Mikhail Diterichs. Russian liberation movement

He received his education at the Corps of Pages and the Academy of the General Staff in 1900. He served in Turkestan. After participating in the Russo-Japanese War, he served in the Main Directorate of the General Staff. A participant in the First World War, at the beginning of 1915 he was the Quartermaster General of the Southwestern Front, under his control all the main operations of the front were developed. Major General since December 1915. Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army in Greece, commander of the Expeditionary Force in Thessaloniki in 1916. Was close to Alekseev. Chief of Staff of the Special Petrograd Army under Krimov during Kornilov’s campaign against Petrograd. In August 1917, he was offered the post of Minister of War, refused it, from September 1917 he was appointed Quartermaster General of the Commander-in-Chief Headquarters, and from November 3 - Chief of Staff of Headquarters; when it was captured by the Bolsheviks, he escaped arrest. On November 8, 1917, Dieterichs left for Kyiv to join his family, and soon became the chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Corps at the suggestion of the Czechs and Slovaks themselves (March 1918 - January 1919).

In 1918, he was one of the organizers of the successful performance of the Czechoslovak Corps against Soviet power at the end of May of the same year. Commander of the Trans-Baikal group of forces of the Siberian group of the Czechoslovak Corps in the Irkutsk - Chita - Vladivostok region. Being at the head of its advanced echelons, he took Vladivostok in June 1918. Advancing to Siberia, he joined forces with Gaida on July 11, 1918 in the Irkutsk region. In response to requests from Woitsekhovsky and Kappel to send reinforcements to Ufa, he stated that he would be able to send the 1st Ural units there only at the beginning of December 1918. During the coup of Kolchak on November 18, 1918, he was in Ufa. He received an order from Kolchak: to arrest the leaders of KOMUCH for their subversive activities against the establishment of the power of the Supreme Ruler, but he hesitated for some time and only on November 26, 1918 he carried out the order and “retired” from the ranks of the Czechoslovak Corps, having quarreled with the Czechs and Slovaks. This episode of his biography delayed for a long time Dieterichs’s advance to the highest command posts of the white forces in eastern Russia. Immediately after leaving the Czechoslovak Corps, he asks Kolchak for personal permission to leave for the Far East with a special task - to deliver there the relics of the Imperial Family, collected by him on the Ural Front. In April 1919, he arrived in Omsk on the “Japanophile train”, at the disposal of the Russian White Army in eastern Russia, and was candidate No. 1 for the post of Chief of Staff of Kolchak’s army. He was not selected under the pretext of being in the Czechoslovak service. General for assignments under Kolchak.

In 1919, he spent some time studying the circumstances of the murder of the royal family, the head of the investigation commission from January to July 1919. In July 1919, he commanded the Siberian Army of Kolchak, Lieutenant General. He opposed the Chelyabinsk operation in the summer of 1919, believing that it could not be entrusted to the weakened forces of the Western Army alone. July 22 - November 17, 1919 - the commander of the White Eastern Front, at the same time, after Lebedev left the post of Chief of Staff, he was appointed in his place, as well as the Minister of War. Initiator of the struggle against the Bolsheviks as a religious one. Thanks to him, volunteer detachments were created - squads of the Holy Cross and Crescent, which completely died in battles against the Reds. Conducts the Tobolsk offensive operation of August - September 1919, after a series of outstanding successes (the Bolsheviks were thrown back beyond the Tobol, suffering heavy losses), which ended unsuccessfully largely due to the criminal slowness of the commander of the Cossack Siberian corps Ivanov-Rinov, whose resignation he soon achieved. In November 1919, Kolchak was removed from command of the Eastern Front, largely because of Sakharov’s intrigues against him at a time when, in order to save the White Army in eastern Russia, he proposed leaving Omsk in advance and removing all valuables and rear units from there. Soon Kolchak again offered him this post, but Dieterichs made it a condition for him to take over Kolchak’s resignation and his departure abroad. He made the Great Ice March with the remnants of Kolchak's army. He proposed to Kolchak a plan according to which, in order to preserve the army, it was necessary to retreat beyond the Irtysh. Emigrated after his offer was rejected. Lived in Harbin from late December 1919 to June 1922. with breaks.

Until the end of the summer of 1920 - Manager of the Military Department of Transbaikalia. In July - August 1920, he was sent by Semenov to negotiate with the Primorsky coalition government regarding the further transfer of white forces to Primorye for their installation and reorganization there. Semenov's envoys disrupted his negotiations with Vladivostok. Semenov believed that Dieterichs was the main initiator of the campaign launched among the troops against him in 1920. Due to intrigues in Verzhbitsky’s army against Lokhvitsky, he decided to withdraw from participation in the struggle in Transbaikalia and went to Harbin, since, in his opinion, a “non-working situation” had developed there. After the fall of the Merkulov government on June 1, 1922, he took command of the white forces of Primorye after Verzhbitsky left. He officially took office after the transfer of powers to him by the acting commander of the White forces in Primorye, General Molchanov, on June 8, 1922. On the same day, he hosted the parade of the troops that overthrew Merkulov and became Chairman of the Government. The managers of the Government Departments joined him on June 9, 1922. Dieterichs did not want the Merkulov government to be eliminated and wanted, relying on it, to fight against the Bolsheviks. On June 10, 1922, he achieved the self-dissolution of the People's Assembly. Diterikhs announced that in conditions of unrest he was subordinate to the Amur Provisional Government until the convening of the Zemsky Sobor in Primorye. By convening the Zemsky Sobor, he hoped to create an authoritative government and attract ordinary people to his side. Despite the preservation of the Merkulov government and apparently good relations, there was a struggle between Dieterichs and the Government, since the Merkulovs did not want army representatives to be included in the government. With Japan's announcement in the summer of 1922 about the evacuation of its troops, he called on everyone in Primorye to remain calm.

Diterichs opened the monarchical Zemsky Sobor in Primorye on July 23, 1922 and elected him “the sole ruler and commander of the zemstvo army” - by the forces of the Primorye White Guards. This was due to disagreements between Semyonovites and Kappelevites on the issue of state administration of white Primorye. In fact, power was transferred to him by the Merkulovs. Nominated Gondatti for the post of Prime Minister. Almost unanimously, on August 8, 1922, Diterichs was elected Chairman of the Government and on August 9, 1922, he declared himself the Ruler of the Amur Zemsky Territory and the Voivode of the Zemsky Rati. He announced a reorganization in the army: corps became groups, regiments became squads. This caused controversy in the army. Dieterichs reduced the rear units, reorganized the supply of troops, taking into account all the features of the war when the white forces were located within Primorye. Abolished the counterintelligence system. Despite all his measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army, he failed to achieve this. Rebuilt civil life in the region: organized the Zemstvo Duma, the Council of External Affairs, the Local Council, prepared the Local Council; The Council of the Zemstvo Group was supposed to decide all civil matters. He was always against the claims of all white governments to be “all-Russian”, wanting to prepare the conditions for the future reconstruction of Russia gradually. He declared a “crusade” against Soviet Russia and advocated the restoration of the monarchy. In the army, especially in the Semyonovtsy units, he was called by the title “Your Eminence.”

With the field headquarters and the Zemstvo Duma on August 26, 1922, Dieterichs moved to Nikolsk-Ussuriysky to strengthen the defense of the white troops in connection with the departure of the Japanese. Established the church parish as the main administrative unit of Southern Primorye. He contributed to the strengthening of the anti-Bolshevik struggle in Yakutia in 1922. Diterichs went to Spassk on September 5, 1922 to familiarize himself with the situation near the city and personally meet with the local population to inform them about further government actions. During this trip I fell ill. Being ill, on September 15, 1922 he spoke at the opening of the National Congress. In this speech he called on Primorye residents to sacrifice in favor of the White Army, as a result of which a large sum of money and a lot of warm clothes were received. Under the leadership of Dieterichs, mobilization was successfully carried out. Failed to re-engage Japan in the campaign against the Communists. He wanted to replenish his supplies of weapons and ammunition at her expense. In Vladivostok he published his research on the case of the murder of the Royal Family: “The Murder of the Royal Family and Members of the House of Romanov in the Urals.” Under his command, the White troops defeated the Reds near Khabarovsk, but for various reasons, the most important of which was the sharp deterioration of weather conditions in Primorye, they were unable to eliminate the Red Anuchinsky partisan region. After the failure of his forces near Spassk in October, he announced a withdrawal to China and Korea, “but not to the Japanese.” At the same time, Dieterichs achieved the evacuation of military families on Japanese ships, and also attracted the Red Cross of the USA and Great Britain for this, which, at his insistence, took care of the wounded and sick. He himself retreated at the head of the largest group of whites from Primorye, numbering 9 thousand people and 3 thousand horses.

