated March 26, 1996
(It is characteristic that in his most “truthful book about the war” G.K. Zhukov described this report and criticized the incorrect conclusions of the report).

When Lieutenant General N.G. Pavlenko, whom G.K. Zhukov insisted that on the eve of the war he knew nothing about the “Barbarossa plan,” G.K. testified. Zhukov received copies of these German documents, which bore the signatures of Timoshenko, Beria, Zhukov and Abakumov, then according to Pavlenko - G.K. Zhukov was amazed and shocked. Strange forgetfulness.
But F.I. Golikov quickly corrected the mistake he had made in his conclusions of the report dated March 20, 1941 and began to present irrefutable evidence of the Germans preparing for an attack on the USSR:
- 4, 16. April 26, 1941 the head of the RU General Staff F.I. Golikov sends special messages to I. Stalin, S.K. Tymoshenko and other leaders about strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border of the USSR;
- May 9, 1941, head of the RU F.I. Golikov introduced I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, presented a report “On plans for a German attack on the USSR,” which assessed the grouping of German troops, indicated the directions of attacks and the number of concentrated German divisions;
-On May 15, 1941, the RU message “On the distribution of the German armed forces across theaters and fronts as of May 15, 1941” was presented;
- On June 5 and 7, 1941, Golikov presented a special report on Romania’s military preparations. Until June 22, a number of more messages were submitted.

As stated above, G.K. Zhukov complained that he did not have the opportunity to report to I. Stalin about the enemy’s potential capabilities.
What capabilities of a potential enemy could the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov report on if, according to him, he was not familiar with the main intelligence report on this issue?
Regarding the fact that his predecessors did not have the opportunity to make a detailed report to I. Stalin, this is also a complete lie in “the most truthful book about the war.”
For example, only in June 1940, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko spent 22 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin’s office, Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov 17 hours 20 minutes.
G.K. Zhukov, from the moment of his appointment to the post of Chief of the General Staff, i.e. from January 13, 1941 to June 21, 1941, spent 70 hours and 35 minutes in I. Stalin’s office.
This is evidenced by the entries in the log of visits to I. Stalin’s office.
(“At a reception with Stalin. Notebooks (journals) of records of persons received by I.V. Stalin (1924-1953)” Moscow. New chronograph, 2008. The records of the duty secretaries of the reception of I.V., stored in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, are published. Stalin for 1924-1953, in which every day the time of stay of all his visitors in Stalin’s Kremlin office was recorded down to the minute).

During the same period, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of Staff, they visited Stalin's office several times. General Staff, Marshalov K.E. Voroshilova, S.M. Budyonny, Deputy People's Commissar Marshal Kulik, Army General Meretskov, Aviation Lieutenant Generals Rychagov, Zhigarev, General N.F. Vatutin and many other military leaders.

On January 31, 1941, the Wehrmacht High Command issued Directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in order to implement Plan Barbarossa.

The directive defined “Day B” - the day the offensive began - no later than June 21, 1941.
On April 30, 1941, at a meeting of senior military leadership, Hitler finally announced the date of the attack on the USSR - June 22, 1941, writing it on his copy of the plan.
On June 10, 1941, Order No. 1170/41 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Halder “On setting a date for the start of the offensive against the Soviet Union” was determined;
"1. The D-Day of Operation Barbarossa is proposed to be June 22, 1941.
2. If this deadline is postponed, the corresponding decision will be made no later than June 18. Data on the direction of the main attack will continue to remain secret.
3. At 13.00 on June 21, one of the following signals will be transmitted to the troops:
a) Dortmund signal. It means that the offensive will begin on June 22 as planned and that open execution of the order can begin.
b) Alton signal. It means that the offensive is postponed to another date. But in this case, it will be necessary to fully disclose the goals of the concentration of German troops, since the latter will be in full combat readiness.
4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive and the flight of aircraft across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of aviation, the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own.”

Unfortunately, our foreign, military and political intelligence, as Sudoplatov said, “having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determining the inevitability of war, did not predict the Wehrmacht’s rate of blitzkrieg. This was a fatal mistake, because the reliance on blitzkrieg indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England.”

Foreign intelligence reports about Germany's military preparations came from various stations: England, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, Finland, etc.

Already in September 1940, one of the most valuable sources of the Berlin station “Corsican” (Arvid Harnak. One of the leaders of the Red Chapel organization. Began collaborating with the USSR in 1935. In 1942 arrested and executed) conveyed information that “at the beginning of the future Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union." There were similar reports from other sources.

In December 1940, a message was received from the Berlin station that on December 18, Hitler, speaking on the occasion of the graduation of 5 thousand German officers from schools, sharply spoke out against “the injustice on earth, when the Great Russians own one-sixth of the land, and 90 million Germans huddle on piece of land" and called on the Germans to eliminate this "injustice."

“In those pre-war years, there was a procedure for reporting to the country’s leadership each material received through foreign intelligence separately, as a rule, in the form in which it was received, without an analytical assessment. Only the degree of reliability of the source was determined.

The information reported to the leadership in this form did not create a unified picture of the events taking place, did not answer the question for what purpose these or other measures were being carried out, whether a political decision had been made to attack, etc.
No summary materials were prepared, with an in-depth analysis of all information received from sources and conclusions for consideration by the country’s leadership.” (“Hitler’s secrets on Stalin’s table”, published by Moscow City Archives, 1995).

In other words, before the war, I. Stalin was simply “inundated” with various intelligence information, in a number of cases contradictory and sometimes false.
Only in 1943 did an analytical service appear in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
It should also be taken into account that in preparation for the war against the USSR, the Germans began to carry out very powerful camouflage and disinformation measures at the level of state policy, in the development of which the highest ranks of the Third Reich took part.

At the beginning of 1941, the German command began to implement a whole system of measures to falsely explain the military preparations being carried out on the borders with the USSR.
On February 15, 1941, document No. 44142/41 “Guidelines of the Supreme High Command for camouflaging the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union” was introduced, signed by Keitel, which provided for concealing from the enemy preparations for the operation under the Barbarossa plan.
The document prescribed, at the first stage, “until April to maintain uncertainty about one’s intentions. At subsequent stages, when it will no longer be possible to hide the preparations for the operation, it will be necessary to explain all our actions as disinformation, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for the invasion of England.”

On May 12, 1941, the second document was adopted - 44699/41 “Order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces dated May 12, 1941 on the second phase of disinformation of the enemy in order to maintain the secrecy of the concentration of forces against the Soviet Union.”
This document provided:

“...from May 22, with the introduction of a maximum condensed schedule for the movement of military echelons, all efforts of disinformation agencies should be aimed at presenting the concentration of forces for Operation Barbarossa as a maneuver in order to confuse the Western enemy.
For the same reason, it is necessary to continue preparations for an attack on England with particular energy...
Among the formations located in the East, rumors about rear cover against Russia and a “distractive concentration of forces in the East” should circulate, and troops located on the English Channel should believe in real preparations for the invasion of England...
To spread the thesis that the action to capture the island of Crete (Operation Mercury) was a dress rehearsal for the landing in England...”
(During Operation Mercury, the Germans airlifted more than 23,000 soldiers and officers, more than 300 artillery pieces, about 5,000 containers with weapons and ammunition and other cargo to the island of Crete. This was the largest airborne operation in the history of wars) .

Our Berlin station was exposed to the agent provocateur “Lyceumist” (O. Berlinks, 1913-1978 Latvian. Recruited in Berlin on August 15, 1940).
Abwehr Major Siegfried Müller, who was in Soviet captivity, testified during interrogation in May 1947 that in August 1940, Amayak Kobulov (resident of our foreign intelligence in Berlin) was set up by a German intelligence agent, Latvian Berlings (“Lyceist”), who, on the instructions of the Abwehr supplied him with disinformation materials for a long time.).
The results of the meeting between the Lyceum Student and Kobulov were reported to Hitler. Information for this agent was prepared and coordinated with Hitler and Ribentrop.
There were reports from “Lyceumist” about the low probability of war between Germany and the USSR, reports that the concentration of German troops on the border was a response to the movement of USSR troops to the border, etc.
However, Moscow knew about the “double day” of “Lyceumist”. Foreign policy intelligence and military intelligence of the USSR had such strong agent positions in the German Foreign Ministry that quickly determining the true identity of the “Lyceumist” left no difficulty.
The game began and, in turn, our resident in Berlin Kobulov supplied the “Lyceumist” with relevant information during meetings.

In German disinformation campaigns, information began to appear that German preparations at our borders are aimed at putting pressure on the USSR and forcing it to accept demands of an economic and territorial nature, a kind of ultimatum that Berlin allegedly intends to put forward.

