Battle of Konotop Battle of Konotop Pereyaslav Rada and Vyhovsky's Army

BATTLE UNDER KONOTOPO 1659

The battle of Konotop in 1659 and its role in the confrontation between Hetman I. Vyhovsky and the Muscovite state.

The battle near Konotop on June 27-29, 1659 was the culmination of an armed confrontation between the Muscovite state and supporters of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, who was a champion of Ukraine's withdrawal from subordination to the Muscovite tsar, which unfolded in 1658-1659. In the foreign (primarily Ukrainian) history of historiography, there is a widespread judgment that "near Konotop the tsarist army experienced one of the biggest defeats in history." However, it would be more correct to say that we are talking about one of the most actively used defeats for political and propaganda purposes. However, the fact that "the color of the Moscow cavalry ... fold in one day" is generally confirmed by sources. This indicates that we are dealing with a more serious problem than the creation of a historical myth.
Let us briefly dwell on the situation that had developed in Ukraine by the summer of 1659 and led to an armed clash between opponents and defenders of the power of the Russian tsar in the country. The characterization of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky almost as an agent of influence of the Polish magnates, which is widespread in Soviet historiography, seems too primitive.

Ivan Evstafievich Vygodsky

This experienced and cunning politician, who combined the features of a pragmatist and an adventurer, was undoubtedly an advocate of the idea of ​​preserving the rights and liberties won by Ukraine under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, which he interpreted as class privileges of the Cossacks and, first of all, of the foremen. This is evidenced by the articles of the notorious Gadyach Treaty, signed on September 16, 1658 by I. Vyhovsky with the Polish government.

The paradox was that it was easier for I. Vyhovsky and his supporters to maintain the broad autonomy of Ukraine as part of the Commonwealth with its traditional weakness of the central government than under the power of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich approaching absolutism.

Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov

Thus, Hetman Vyhovsky joined the bloc of opponents of Moscow, headed by Warsaw and the Crimean Khanate that joined it. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to interpret the hostilities launched by him in August 1658 with the aim of extending his influence to the left bank, and especially to Kiev, as a full-scale war with the Muscovite state. According to the Hadiach Articles, the hetman was a subject of the Commonwealth, and the latter was in a state of truce with Moscow since 1656 (Vilna Treaty). Formally, I. Vyhovsky acted at his own peril and risk, albeit with the secret blessing of Warsaw. Even the detachment (according to Polish terminology - "division") of the crown convoy Andrzej Potocki, sent in support of the hetman in December 1658, consisted primarily of Wallachian, Moldavian, Hungarian, German and Serbian hired banners (units roughly corresponding to a Western European company) , which indicates the reluctance of Poland to demonstrate its own troops in the conflict.

Andrzej Potocki

At the same time, I. Vygovsky himself continued to play a risky diplomatic game with the Russian tsar, already after the start of clashes between his troops and the Russian garrisons, assuring Alexei Mikhailovich: “... We remain irreplaceable subjects of your royal majesty today.” During the subsequent conflict, he entered into negotiations with representatives of the Moscow administration in Ukraine, and even sent his representatives to the tsar, justifying the start of the conflict by the fact that "everything was caused by a quarrel and from letters of traitors on both sides." The position of the Moscow government was also similar, until the last moment it sought to maintain control over Ukraine through negotiations.

So, the Kiev voivode V. B. Sheremetiev, whose subordinate troops were already drawn into the battles, receives an instruction from the tsar "to see the hetman in Kyiv and talk over, no matter what measures to calm the civil strife."

Vasily Borisovich Sheremetiev

Prince N. S. Trubetskoy, who in February-March 1659 marched on Ukraine with an army, which some Ukrainian authors regard as a “Moscow intervention”, received an order “to persuade the Cherkasy (this is how the Ukrainian Cossacks were called in Moscow - ed.), so that in their guilt they finish off the sovereign with their foreheads, and the sovereign will grant them as before ”and accept practically any conditions of I. Vyhovsky.

Thus, in 1658-59. it may be more about intense political maneuvering on both sides, accompanied by sporadic outbreaks of hostilities.

At the same time, before the Konotop battle, the military situation was clearly not in favor of the hetman's supporters. On August 16-24, 1658, an attempt by a detachment of Cossacks and Tatars, whose number was estimated at 21.5 thousand people, under the command of the brother of the hetman Danila Vyhovsky, to besiege Kyiv was easily repulsed by the Russian garrison; during the battle, apparently not particularly fierce (losses of the garrison are shown by Sheremetyev as only 21 people), Vygovsky's supporters were scattered and threw 12 cannons and 48 banners. On October 29, near Kiev, Vyhovsky himself suffered a failure, after which he held negotiations with the governor Sheremetyev, an embassy was sent to Moscow, and there was a lull in the hostilities. I. Vygovsky resumed offensive operations only in February 1659, sending a 30,000-strong army near Lokhvitsa, incl. Tatar and Polish detachments.