He retreated with them to Posyet and New Kyiv, where he remained until the surrender of Vladivostok on October 25, 1922. He retreated with this group to Genzan. Since October 25, 1922 - emigrant, one of the main leaders of white emigration in the Far East. Until May 1923 he was in an emigrant camp. Head of the Far Eastern Department of the EMRO. In 1931, from Shanghai he sent a leaflet “To the White Russian Emigration of the Whole World,” in which he called for a fight against Soviet Russia. Died in September 1937 in Shanghai.

General Dieterichs' plan for a deep withdrawal

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General Dieterichs was clearly aware that Kolchak’s idea of ​​permanently delaying the armies on the Irtysh River was impracticable; but even if it were feasible, it was impossible to look at Omsk as a capital with the Government residing there, as soon as this city would enter the front line. We also had to reckon with the approaching onset of winter, when the Irtysh ceased to be a barrier and a defensive line. For all these reasons, Dieterichs ordered the armies to begin a deep retreat, and Kolchak had to reluctantly order the evacuation of government buildings.

According to Diterikhs's plan, the First Army was supposed to retreat to Tomsk for recruitment, the remaining two to Omsk, Novonikolaevsk, Mariinsk and further, depending on the situation. Some government agencies began to move to Irkutsk. Unfortunately, this plan was not implemented in a timely manner; how and why, I will say below. Now I want to dwell on the considerations that this plan promised us if it were carried out, or, clarifying the question, decide whether the White offensive struggle in Siberia could then be revived again with the hope of defeating the Reds. Undoubtedly, it could, but under the indispensable presence of one of two conditions: either that the Reds were completely defeated in European Russia by Denikin, and then the Siberian Army would not allow them to hold out in Siberia, where they would naturally have to rush after the Volga. Another possibility of holding out was clearly incredible - that the Japanese would decide to support our army with their troops, for which they would demand large land compensation, and Kolchak would not agree to this.

Outside of these two conditions, there was not one hundred percent chance of a successful resumption of the struggle in the spring of 1920. I'm talking, of course, about offensive combat. Neither Dieterichs' plan nor any other promised us success. The war was lost through the loss of time, space and manpower due to a series of colossal strategic and political mistakes. A year ago, from the Perm-Ekaterinburg-Chelyabinsk line, it cost nothing to reach the Volga between Samara and Tsaritsyn with 50 thousand Czechs, reinforce the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks along the way and unite with Denikin. This operation was worth going through even with the risk of opening a passage to Siberia through the Ural ridge. It was much more difficult, but still not impossible, to approach Moscow through Vyatka, for which it was necessary to act with combined forces in this direction, slowly, methodically and coordinating their actions with what was happening among the volunteers. Kolchak, instead of one plan or another, went for Lebedev’s adventurist strategy. The result of this strategy was that by mid-July the troops had suffered a number of major defeats and were in disarray. But at this time, not everything was lost, and if they had listened to the advice of experienced generals and retreated beyond the Ishim River for reorganization and recruitment, the campaign could have been started anew in one direction or another or switched to active defense until the spring of next year . Of course, Lebedev, Sakharov and Co. could not count on understanding this situation, because they did not understand anything at all, but how Admiral Kolchak did not understand such a simple thing is inexplicable, for everyone who knew him could not help but see that he is a very smart and widely educated man, and also an outstanding naval strategist, tactician and technician. After all, if in the Baltic or Black Seas the fleet under his command had suffered a number of failures, he probably would not have continued to hit the wall with his forehead, but would have turned to studying the reasons for the failures suffered and would have subsequently changed his strategy or tactics. It is incomprehensible to his mind that the same thing did not occur to him in land affairs, where, moreover, he could take advantage of other people’s knowledge, gleaned from many years of service. It seems that Kolchak was either afraid or ashamed to admit his land-based ignorance and not only did not ask for help from experienced people, but pushed it away when it was offered to him. So, he took Budberg with him on a trip to Sakharov’s army, but did not invite him to the operational report and did not talk to him about upcoming operations. Another time, Budberg, in his capacity as Minister of War, invited him to submit his written opinion on the strategic position of our armies and the possible course of their actions. Kolchak dryly replied that he had all the information from his Chief of Staff. This is no longer heightened pride, but positively some kind of eclipse.

From these two examples, it is undoubtedly clear that Budberg also suffered from the same disease that I mentioned above - a lack of will and firmness of opinion in front of the senior boss. As an experienced old general, he had every right to be listened to, especially by Kolchak, who was clearly ignorant of land affairs, and by Sakharov, who was too young and inexperienced in managing large-scale operations. Consequently, since Kolchak did not think to call him for an operational report, Budberg himself had to ask for it, putting his pride aside.

In the second case, there was no need to ask Kolchak’s permission to present his opinion on operational issues, but should have directly submitted the report. It was up to Kolchak to read it or not, to agree with it or not. Budberg would have done his duty. There is nothing more stupid than the widely developed passive interpretation of the also rather stupid saying: “Don’t ask for service, don’t refuse service,” or, even worse, “Every cricket knows its nest.” It was this bashful passivity that ruined Russia. They looked at the service as some kind of private and personal matter of the senior boss and, if he did not ask, they were afraid to even hint at their opinion. This had a particularly disastrous effect during the time of the Provisional Government, which so quickly collapsed the army with the complete lack of resistance of the military command.

Returning to Dieterichs's plan, I repeat once again that the retreat from Omsk into the depths of Siberia, in the winter and after the loss of most of the army and military equipment, no longer left hope for the possibility of a new offensive campaign next summer. The Bolsheviks, of course, would have continued the pursuit of the Siberian troops, and it is possible that these latter would have had to retreat even to Transbaikalia. But if we had been able to complete the withdrawal planned by Dieterichs in complete order, we would still have had very significant benefits. First of all, the lives of many thousands of people who died in the subsequent panic retreat would have been preserved, and Kolchak himself, who embodied the symbol of all-Russian power, would have survived. The entire gold reserve would have been preserved in his hands, due to which Wrangel’s army from the Crimea could have been transferred to the east. Having gone to Transbaikalia, it was possible for a long time, if not for the entire reign of the Bolsheviks, to form an independent part of the Russian state from the Transbaikal, Amur and Primorsky regions. Geographical conditions, the navigable Amur, two railways and the availability of troops and money made the defense of this territory quite feasible. The Russian emigration, now scattered all over the world, would find refuge and work there.

But this possible small piece of Russian happiness floated from our hands thanks to Kolchak’s hesitation and his easy responsiveness to activity, even if it was obviously absurd.