Information was spread that Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of food and raw materials, and that without solving this problem through supplies from Ukraine and oil from the Caucasus, it would not be able to defeat England.
All this disinformation was reflected in their messages not only by the sources of the Berlin station, but it also came to the attention of other foreign intelligence services, from where our intelligence received it through its agents in these countries.
Thus, there was multiple overlap of the obtained information, which seemed to confirm its “reliability” - and they had one source - disinformation prepared in Germany.
On April 30, 1941, information came from the Corsican that Germany wanted to solve its problems by presenting an ultimatum to the USSR on a significant increase in supplies of raw materials.
On May 5, the same “Corsican” provides information that the concentration of German troops is a “war of nerves” so that the USSR accepts Germany’s conditions: the USSR must give guarantees of entering the war on the side of the Axis powers.
Similar information comes from the English station.
On May 8, 1941, a message from the “Starshina” (Harro Schulze-Boysen) said that an attack on the USSR was not off the agenda, but the Germans would first present us with an ultimatum demanding increased exports to Germany.

And so all this mass of foreign intelligence information, as they say, in its original form, fell out, as mentioned above, without conducting a generalized analysis and conclusions, onto the table of Stalin, who himself had to analyze it and draw conclusions..

Here it will become clear why, according to Sudoplatov, Stalin felt some irritation towards intelligence materials, but not towards all materials.
This is what V.M. recalled. Molotov:
“When I was Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, I spent half a day every day reading intelligence reports. What was there, what deadlines were mentioned! And if we had succumbed, the war could have started much earlier. The intelligence officer’s task is not to be late, to have time to report...”

Many researchers, speaking about I. Stalin’s “distrust” of intelligence materials, cite his resolution on the special message of the People’s Commissar of State Security V.N. Merkulov No. 2279/M dated June 17, 1941, containing information received from the “Sergeant Major” (Schulze-Boysen) and “The Corsican” (Arvid Harnak):
“Comrade Merkulov. Your source from the German headquarters may send it. aviation to your fucking mother. This is not a source, but a disinformer. I.St.”

In fact, those who spoke about Stalin’s distrust of intelligence apparently did not read the text of this message, but drew a conclusion only based on I. Stalin’s resolution.
Although a certain amount of distrust in intelligence data, especially in the numerous dates of a possible German attack, since more than ten of them were reported through military intelligence alone, Stalin apparently developed it.

Hitler, for example, during the war on the Western Front, issued an order for an offensive, and on the planned day of the offensive he canceled it. Hitler issued an order for an offensive on the Western Front 27 times and canceled it 26 times.

If we read the message of the “Starshina” itself, then I. Stalin’s irritation and resolution will become understandable.
Here is the text of the Chief's message:
"1. All military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR have been completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time.
2. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. They emphasize that this statement cannot have any significance.
3.The targets of German air raids will primarily be the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories that produce individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops...”
(The following is a message from The Corsican on issues of economics and industry in Germany).
.
“Foreman” (Harro Schulze-Boysen 09/2/1909 - 12/22/1942. German. Born in Kiel in the family of a captain of the 2nd rank. Studied at the Faculty of Law of the University of Berlin. Was appointed to one of the departments of the communications department of the Reich Ministry of Aviation, Before the outbreak of World War II, Schulze-Boysen established contact with Dr. Arvid Harnack ("The Corsican"). On August 31, 1942, Harro Schulze-Boysen was arrested and executed. Posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner in 1969. He was always honest agent who gave us a lot of valuable information.

But his report of June 17 looks quite frivolous simply because the date of the TASS report is mixed up (not June 14, but June 6), and the priority targets of German air raids are the second-rate Svirskaya hydroelectric power station, Moscow factories “producing individual parts for aircraft, as well as auto repair shops.”

So Stalin had every reason to doubt such information.
At the same time, we see that I. Stalin’s resolution applies only to “Starshina” - an agent working at the headquarters of German aviation, but not to “Corsican”.
But after such a resolution, Stalin then summoned V.N. Merkulov and the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina.
Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the Sources. After Fitin explained why intelligence trusted “Starshina,” Stalin said: “Go double-check everything and report to me.”

A huge amount of intelligence information also came through military intelligence.
Only from London, where a group of military intelligence officers was led by military attache Major General I.Ya. Sklyarov, in one pre-war year, 1,638 sheets of telegraph messages were sent to the Center, most of which contained information about Germany’s preparations for war against the USSR.
A telegram from Richard Sorge, who worked in Japan through the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, became widely known:

In reality, there was never a message with such a text from Sorge.
On June 6, 2001, “Red Star” published materials from a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, in which SVR Colonel Karpov quite definitely said that, unfortunately, this was a fake.

The “resolution” of L. Beria dated June 21, 1941 is the same fake:
“Many workers are sowing panic... The secret employees of “Yastreb”, “Carmen”, “Almaz”, “Verny” will be erased into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to embroil us with Germany.”
These lines are circulating in the press, but their falsity has long been established.

After all, since February 3, 1941, Beria had no foreign intelligence subordinate to him, because the NKVD was divided that day into Beria’s NKVD and Merkulov’s NKGB, and foreign intelligence came completely under the subordination of Merkulov.

Here are a few actual reports from R. Sorge (Ramsay):

- “May 2: “I talked with the German Ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR... The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler, either in May or after the war with England.”
- May 30: “Berlin informed Ott that the German offensive against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure that war will start.”
- June 1: “The expectation of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left on May 6 for Bangkok. In Bangkok he will take up the post of military attaché.”
- June 20 “The German ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, told me that war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable.”

According to military intelligence alone, there have been more than 10 messages about the start date of the war with Germany since 1940.
Here they are:
- December 27, 1940 - from Berlin: the war will begin in the second half of next year;
- December 31, 1940 - from Bucharest: the war will begin in the spring of next year;
- February 22, 1941 - from Belgrade: the Germans will advance in May - June 1941;
- March 15, 1941 - from Bucharest: war should be expected in 3 months;
- March 19, 1941 - from Berlin: the attack is planned between May 15 and June 15, 1941;
- May 4, 1941 - from Bucharest: the start of the war is scheduled for mid-June;
- May 22, 1941 - from Berlin: an attack on the USSR is expected on June 15;
- June 1, 1941 - from Tokyo: the beginning of the war - around June 15;
- June 7, 1941 - from Bucharest: the war will begin on June 15 - 20;
- June 16, 1941 - from Berlin and from France: German attack on the USSR on June 22 - 25;
June 21, 1941 - from the German Embassy in Moscow, the attack was scheduled for 3 - 4 o'clock in the morning on June 22.

As you can see, the latest information from a source at the German Embassy in Moscow contains the exact date and time of the attack.
This information was received from an agent of the Intelligence Agency - "HVC" (aka Gerhard Kegel), an employee of the German embassy in Moscow, who early in the morning of June 21. “KhVC” itself summoned its curator, RU Colonel K.B. Leontva, to an urgent meeting.
On the evening of June 21, Leontiev once again had a meeting with an HVC agent.
The information from "HVC" was immediately reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov.

Very extensive information was received from various sources about the concentration of German troops near our borders.
As a result of intelligence activities, the Soviet leadership knew and posed a real threat from Germany, its desire to provoke the USSR into military action, which would compromise us in the eyes of the world community as the culprit of aggression, thereby depriving the USSR of allies in the fight against the true aggressor.

How extensive the intelligence network of Soviet intelligence was is also evidenced by the fact that such celebrities as film actresses Olga Chekhova and Marika Rekk were agents of our military intelligence.

An illegal intelligence officer, operating under the pseudonym "Merlin", aka Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova, worked for Soviet intelligence from 1922 to 1945. The scale of her intelligence activities, volumes and especially the level and quality of information she sent to Moscow is clearly evidenced by the fact that the connection between O.K. Chekhova and Moscow were supported by three radio operators in Berlin and its environs.
Hitler awarded Olga Chekhova the specially established title of State Artist of the Third Reich, invited her to the most prestigious events, during which he demonstratively showed her signs of the highest attention, and invariably seated her next to him. (A.B. Martirosyan “Tragedy of June 22: Blitzkrieg or Treason.”)

OK. Chekhov at one of the receptions next to Hitler.

Marika Rekk belonged to an intelligence group of Soviet military intelligence, code-named “Krona”. Its creator was one of the most prominent Soviet military intelligence officers, Jan Chernyak.
The group was created back in the mid-20s. XX century and it operated for about 18 years, but not one of its members was discovered by the enemy.
And it included over 30 people, most of whom became important Wehrmacht officers and major industrialists of the Reich.