The offensive was again repulsed by the Moscow governors, the princes Romodanovsky and Kurakin, with the support of the Cossacks of the “executive” (temporary) hetman Bespaly, who remained loyal to the tsar. The only victory that Hetman Vyhovsky won by the time of the Battle of Konotop was the capture of Mirgorod on February 4-7, 1659, and this was due to the transfer of local residents to his side and the condition of the free exit of the Moscow dragoons stationed in the city. Without calling into question more than once demonstrated in the wars of the 17th century. the excellent fighting qualities of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the military talents of their leaders, the unsuccessful actions of Vyhovsky's troops can be explained by the fact that their fighting spirit was still in 1658-59. clearly not up to the mark. The armed struggle against the Muscovite tsar, whose authority in the eyes of all Ukrainians, regardless of their beliefs, was quite high in those years, was not popular.
In January 1659, the tsar sent Prince A.N. Trubetskoy to Ukraine with a strong army. Officially, the purpose of the parish was to calm civil strife among the tsar's subjects in Little Russia, and the tsar's charter informed the Ukrainians about this. In a secret order, the prince was instructed to negotiate with I. Vygovsky, trying to conclude an agreement with him on accepting him again into Russian citizenship, and the tsarist government was ready for big concessions. Thus, the hostilities were considered by Moscow as a last resort to bring Ukraine into obedience, and Trubetskoy's expedition was in the nature of a military-political demonstration. It is from this point of view that the Russian troops, who soon met in the battle near Konotop with the forces of I. Vyhovsky and his allies, should be assessed.
Aleksey Mikhailovich relied on the intimidating effect of his military presence in Ukraine as the main argument in the negotiations; therefore, the army of Prince Trubetskoy, who was considered one of the best Moscow commanders of that time, must indeed have been impressive. Reliable sources do not give an unambiguous number of Russian troops near Konotop. The "Chronicle of the Seer" defines it as "more than a hundred thousand"; S. M. Solovyov believes that there were about 150 thousand people in the army of Prince Trubetskoy. Some modern authors, however, believe that the number of Moscow troops is greatly overestimated; however, we note that in 1659 the same units that fought in the Russian-Polish war of 1654-67 went under Konotop in 1659, and historians estimate them at 122 thousand people during the culmination of hostilities. Taking into account the fact that the forces of princes Romodanovsky and Lvov, as well as the Cossacks of Bespaly loyal to Moscow, joined the army of Trubetskoy near Konotop, the statement about the size of the Russian army at about 100 thousand people. looks quite realistic.
Moscow troops near Konotop were represented by units of the Belgorod and Sevsky ranks (military administrative districts), which traditionally bore the brunt of military conflicts on the southwestern borders of the Moscow state, as well as elite regiments of the Moscow (otherwise: Big or Tsar) rank, which testified about the importance of the campaign of Prince Trubetskoy for the tsarist government. According to the report of Prince Trubetskoy, the army consisted of "Moscow nobles and residents, city nobles and boyar children, and newly baptized murzas and Tatars, and Cossacks, and the Reiter system of the initial people and reiters, dragoons, soldiers and archers" . Consequently, it included both service and local components traditional for the Moscow state - noble cavalry, archers and Cossacks, and organized in the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich in Western European "regiments of the new system" - cavalry (reitar and dragoon) and infantry (soldiers).

Despite the well-known fact that the fighting qualities of the Russian troops in the second half of the 17th century. left much to be desired, in 1659, under the command of Trubetskoy, units that had combat experience of the company against the Poles in 1654-1656 prevailed, which to some extent increased their combat effectiveness. Particularly noteworthy are the "Moscow nobles and residents", who on June 29, 1659 were to become the main participants and victims of the Battle of Konotop from the Russian side. Representing the color of the noble militia, this local cavalry, which included many representatives of noble families, nevertheless, was an irregular formation archaic for its time. Possessing good, albeit varied, weapons and a good horse composition, the Moscow noble hundreds were weak in another way: called up for service from their estates in wartime and did not conduct regular exercises, they did not have sufficient skills to act as well-coordinated military units and were extremely heterogeneous by composition. Undoubtedly, in their ranks there were also good fighters; however, the specific gravity of people was great, whose attitude to their military duties was determined by the sacramental phrase: “God forbid to serve the great sovereign, and do not remove the sabers from the scabbard.”

The main opponents of the Moscow noble cavalry in the Battle of Konotop - Ukrainian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars, for whom war was actually a way of life - significantly surpassed it both in individual combat training and in first-class ability to act as a single whole as part of their units (hundreds) and units (regiments and Chambulov). As for the Moscow reytars and dragoons, more or less trained to fight in the ranks with firearms and edged weapons, according to the rules adopted in the 17th century. European tactical principles, then one by one these poorly trained cavalrymen (with the exception of some officers) fought even worse than the noble cavalry. In a word, the strength of the troops of Prince Trubetskoy near Konotop consisted primarily in large numbers and military experience, which, with successful leadership, could be turned into a guarantee of victory.

In March 1659, Prince Trubetskoy arrived with an army in Putivl, which for the time of the entire company became his main rear base. In a letter to the tsar, he reported on the performance in mid-January of Vygovsky with the Tatars, Poles and "Cherkasy" against the detachment of Prince Romodanovsky and the continuation of clashes, including near Kiev, which was under threat of attack. The message ended with the words: "... Cherkasy, sovereign, cannot be trusted, no matter what they say, they lie in everything." Vygovsky, in turn, did not agree to Trubetskoy's proposal for negotiations and continued to distribute a circular declaring war on Moscow and revealing its "treason" towards Ukraine. Thus, a decisive armed clash between the parties became inevitable.
Russian troops entered Ukrainian territory in March 1659. The first clash took place near the town of Sribne (Srebnoe), where the Moscow vanguard under the command of the brave and energetic cavalry commander Prince Semyon Pozharsky, according to the chronicle of Samuil Velichko, "without great labor, the city ... got the inhabitants of the local He cut down some of them, and took the others to the full ..., and smashed the Cossacks of the former Prilutsky regiment there ... so that their colonel Doroshenko himself, like a hare driven through the swamps there, ... escaped ... ". In itself, a secondary, this combat episode is important for understanding the course of the Battle of Konotop because S. Pozharsky, who led the Moscow troops directly involved in it, near Sribny won an easy victory over the supporters of Hetman Vyhovsky, and this subsequently caused him to underestimate the enemy.