The leaders of the White movement had a tragic fate. People who suddenly lost their homeland, to which they swore allegiance, and their ideals, could not come to terms with this for the rest of their lives.
Mikhail Konstantinovich Diterichs, outstanding, lieutenant general, was born on April 5, 1874 in a family of hereditary officers. The knightly family of Dieterichs from Czech Moravia settled in Russia in 1735. Thanks to his origin, the future general received an excellent education in the Corps of Pages, which he then continued at the Academy of the General Staff. With the rank of captain, he participated in the Russian-Japanese War, where he distinguished himself as a brave officer. For heroism shown in battles he was awarded III and II degrees, IV degrees. He finished the war with the rank of lieutenant colonel. Further service took place at army headquarters in Odessa and Kyiv.
The First World War found Dieterichs in the position of chief of staff in the mobilization department, but he was soon appointed quartermaster general. It was he who led the development of all military operations of the Southwestern Front. For successful developments that brought victories to the Russian army, Mikhail Konstantinovich was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav with swords, 1st degree.
Diterikhs continues to serve in the Russian Expeditionary Force in the Balkans and participated in the battles for the liberation of Serbia. He showed himself to be a talented military leader and led the Franco-Russian division. For successfully carried out operations, the general was awarded the highest award in France - the Order of the Legion of Honor and the Order of St. Vladimir, 2nd degree.
During this time, Dieterichs took part in battles on the Thessaloniki front. He cannot imagine what is happening in Russia at this time. When he returned to his homeland in the summer of 1917, he did not recognize the country. The chaos-ridden state was not the Russia he left a year ago. He refuses the post of Minister of War and takes part in the performance.
finds Diterichs in the position of Quartermaster General of Headquarters. When Headquarters was captured by the Bolsheviks, he was able to escape with the help of a French military mission. He goes to his family in Kyiv. Here he immediately headed the Czechoslovak Corps, which was subordinate to the Entente, and continued the fight against the Bolsheviks. Soon the corps was sent to Siberia and the Far East. All further service of Dieterichs took place here. At the end of 1918 he joins the army of Admiral Kolchak.
In 1919, Mikhail Konstantinovich was investigating the murder of the royal family and came to the conclusions that he outlined in his book “The Murder of the Royal Family and Members of the House of Romanov in the Urals,” which was published in Vladivostok in 1922. However, as a result of the investigation, facts became known that even representatives of the Entente did not like.
Dieterichs decides that to restore the monarchy, the spiritual revival of the Russian people is required and all his further activities are aimed precisely at this.
in the Far East lasted the longest, until 1922. At this time, he repeatedly leaves Russia, not wanting to accept the existing state of affairs, and returns when he is once again called upon to head the next government. After the capture of Primorye by the Bolsheviks, the general finally left Russia in October 1922, but before that, the general sought the evacuation of military families and the removal of the wounded. Only after this did he and his family settle in Shanghai, where for the rest of his life he was engaged in social and political activities, trying to unite Russian emigrants and restore the monarchy. However, his dreams were not destined to come true. Mikhail Konstantinovich died in 1937 in Shanghai, where he was buried. During the years of the "cultural revolution" the Russian cemetery was demolished, not even leaving the grave cross of the Russian general.

8.10.1937. – White general Mikhail Konstantinovich Diterikhs, the last leader of the White Army, ruler of the Amur region, died in Shanghai

White Knight of the Russian Monarchy

(04/05/1874–10/08/1937), - Lieutenant General, an outstanding figure in the White movement. Born into a hereditary officer family. The Dieterichs are an ancient knightly family with roots from Czech Moravia, one of whose descendants was invited to Russia in 1735 to build a port in Riga. Mikhail Konstantinovich received his education in the elite Corps of Pages (1894) and at the Academy of the General Staff (1900). started as a captain, ended up as a lieutenant colonel, awarded the Order of St. Anna 3rd degree with swords and bow, Order of St. Vladimir 4th degree, Order of St. Anna 2nd degree with swords. Then he served as a staff officer in Moscow, Odessa, and Kyiv.

From May 1916, Mikhail Konstantinovich had to continue participating in the war already in the camp of Russia’s allies in the Entente, in the Balkans. After successfully commanding a 10,000-strong brigade (at first he had to fight with his Serbian brothers against the Bulgarian brothers - allies of Germany...) he was appointed commander of the Franco-Russian division. Thus, the Russian general laid the foundation for the liberation of Serbia, earning the gratitude of Prince Alexander; from November 1916, the Russian brigade became part of the Serbian army. He was awarded the highest French award - the Order of the Legion of Honor, and in Russia the Order of St. Vladimir 2nd degree.

I found him on the Thessaloniki front, where the Russians were dying in the interests of the Entente countries - the initiators of this revolution. But, of course, Dieterichs could not have known this then. The army's recognition of the power of the Provisional Government was dictated by the call itself. When Mikhail Konstantinovich was called to Russia in the summer of 1917, he saw a completely different country, engulfed in chaos and madness. In August 1917, he refused Kerensky's offer to take the post of Minister of War. As the chief of staff of the special Petrograd army under General Krymov, he participated in the assault on Petrograd, but avoided arrest and from September 1917 he was even appointed quartermaster general of the Commander-in-Chief Headquarters, and from November 3 - chief of staff of the Headquarters under the command of General Dukhonin (on his initiative). When headquarters was captured by the Bolsheviks, he escaped with the help of a French military mission (the order came in handy...) and went to Kyiv to join his family.

Almost immediately, he became the chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Corps stationed in Ukraine at the suggestion of the Czechs and Slovaks themselves, who saw in the noble Russian general their “countryman”, a native of the Czech Republic. These 50 thousand former Austrian soldiers were mobilized by the Austrians against Russia, but preferred Russian captivity. The corps was created under the Provisional Government to fight as part of the Russian army at the front, after which it was subordinate to the command of the Entente, which also hoped to use it for the war against the Central Powers, and therefore after the corps was sent through Siberia and Vladivostok to the front in Europe, without entering into conflicts with the Red authorities. But since it was in an alliance with Germany, the Bolsheviks began to obstruct the corps and demanded its disarmament.

Nevertheless, among the Czechoslovaks, many, out of a personal sense of duty, were ready to help the whites. Dieterichs became one of the organizers of the action of the Czechoslovak Corps against the Red regime at the end of May 1918. Dieterichs commanded the Transbaikal group of forces of the Czechoslovak Corps and took Vladivostok in June 1918. After this, the Czechoslovak Corps turned west along the Trans-Siberian Railway, liberating one city after another with battles and uniting with the army and other white units. Representatives of the Entente were unable to prevent this, but again hoped to send the Czechoslovakians against the Germans on their eastern front.

In October 1918, Dieterichs arrived in Ufa, where the mainly Socialist-Revolutionary anti-Bolshevik government was located - the so-called Directory of members of the one dispersed by the Bolsheviks. In November 1918, Diterikhs joined the Omsk coup against the February socialists and, while in Ufa, received an order to arrest the leaders of the Directory there. In connection with this coup and the recognition of Kolchak’s power as the Supreme Ruler of Russia, Dieterichs left the ranks of the Czechoslovak Corps, where the attitude towards Kolchak ranged from restrained to negative. He took the position of chief of staff, then acting. Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front, Admiral Kolchak.

In January 1919, Mikhail Konstantinovich was appointed head of the commission to investigate the murder of the Royal Family, entrusting the work to N.A. Sokolov and finally giving the investigation a targeted character. Dieterichs (like the English journalist R. Wilton, who helped him) came to the conclusion and summarized the results in the book “The Murder of the Royal Family and Members of the House of Romanov in the Urals” - it was urgently written and published in Vladivostok in 1922 (Unfortunately, when After the Whites retreated, a significant part of the collected evidence and documents disappeared, including through the fault of representatives of the Entente, who apparently did not want such an inconvenient truth to be established.)

Participation in the investigation of the ritual regicide prompted Mikhail Konstantinovich to a more spiritual awareness of the revolution and civil war. He increasingly realizes that military efforts alone will not defeat the Bolsheviks. He felt what was happening as the culmination of a struggle between the holding Christian forces, whose stronghold was the monarchy, and the attacking anti-Christian forces; and in this struggle only the restoration of the Orthodox monarchy could stop the destruction of Russia and the world. Since the summer of 1919, Dieterichs has been hatching plans to convene a Zemsky Sobor for this purpose. It was also important for him that in January 1919 he blessed the Supreme Ruler of Russia, Admiral Kolchak, to fight against the God-fighting Bolsheviks. In order to raise the Orthodox spirit of the army, Dieterichs initiated the creation of sacrificial volunteer white detachments (teams) of the Holy Cross and the Green Banner; the soldiers took an oath on the Gospel and sewed white crosses onto their chests.

Since the summer of 1919, Dieterichs became commander of the Siberian Army, Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front, and then also Minister of War. The measures he took to strengthen the army made it possible to initially stop the onslaught of the Reds, and in September to push them back (Tobolsk operation). But defeat in the European part allowed Trotsky to transfer superior forces to the east against Kolchak. The subversive activities of the Social Revolutionaries and Red partisans in the rear intensified, and human reserves were drying up. Strategic differences with Kolchak led to Dieterichs' dismissal in early November; At the same time, the Reds took the Siberian capital - Omsk. The Czechoslovakians had previously received an order from the Entente to evacuate home through Vladivostok (the war with Germany was over, and the Entente was not going to fight against the Bolsheviks), for which they seized the entire train. The army under the command of General Kappel entered the three-month Siberian Ice Campaign on foot, bypassing Irkutsk through frozen Baikal - to Chita...