Marika Rekk
(Known to our viewers from captured German
movie "The Girl of My Dreams")

But G.K. Zhukov still did not miss the opportunity to spoil our intelligence and accused the Intelligence Department of insolvency, writing in a letter to the writer V.D. Sokolov dated March 2, 1964 the following:

“Our intelligence agency, which was led by Golikov before the war, worked poorly and failed to reveal the true intentions of the Hitlerite high command. Our human intelligence was unable to refute Hitler’s false version of his lack of intention to fight with the Soviet Union.”

Hitler continued to play his disinformation game, hoping to outplay I. Stalin in it.

So on May 15, 1941, the off-flight Yu-52 aircraft (Junkers-52 aircraft were used by Hitler as personal transport), flying freely over Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, landed in Moscow at 11.30 on the Khodynskoye field, without encountering opposition from Soviet means Air defense.
After this landing, many leaders of the Soviet air defense and aviation forces had very “serious troubles.”
The plane brought a personal message from Hitler to I. Stalin.
Here is part of the text of this message:
“During the formation of the invasion force away from the eyes and aircraft of the enemy, and also in connection with recent operations in the Balkans, a large number of my troops accumulated along the border with the Soviet Union, about 88 divisions, which may have given rise to rumors currently circulating about a possible military conflict between us. I assure you with the honor of the head of state that this is not so.
For my part, I also understand that you cannot completely ignore these rumors and have also concentrated a sufficient number of your troops on the border.
In such a situation, I do not at all exclude the possibility of an accidental outbreak of an armed conflict, which, in conditions of such a concentration of troops, could take on very large proportions, when it would be difficult or simply impossible to determine what was its root cause. It will be no less difficult to stop this conflict.
I want to be completely frank with you. I fear that one of my generals will deliberately enter into such a conflict in order to save England from her fate and thwart my plans.
We are talking about just one month. Around June 15-20, I plan to begin a massive transfer of troops to the West from your border.
At the same time, I earnestly ask you not to succumb to any provocations that may occur on the part of my generals who have forgotten their duty. And, of course, try not to give them any reason.
If provocation from one of my generals cannot be avoided, I ask you to show restraint, do not take retaliatory actions and immediately report what happened through a communication channel known to you. Only in this way will we be able to achieve our common goals, which, as it seems to me, you and I have clearly agreed upon. I thank you for meeting me halfway on a matter known to you, and I ask you to forgive me for the method I chose to deliver this letter to you as quickly as possible. I continue to hope for our meeting in July. Sincerely yours, Adolf Hitler. May 14, 1941."

(As we see in this letter, Hitler practically himself “names” the approximate date of the attack on the USSR on June 15-20, covering it up with the transfer of troops to the West.)

But J. Stalin always had a clear position regarding Hitler’s intentions and trust in him.
The question of whether he believed or not believed simply should not exist, he never believed.

And all subsequent actions of I. Stalin show that he really did not believe Hitler’s “sincerity” and continued to take measures to “bring into combat readiness operational groupings of troops in the near, but ... not in the immediate rear,” which he spoke about in his speech from November 18, 1940 at a meeting of the Politburo so that the German attack would not take us by surprise.
So directly according to his instructions:

On May 14, 1941, General Staff directives No. 503859, 303862, 303874, 503913 and 503920 were sent (for the Western, Kiev, Odessa, Leningrad and Baltic districts, respectively) on the preparation of border defense and air defense plans.
However, the command of all military districts, instead of the deadline indicated in them for submitting plans by May 20 - 25, 1941, submitted them by June 10 - 20. Therefore, these plans were not approved by either the General Staff or the People's Commissar of Defense.
This is the direct fault of the district commanders, as well as the General Staff, who did not demand the submission of plans by the specified deadline.
As a result, thousands of soldiers and officers responded with their lives at the start of the war;

- “...In February - April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments of the Baltic, Western, Kiev special and Leningrad military districts were called to the General Staff. Together with them, the procedure for covering the border, the allocation of the necessary forces and forms of their use for this purpose were outlined...” (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of a Whole Life.” M., 1974);

From March 25 to April 5, 1941, a partial conscription into the Red Army was carried out, thanks to which it was possible to additionally conscript about 300 thousand people;

On January 20, 1941, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense was announced on the enrollment of reserve command personnel, called up upon mobilization on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, who were detained in the army after the end of this war until special tension;

On May 24, 1941, at an extended meeting of the Politburo, J. Stalin openly warned all senior Soviet and military leadership that in the very near future the USSR could be subject to a surprise attack by Germany;

During May-June 1941. as a result of “hidden mobilization”, about a million “assignees” from the internal districts were raised and sent to the western districts.
This made it possible to bring almost 50% of the divisions to their normal wartime strength (12-14 thousand people).
Thus, the actual deployment and reinforcement of troops in the western districts began long before June 22.
This hidden mobilization could not be carried out without the instructions of I. Stalin, but it was carried out secretly in order to prevent Hitler and the entire West from accusing the USSR of aggressive intentions.
After all, this has already happened in our history, when in 1914 Nicholas II declared mobilization in the Russian Empire, which was regarded as a declaration of war;

On June 10, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 503859/SS/OV was sent to ZapOVO, which provided: “To increase the combat readiness of the district troops, all deep rifle divisions ... be withdrawn to the areas provided for by the cover plan,” which meant the actual bringing troops to increased combat readiness;
- On June 11, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent to immediately bring the defensive structures of the first line of fortified areas of the Western OVO to proper condition and full combat readiness, primarily to strengthen their firepower.
“General Pavlov was obliged to report the execution by June 15, 1941. But there was no report on the implementation of this directive.” (Anfilov V.A. “The failure of the Blitzkrieg.” M., 1975).
And as it turned out later, this directive was not implemented.
Again the question is, where were the General Staff and its chief, who should have demanded its implementation, or should J. Stalin control these issues for them?;

On June 12, 1941, directives from the People's Commissariat of Defense signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov were sent on the implementation of Cover Plans for all western districts;

On June 13, 1941, at the direction of I. Stalin, a General Staff directive was issued on the deployment of troops located in the depths of the district, closer to the state border (Vasilevsky A.M. “The Work of a Whole Life”).
In three out of four districts, this directive was implemented, except for the Western OVO (District Commander, Army General D.F. Pavlov).
As military historian A. Isaev writes, “since June 18, the following units of the Kyiv OVO moved closer to the border from their places of deployment:
31 sk (200, 193, 195 sd); 36 sk (228, 140, 146 sd); 37 sk (141,80,139 sd); 55 sk (169,130,189 sd); 49 sk (190,197 sd).
Total - 5 rifle corps (rk), comprising 14 rifle divisions (rf), which is about 200 thousand people.”
In total, 28 divisions were moved closer to the state border;

In the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov we also find the following message:
“People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Already in June 1941, Timoshenko recommended that district commanders conduct tactical exercises of formations towards the state border in order to pull troops closer to deployment areas according to cover plans (i.e., to defense areas in the event of an attack).
This recommendation of the People's Commissar of Defense was implemented by the districts, however, with one significant caveat: a significant part of the artillery did not take part in the movement (to the border, to the line of defense)....
...The reason for this was that the commanders of the districts (Western OVO-Pavlov and Kiev OVO-Kirponos), without coordination with Moscow, decided to send most of the artillery to the firing ranges.”
Again the question: Where was the General Staff, its chief, if such events are carried out without their knowledge by the district commanders when war with Germany is on the threshold?
As a result, some corps and divisions of covering troops during the attack of Nazi Germany found themselves without a significant part of their artillery.
K.K. Rokossovsky writes in his book that “back in May 1941, for example, an order was issued from the district headquarters, the expediency of which was difficult to explain in that alarming situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the training grounds located in the border zone.
Our corps managed to defend its artillery.”
Thus, large-caliber artillery, the striking force of the troops, was practically absent from the battle formations. And most of the anti-aircraft weapons of the Western OVO were generally located near Minsk, far from the border, and could not cover units and airfields attacked from the air in the first hours and days of the war.
The district command provided this “invaluable service” to the invading German troops.
This is what German General Blumentritt, chief of staff of the 4th Army of Army Group Center, writes in his memoirs (the 2nd Tank Group of this army, commanded by Guderian, advanced on June 22, 1941 in the Brest area against the 4th Army of the Western OVO - army commander, Major General M.A. Korobkov):
“At 3 hours 30 minutes, all of our artillery opened fire... And then something happened that seemed like a miracle: the Russian artillery did not respond... A few hours later, the first echelon divisions were on the other side of the river. Bug. Tanks were crossed, pontoon bridges were built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy... There was no doubt that the Russians were taken by surprise... Our tanks almost immediately broke through the Russian border fortifications and rushed east along the flat terrain" ("Fatal Decisions" Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1958).
To this we must add that the bridges in the Brest area were not blown up, along which German tanks were moving. Guderian was even surprised by this;

On December 27, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko issued order No. 0367 on the mandatory camouflage of the entire Air Force airfield network within a 500-km strip from the border with completion of work by July 1, 1941.
Neither the Air Force Main Directorate nor the districts complied with this order.
The direct fault is that of the Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the Red Army General Staff for Aviation Smushkevich (in accordance with the order, he was entrusted with control and a monthly report on this to the General Staff) and the Air Force command;

On June 19, 1941, Order No. 0042 of the People's Commissar of Defense was issued.
It states that “nothing significant has yet been done to camouflage airfields and the most important military installations”, that aircraft with “the complete absence of their camouflage” are crowded at airfields, etc.
The same order states that “... Artillery and mechanized units show similar carelessness towards camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks provides not only excellent observation objects, but also targets advantageous for hitting from the air. Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with paints that give a bright reflection and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military facilities...”
What was the result of this carelessness of the district command, primarily the Western OVO, was shown on June 22, when about 738 aircraft were destroyed at its airfields, including 528 lost on the ground, as well as a large number of military equipment.
Who is to blame for this? Again I. Stalin, or the command of the military districts and the General Staff, who failed to exercise strict control over the implementation of their orders and directives? I think the answer is clear.
The commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I.I. Kopets, upon learning of these losses, shot himself on the same day, June 22.