On April 19, Trubetskoy's army laid siege to the city of Konotop, in which Nezhinsky and Chernigov regiments loyal to Vygovsky, led by Colonel G. Gulyanitsky, stubbornly defended themselves with the support of local residents. The siege lasted more than two months and was conducted by the Moscow governors according to all the rules of the military art of that time: with artillery bombardment, siege engineering work and repeated attacks, "in which ... the boyar Prince Trubetskoy spent a lot of people" . However, the situation of the besieged in Konotop in June became critical. Gulyanitsky, in his letter dated June 14, begs Hetman Vyhovsky to rush to his aid, warning that otherwise he will be forced to surrender the city in a week.
Probably, the delay of Trubetskoy near Konotop was due to political considerations - to demonstrate force to Ukraine, avoiding a general battle, but Hetman Vyhovsky used it exclusively for military purposes. During this time, he mobilized troops loyal to him and, most importantly, united with his main ally, the Crimean Khan Mohammed Giray IV.

Sources report that under the command of Vyhovsky there were 10 Cossack regiments; historians again disagree in determining their number, estimating it from 16 to 30 thousand people. Taking into account the fact that the Ukrainian Cossack regiment of that time averaged about 3 thousand fighters, the second figure looks more realistic. The Crimean Khan had about 30 thousand excellent cavalry troops, and to this should be added a significant part of the Polish mercenaries from the “division” of Andrzej Potocki, who also marched with the Cossacks and Tatars near Konotop. In a word, given the significant qualitative superiority of the Ukrainian-Tatar army (consisting of born warriors) over the Russian troops, Trubetskoy's numerical advantage (moreover, reduced by assaults and infectious diseases and desertion, inevitable in military camps of the 17th century, no longer looks so impressive.

On June 27, 1659, the combined forces of Vygovsky and the Crimean Khan approached Konotop. On their part, the battle that took place over the next three days really looks like a cunning operational-tactical combination worked out in advance. By successive blows and withdrawals of the Cossack cavalry, the Moscow troops were lured right to the place where they had organized a fatal ambush, and on the Sosnovka River, the Cossacks had previously built a dam and dug ditches to cut off the enemy's retreat with a water barrier. However, one should not indiscriminately blame Prince Trubetskoy for the fact that the enemy’s approach came as a complete surprise to him. The chronicles of Samovidets and Samuil Velichko contain information that on June 24, at the crossing to Konotop near Shapovalovka, the first skirmishes took place in which the Cossacks of Vygovsky “took the language, but the Moscow people did not get the language”. In addition, Vyhovsky himself, in a report about the battle, admits that, having launched a demonstrative attack on June 27 on the Russian camp, when crossing the Lipka River, “I found fifteen thousand Moscow there, harrowing the crossing.” Consequently, Trubetskoy expected an attack, undertook a search with reconnaissance detachments in the direction of the alleged approach of the enemy, and put up a strong barrier there. However, the Moscow governor could not unravel the enemy’s plan, and throughout the entire battle he was deluded about his strength, first underestimating it, and then overestimating it.
On June 27, the entire army of the Crimean Khan, half of the Cossack troops (probably the infantry, which at that time made up about 50% of the Ukrainian units and the Polish banners, hid in an ambush in the forests outside the village of Sosnovka; in front of them lay a lowland, on which it was planned to lure the enemy and flood Using the element of surprise, Hetman Vygovsky with the cavalry half of the Cossacks attacked the Moscow detachment of Prince Romodanovsky at the crossing, inflicted serious losses on him, drove away the horses grazing in the fields and retreated across the Sosnovka River. a flying detachment led by the most experienced cavalry commander, Prince Pozharsky, who was best suited for this task, as well as Prince Semyon Lvov and the governor Lev Lyapunov.Probably the latter two were deputies of the first.Sources attribute the performance of the Pozharsky detachment as early as June 28, i.e. there is this unit was not hastily assembled.In addition, the estimate of its composition of 5 thousand noble cavalry and 2 thousand Cossacks of the “mandatory” hetman Bespaly, found by a number of modern Russian authors, also seems to be underestimated. Based on source data, the forces of Prince Pozharsky look completely different. According to Samuil Velichko, the Moscow cavalry, chasing the Cossacks of Vyhovsky, amounted to "more than ten ("kіlkanadtsyat") thousand reytars and other good cavalry troops" . Contemporaries testify that in addition to the nobles and Cossacks, Pozharsky's cavalry included at least two regiments of the "new order" - Colonels William Johnson and Anz Georg Fanstrobel (who died in this battle). The presence of infantry in the Pozharsky detachment is not directly confirmed by sources; although the fact that the site of the main battle near Sosnovka is a little more than 10 km away from Konotop suggests that some foot contingents of the Moscow army could have reached the battlefield by June 29.
There is some confusion in the dating of the decisive events of the Battle of Konotop by sources, primarily the annals of Samovidets and Velichko. Based on the relation of I. Vyhovsky, we can distribute them as follows. Having moved out of the camp of the Russian army, Pozharsky's cavalry during the day on June 28 had several skirmishes with the Ukrainian Cossacks who were luring them, and then crossed the Sosnovka River along the bridge - i.e. exactly where Vygovsky and Mohammed Giray expected. It was at this stage that the Moscow governors made a fatal mistake. The presence of the main forces of the Crimean Tatar army nearby was undoubtedly assumed by them, and now it has received confirmation from the interrogations of the captured Cossacks. However, Prince Pozharsky, who was in a state of victorious euphoria, excusable for a young cavalryman, but not for a unit commander, clearly overestimated his strength. Contemporaries cite his arrogant and self-confident words: “Come on, honey! Let's kalga and Nuradin (sultans, sons of the khan - ed.)! ... We cut them all down and capture them! At the same time, as far as is known, he completely neglected reconnaissance and had no idea either about the real location of the enemy, or even about his engineering work on the Sosnovka River, which threatened the Moscow detachment with a real “konotop” (Ukrainian researchers deduce the name of the city precisely from the presence of vast swamps in its in turn, Prince Trubetskoy left the pursuit of Vygovsky entirely to Prince Pozharsky and did not bother to send infantry and artillery to reinforce his detachment, which would have made counter-offensive actions, if not Cossacks, then at least mounted Tatar Chambuls (regiments - approx. He considered Pozharsky's forces quite adequate to the task entrusted to them, possibly under the influence of the reports of the latter. And this at a time when the Russian military leaders could not help but know that luring the enemy by feigned retreat under attack (the so-called "Tatar dance ”or“ hertz ”is a common combat technique of Ukrainian Cossacks.