During the retreat of the Whites, until the end of the summer of 1920, Dieterichs was the Manager of the Military Department of Transbaikalia under, to whom, by the last decree of Admiral Kolchak of January 4, 1920, the fullness of military and civil power was transferred as the Supreme Ruler of Siberia. In the territories under his control, Semenov established a military dictatorship with the restoration of the pre-February order. In July–August 1920, Diterichs was sent by Semenov to negotiate with the Primorye coalition government regarding the further transfer of white forces to Primorye for their organization and reorganization there. The negotiations ended in failure. In November of the same 1920, Semenov suffered a final defeat in Transbaikalia, his troops retreated to a neutral zone on the border of China and Primorye. (At the same time, in the summer of 1921, an independent attempt to attack from Mongolia ended in failure...)

After Semenov’s defeat, Diterikhs left for Harbin, where he even had to work in a shoe workshop to support his family. But after the collapse of the motley coalition government in Vladivostok on June 1, 1922, Mikhail Konstantinovich was called there and took command of the White forces of Primorye with the goal of creating at least a fragment of Russian statehood in the Far East to continue the White struggle. On June 8, he became Chairman of the Government until the convocation, a dream of which he began to realize.

The cathedral opened on July 23, 1922 and elected Diterichs as Ruler of the Amur Zemsky Territory and Voivode of the Zemsky Rati. The Council, led by Dieterichs, recognized the sins of the Russian people as the cause of the revolution, called for repentance and proclaimed the only way to save Russia was the restoration of the legitimate Orthodox monarchy. The Council recognized the Romanov Dynasty as reigning despite the turmoil and restored it in the Amur region. Accordingly, Mikhail Konstantinovich took the oath in the Assumption Cathedral and restructured the entire civil life in the region: he organized the Zemstvo Duma, the Council of External Affairs, the Local Council, prepared the Local Council; The Council of the Zemstvo Group was supposed to decide all civil matters. The church parish was established as the main administrative unit of Southern Primorye.

After the Japanese left, mobilization was successfully carried out. Under the command of Dieterichs, the White troops defeated the Reds near Khabarovsk, but were unable to suppress the Red partisan detachments. After the failure of the White forces near Spassk in October, they retreated to China and Korea. At the same time, Dieterichs achieved the evacuation of military families on Japanese ships, and also attracted the US and British Red Cross to evacuate the wounded and sick.

Mikhail Konstantinovich himself left Russia on October 25, 1922, settling with his family in Shanghai. I had to work as the chief cashier at the Franco-Chinese Bank. His wife Sofya Emilievna has long been involved in caring for children - and in Shanghai she created an orphanage for Russian children, as well as a “School at Home” for girls with training in the gymnasium course, this was the first stage of the gradually growing Russian Girls’ Gymnasium, the first graduate of which took place in 1937. The Diterichs family also provided financial support to the Society for the Dissemination of Russian National Literature.

Mikhail Konstantinovich also could not leave his political activities: he became the recognized leader of the white emigration in the Far East - the head of the Far Eastern department (they prepared combat groups to be sent to the USSR), an honorary member of the Brotherhood of Russian Truth (which did the same). After the occupation of Manchuria by Japan (1932), Dieterichs expressed support for the Japanese government, which soon entered into the Anti-Comintern Pact. In emigration, hopes for the formation of a Russian state in the Far East were revived, in connection with which Dieterichs wrote “An Appeal to the White Russian Emigration of the Whole World.” In 1933, Mikhail Konstantinovich began correspondence with the Prince of the Imperial Blood Nikita Alexandrovich (great-grandson on the male side and son of the sister of Sovereign Nicholas II on the female side), who did not recognize the impostor of Grand Duke Kirill. But for this, as Dieterichs planned, a general impulse of Russian emigration was needed, which no longer appeared...

Thank you very much for the unique article about one of the Russian generals who adorn the history
riya of Russian military science (just don’t write
about the white general). They are all Russian - both red and white. They don't need to be divided...
It’s doubly pleasant that I wrote a book about M.M. Diterichs, a Soviet surgeon (this is his
nephew, whose name was not published anywhere for a long time due to his relationship with M.K. Dieterichs).
May their memory be blessed!!!

Serving the Motherland faithfully is hard and sometimes thankless work.

M. K. Diterichs was born in Kyiv on April 5 (17), 1874 in a large family of an officer, artilleryman, and regiments

Mikhail Konstantinovich Diterichs

Diterikhs Mikhail Konstantinovich (04/5/17/1874-10/9/1937), Russian general and public figure. One of the organizers of the White movement in Siberia. In July 1919 he commanded the Siberian Army of A.V. Kolchak, in July - November 1919 - the Eastern Front. Personally supervised the investigation into the murder of the Royal Family, conducted by the investigator N. A. Sokolov. He defended Orthodox-monarchist positions. He managed to rally Orthodox Russian people around himself and lead them to Primorye in 1922 Priamursky Zemsky Cathedral, at which its participants announced that “The Supreme All-Russian power belongs to the Royal House Romanovs.” At this council, the general was elected “ruler and governor of the zemstvo army,” “ruler of the Amur Zemsky region.” From October 1922 in exile, where, based on the investigative case of N. A. Sokolova, he published a book about the murder of the Royal Family and other members of the House of Romanov (see. Murder of the royal family and members of the House of Romanov in the Urals. Causes, goals and consequences ).

ABOUT. Platonov

Lieutenant General M.K., Dieterichs
(The original photo is in the personal archive of S.P. Petrov).

Diterichs Mikhail Konstantinovich (April 5, 1874 – September 9, 1937), from the family of an officer of Czech origin who served in the Russian army in the Caucasus. He received his education at the Corps of Pages and the Academy of the General Staff in 1900. He served in Turkestan. After participating in the Russo-Japanese War, he served in the Main Directorate of the General Staff. A participant in the First World War, at the beginning of 1915 he was the Quartermaster General of the Southwestern Front, under his control all the main operations of the front were developed. Major General since December 1915. Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army in Greece, commander of the Expeditionary Force in Thessaloniki in 1916. Was close to Alekseev. Chief of Staff of the Special Petrograd Army under Krimov during Kornilov’s campaign against Petrograd. In August 1917, he was offered the post of Minister of War, refused it, from September 1917 he was appointed Quartermaster General of the Commander-in-Chief Headquarters, and from November 3 - Chief of Staff of Headquarters; when it was captured by the Bolsheviks, he escaped arrest. On November 8, 1917, Dieterichs left for Kyiv to join his family, and soon became the chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Corps at the suggestion of the Czechs and Slovaks themselves (March 1918 - January 1919).

In 1918, he was one of the organizers of the successful performance of the Czechoslovak Corps against Soviet power at the end of May of the same year. Commander of the Trans-Baikal group of forces of the Siberian group of the Czechoslovak Corps in the Irkutsk - Chita - Vladivostok region. Being at the head of its advanced echelons, he took Vladivostok in June 1918. Advancing to Siberia, he joined forces with Gaida on July 11, 1918 in the Irkutsk region. In response to requests from Woitsekhovsky and Kappel to send reinforcements to Ufa, he stated that he would be able to send the 1st Ural units there only at the beginning of December 1918. During the coup of Kolchak on November 18, 1918, he was in Ufa. He received an order from Kolchak: to arrest the leaders of KOMUCH for their subversive activities against the establishment of the power of the Supreme Ruler, but he hesitated for some time and only on November 26, 1918 he carried out the order and “retired” from the ranks of the Czechoslovak Corps, having quarreled with the Czechs and Slovaks. This episode of his biography delayed for a long time Dieterichs’s advance to the highest command posts of the white forces in eastern Russia. Immediately after leaving the Czechoslovak Corps, he asks Kolchak for personal permission to leave for the Far East with a special task - to deliver there the relics of the Imperial Family, collected by him on the Ural Front. In April 1919, he arrived in Omsk on the “Japanophile train”, at the disposal of the Russian White Army in eastern Russia, and was candidate No. 1 for the post of Chief of Staff of Kolchak’s army. He was not selected under the pretext of being in the Czechoslovak service. General for assignments under Kolchak.