Here I will quote the words of the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova:
“Analyzing the events of the last peaceful days, I assume: I.V. Stalin imagined the combat readiness of our armed forces to be higher than it actually was... He believed that at any moment, upon a combat alarm signal, they could reliably repel the enemy... Knowing absolutely exactly the number of aircraft stationed on his orders at border airfields , he believed that at any moment, upon a combat alarm, they could fly into the air and reliably repel the enemy. And I was simply stunned by the news that our planes did not have time to take off, but died right at the airfields.”
Naturally, I. Stalin’s idea of ​​the state of combat readiness of our Armed Forces was based on the reports, first of all, of the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as other military commanders, whom he regularly listened to in his office;

On June 21, I. Stalin decided to deploy 5 fronts:
Western, Southwestern. Southern, Northwestern, Northern.
By this time, the front command posts were already equipped, because Back on June 13, a decision was made to separate the command structures in the military districts and transform the military district directorates into front-line ones.
Command post of the Western Front (The front commander, Army General D.G. Pavlov, was deployed in the area of ​​the Obuz-Lesnaya station. But Pavlov never appeared there before the start of the war).
The front command post of the Southwestern Front was located in the city of Ternopil (the front commander, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos, died on September 20, 1941).

Thus, we see that before the war, on the instructions of I. Stalin, a number of measures were taken to strengthen the readiness of the Red Army to repel aggression from Germany. And he had every reason to believe, as the People’s Commissar of the Navy N.G. wrote. Kuznetsov, “the combat readiness of our armed forces is higher than it actually turned out to be...”.
It should be noted that I. Stalin, receiving information about the approaching war from the foreign intelligence stations of Merkulov from the NKGB, from the military intelligence of General Golikov of the General Staff, through diplomatic channels, apparently could not be completely sure that all this was not a strategic provocation of Germany or Western countries that see their own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.
But there was also intelligence of the border troops, subordinate to L. Beria, which provided information about the concentration of German troops directly at the borders of the USSR, and its reliability was ensured by the constant observation of border guards, a large number of informants in the border areas who directly observed the concentration of German troops - these were residents of the border areas, train drivers , switchmen, oilers, etc.
Information from this intelligence is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it cannot be unreliable. This information, generalized and collected together, gave the most objective picture of the concentration of German troops.
Beria regularly reported this information to I. Stalin:
- In information No. 1196/B on April 21, 1941, Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko were given specific data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border.
- On June 2, 1941, Beria sent note No. 1798/B personally to Stalin with information about the concentration of two German army groups, the increased movement of troops mainly at night, reconnaissance carried out by German generals near the border, etc.
- On June 5, Beria sends Stalin another note No. 1868/B on the concentration of troops on the Soviet-German, Soviet-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian border.
In June 1941, more than 10 such information messages from border troops intelligence were presented.

But this is what Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov recalls, who in June 1941, commanding the separate 212th Long-Range Aviation Bomber Regiment, subordinate directly to Moscow, arrived from Smolensk to Minsk to present to the Air Force Commander of the Western Special Military District I.I. Kopts and then to the Commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov himself.

During the conversation with Golovanov, Pavlov contacted Stalin via HF. And he began to ask the general questions, to which the District Commander answered the following:

“No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I’ll check it again, but I think it’s just a provocation...”
And then, turning to him, he said:
“Boss is not in a good mood. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border...” Apparently, by this “bastard” he meant L. Beria, who was in charge of the border troops.
And many historians continue to insist that Stalin allegedly did not believe “Pavlov’s warnings” about the concentration of German troops....
The situation was heating up every day.

On June 14, 1941, a TASS message was published. It was a kind of trial balloon to test the reaction of the German leadership.
The TASS message, intended not so much for the population of the USSR as for official Berlin, refuted rumors about the “proximity of war between the USSR and Germany.”
There was no official reaction from Berlin to this message.
It apparently became clear to I. Stalin and the Soviet leadership that Germany’s military preparations for an attack on the USSR had entered the final stage.

June 15 came, then June 16, 17, but no “withdrawal” or “transfer” of German troops, as Hitler assured in his letter dated May 14, 1941, from the Soviet border, “towards England,” did not happen.
On the contrary, an increased accumulation of Wehrmacht troops began on our border.

On June 17, 1941, a message was received from Berlin from the USSR naval attache, Captain 1st Rank M.A. Vorontsov, that a German attack on the USSR would occur on June 22 at 3.30 am. (Captain 1st Rank Vorontsov was summoned by I. Stalin to Moscow and, according to some information, on the evening of June 21, he attended a meeting in his office. This meeting will be discussed below).

And then a reconnaissance flight over the border was made with an “inspection” of German units near our border.
This is what Major General of Aviation, Hero of the Soviet Union G. N. Zakharov writes in his book “I am a fighter.” Before the war, he was a colonel and commanded the 43rd Fighter Division of the Western Special Military District:
“Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or eighteenth of June forty-one - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and we had to fly from south to north – to Bialystok.
I flew out on a U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Aviation Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were filled with troops. In villages, farmsteads, and groves there were poorly camouflaged, or even completely uncamouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles and passenger cars, apparently staff cars, were darting along the roads. Somewhere in the depths of the vast territory a movement was emerging, which here, right at our border, was slowing down, resting against it... and ready to overflow across it.
We flew then for a little over three hours. I often landed the plane at any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently took his visor (as we see, he knew in advance that a plane with urgent information would soon land -sad39) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, having traveled 30–50 kilometers, landed again. And I wrote the report again, and the other border guard waited silently and then, saluting, silently disappeared. In the evening, in this way we flew to Bialystok.
After landing, the district air force commander, General Kopec, took me after the report to the district commander.
D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he was seeing me for the first time. I felt dissatisfied when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The commander’s intonation openly replaced the word “exaggerate” with “panic” - he clearly did not fully accept everything I said... And with that we left.”
D.G. Pavlov did not believe this information either...

In the early morning of June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began. The German attack on the USSR came as a complete surprise to the Soviet government. No one expected such treachery from Hitler. The command of the Red Army did everything to avoid giving rise to aggression. There was a strict order among the troops not to give in to provocations.

In March 1941, anti-aircraft gunners of the coastal artillery of the Baltic Fleet opened fire on German intruder aircraft. For this, the fleet leadership almost went under execution. After this incident, cartridges and shells were confiscated from the leading regiments and divisions. The locks on the artillery pieces were removed and put into storage. All border bridges have been cleared. For attempting to shoot at German military aircraft, the perpetrators faced a military tribunal.

And then suddenly the war began. But the draconian order of provocation tied the officers and soldiers hand and foot. For example, you are the commander of an aviation regiment. German planes are bombing your airfield. But you don't know if other airfields are being bombed. If they knew, then it is clear that a war has begun. But you are not allowed to know this. You see only your airfield and only your burning planes.

And each of the millions of officers and soldiers could see only a tiny piece of what was happening. What is this? Provocation? Or is it no longer a provocation? You start shooting, and then it turns out that only in your area the enemy took provocative actions. And what awaits you? Tribunal and execution.

After the outbreak of hostilities on the border, Stalin and the top commanders of the Red Army gathered in his office. Molotov came in and announced that the German government had declared war. The directive ordering the start of retaliatory military action was written only at 7:15 am. After that, it was encrypted and sent to military districts.