On June 29, the flying detachment of Prince Pozharsky, which the Cossacks of Vygovsky lured into the lowland between the village of Sosnovka and the river of the same name by a feigned retreat, came under attack by many times superior ambush Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian forces and was defeated. At the same time, Cossack "sappers" under the command of S. Gulyanitsky (brother of the colonel besieged in Konotop) destroyed the bridge and the dam in the rear of the Moscow cavalry; the spilled Sosnovka turned the path of Pozharsky's "military people" to retreat into a huge swamp. It is logical that the decisive role in the defeat of the Pozharsky detachment was played by the rifle and cannon fire of the ambush Cossack infantry and the rain of arrows that the Crimean Tatars showered on the Russian cavalry, following their favorite trick. Only when the enemy was completely upset did the troops of Vygovsky and Mohammed-Giray deal a decisive blow in cavalry formation with cold weapons; It was not difficult for the Cossacks and Tatars to cope with the demoralized and poorly trained Moscow riders for hand-to-hand combat. At this stage, probably, all three Moscow governors were captured - the princes Pozharsky and Lvov and Lyapunov, easily recognizable by their luxurious equipment and weapons. Obviously, against the flexible fighting style demonstrated by the Ukrainian-Tatar forces, the Russian governors and their subordinates were completely powerless; however, primarily not because of the archaism of Moscow's tactics, but because of the notorious "human factor" in the command and the low training of the troops.

The "Chronicle of the Seer" claims that the defeat of Pozharsky took place in just one hour, and this seems to be true. However, her statement that the losses of the Russian troops at the same time amounted to "twenty or thirty thousand people of his royal majesty" does not seem so plausible. The losses of the Russian cavalry, no doubt, were very heavy. However, sources from the Moscow side give a much more modest figure: “Total in Konotop in a big battle and on the withdrawal: the regiment of the boyar and voivode Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy with comrades of the Moscow rank, city nobles and boyar children, and newly baptized Murzas and Tatars, and Cossacks, and the Reiter ranks of the initial people and reiters, dragoons, soldiers and archers were beaten and 4769 people were caught in captivity. Of these, the losses of the Moscow category (of which the Pozharsky cavalry was mainly formed) amounted to 2873 people,
- Sevsky category - 774 people, Belgorod category - 829 people. These figures may be inaccurate or significantly underestimated, especially since the dead Bespaly Cossacks are not taken into account (only “Rylsky, Odoevsky, Don and Yaik Cossacks” are mentioned in the list of losses), and military leaders of all times and peoples hid their losses. But the difference with the tens of thousands offered by the Seer is still too great. Confirmation that part of the Pozharsky detachment still managed to escape from the trap near Sosnovka can be the ratio of losses and survivors among the "capital officials of the sovereign regiment" known on the basis of modern documents. Of these, 2 okolnichy (princes Pozharsky and Lvov), 1 steward, 3 solicitors, 79 Moscow nobles, 163 tenants died, and 717 people survived (including those subsequently redeemed from Tatar captivity). A rather high percentage of survivors among the "capital ranks" is explained by the fact that the nobles, who had the best horses, had more chances to escape during the retreat than, for example, the "thin" reytars and dragoons. As for the Ukrainian-Tatar losses during the defeat of Pozharsky, then, given the course of the battle, they could not be particularly great. The figures given by some Ukrainian authors of 4,000 Cossacks and 6,000 Tatars cannot be confirmed in the sources.
Undoubtedly, among the Moscow “military people” who survived at Sosnovka, there were both cowards who fled at the first sign of failure, and brave men who made their way through the enemy’s orders; but it is easy to imagine in what catastrophic tone both of them reported to Prince Trubetskoy about the defeat of the Pozharsky detachment. Although the Moscow governor had numerous fresh infantry and all artillery at his disposal, the Lipka River represented a convenient natural line of defense, where it was quite possible to stop Vygovsky and the Tatars, and the exhausted defenders of Konotop (who remained in the ranks no more than one and a half thousand would hardly have decided in such conditions for a deep sortie, Trubetskoy prematurely considered the battle lost.