In 1919, he spent some time studying the circumstances of the murder of the royal family, the head of the investigation commission from January to July 1919. In July 1919, he commanded the Siberian Army of Kolchak, Lieutenant General. He opposed the Chelyabinsk operation in the summer of 1919, believing that it could not be entrusted to the weakened forces of the Western Army alone. July 22 - November 17, 1919 - the commander of the White Eastern Front, at the same time, after Lebedev left the post of Chief of Staff, he was appointed in his place, as well as the Minister of War. Initiator of the struggle against the Bolsheviks as a religious one. Thanks to him, volunteer detachments were created - squads of the Holy Cross and Crescent, which completely died in battles against the Reds. Conducts the Tobolsk offensive operation of August - September 1919, after a series of outstanding successes (the Bolsheviks were thrown back beyond the Tobol, suffering heavy losses), which ended unsuccessfully largely due to the criminal slowness of the commander of the Cossack Siberian corps, Ivanov-Rinov, whose resignation he soon achieved. In November 1919, Kolchak was removed from command of the Eastern Front, largely because of Sakharov’s intrigues against him at a time when, in order to save the White Army in eastern Russia, he proposed leaving Omsk in advance and removing all valuables and rear units from there. Soon Kolchak again offered him this post, but Dieterichs made it a condition for him to take over Kolchak’s resignation and his departure abroad. He made the Great Ice March with the remnants of Kolchak's army. He proposed to Kolchak a plan according to which, in order to preserve the army, it was necessary to retreat beyond the Irtysh. Emigrated after his offer was rejected. Lived in Harbin from late December 1919 to June 1922. with breaks.

Until the end of the summer of 1920 - Manager of the Military Department of Transbaikalia. In July - August 1920, he was sent by Semenov to negotiate with the Primorye coalition government regarding the further transfer of white forces to Primorye for their installation and reorganization there. Semenov's envoys disrupted his negotiations with Vladivostok. Semenov believed that Dieterichs was the main initiator of the campaign launched among the troops against him in 1920. Due to intrigues in Verzhbitsky’s army against Lokhvitsky, he decided to withdraw from participation in the struggle in Transbaikalia and went to Harbin, since, in his opinion, a “non-working situation” had developed there. After the fall of the Merkulov government on June 1, 1922, he took command of the white forces of Primorye after Verzhbitsky left. He officially took office after the transfer of powers to him by the acting commander of the White forces in Primorye, General Molchanov, on June 8, 1922. On the same day, he hosted the parade of the troops that overthrew Merkulov and became Chairman of the Government. The managers of the Government Departments joined him on June 9, 1922. Dieterichs did not want the Merkulov government to be eliminated and wanted, relying on it, to fight against the Bolsheviks. On June 10, 1922, he achieved the self-dissolution of the People's Assembly. Diterikhs announced that in conditions of unrest he was subordinate to the Amur Provisional Government until the convening of the Zemsky Sobor in Primorye. By convening the Zemsky Sobor, he hoped to create an authoritative government and attract ordinary people to his side. Despite the preservation of the Merkulov government and apparently good relations, there was a struggle between Dieterichs and the Government, since the Merkulovs did not want army representatives to be included in the government. With Japan's announcement in the summer of 1922 about the evacuation of its troops, he called on everyone in Primorye to remain calm.

Diterichs opened the monarchical Zemsky Sobor in Primorye on July 23, 1922 and elected him “the sole ruler and commander of the zemstvo army” - by the forces of the Primorye White Guards. This was due to disagreements between Semyonovites and Kappelevites on the issue of state administration of white Primorye. In fact, power was transferred to him by the Merkulovs. Nominated Gondatti for the post of Prime Minister. Almost unanimously, on August 8, 1922, Diterichs was elected Chairman of the Government and on August 9, 1922, he declared himself the Ruler of the Amur Zemsky Territory and the Voivode of the Zemsky Rati. He announced a reorganization in the army: corps became groups, regiments became squads. This caused controversy in the army. Dieterichs reduced the rear units, reorganized the supply of troops, taking into account all the features of the war when the white forces were located within Primorye. Abolished the counterintelligence system. Despite all his measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army, he failed to achieve this. Rebuilt civil life in the region: organized the Zemstvo Duma, the Council of External Affairs, the Local Council, prepared the Local Council; The Council of the Zemstvo Group was supposed to decide all civil matters. He was always against the claims of all white governments to be “all-Russian”, wanting to prepare the conditions for the future reconstruction of Russia gradually. He declared a “crusade” against Soviet Russia and advocated the restoration of the monarchy. In the army, especially in the Semyonovtsy units, he was called by the title “Your Eminence.”

With the field headquarters and the Zemstvo Duma on August 26, 1922, Dieterichs moved to Nikolsk-Ussuriysky to strengthen the defense of the white troops in connection with the departure of the Japanese. Established the church parish as the main administrative unit of Southern Primorye. He contributed to the strengthening of the anti-Bolshevik struggle in Yakutia in 1922. Diterichs went to Spassk on September 5, 1922 to familiarize himself with the situation near the city and personally meet with the local population to inform them about further government actions. During this trip I fell ill. Being ill, on September 15, 1922 he spoke at the opening of the National Congress. In this speech he called on Primorye residents to sacrifice in favor of the White Army, as a result of which a large sum of money and a lot of warm clothes were received. Under the leadership of Dieterichs, mobilization was successfully carried out. Failed to re-engage Japan in the campaign against the Communists. He wanted to replenish his supplies of weapons and ammunition at her expense. In Vladivostok he published his research on the case of the murder of the Royal Family: “The Murder of the Royal Family and Members of the House of Romanov in the Urals.” Under his command, the White troops defeated the Reds near Khabarovsk, but for various reasons, the most important of which was the sharp deterioration of weather conditions in Primorye, they were unable to eliminate the Red Anuchinsky partisan region. After the failure of his forces near Spassk in October, he announced a withdrawal to China and Korea, “but not to the Japanese.” At the same time, Dieterichs achieved the evacuation of military families on Japanese ships, and also attracted the Red Cross of the USA and Great Britain for this, which, at his insistence, took care of the wounded and sick. He himself retreated at the head of the largest group of whites from Primorye, numbering 9 thousand people and 3 thousand horses.

He retreated with them to Posyet and New Kyiv, where he remained until the surrender of Vladivostok on October 25, 1922. He retreated with this group to Genzan. Since October 25, 1922 - emigrant, one of the main leaders of white emigration in the Far East. Until May 1923 he was in an emigrant camp. Head of the Far Eastern Department of the EMRO. In 1931, from Shanghai he sent a leaflet “To the White Russian Emigration of the Whole World,” in which he called for a fight against Soviet Russia. Died in September 1937 in Shanghai.

Materials from the website of A.V. were used. Kvakina http://akvakin.narod.ru/

M.K. Dieterichs during a trip to Beijing in the spring of 1922.

DITERICHS Mikhail Konstantinovich (04/05/1874-09/09/1937). Major General (12/06/1915). Lieutenant General (1919). He graduated from the Corps of Pages (1894) and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (1900). Participant in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Participant of the First World War: from 05/28/1916 commander of the Expeditionary Force (2nd Special Infantry Brigade of the Russian Army) in Thessaloniki (Greece). Returning from Greece, he was appointed chief of staff of the Special Petrograd Army (commander - General Krymov), 08/24-09/1917. Quartermaster General of the Headquarters (Stavka) of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Kerensky), 09-03.11.1917; Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters (Dukhonin), 03 - 08.11.1917. In the White movement: fled to Ukraine, appointed chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Army Corps. *), 03.1918-01.1919.