Meanwhile, airfields were burning, Soviet soldiers were dying. German tanks crossed the state border, and a powerful large-scale offensive by the fascist army began. Communications in the Red Army were disrupted. Therefore, the directive simply could not reach many headquarters. All this can be summed up in one phrase - loss of control. There is nothing worse in wartime.

Following the first directive, the second directive went to the troops. She ordered a counterattack to begin. Those who received it were forced not to defend, but to attack. This only made the situation worse, as the planes were on fire, the tanks were on fire, the artillery pieces were on fire, and their shells were lying in warehouses. The personnel also had no ammunition. All of them were also in warehouses. And how to carry out counterattacks?

Captured Red Army soldiers and German soldiers

As a result of all this, in 2 weeks of fighting, the entire personnel of the Red Army was destroyed. Some of the personnel died, and the rest were captured. The enemy captured a huge number of tanks, guns and ammunition. All captured equipment was repaired, repainted and launched into battle under German banners. Many former Soviet tanks went through the entire war with crosses on their turrets. And the former Soviet artillery fired at the advancing Red Army troops.

But why did the disaster happen? How did it happen that the German attack came as a complete surprise to Stalin and his entourage? Maybe Soviet intelligence did not work well and overlooked the unprecedented concentration of German troops near the border? No, I didn’t miss it. Soviet intelligence officers knew the location of the divisions, their numbers, and weapons. However, no measures were taken. And why? We'll figure this out now.

Why did Germany attack the USSR unexpectedly?

Comrade Stalin understood that war with Germany could not be avoided, so he prepared for it extremely seriously. The leader paid great attention to personnel. He changed them gradually, step by step. Moreover, he was guided by some of his own principles. But the most remarkable thing is that Joseph Vissarionovich ordered that undesirable people be shot. Soviet intelligence did not escape bloody repressions.

All its leaders were eliminated one after another. These are Stigga, Nikonov, Berzin, Unshlikht, Proskurov. Aralov spent several years under investigation with the use of physical force.

Here is a description of Oskar Ansonovich for Stiggu, written at the end of 1934: “In his work he is proactive, disciplined, hardworking. He has a firm and decisive character. He implements outlined plans and orders with persistence and perseverance. He reads a lot, engages in self-education.” The characteristic is good, but it did not save the scout. As Vysotsky sang: “They took the useful one out, hands behind his back, and threw him into a black crater with a flourish.”

An abandoned Soviet T-26 tank reached Moscow as part of German troops

It goes without saying that when a leader was liquidated, his first deputies, deputies, advisers, assistants, and heads of departments and departments were also subject to liquidation. When department heads were eliminated, a shadow of suspicion fell on the operational officers and the agents they led. Therefore, the destruction of the leader entailed the destruction of the entire intelligence network.

This could have affected the fruitful work of such a serious department as the Intelligence Agency. Of course it could, and it did. The only thing Stalin achieved was to prevent any conspiracy against himself and the Politburo. No one planted a briefcase with a bomb on the leader, unlike Hitler, who limited himself to only one night of long knives. And Joseph Vissarionovich had as many such nights as there were days in a year.

Work on replacing personnel was carried out constantly. It is quite possible that the intelligence service was finally staffed by real masters of their craft. These people thought professionally, and considered their enemies to be exactly the same professionals as themselves. To this we can add high ideological principles, party modesty and personal devotion to the leader of the people.

A few words about Richard Sorg

The work of military intelligence in 1940-1941 can be examined using the example of Richard Sorge. This man was once personally recruited by Yan Berzin. And the work of Ramsay (operational pseudonym Sorge) was supervised by Solomon Uritsky. Both of these intelligence officers were liquidated at the end of August 1938 after severe torture. After this, German resident Gorev and Finnish woman Aina Kuusinen were arrested. Shanghai resident Karl Rimm was summoned to leave and was eliminated. Sorge's wife Ekaterina Maksimova was arrested. She admitted to having connections with enemy intelligence and was eliminated.

And then in January 1940, Ramsay received an encrypted message from Moscow: “Dear friend, you work hard and are tired. Come, relax. We look forward to seeing you in Moscow.” To which the glorious Soviet intelligence officer replies: “With great gratitude I accept your greetings and wishes regarding vacation. But, unfortunately, I cannot come on vacation. This will reduce the flow of important information.”

But the bosses from the Intelligence Directorate are not appeased. They again send an encrypted message: “God bless the work, Ramsay. You can’t change it all anyway. Come, relax. You’ll go to the sea, sunbathe on the beach, drink vodka.” And our intelligence officer answers again: “I can’t come. There’s a lot of interesting and important work.” And the answer was: “Come, Ramsay, come.”

But Richard never heeded the entreaties of his leaders from Moscow. He did not leave Japan and did not go to Russia, because he knew perfectly well what awaited him there. And what awaited him was Lubyansky's deliverance, torture and death. But from the point of view of the communists, this meant that the intelligence officer refused to return to the USSR. He was registered as a malicious defector. Could Comrade Stalin trust such a person? Naturally not.

The legendary Soviet T-34 tanks went to the Germans in the first days of the war and fought in German tank divisions

But you need to know the leader of the peoples. He cannot be denied intelligence, prudence and restraint. If Ramsay had sent a message supported by facts, he would have been believed. However, Richard Sorge had no evidence regarding the German attack on the USSR. Yes, he sent a message to Moscow that the war would begin on June 22, 1941. But such messages also came from other intelligence officers. However, they were not confirmed by ironclad facts and evidence. All this information was based only on rumors. Who takes rumors seriously?

It should be noted here that Ramsay’s main target was not Germany, but Japan. He was faced with the task of preventing the Japanese army from starting a war against the USSR. And Richard managed to do this brilliantly. In the fall of 1941, Sorge informed Stalin that Japan would not start a war against the Soviet Union. And the leader believed this unconditionally. Dozens of divisions were removed from the Far Eastern border and thrown near Moscow.

Where does such faith come from for a malicious defector? And the whole point is that the intelligence officer provided not rumors, but evidence. He named the state against which Japan was preparing a surprise attack. All this was confirmed by facts. That is why Ramsay’s encryption was treated with complete confidence.

Now let’s imagine that in January 1940, Richard Sorge would have left for Moscow, naively believing his bosses from the Intelligence Directorate. And who would then be involved in preventing a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union? Who would have informed Stalin that the Japanese militarists would not violate the Soviet border? Or maybe the leader of the people had dozens of intelligence officers in Tokyo? However, only Sorge became a Hero of the Soviet Union. Therefore, there was no one except him. And how should we then treat Comrade Stalin’s personnel policy?

Why did Stalin believe that Germany was not ready for war?

In December 1940, the leadership of Soviet intelligence informed the Politburo that Hitler had decided to fight on 2 fronts. That is, he was going to attack the Soviet Union without ending the war in the West. This issue was thoroughly discussed, and Joseph Vissarionovich ordered the intelligence officers to organize their work in such a way as to know for sure whether Germany was really preparing for war or was simply bluffing.

After this, military intelligence began to carefully monitor a number of aspects that made up the military preparations of the German army. And Stalin received messages every week that military preparations had not yet begun.

On June 21, 1941, a Politburo meeting took place. It discussed the issue of the enormous concentration of German troops on the western border of the USSR. The numbers of all German divisions, the names of their commanders and locations were given. Almost everything was known, including the name of Operation Barbarossa, the time it began and many other military secrets. At the same time, the head of the Intelligence Directorate reported that preparations for war had not yet begun. Without this, combat operations cannot be carried out. And 12 hours after the end of the Politburo meeting, the German attack on the USSR became a reality.

And how should we then treat military intelligence, which did not see the obvious and misled the leaders of the Soviet state? But the whole point is that the intelligence officers reported only the truth to Stalin. Hitler really did not prepare for war against the Soviet Union.

Joseph Vissarionovich did not believe the documents, considering them a fake and a provocation. Therefore, key indicators were found that determined Hitler's preparation for war. The most important indicator is rams. All residents in Germany were ordered to keep an eye on the sheep.

Information on the number of sheep in Europe was collected and carefully processed. The scouts identified the main centers of their cultivation and slaughtering centers. Residents received information about lamb prices in the markets of European cities 2 times a day.

The second indicator is dirty rags and oily paper that remains after cleaning the weapon.. There were many German troops in Europe, and the soldiers cleaned their weapons every day. The rags and paper used were burned or buried in the ground. But this rule was not always observed. So the scouts had the opportunity to obtain used rags in large quantities. The oiled rags were transported to the USSR, where they were carefully examined by experts.

As a third indicator, kerosene lamps, kerosene gases, kerosene stoves, lanterns and lighters were transported across the border. They were also carefully examined by experts. There were other indicators that were mined in large quantities.