He hurriedly broke camp and began to retreat with the army in the direction of Putivl, which, according to the Polish participant in the battle R. Peglasevich, "amazed everyone." The persecution, organized by the Ukrainian-Tatar troops, was not successful: the Moscow governor, who did not show himself in the best way near Konotop, conducted the retreat very successfully. Its units moved, hiding behind a “walk-city” made up of wagons, dug in at halts and repelled all attacks of the enemy cavalry with dense artillery fire. According to Samuil Velichko, on July 10 they "entered Putivl without great damage." This mobile fighting retreat is a much more complex way of fighting than defending in prepared positions. If the Moscow army had remained near Konotop, it would most likely have fought off the enemy with even greater ease. It will not be a mistake to say that Trubetskoy is to blame for the fact that the Battle of Konotop turned out to be a defeat for the Moscow troops, to an even greater extent than Pozharsky, although he acted more adequately.

The last tragic chord of the battle was the well-known execution of the captive Prince Pozharsky, whom the Crimean Khan ordered to be hacked to death for impudent speeches and spitting in the eyes. It can be assumed that, realizing his responsibility for the defeat, the Russian governor deliberately provoked Mohammed Giray - spectacular death to some extent atoned for his guilt in the eyes of his contemporaries. But the assertion that all the prisoners were killed together with Pozharsky Crimeans is probably far from the truth. Recall that the second prince - Semyon Lvov - later died in captivity from an illness (possibly due to wounds received in battle), and among the "capital officials" who received the honorary name "Konotop Regiment" in Moscow, a few years later there were redeemed from Crimean captivity . The Tatars who fought for the sake of booty had no reason to destroy prisoners for whom it was possible to get a ransom. However, the fate of the simple “military people” captured by them at Sosnovka could well turn out to be the most tragic: not being able to drive them to the Crimea at the height of the campaign, the Tatars, most likely, really massacred them.
The psychological effect of the defeat at Konotop for the Muscovite state was undoubtedly extremely negative. “In a sad dress, Alexei Mikhailovich went out to the people, and horror attacked Moscow,” writes S. M. Solovyov. The main reason for this seems to be really very heavy losses suffered in the battle by the well-born Moscow nobility. After studying the most famous genealogical books of noble families, modern Russian researchers managed to compile a general list of representatives of noble noble families who died in the battle of Konotop. Among them are the princes Volkonsky, Ukhtomsky and Vyazemsky, Neledinsky, Velyaminov-Zernov; moreover, in many cases, the father and son, or several brothers, died. It can be admitted that after Konotop such a strong noble militia "the Tsar of Moscow was no longer able to lead into the field"; although the combat value of the local cavalry should not be exaggerated. However, it is hardly logical to link the work begun in August 1659 to strengthen the fortifications of Moscow with a real fear of an invasion by Vygovsky and the Tatars.
From a military point of view, the Battle of Kontop was an impressive victory for Vygovsky and the Crimean Khan over the Moscow governors. Through the use of feigned retreat, ambush and engineering on the ground, they demonstrated complete tactical superiority over the enemy, who actually played by their rules throughout the battle. The Ukrainian and Tatar cavalry skillfully used their advantage over the poorly trained and heterogeneous cavalry units of Pozharsky. The combat mission of lifting the siege of Konotop and forcing the Russian troops to retreat was completed in full. However, the defeat of Trubetskoy cannot be considered complete. The main body of his army remained intact; moreover, having made a successful retreat with battles to Putivl, they showed that they had not lost their combat capability. The battle confirmed the ability of the Moscow "military people" mentioned more than once by contemporaries after the defeat to re-engage in battle, "without losing heart". The losses of the Russian troops near Konotop were undoubtedly very sensitive, but by no means huge. Recalling the experience of the Ukrainian uprising against the Commonwealth in 1648-56, we can say that, compared with the brilliant victories of the Cossack army near Zhovti Vody, Pilyavtsy and Batogh, the Battle of Konotop looks like a rather ordinary success, half of which, moreover, belongs to the allies - Tatars.
The impact of this battle on the course of further struggle in Ukraine should not be overestimated either. The Moscow garrisons in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities (with the exception of Romny resisted. Vyhovsky’s attempt to undertake a joint campaign with the khan “to the land of Moscow for prey and to waste” was neutralized by a raid of the Cossacks led by Yuri Khmelnitsky on the Crimea, after which the khan and a half burdened with trophies troops turned back. However, it is unlikely that, with the main enemy forces in the rear, Vygovsky and Mohammed-Girey, in any case, would have decided on a deep invasion on the southwestern borders of the Muscovite state. Trubetskoy, in turn, soon resumed active combat and It is significant that Vyhovsky's victory at Konotop did not inspire confidence in his supporters, and in August-September 1659 the hetman faced such a large-scale transition of the Cossacks from his camp to the pro-Moscow one that a little more than two months after the battle he resigned Hetman's powers (Bila Tserkva Rada) All this makes it possible to characterize the battle of Konotop not as one of the greatest, but as one of the most fruitless victories in the history of Ukraine.