Head of the commission to investigate the murder of the royal family, 01 - 07.1919. Commander of the Siberian Army (07.11 - 22.1919) and the Eastern Front, at the same time (08.12-10.06.1910) Chief of Staff of the Supreme Ruler of Russia Admiral Kolchak, 07.22 - 11.17.1919. To save from complete defeat and destruction of the Siberian armies of the Eastern Front, on November 15, 1919, he proposed to Admiral Kolchak to withdraw the remnants of the troops beyond the Ob, taking into account that on November 14, 1919, Omsk was surrendered to Soviet troops. After Admiral Kolchak rejected the plan and refused to leave the Ob water barrier, General Dieterichs decided to resign and emigrated to Manchuria, Harbin. In exile: Harbin, 12.1919-07.1922. Elected on 06/1922 at the Zemsky Council in Vladivostok as the Ruler of the Far East, Zemsky Voivode and on 07/23/1922 - commander of the Zemsky Army - the former Far Eastern army that moved to southern Primorye (successor of General Verzhbitsky). 07/08/1922 headed the Zemsky Amur Provisional Government in Vladivostok (successor of Merkulov). The Zemstvo Army of General Diterichs was defeated in the battles of 09-10.1922 by the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic (commanded by Army Commander I.V. Smorodinov). On October 25, 1922, Soviet troops entered Vladivostok. The remnants of the troops of the Zemstvo Rati of General Dieterichs retreated south to Posyet Bay, from where they were evacuated to Genzan (Korea) on the ships of the Far Eastern Flotilla of Admiral Stark and a few days later to Shanghai, 10/26/1922. In exile in China since 11.1922. Died in Shanghai (China).

Notes:

*) The Czechoslovak Corps was formed (11.1917) from Czech prisoners of war, soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian Army. Commander - Russian General V.N. Shokorov. Consisted of two divisions and a reserve brigade. The total number is about 30,000 soldiers and officers. He was stationed in Ukraine in the rear of the Southwestern Front. The Czechoslovak Corps (during the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations) was declared by the Entente on January 15, 1918, an integral part of the French army, and the question was raised before Soviet Russia about its evacuation to Western Europe. On 03.1918, parts of the corps left Ukraine and reached Vladivostok in railway trains, sequentially located from the Volga to Vladivostok, with the goal of evacuating to Europe. By the end of May 1918, approximately 45,000 bayonets of the Czechoslovak Corps were concentrated in this chain. In May 1918, the Czech command of the corps adopted the slogan “advance to Vladivostok by force.” On May 25, 1918, units of the Czechoslovak Corps launched an anti-Soviet rebellion along the entire chain of Czech troops. Including Chechek's group, about 8,000 soldiers in the area of ​​the cities of Penza and (later) Samara; Voitsekhovsky group, about 8800 in the Chelyabinsk region; Gaida's group, about 4,500 in the Novonikolaevsk area, and General Dieterichs' group, 14,000 Czechoslovak legionnaires in Vladivostok. In total there are approximately 35-40,000 soldiers.

Materials used from the book: Valery Klaving, Civil War in Russia: White Armies. Military-historical library. M., 2003.

Dieterichs (Diederichs, Dieteriks) Mikhail Konstantinovich (04/5/1874-10/8/1937), military leader, the last head of Russian statehood on Russian territory. Of the Baltic nobles of Swedish origin who appeared in Russia during the reign of Empress Anna Ivanovna and were related to the Lermontovs and Aksakovs. Born into the family of an officer who served in the Caucasus for 40 years. Many of his ancestors were also military. After graduating from the Corps of Pages (1894), he was promoted to second lieutenant and sent to the Turkestan Horse-Mountain Battery. After graduating from the Imperial Nicholas Academy of the General Staff (1900), he was assigned to the General Staff. Participant in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 as part of the 17th Army Corps. Fought near Liaoyang, on the river. Shahe, near Mukden. Head of the mobilization department of the headquarters of the Kyiv Military District (1910). He was sent abroad legally and illegally, where he studied in detail the fortifications of Przemysl, the Carpathian passes and the approaches to Lviv. For the successful fulfillment of instructions, he was promoted more than once.

By the beginning of the First World War - colonel; head of the operational department of the 3rd Army headquarters formed on the basis of the Kyiv Military District (1914); Quartermaster General, Quartermaster General of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front (April 1915). The appointment was received on the eve of the operation in the Carpathians, the so-called. the Brusilov breakthrough, in the development of which General Dieterikhs, who knew the theater of military operations very well, took a direct part; Major General (Dec. 1915); commander of the 2nd Special Brigade (May 1916), which fought on the Thessaloniki Front. Awarded golden arms and the French Legion of Honor. After the liquidation of the front - in the reserve of ranks at the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District (July 1917). In Aug. he was offered the post of Minister of War, but he refused. Chief of Staff of the Special Petrograd Army (commander General A. M. Krymov) (Aug. 1917); Quartermaster General of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Sept. 1917); temporarily correcting the post of chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (November 1917), which became Lieutenant General N. N. Dukhonin. He contributed to softening the regime of General Kornilov and his associates who were in Bykhov prison. He ensured that the internal security of those arrested was carried out by the Tekinsky Cavalry Regiment - Kornilov’s personal escort.

He was appointed to the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Front, but did not go to his destination, remaining at Headquarters. During the occupation of Mogilev by the Bolsheviks, Dieterichs took refuge in the French military mission and, dressed in a French uniform, went with the mission to Kyiv (1917), where his family was located. Chief of Staff of the Separate Czechoslovak Corps (1918-19); headed the Far Eastern group of the corps (about 14 thousand people) in Vladivostok (1918); Chief of Staff of the Russian troops of the Western Front (1919); Lieutenant General The Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Admiral A.V. Kolchak, entrusted him with “general leadership of the investigation and investigation of the murders in the Urals of Members of the August Family and other Members of the House of Romanov” (01/17/1919). The head of the Military Administrative Department of the Yekaterinburg District, Major General S. A. Domantovich, was appointed as an assistant for carrying out search work and excavations. The investigation continued from February 7. until July 10, 1919. Commander of the Siberian Army (06/28-07/11/1919); Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front with the subordination of all troops of the Siberian and Western armies, as well as the Tyumen and Kurgan districts in the theater of military operations (07/14/1919); Minister of War of the Omsk government and acting chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Aug. 1919). Having organized resistance to Tukhachevsky’s 5th Army, he did not give him the opportunity to transfer part of his troops against Denikin. According to Lieutenant General A.P. Budberg, Dieterichs “adopted the Siberian point of view that a civil war requires senior commanders who go on the attack with a rifle in their hand.” Well understanding the spiritual essence of the struggle against the Bolsheviks, he stood at the origins of the formation of the “Drugs of the Holy Cross”. He created a boarding house for officer orphans “Ochag”, initially located in the general’s house, and then taken by him abroad. As a result of a disagreement with Kolchak over the advisability of defending Omsk, he left his position; appointed to the disposal of the Supreme Ruler (11/4/1919). Contributed to the transportation of the coffins of the Alapaevsk Martyrs, first to Eastern Siberia, and then to China (1919); preservation and export to France of investigative documents and material evidence in the case of the Regicide (March 1920). “God was pleased,” he wrote later, “to allow me to get too close to the place of death of these unforgettable Royal Martyrs and to save everything that was possible to collect from the August Bodies and things barbarously destroyed by the Bolsheviks. ..” Under pressure from the brothers V.N. and A.N. Pepelyaev in December. 1919 Admiral A.V. Kolchak contacted Diterichs, who was in Vladivostok, via direct wire, offering him again the post of Commander-in-Chief. As a condition, the general demanded the resignation of the Supreme Ruler and his departure abroad, which, of course, was not accepted. In Vladivostok, on behalf of Ataman G.M. Semenov, he conducted unsuccessful negotiations with the Primorsky Regional Zemstvo Administration on the formation of a buffer state (July 1920). He went to Harbin, where he opened a shoe shop, in which he worked. Successor to Lieutenant General G. A. Verzhbitsky (born 1941) as commander of the Transbaikal (Siberian) Kolchak-Kappel army (1922).