Stalin and the leaders of military intelligence reasonably believed that very serious preparation was needed for a war against the USSR. The most important element of readiness for combat operations were sheepskin coats. About 6 million of them were required. That's why the scouts kept an eye on the sheep.

As soon as Hitler decides to attack the Soviet Union, his General Staff will give the order to prepare the operation. Consequently, mass slaughter of sheep will begin. This will have an immediate impact on the European market. Prices for lamb meat will go down, and prices for lamb skins will soar up.

Soviet intelligence believed that for the war with the USSR, the German army should use a completely different type of lubricating oil for its weapons. Standard German gun oil froze in the cold, which could lead to weapon failure. Therefore, the scouts waited for the Wehrmacht to change the type of oil for cleaning weapons. But the collected rags indicated that the Germans continued to use their usual oil. And this proved that the German troops were not ready for war.

Soviet experts carefully monitored German motor fuel. In the cold, ordinary fuel decomposed into non-combustible fractions. Therefore, the General Staff had to give an order for the production of other fuel that would not decompose in the cold. Scouts transported samples of liquid fuel across the border in lanterns, lighters, and Primus stoves. But tests showed that there was nothing new. German troops used their usual fuel.

There were other aspects that were under the careful control of intelligence officers. Any deviation from the norm should have been a warning signal. But Adolf Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa without any preparation. Why he did this is a mystery to this day. German troops were created for the war in Western Europe, but nothing was done to prepare the army for the war in Russia.

That is why Stalin did not consider the German troops ready for war. His opinion was shared by all the intelligence officers. They did everything possible to uncover preparations for the invasion. But there was no preparation. There was only a huge concentration of German troops near the Soviet border. But there was not a single division ready for combat on the territory of the Soviet Union.

So was the new cohort of intelligence officers, who replaced the old cadres, to blame for failing to predict Germany’s attack on the USSR? It seems that the liquidated comrades would have behaved in exactly the same way. They would look for signs of preparation for hostilities, but they would not be able to find anything. Since it is impossible to detect what is not there.

Alexander Semashko

It is generally accepted that in December 1941, when the German army was rushing to Moscow, its Siberian divisions saved it. These were fully equipped units that arrived from the east along the Siberian railway. That's why they were called Siberian. But that's not true. In reality, these were Far Eastern divisions, and they arrived from the farthest borders of the Soviet Union and entered the battle straight from the wheels.

An extra straw breaks the camel's back. The entire art of war is based on this postulate. At the right moment, you need to have this straw and put it on the appropriate ridge. Stalin had such a straw, and subsequently many, many more straws appeared. This indicates the inexhaustible reserves of a huge country. But Germany did not have such straws. So why did Hitler attack the Soviet Union if it did not have the appropriate resources and capabilities?

The protracted war with the USSR was deadly for Germany. But Hitler had no intention of waging a protracted war: he was counting on a blitzkrieg. But was it possible under those conditions? The Germans defeated France, but they did not have the strength to capture it entirely. And certainly there was no strength to capture the French colonies. Germany did not even have the strength to completely occupy tiny Holland. This required two divisions, and Hitler allocated only one.

In 1941, the Germans could no longer fully control what they had captured. And then there was the war with Britain, behind which stood “neutral” America. German troops were scattered from Northern Norway to North Africa, and the fleet fought from Greenland to the Cape of Good Hope. And in such a difficult situation, Hitler began a blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union.

What is the Soviet Union? This is a huge country in which only four months are favorable for military operations - from mid-May to mid-September. The rest of the time it’s rain, impassable mud, and then snow and frost. Hitler started the war on June 22, which meant he basically had only three normal months left. And in this insignificant period of time he was going to reach the Urals?

A full-scale war on two fronts poses a mortal danger for any country, no matter how powerful it is militarily and industrially. And Germany found itself in exactly this situation. On one side is Britain, and on the other side is the USSR. In addition, a liberation movement began in the occupied territories, which only worsened the position of the aggressor.

Back in January 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General Halder, wrote in his diary: “The meaning of Operation Barbarossa is unclear. It does not affect England in any way. Our economic base will not improve at all from this. If our troops are pinned down in Russia, the situation will become even more difficult. The operation is very risky and does not provide any strategic benefits to Germany."

However, the true state of affairs became fully clear only after June 22, 1941. The same Halder recorded on July 12 that tank losses amounted to 50%, and the troops were severely exhausted. And on August 7, he reported that the fuel situation was catastrophic. The Germans planned to defeat the USSR in three months, and by August 7 they had already run out of fuel. And how were they going to get to the Urals? On carts and carts.

Back on December 2, 1941, Halder believed that Stalin had no reserves. But already on December 5, fresh divisions appeared, and a grandiose counteroffensive began near Moscow. Subsequently, Halder admitted that the level of equipment of German soldiers and the motorization of the army did not correspond in any way to the Russian winter. There was no frost-resistant fuel or winter clothing, which had a devastating effect on the overall course of military battles in the winter of 1941-1942.

Yes, the Germans carried out blitzkriegs in Poland and France, they captured almost all of Europe, but with their apparent power they deceived only faint-hearted journalists. And that’s why the blitzkrieg didn’t work out in Russia. Only individual military operations were lightning fast, and the entire war became protracted. Therefore, it became deadly for Germany, which did not have inexhaustible human reserves and corresponding industrial capacities. So why did Hitler attack the Soviet Union? What was he missing? Maybe living space or mind?

As for the territories, Germany faced the defenseless and unoccupied south of France with vineyards, fine wines and beautiful women. Before Germany lay the French and Dutch colonies with a heavenly climate and luxurious beaches. Take it all and use it. But no, for some reason the Germans dreamed of the Astrakhan reeds and Arkhangelsk swamps. These dreams, completely misunderstood by anyone, ruined Germany.

As for human resources, in the Soviet Union they were truly inexhaustible. By July 1, 1941, 5.3 million people were mobilized into the Red Army. At the same time, mobilization continued in July, and in August, and in September, etc. The total mobilization resource of the USSR was 10% of the population. All of it was used during the war. The Soviet country lost 35 million people over four terrible years, but this did not affect its combat effectiveness. In August 1945, the Soviet army defeated a million-strong Japanese army in just two weeks and liberated China.

What about the Germans? Their mobilization resource was an order of magnitude lower. In 1945, teenagers and old people began to be drafted into the army. They fought equally with mature men and died in the same way. But this did not save Nazi Germany from complete collapse and shame. So why did Hitler attack the Soviet Union, to whom and what was he trying to prove?

In politics, it matters a lot whether you are seen in the world as a villain or an innocent victim and defender of the oppressed. The entire planet considered Hitler a villain and wished him dead. And everyone considered Stalin a victim of aggression. He had the sympathies of all countries, all peoples, all governments on his side. Both the proletarians and the bourgeoisie wished Stalin success. He received assistance from the richest countries in the world. And who sincerely helped Hitler? Nobody.

Here is what Winston Churchill wrote about Stalin: “ This man made an indelible impression on us. When he entered the hall of the Yalta Conference, we all stood up, as if on command, and for some reason kept our hands at our sides. He possessed deep wisdom and logic alien to any panic. Stalin was an unsurpassed master of finding the right way out of hopeless situations. He was always reserved and never succumbed to illusions. He was a complex personality, the greatest, unparalleled».

And Hitler decided to attack such a person, who stood at the head of a huge country with inexhaustible resources. And Stalin, until June 22, 1941, did not believe that the Third Reich would decide to commit suicide. But what happened, happened. Hitler and his entourage doomed themselves to death on the specified date. It doesn’t matter that the war lasted four years, it was already initially lost at the very moment when German planes dropped the first bombs on Soviet territory. Everything else can be called the slow agony of the fascist regime.

And therefore, answering the question of why Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, one can go through many options. But as a result, only one rational answer suggests itself: the Fuhrer wanted to die beautifully in an underground bunker with a pistol in his hand. Nothing else suitable comes to mind.

Germany's attack on the USSR can safely be considered madness. It resulted in a terrible and absolutely senseless massacre that claimed tens of millions of lives. And the only people I sincerely feel sorry for are the people who died at the behest of a stupid and absolutely short-sighted dictator.

- When exactly was the decision made in Germany to attack the USSR?

This decision was made during the successful campaign for Germany in France. In the summer of 1940, it became increasingly clear that war against the Soviet Union would be planned. The fact is that by this time it became clear that Germany would not be able to win the war with Great Britain with the available technical means.

That is, in the fall of 1939, when World War II began, Germany did not yet have plans to attack the USSR?

There may have been an idea, but there were no concrete plans. There were also doubts about such plans, which were later, however, discarded.

- What were these doubts?

Chief of the General Staff of the Army Franz Halder was not against war, but on one strategic issue he disagreed with Hitler. Hitler wanted to capture Leningrad for ideological reasons and Ukraine, where there were large industrial centers. Halder, taking into account the limited capabilities of the German army, considered it important to take Moscow. This conflict remained unresolved.