On October 17, 1659, the Cossack Rada in Bila Tserkva finally approved Yury Khmelnytsky as the new hetman of the Cossacks. Vyhovsky was forced to abdicate and officially transfer the hetman's kleinods to Khmelnytsky.

At the Rada, the entire Zaporizhzhya Army "became under its Great Sovereign by the autocratic hand in eternal allegiance as before." Vygovsky fled to Poland, where he was later executed on charges of treason - a natural end for a traitor.

E.G. Fedoseev

On July 8, 1659, the Battle of Konotop began - one of the most controversial episodes in history. In Ukraine, it is called the victory of the Ukrainian army over the Russian. For Russian historians, this battle is only an episode of the Russian-Polish war, overshadowed by the internecine strife of the Cossacks.

Split

Trouble and discord in the Hetmanate appeared even under Bohdan Khmelnitsky. In particular, discord emerged after the union treaty with Charles X, which the hetman concluded in 1656. According to the agreement, Khmelnitsky undertook to send 12,000 Cossacks to help the Swedish king for the war with Poland, with which shortly before this the Moscow Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich made peace. The hetman himself supported this peace.
Ivan Vyhovsky, who received hetmanship after the death of Khmelnytsky, turned out to be a much more controversial figure. If he still found support among the right-bank Cossacks, then he was clearly unpopular among the left-bank Cossacks. The split, which was geographically marked by the line of the Dnieper, determined two vectors: the first one, with Hetman Vyhovsky, was oriented towards Poland, and the second, with Hetman Bespaly, towards the Muscovite state.

Invasion or appeasement?

Against the background of the struggle for power in the Hetmanate, as well as the raids of the Cossacks of Vyhovsky and the Crimean Tatars on the border Russian fortresses, Alexei Mikhailovich intended to persuade the hetman to peace. But after unsuccessful attempts to negotiate, the Moscow tsar decides to send an army under the voivodeship of Alexei Trubetskoy to establish order in the troubled lands.

This is where cardinal disagreements with Ukrainian historiography begin, which calls the campaign of the Russian army nothing more than an invasion of Ukraine and interference in the internal political affairs of another state.
Were there grounds for a military campaign? According to the “Chronology of the highly glorious clairvoyant hetmans”: “This Vygovsky, in his love of power, betrayed the Russian state and gave many cities, towns, villages and villages of the Little Russian Horde for plunder.”

What for Moscow was a threat to the security of the southern borders, in the eyes of Ukrainian historians, is only a manifestation of the desire for national self-determination.
Tatyana Tairova-Yakovleva, director of the St. Petersburg Center for the Study of the History of Ukraine, takes a rather balanced approach to assessing the confrontation: “The essence of the conflict was in the degree of autonomy of the Ukrainian hetmanate and in the desire of Russian governors to expand their powers there.”

son against father

Vyhovsky twice swore allegiance to the Russian Tsar, and twice cheated on him. Ultimately, in September 1658, the hetman signed the Gadyach peace treaty with Poland, according to which Little Russia was to become part of the Commonwealth again. At the same time, an alliance is concluded with the Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray. Now, in the person of strong neighbors, Vyhovsky had a good help in confronting Moscow.

The chronicler Samoilo Velichko then wrote: “Vyhovsky leaned back to the Poles, bringing a great conclusion to Ukraine Little Russia, many rebellions, bloodshed and extreme ruin.” According to some estimates, in the first year of the new hetman's rule, Ukraine lost about 50,000 inhabitants.

Even in the camp of his associates, the detachment of Ivan Gulyanitsky, who defended Konotop from Trubetskoy's troops, they were dissatisfied with Vyhovsky's policy. And the Little Russian Cossacks with Hetman Bespaly sided with the Russian Tsar. “A terrible Babylonian pandemonium… One place is fighting against another, a son against a father, a father against a son,” wrote an eyewitness of what was happening.
In the battle with the Moscow army, Vyhovsky used "coalition forces", which included Poles, Lithuanians, Germans, Crimean Tatars and his own regiments. To prepare for the battle, Vyhovsky spent a million rubles inherited from Khmelnitsky.

Adventure or trap?

The key episode of the Konotop battle was the defeat of the cavalry led by Pozharsky and Lvov near the Sosnovka River. The Russian cavalry, carried away by the pursuit of Cossack detachments and German dragoons, was surrounded by the many thousands of Tatar troops of Mehmed Giray and almost completely destroyed.
However, it is not known for certain whether this was an unforgivable adventure on the part of the Russian commanders, which allowed the detachment to go deep behind enemy lines and get bogged down in soft river sand, or whether it was a trick by Vygovsky, who lured the Russian army into a death trap. Few managed to break out of the encirclement.

Side forces

Ukrainian and Russian data on the number of troops on both sides differ greatly. The former claim that a 100,000, and according to some sources, a 150,000 army of Muscovites invaded Ukrainian lands. In particular, these data are taken from the works of the Russian historian Sergei Solovyov, who cited similar figures.

According to Solovyov, the losses of the Russian troops were tangible - about 30 thousand. But the Ukrainian historian Yuriy Mytsyk determines an even greater number of deaths. In his opinion, "then 50 thousand of the colors of the Moscow cavalry lay down on the battlefield as corpses."
True, in the calculations of Ukrainian researchers, obvious inconsistencies periodically slip through. So, Igor Syundyukov writes that the Tatars came from the rear and were able to "surround the royal army, divide it into separate detachments and completely defeat it."