From July 10 to July 28 Aug. 1922 The Amur Zemsky Council was held in Vladivostok, electing General Diterichs as ruler of the Amur region (July 1922). In the oath he took, he promised to “give an answer for everything done in accordance with the Ruler’s duty to the Russian Tsar and the Russian land.” The state entity was named the Amur Zemsky Territory, and its armed forces - the Zemskaya Rat, whose Voivode was Diterikhs. In honor of this event, a special medal was established - the last sign of national Russia. On the front side of the round (diameter 28 mm) medal there is an image of a SVM. George slaying a serpent with a spear; on the reverse there is an inscription framed by a laurel wreath in 6 lines: “July 23 - August 10. July 1922 - Amur Zemsky Sobor." The medal was worn on a white, blue and red ribbon. With Diterichs coming to power, according to General V.G. Boldyrev, the “open proclamation of the monarchical principle as a guiding political slogan” began; he “quite definitely and openly expressed the idea of ​​​​monarchy, expressed what secretly, with caution and caution, or, conversely, in a drunken stupor, was sometimes completely anarchically revealed before him by ideological and sincere or crafty and calculating supporters of the monarchical principle.” “Our first task,” stated the Ruler’s Decree No. 1 (1922), “is a single, exclusive and definite struggle against Soviet power - its overthrow. Next, it’s no longer us. Next is the future Zemsky Sobor. This is extremely important, because until now this principle was not pure, and the constantly emerging Russian authorities, except for the Amur region, constantly pursued the principle of the Supremacy of the All-Russian, since they set not only the principle of fighting the Soviet regime, but also the leadership of all of Russia. It was a strange mistake. And the fact that the Zemsky Sobor rejected this principle, at least in the form that it rejected the title of Supreme Ruler, thereby emphasized our idea. We can lead our struggle with a Dynastic figure, but still we now face one task - the fight against Soviet power, its overthrow. After this, we can say to the Lord God: “Now You are releasing us. Others will work.” The third principle is the ideology established by the Zemsky Sobor, which says that the current rulers called for this struggle, whoever they are, even from the Romanov dynasty, can look at themselves at this moment as the Supreme Anointed of the future Russia, for this question again it is not resolved by us. The Romanov dynasty may have been the Anointed Ones, but for us mortals we cannot even dream of taking upon ourselves the title of Rulers of all Russia. We are the Rulers of the struggle against Soviet power and the Rulers of those State associations that are born for this purpose. When I heard these three principles, I received deep moral satisfaction within myself and that colossal faith that gives me the courage to say: “On these three principles we will go to success and achieve success.” About some practical steps of state building in the last piece of free land from the Bolsheviks of the Russian land, Major General V.A. Babushkin, assistant to the Ruler as Minister of Internal Affairs, wrote: "Only religious people can take part in the construction of the Amur state. A church parish is taken as the basis. Every citizen according to his faith must be assigned to the parish of their religion. Church parishes are united into a council of church parishes of the city and zemstvo districts [...] Unions of church parishes will have to replace what is now called city and zemstvo self-government. All citizens must be assigned to the parishes [...] On the appointed day parishioners gather in the church.After prayer, an urn is installed in the church, into which parishioners put their personal numbers. The priest then takes out the required number of them; This is how the ward council is formed. The parishes will be headed by persons appointed by the supreme authority. Unworthy and inappropriate persons will be replaced by the next ones who receive the next lot. Thanks to this, the discretion and will of God will be put into the principle of future self-government. One must think that the new self-government bodies will be quite authoritative among the population. There probably won't be any police. Citizens will be given the right to organize self-defense under the control of church parishes.” Dieterichs’s firm Orthodox faith gave food to numerous rumors in the already godless army environment. Many such wits called him (behind the eyes, of course) “Your Eminence.” Among the first steps of the new government was the replacement of the death penalty for the Bolsheviks with their deportation to the Amur region. In Oct. 1922, under the blows of the Bolsheviks (after the battles of Spassk and Monastyrische), the Amur Zemsky Territory ceased to exist. Of decisive importance was the cessation of Japan's supply of weapons and other assistance to Primorye. This was done at the categorical request of the United States. “The forces of the Land of the Amur Rati are broken,” we read in the last decree of the Ruler on October 17. 1922. - Twelve difficult days of struggle alone with the cadres of the immortal heroes of Siberia and the Ice March, without reinforcements, without ammunition, decided the fate of the Zemsky Amur Region. Soon he will be gone. He is like a body - he will die. But only as a body. In spiritual terms, in the meaning of the Russian, historical, moral and religious ideology that flared up brightly within his boundaries, he will never die in the future history of the revival of the Great Holy Rus'. The seed is thrown. It has now fallen onto unprepared soil. But the coming storm of horrors of Soviet power will spread this seed across the wide field of the Great Mother Fatherland. And in the future it will come across the limit of our repentance and, by the infinite mercy of the Lord, to a fertile and prepared piece of the Russian Land and then give the desired fruit. I believe in this goodness of the Lord; I believe that the spiritual significance of the short-term existence of the Amur region will leave deep, indelible traces even among the people of the region. I believe that Russia will return to the Russia of Christ, the Russia of God’s Anointed, but that we were not yet worthy of this mercy of the Most High Creator.” Vladivostok was abandoned by the Zemstvo Army on October 26. 1922. With the surviving warriors and refugees (up to 9 thousand people in total), Dieterichs crossed the Russian-Chinese border near the city of Hunchun. We walked in the direction: Girin-Mukden. For some time he lived with a group of officers in a camp in Girin. After the Chinese authorities proposed that all Russian senior officials leave Girin, the general moved to Shanghai (1923). He worked as a clerk and later as chief cashier at the French-Chinese Bank. He was involved in charity work. He took care of orphanages for children he brought from Russia in Harbin and Shanghai. Meanwhile, Diterichs’s own daughter, Natalia Poluektova (her godfather was Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich), remained in Russia, subsequently serving 13 years in camps and exile. With the help of his wife Sofia Emilievna (born after 1943), a former teacher and teacher at the Smolny Institute, he opened an institute-school for Russian girls in Shanghai (1933). This educational institution, which enjoyed the support of the League of Russian Women, differed from other Russian schools in its education. He was a member of the Russian National Committee, which united representatives of different movements of Russian emigration and was in charge of the entire life of the Russian colony in Shanghai. After the abduction by NKVD agents of the chairman of the EMRO, General A.P. Kutepov (Jan. 1930), Diterichs declared himself the head of the Far Eastern department of the EMRO. The previous boss, General M.V. Khanzhin, who lived in Dairen, immediately resigned from his post. The Chairman of the EMRO, Lieutenant General E.K. Miller, approved this appointment. In 1931, Dieterichs addressed a special leaflet “To the White Russian emigration of the whole world,” calling for a fight against Soviet Russia. He transferred his activities to Harbin, choosing Lieutenant General G. A. Verzhbitsky as his assistant. Non-commissioned officer courses were approved there, and then courses at the cadet school. Dieterichs is of great importance in revealing the ritual nature of the regicide as a result of an international conspiracy. On the general's train between Chita and Verkhne-Udinsk, copies of the investigative file were made (1920); during his stay in Harbin (1920-22), based on them, he wrote and in 1922 published his 2-volume work “The Murder of the Royal Family and Members of the House of Romanov in the Urals.” The book was printed in Vladivostok in the printing house of the Military Academy on the island. Russian. Most of the circulation that remained unsold due to political events was, fortunately, exported abroad. Proceeds from the sale of these books went to charity. This is evidenced by the inscriptions on the miraculously preserved copies of this publication: “Price 5 rubles in gold. All proceeds from this publication go to the Home for Lonely Teenage Refugees.” Next, the addresses of the publication’s warehouses were indicated: “Harbin - Old Town, Furazhnaya, 44” and “Harbin - New Town, Book Publishing House “Russkoe Delo””. Shortly before his death, Diterikhs ordered the transfer of his copy of the investigative file to the central department of the EMRO, however, shortly before his death, he learned shortly before his death about the abduction in Paris (September 1937) by NKVD agents of the chairman of the EMRO, Lieutenant General E. K. Miller, he changed his intention. Died of tuberculosis. A memorial service was served in St. Nicholas Cathedral in Harbin on October 10. at 7 o'clock evenings. The investigative file remaining with the widow was later “transferred for safekeeping to a safe place in one of the Western countries.” According to some reports, it is still privately owned by the general’s relatives. There is evidence that the widow handed over her husband’s archive to her brother, Major General F. E. Bredov (04/22/1884-03/15/1959), who fought in the ranks of the Russian Corps during the Second World War and died in San Francisco.