Another issue is the supply of German troops with ammunition, ammunition, and food. The loudest warnings were sounded on this matter. The German military attache in Moscow warned that the USSR was a huge country with enormous distances. But when the boss wants war, warnings about dangers are undesirable. Recently, the Pentagon was reluctant to listen to people who doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

- Was Hitler really the main driving force of this war?

Yes. The German Ambassador to the USSR hoped that relations would be good. However, the ambassador did not play much of a role when it came to defining German policy.

Strategic supplies of raw materials from the Soviet Union were very important for the German war campaign. In addition, the USSR transited supplies from Southeast Asia. For example, rubber for the production of tires. That is, there were important strategic reasons not to go to war against the Soviet Union, but the military, who were ingratiating themselves with Hitler and competing with each other, tried to outdo each other by proposing plans to attack the USSR.

- Why did Hitler want this war so much?

Firstly, these were the ideological reasons outlined in his book “Mein Kampf” - living space for the Germans and gaining access to raw materials. But for these reasons, war could have started at any moment. Therefore, there had to be additional reasons, and the main one at that moment was the impossibility of winning the war with Great Britain.

How do you explain the fact that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ignored Germany’s preparations for war, because there were intelligence reports about this?

This passivity was based on the belief that Hitler would not be so stupid. Until the evening of June 22, 1941, Stalin thought that this was an operation of the German generals without the knowledge of Hitler, with the goal of setting him up. Only then were decisive orders given to the Red Army to defeat and pursue the enemy everywhere. Until this point, Stalin apparently refused to believe what had really happened.

Hitler and the German generals were convinced that the war with Russia could be won in three months. These views were shared in the West, against the backdrop of the German successes in Europe, especially the quick victory over France.

Judging by secret documents, in particular intelligence reports, it seems that the USSR intelligence services knew about the upcoming German attack, but the army was not informed about it. Is it so?

Yes, at least the army didn’t sound an alarm. Stalin was convinced that any provocation could force Hitler to attack the USSR. He thought that by demonstrating an unpreparedness for war, Hitler would focus on the Western Front. This was a big mistake for which the Soviet Union had to pay a high price. As for intelligence data, reports about the timing of the attack were constantly changing. The Germans themselves were engaged in disinformation. Nevertheless, all information about the upcoming attack came to Stalin. He knew everything.

This was due to the completion of the Wehrmacht's preparations for this war. But in the end, he was still not ready. Technical superiority was a fiction. Half of the German troops were supplied by horse-drawn carts.

The beginning of summer was also chosen because then the danger of off-road conditions increased every day. The Germans knew that, firstly, there are no good roads in Russia, and secondly, rains in the off-season wash them away. By the fall, the Germans were actually stopped not by enemy forces, but by nature. Only with the arrival of winter were German troops able to continue the offensive again.

Hitler explained the war with the USSR by the fact that he was allegedly ahead of Stalin. In Russia you can also hear this version. What do you think?

There is still no confirmation of this. But no one knows what Stalin really wanted. It is known that Zhukov had a plan to launch a preventive strike. It was handed over to Stalin in mid-May 1941. This happened after Stalin gave a speech to graduates of the military academy and said that the Red Army was an offensive army. Zhukov saw a greater danger in German military plans than Stalin. He then headed the General Staff and used Stalin's speech as an occasion to develop a plan for a pre-emptive strike to prevent a German offensive in the east. As far as we know, Stalin rejected this plan.

- Could Germany have won the war against the USSR?

Considering that Stalin and his system did not want to give up, stopping at nothing, and the Soviet people were literally driven into this war, then Germany could not win it.

But there were two points. The first - at the beginning of the war, and the second - in October 1941, when German troops were already exhausted, but they began an attack on Moscow. The Russians had no reserves, and Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that the gates to Moscow stood wide open. Advance detachments of German tanks then reached the outskirts of today's Moscow. But they could not go further. Stalin was apparently ready to try to negotiate with Hitler again. According to Zhukov, he entered Stalin’s office at the moment when he was saying goodbye to Beria with words about searching for the possibility of a separate peace with the Germans. The USSR was allegedly ready for major concessions to Germany. But nothing happened.

- What were Germany’s plans for the occupied lands?

Hitler did not want to occupy the entire Soviet Union. The border was supposed to run from the White Sea in the north along the Volga to the south of Russia. Germany did not have sufficient resources to occupy the entire USSR. It was planned to push the Red Army to the east and contain it with the help of air strikes. It was a big illusion. National Socialist ideas were to be implemented in the occupied territories. There was no exact plan. It was assumed that the Germans would rule, and the local population would do slave labor. It was assumed that millions of people would die of starvation, this was part of the plan. At the same time, Russia was supposed to become the breadbasket of Germany-occupied Europe.

When do you think the turning point in the war came, after which it was no longer possible for Germany to win it?

Provided that the Soviet Union was not going to surrender, and this was the case, except for one moment in October, it was impossible to win the war in principle. I would even say that even without Western help to Moscow, Germany could not have won this war. Moreover, Soviet tanks, both the T-34 and the Joseph Stalin heavy tank, were superior to German models. It is known that after the first tank battles in 1941, designer Ferdinand Porsche was sent to the front as part of a commission to study Soviet tanks. The Germans were very surprised. They were confident that their technique was much better. There was no way Germany could win this war. There was only the possibility of an agreement on certain conditions. But Hitler was Hitler, and at the end of the war he behaved more and more insanely, like Stalin at the beginning - that is, the order was given not to surrender anything to the enemy. But the price was too high. The Germans could not afford this, unlike the USSR at the beginning of the war. The Soviet Union lost millions of people, but reserves remained and the system continued to work.

Professor Bernd Bohn evening (Bernd Bonwetsch)- German historian, founder and first director of the German Historical Institute in Moscow, author of publications on German-Russian history

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

June 21, 1941, 13:00. German troops receive the code signal "Dortmund", confirming that the invasion will begin the next day.

Commander of the 2nd Tank Group of Army Group Center Heinz Guderian writes in his diary: “Careful observation of the Russians convinced me that they did not suspect anything about our intentions. In the courtyard of the Brest fortress, which was visible from our observation points, they were changing the guards to the sounds of an orchestra. The coastal fortifications along the Western Bug were not occupied by Russian troops."

21:00. Soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant's office detained a German serviceman who crossed the border Bug River by swimming. The defector was sent to the detachment headquarters in the city of Vladimir-Volynsky.

23:00. German minelayers stationed in Finnish ports began to mine the exit from the Gulf of Finland. At the same time, Finnish submarines began laying mines off the coast of Estonia.

June 22, 1941, 0:30. The defector was taken to Vladimir-Volynsky. During interrogation, the soldier identified himself Alfred Liskov, soldiers of the 221st Regiment of the 15th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht. He said that at dawn on June 22, the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information was transferred to higher command.

At the same time, the transmission of Directive No. 1 of the People's Commissariat of Defense for parts of the western military districts began from Moscow. “During June 22-23, 1941, a surprise attack by the Germans is possible on the fronts of LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO. An attack may begin with provocative actions,” the directive said. “The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.”

The units were ordered to be put on combat readiness, to secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border, and to disperse aircraft to field airfields.

It is not possible to convey the directive to military units before the start of hostilities, as a result of which the measures specified in it are not carried out.

Mobilization. Columns of fighters are moving to the front. Photo: RIA Novosti

“I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory”

1:00. The commandants of the sections of the 90th border detachment report to the head of the detachment, Major Bychkovsky: “nothing suspicious was noticed on the adjacent side, everything is calm.”

3:05 . A group of 14 German Ju-88 bombers drops 28 magnetic mines near the Kronstadt roadstead.

3:07. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to the Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov: “The fleet's air surveillance, warning and communications system reports the approach of a large number of unknown aircraft from the sea; The fleet is in full combat readiness."

3:10. The NKGB for the Lviv region transmits by telephone message to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR the information obtained during the interrogation of the defector Alfred Liskov.

3:30. Chief of Staff of the Western District General Klimovsky reports on enemy air raids on the cities of Belarus: Brest, Grodno, Lida, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi and others.

3:33. The chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General Purkaev, reports on an air raid on the cities of Ukraine, including Kyiv.

3:40. Commander of the Baltic Military District General Kuznetsov reports on enemy air raids on Riga, Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas and other cities.

“The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships was foiled."

3:42. Chief of the General Staff Zhukov is calling Stalin and reports the start of hostilities by Germany. Stalin orders Tymoshenko and Zhukov arrive at the Kremlin, where an emergency meeting of the Politburo is convened.