At the same time, the author counts at least 70 thousand people in the Russian army, and according to his data, Vygovsky had “16 thousand soldiers plus 30-35 thousand Tatar cavalry” at his disposal. It is hard to imagine that a 70,000-strong army was surrounded and completely defeated by detachments whose number barely exceeded 50,000.
Russian historians, in particular N.V. Smirnov, notice that Moscow could not muster an army of 100-150 thousand people, otherwise the Russian state would have to send all its troops to Ukraine and even more. According to the Discharge Order, the total number of military people in 1651 was 133,210 people.

The following data appear in Russian historiography: the Moscow army with the Cossacks of Hetman Bespaly did not exceed 35 thousand people, and from the "coalition forces" there were approximately 55-60 thousand. The losses of the Russian army amounted to 4769 warriors (mainly the cavalry of Pozharsky and Lvov) and 2000 Cossacks. The enemy, according to Russian historians, lost from 3,000 to 6,000 Tatars and 4,000 Cossacks.

Historical metamorphoses

In March 2008, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree to celebrate the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop. In particular, he instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to consider renaming streets, avenues and squares in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Konotop. The same instruction was given to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Administration.
Yushchenko called the Battle of Konotop "one of the biggest and most glorious victories of Ukrainian weapons." However, the comments of high-ranking officials do not explain who was defeated, and what they mean by "Ukrainian weapons."

The decree caused quite a strong public outcry, both in Ukraine itself and in Russia. To “bewilderment and regret” from Moscow, Kyiv replied that the celebration of historical dates is an internal issue of Ukraine.
Historian Dmitry Kornilov sees this as an attempt by Ukrainian politicians to once again “kick Russia”, and the assessment of the role of the Russian state in that tragic conflict is of secondary importance.

“Practically none of the historians wants to admit an absolutely indisputable fact: the Ukrainian people simply did not want to betray Moscow, the people were faithful to the decisions of the Pereyaslav Rada,” the researcher notes. The unpleasant fact of the division of Ukrainian society into "anti-Moscow" and "pro-Moscow" parties, historians and politicians of Ukraine continue to bypass.

Battle of Konotop- armed clash in 1659, one of the episodes of the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667. It happened not far from the city of Konotop, near the village of Sosnovka, between the Russian army of Prince Trubetskoy and the Cossacks of the Ukrainian hetman Vyhovsky, who acted in alliance with the Crimean Tatars and Poles, as well as with foreign mercenaries. In the battle, the Russian cavalry was defeated, after which the main forces of Trubetskoy had to lift the siege of Konotop. The consequence of the events near Konotop was the strengthening of opposition to Vyhovsky and the defeat of the latter in the political struggle.

background

The Battle of Konotop took place during the period, which in Ukrainian historiography is usually called "Ruin" (Ukrainian "Ruina"). This period, which began almost immediately after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, is characterized by a civil war in most of the territory of present-day Ukraine, during which the warring parties turned to the neighbors of the Hetmanate for help, which led to intervention by Russia, the Commonwealth and the Crimean Khanate.

The prerequisites for an armed civil conflict in the Hetmanate were laid back under Bogdan Khmelnitsky, who, after the peace between Alexei Mikhailovich and Jan II Casimir in 1656, concluded an alliance treaty with King Charles X of Sweden and Prince Yuriy Rakocha of Semigrad. According to this agreement, Khmelnitsky sent 12 thousand Cossacks to help the allies against Poland.

After the death of Khmelnitsky, in the beginning of the turmoil, Yuri Khmelnitsky became the hetman, with the support of the Russian state. A little later, in an atmosphere of sharp contradictions, Ivan Vyhovsky (Korsun Rada October 21, 1657) was finally elected hetman of the Hetmanate, who concluded the Gadyach Treaty with the Commonwealth in 1658, openly taking the side of Poland and Lithuania in the Russian-Polish war. To attract Mehmed IV Giray to his side, he had to swear allegiance to the Crimean Khan.

Chronicle of the Seer:
“... with all the foremen, and the colonels and centurions with all the rabble swore to the Khan of Crimea on that, if he did not retreat, there the Khan with the sultans and the mustache Murzas swore by the Cossack, if they did not retreat in that war, like they would hit with wax Moscow."

The course of the battle

The battle was preceded by the siege of the Konotop fortress by the royal army. On June 29, 1659, the Cossack hetman Ivan Vygovsky (25 thousand troops), together with the Tatars of Mehmed IV Giray (30 thousand) and the Poles of Andrei Pototsky (3.8 thousand), defeated the cavalry of Semyon Pozharsky and Semyon Lvov (from 20 to 30 thousand) and the suburban Cossacks of the Hetman Ivan Bespaly (2 thousand). After the feigned retreat of the Cossacks of Vygovsky, who lured the detachment of Pozharsky and Lvov to a swampy place, the Tatars unexpectedly struck from an ambush and defeated the Russian cavalry. Both governors were taken prisoner, where Lvov died of his wounds, and Pozharsky was executed for spitting in the face of the Crimean Khan. Mehmed-Girey and Vygovsky staged a mass execution of all the prisoners.