Materials used from the site Great Encyclopedia of the Russian People - http://www.rusinst.ru

Diterikhs Mikhail Konstantinovich (5.4.1874 -8.10.1937, Shanghai, China), lieutenant general (1919). He received his education in the Corps of Pages (1894) and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (1900). From April 2, 1910, senior adjutant of the headquarters of the Kyiv Military District, from June 30, 1913, head of the GUGS department. During mobilization on August 23, 1914, he was appointed as acting. general for office work and assignments under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was involved in the development of various aspects of Russian operations. army. From 30.9.1914 etc. Quartermaster General of the 3rd Army headquarters, during the battles near Krakow he served as chief of staff. On April 1, 1915, he was appointed Quartermaster General of the Army Headquarters of the Southwestern Front. One of the closest assistants to Gen. A.A. Brusilov, played a big role in preparing the offensive of the Southwestern Front (Brusilovsky breakthrough). On April 11, 1915 he was awarded the Arms of St. George. On May 28, 1916 he was appointed commander of the 2nd Special Infantry. brigade (3rd and 4th special infantry regiments), intended to be sent to the Thessaloniki front. In July 1917 he was recalled from Russia and enlisted in the reserve of ranks at the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District. On September 10, 1917, he was appointed Quartermaster General under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On November 8, 1917, he fled to Ukraine, where he soon took up the post of chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Corps (until January 1919). 17.1.1919 on behalf of A.V. Kolchak headed the commission of inquiry into the murder of members of the royal family and other members of the Romanov dynasty in the Urals. From Jan. 1919 Chief of Staff of the Western Front. 11-22.7.1919 commander of the Siberian separate army. From July 22 to November 4 1919 commander of the Eastern Front; simultaneously with 10 Aug. to Oct. 1919 Chief of Staff of the Supreme Ruler, and Aug. 10-27. - Minister of War. After the defeat of Kolchak’s troops, who did not accept D.’s plan to withdraw troops from the Irtysh line, he went to Harbin, where he lived until 1922. On June 1, 1922, after the overthrow of the Merkulov government, he assumed power as commander of the troops of the Provisional Amur Government. 8.8:1922 The Council transferred power to him as the governor of the Zemstvo Army and the ruler of the Primorsky Territory. In September-October 1922, his troops were defeated by units of the Red Army, after which D. emigrated to China. 19.6.1930 replaced by general. Khanzhina as head of the Far Eastern Department of the EMRO; was an honorary member of the Officers' Assembly in Shanghai. Author of the book “The Murder of the Royal Family and Members of the House of Romanov in the Urals” (M., 1991).

Book materials used: Zalessky K.A. Who was who in the Second World War. Allies of Germany. Moscow, 2003

General Dieterichs' plan for a deep withdrawal

General Dieterichs was clearly aware that Kolchak’s idea of ​​permanently delaying the armies on the Irtysh River was impracticable; but even if it were feasible, it was impossible to look at Omsk as a capital with the Government residing there, as soon as this city would enter the front line. We also had to reckon with the approaching onset of winter, when the Irtysh ceased to be a barrier and a defensive line. For all these reasons, Dieterichs ordered the armies to begin a deep retreat, and Kolchak had to reluctantly order the evacuation of government buildings.

According to Diterikhs's plan, the First Army was supposed to retreat to Tomsk for recruitment, the remaining two to Omsk, Novonikolaevsk, Mariinsk and further, depending on the situation. Some government agencies began to move to Irkutsk. Unfortunately, this plan was not implemented in a timely manner; how and why, I will say below. Now I want to dwell on the considerations that this plan promised us if it were carried out, or, clarifying the question, decide whether the White offensive struggle in Siberia could then be revived again with the hope of defeating the Reds. Undoubtedly, it could, but under the indispensable presence of one of two conditions: either that the Reds were completely defeated in European Russia by Denikin, and then the Siberian Army would not allow them to hold out in Siberia, where they would naturally have to rush after the Volga. Another possibility of holding out was clearly incredible - that the Japanese would decide to support our army with their troops, for which they would demand large land compensation, and Kolchak would not agree to this.

Outside of these two conditions, there was not one hundred percent chance of a successful resumption of the struggle in the spring of 1920. I'm talking, of course, about offensive combat. Neither Dieterichs' plan nor any other promised us success. The war was lost through the loss of time, space and manpower due to a series of colossal strategic and political mistakes. A year ago, from the Perm-Ekaterinburg-Chelyabinsk line, it cost nothing to reach the Volga between Samara and Tsaritsyn with 50 thousand Czechs, reinforce the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks along the way and unite with Denikin. This operation was worth going through even with the risk of opening a passage to Siberia through the Ural ridge. It was much more difficult, but still not impossible, to approach Moscow through Vyatka, for which it was necessary to act with combined forces in this direction, slowly, methodically and coordinating their actions with what was happening among the volunteers. Kolchak, instead of one plan or another, went for Lebedev’s adventurist strategy. The result of this strategy was that by mid-July the troops had suffered a number of major defeats and were in disarray. But at this time, not everything was lost, and if they had listened to the advice of experienced generals and retreated beyond the Ishim River for reorganization and recruitment, the campaign could have been started anew in one direction or another or switched to active defense until the spring of next year . Of course, Lebedev, Sakharov and Co. could not count on understanding this situation, because they did not understand anything at all, but how Admiral Kolchak did not understand such a simple thing is inexplicable, for everyone who knew him could not help but see that he is a very smart and widely educated man, and also an outstanding naval strategist, tactician and technician. After all, if in the Baltic or Black Seas the fleet under his command had suffered a number of failures, he probably would not have continued to hit the wall with his forehead, but would have turned to studying the reasons for the failures suffered and would have subsequently changed his strategy or tactics. It is incomprehensible to his mind that the same thing did not occur to him in land affairs, where, moreover, he could take advantage of other people’s knowledge, gleaned from many years of service. It seems that Kolchak was either afraid or ashamed to admit his land-based ignorance and not only did not ask for help from experienced people, but pushed it away when it was offered to him. So, he took Budberg with him on a trip to Sakharov’s army, but did not invite him to the operational report and did not talk to him about upcoming operations. Another time, Budberg, in his capacity as Minister of War, invited him to submit his written opinion on the strategic position of our armies and the possible course of their actions. Kolchak dryly replied that he had all the information from his Chief of Staff. This is no longer heightened pride, but positively some kind of eclipse.

From these two examples, it is undoubtedly clear that Budberg also suffered from the same disease that I mentioned above - a lack of will and firmness of opinion in front of the senior boss. As an experienced old general, he had every right to be listened to, especially by Kolchak, who was clearly ignorant of land affairs, and by Sakharov, who was too young and inexperienced in managing large-scale operations. Consequently, since Kolchak did not think to call him for an operational report, Budberg himself had to ask for it, putting his pride aside.

In the second case, there was no need to ask Kolchak’s permission to present his opinion on operational issues, but should have directly submitted the report. It was up to Kolchak to read it or not, to agree with it or not. Budberg would have done his duty. There is nothing more stupid than the widely developed passive interpretation of the also rather stupid saying: “Don’t ask for service, don’t refuse service,” or, even worse, “Every cricket knows its nest.” It was this bashful passivity that ruined Russia. They looked at the service as some kind of private and personal matter of the senior boss and, if he did not ask, they were afraid to even hint at their opinion. This had a particularly disastrous effect during the time of the Provisional Government, which so quickly collapsed the army with the complete lack of resistance of the military command.

Returning to Dieterichs's plan, I repeat once again that the retreat from Omsk into the depths of Siberia, in the winter and after the loss of most of the army and military equipment, no longer left hope for the possibility of a new offensive campaign next summer. The Bolsheviks, of course, would have continued the pursuit of the Siberian troops, and it is possible that these latter would have had to retreat even to Transbaikalia. But if we had been able to complete the withdrawal planned by Dieterichs in complete order, we would still have had very significant benefits. First of all, the lives of many thousands of people who died in the subsequent panic retreat would have been preserved, and Kolchak himself, who embodied the symbol of all-Russian power, would have survived. The entire gold reserve would have been preserved in his hands, due to which Wrangel’s army from the Crimea could have been transferred to the east. Having gone to Transbaikalia, it was possible for a long time, if not for the entire reign of the Bolsheviks, to form an independent part of the Russian state from the Transbaikal, Amur and Primorsky regions. Geographical conditions, the navigable Amur, two railways and the availability of troops and money made the defense of this territory quite feasible. The Russian emigration, now scattered all over the world, would find refuge and work there.

But this possible small piece of Russian happiness floated from our hands thanks to Kolchak’s hesitation and his easy responsiveness to activity, even if it was obviously absurd.

World War I(chronological table).

Participants of the First World War(biographical reference book).

Civil war 1918-1920 in Russia(chronological table).

White movement in faces(biographical reference book).