3:45. The 1st border outpost of the 86th August border detachment was attacked by an enemy reconnaissance and sabotage group. Outpost personnel under command Alexandra Sivacheva, having entered into battle, destroys the attackers.

4:00. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, reports to Zhukov: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to strike our ships was foiled. But there is destruction in Sevastopol.”

4:05. The outposts of the 86th August Border Detachment, including the 1st Border Outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev, come under heavy artillery fire, after which the German offensive begins. Border guards, deprived of communication with the command, engage in battle with superior enemy forces.

4:10. The Western and Baltic special military districts report the beginning of hostilities by German troops on the ground.

4:15. The Nazis open massive artillery fire on the Brest Fortress. As a result, warehouses were destroyed, communications were disrupted, and there were a large number of dead and wounded.

4:25. The 45th Wehrmacht Infantry Division begins an attack on the Brest Fortress.

Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Residents of the capital on June 22, 1941, during the radio announcement of a government message about the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti

“Protecting not individual countries, but ensuring the security of Europe”

4:30. A meeting of Politburo members begins in the Kremlin. Stalin expresses doubt that what happened is the beginning of a war and does not exclude the possibility of a German provocation. People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and Zhukov insist: this is war.

4:55. In the Brest Fortress, the Nazis manage to capture almost half of the territory. Further progress was stopped by a sudden counterattack by the Red Army.

5:00. German Ambassador to the USSR Count von Schulenburg presented to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov“Note from the German Foreign Office to the Soviet Government,” which states: “The German Government cannot remain indifferent to the serious threat on the eastern border, therefore the Fuehrer has ordered the German Armed Forces to ward off this threat by all means.” An hour after the actual start of hostilities, Germany de jure declares war on the Soviet Union.

7:00. Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop begins a press conference at which he announces the beginning of hostilities against the USSR: “The German army has invaded the territory of Bolshevik Russia!”

“The city is burning, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?”

7:15. Stalin approves a directive to repel the attack of Nazi Germany: “The troops with all their might and means attack enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border.” Transfer of “directive No. 2” due to saboteurs’ disruption of communication lines in the western districts. Moscow does not have a clear picture of what is happening in the combat zone.

9:30. It was decided that at noon, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov would address the Soviet people in connection with the outbreak of war.

10:00. From the speaker's memories Yuri Levitan: “They’re calling from Minsk: “Enemy planes are over the city,” they’re calling from Kaunas: “The city is burning, why aren’t you broadcasting anything on the radio?” “Enemy planes are over Kiev.” A woman’s crying, excitement: “Is it really war?..” However, no official messages are transmitted until 12:00 Moscow time on June 22.

10:30. From a report from the headquarters of the 45th German division about the battles on the territory of the Brest Fortress: “The Russians are resisting fiercely, especially behind our attacking companies. In the citadel, the enemy organized a defense with infantry units supported by 35-40 tanks and armored vehicles. Enemy sniper fire resulted in heavy casualties among officers and non-commissioned officers."

11:00. The Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts.

“The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours"

12:00. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov reads out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union: “Today at 4 o’clock in the morning, without making any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed us with their planes attacked our cities - Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Raids by enemy planes and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory... Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to repel the bandit attack and expel German troops from the territory of our homeland... The government calls on you, citizens and citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally our ranks even more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader, Comrade Stalin.

Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours" .

12:30. Advanced German units break into the Belarusian city of Grodno.

13:00. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues a decree “On the mobilization of those liable for military service...”
“Based on Article 49, paragraph “o” of the USSR Constitution, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announces mobilization on the territory of the military districts - Leningrad, Baltic special, Western special, Kiev special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North -Caucasian and Transcaucasian.

13:30. Chief of the General Staff General Zhukov flies to Kyiv as a representative of the newly created Headquarters of the Main Command on the Southwestern Front.

Photo: RIA Novosti

14:00. The Brest Fortress is completely surrounded by German troops. Soviet units blocked in the citadel continue to offer fierce resistance.

14:05. Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano states: “In view of the current situation, due to the fact that Germany declared war on the USSR, Italy, as an ally of Germany and as a member of the Tripartite Pact, also declares war on the Soviet Union from the moment German troops entered Soviet territory.”

14:10. The 1st border outpost of Alexander Sivachev has been fighting for more than 10 hours. The border guards, who had only small arms and grenades, destroyed up to 60 Nazis and burned three tanks. The wounded commander of the outpost continued to command the battle.

15:00. From the notes of the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock: “The question of whether the Russians are carrying out a systematic withdrawal remains open. There is now plenty of evidence both for and against this.

What is surprising is that nowhere is any significant work of their artillery visible. Heavy artillery fire is conducted only in the northwest of Grodno, where the VIII Army Corps is advancing. Apparently, our air force has an overwhelming superiority over Russian aviation."

Of the 485 border posts attacked, not a single one withdrew without orders.

16:00. After a 12-hour battle, the Nazis took the positions of the 1st border outpost. This became possible only after all the border guards who defended it died. The head of the outpost, Alexander Sivachev, was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.

The feat of the outpost of Senior Lieutenant Sivachev was one of hundreds committed by border guards in the first hours and days of the war. On June 22, 1941, the state border of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea was guarded by 666 border outposts, 485 of which were attacked on the very first day of the war. Not one of the 485 outposts attacked on June 22 withdrew without orders.

Hitler's command allotted 20 minutes to break the resistance of the border guards. 257 Soviet border posts held their defense from several hours to one day. More than one day - 20, more than two days - 16, more than three days - 20, more than four and five days - 43, from seven to nine days - 4, more than eleven days - 51, more than twelve days - 55, more than 15 days - 51 outpost. Forty-five outposts fought for up to two months.

Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The workers of Leningrad listen to a message about the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Photo: RIA Novosti

Of the 19,600 border guards who met the Nazis on June 22 in the direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, more than 16,000 died in the first days of the war.

17:00. Hitler's units manage to occupy the southwestern part of the Brest Fortress, the northeast remained under the control of Soviet troops. Stubborn battles for the fortress will continue for weeks.

“The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox Christians for the defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland”

18:00. The Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna, addresses the believers with a message: “Fascist robbers attacked our homeland. Trampling all kinds of agreements and promises, they suddenly fell upon us, and now the blood of peaceful citizens is already irrigating our native land... Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the people. She endured trials with him and was consoled by his successes. She will not abandon her people even now... The Church of Christ blesses all Orthodox Christians for the defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland.”

19:00. From the notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder: “All armies, except the 11th Army of Army Group South in Romania, went on the offensive according to plan. The offensive of our troops, apparently, came as a complete tactical surprise to the enemy along the entire front. Border bridges across the Bug and other rivers were everywhere captured by our troops without a fight and in complete safety. The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in a barracks arrangement, the planes were parked at airfields, covered with tarpaulins, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do... The Air Force command reported, that today 850 enemy aircraft have been destroyed, including entire squadrons of bombers, which, having taken off without fighter cover, were attacked by our fighters and destroyed.”

20:00. Directive No. 3 of the People's Commissariat of Defense was approved, ordering Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive with the task of defeating Hitler's troops on the territory of the USSR with further advance into enemy territory. The directive ordered the capture of the Polish city of Lublin by the end of June 24.

Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. June 22, 1941 Nurses provide assistance to the first wounded after a Nazi air raid near Chisinau. Photo: RIA Novosti

“We must provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can.”

21:00. Summary of the Red Army High Command for June 22: “At dawn on June 22, 1941, regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the Grodno and Kristinopol directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes and occupy the towns of Kalwaria, Stoyanuv and Tsekhanovets (the first two are 15 km and the last 10 km from the border).

Enemy aircraft attacked a number of our airfields and populated areas, but everywhere they met decisive resistance from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy aircraft.”

23:00. Message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill to the British people in connection with the German attack on the USSR: “At 4 o'clock this morning Hitler attacked Russia. All his usual formalities of treachery were observed with scrupulous precision... suddenly, without a declaration of war, even without an ultimatum, German bombs fell from the sky on Russian cities, German troops violated Russian borders, and an hour later the German ambassador, who just the day before had generously lavished his assurances on the Russians in friendship and almost an alliance, paid a visit to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that Russia and Germany were at war...

The past, with its crimes, follies and tragedies, recedes. I see Russian soldiers as they stand on the border of their native land and guard the fields that their fathers have plowed since time immemorial. I see them guarding their homes; their mothers and wives pray—oh, yes, because at such a time everyone prays for the safety of their loved ones, for the return of their breadwinner, patron, their protectors...

We must provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can. We must call on all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to pursue a similar course and pursue it as steadfastly and steadily as we will, to the very end.”

June 22 came to an end. There were still 1,417 days ahead of the worst war in human history.