An attempt by the Tatars to develop success and attack Trubetskoy's army, which was besieging Konotop, was thwarted by the actions of Russian artillery. At the same time, with the appearance of a strong Polish-Tatar grouping in the rear of Trubetskoy, the strategic situation in the Konotop region changed. Further besieging Konotop, having a numerous enemy in the rear, became meaningless. Trubetskoy decided to make a breakthrough. According to the reconstruction of events done by the military historian V. Kargalov, voivode Aleksey Trubetskoy applied the tactics of a walk-city: he ordered the troops to move in a ring of carts, which, having closed, formed a kind of mobile fortress. Under the cover of a convoy, foot soldiers with rifle and cannon fire repulsed the assaults of the Tatar cavalry, and detachments of the noble cavalry counterattacked from the openings between the carts of the Tatars. As a result, regiments of soldiers, reiters and noble cavalry crossed in perfect order to the right side of the Seim and took refuge in the Putivl fortress.

Losses

According to the Cossack "Chronicle of the Self-Watcher" of the 17th century, Trubetskoy's losses in the Konotop clash and during the retreat amounted to 20 to 30 thousand people. According to Russian archival data, “In total, in Konotop, in a big battle and on the withdrawal: the regiment of the boyar and governor, Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy, with comrades of the Moscow rank, city nobles and boyar children, and newly baptized Murzas and Tatars, and Cossacks, and the Reitarsky ranks of the initial people and reytar, dragoons, soldiers and archers were beaten and 4761 people were caught in full. According to S.M. Solovyov, only more than 5 thousand prisoners were captured.
“The flower of the Moscow cavalry, who served the happy campaigns of 1654 and 1655, died in one day, and never after that the Tsar of Moscow could lead such a brilliant army into the field. In mourning clothes, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich went out to the people and horror seized Moscow ... "

Two roundabouts died or were executed after the battle: S.R. Pozharsky, S.P. Lvov, steward E.A. Buturlin, 3 attorneys: M.G. Sonin, I.V. Izmailov, Ya.G. Krekshin, 79 Moscow nobles and 164 residents. There are 249 "Moscow officials" in total. Semyon Pozharsky, on the orders of the Khan, was executed at his headquarters. As S. Velichko writes about this, Pozharsky, “inflamed with anger, scolded the khan according to the Moscow custom and spat between his eyes. For this, the khan became furious and ordered to immediately cut off the head of the prince in front of him.

Meaning and consequences of the battle

The immediate consequence of the clash at Konotop was the fall of the political authority of the rebellious hetman Vyhovsky, the legitimacy of his election to the post of hetman after the death of Bohdan Khmelnitsky was initially in doubt. Actually, the battle near Konotop was an attempt by military measures to strengthen the political and personal power of Vyhovsky, which the population of the Left-Bank Ukraine refused to recognize. The result was just the opposite. Immediately after the retreat of Trubetskoy to Putivl, peasant and urban uprisings broke out in Ukraine. Popular anger was fueled by the actions of the Crimean Tatars, allied with Vyhovsky, who shamelessly plundered Ukrainian settlements, took women and children into slavery. Almost simultaneously with the development of events around Konotop, the Zaporizhzhya ataman Ivan Serko attacked the Nogai uluses. And at the beginning of the year, the Don Cossacks organized an ambush on the Samara River, which begins on the territory of modern Donbass, and cut the road to a three thousandth detachment of Tatars, led by Kayabey, who was in a hurry to join Vygovsky. All these events forced the Crimean Khan to leave Vygovsky and leave with the main forces for the Crimea. Soon, Poltava, pacified by Vyhovsky in the previous year, joined the cities of Romny, Gadyach, and Lokhvitsa that had rebelled against Vyhovsky. Some clerics opposed Vyhovsky: Maxim Filimonovich, an archpriest from Nizhyn, and Semyon Adamovich, an archpriest from Ichny. By September 1659, the oath to the "white tsar" was taken by: Colonel Ivan Yekimovich of Kiev, Timofey Tsetsyura of Pereyaslavl, Anikey Silin of Chernigov.

Very soon, the Cossacks of the Kyiv, Pereyaslov and Chernihiv regiments, as well as the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks under the command of Ivan Sirko, nominated a new hetman - Yuri Khmelnitsky. At the Cossack Rada in the town of Garmanovtsy near Kiev, a new hetman was elected. In Garmanovtsy, the ambassadors of Vyhovsky, Sulima and Vereshchak were hacked to death, who had signed the Gadyach Treaty a little earlier (an agreement between Vyhovsky and the Poles that provoked the military campaign of 1659). Vyhovsky fled with gladness in Garmanovtsy. In October 1659, the Cossack Rada in Bila Tserkva finally approved Yuri Khmelnytsky as the new hetman of Ukraine. Vyhovsky was forced to abdicate and officially transfer the hetman's kleinods to Khmelnytsky. Soon Vyhovsky fled to Poland, where he was subsequently executed.

After the next election of Yuri Khmelnitsky, in 1659 he signed a new treaty with the Russian kingdom, which, due to the betrayal of Vyhovsky, significantly limited the power of the hetmans.

The Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667, an episode of which was the Battle of Konotop, eventually ended with the Andrusovo truce, which led to the division of the Hetmanate along the Dnieper into the Right-Bank and Left-Bank. This was a consequence of the split and the legal consolidation of realities in the Hetmanate itself, since the main part of the Cossacks on the Left Bank wanted to join the Russian state, while on the Right Bank, pro-Polish aspirations prevailed.

The controversy between the Foreign Ministry of Russia and Ukraine

On June 10, 2008, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed "perplexity and regret" at Ukraine's desire to celebrate the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop. The Russian Foreign Ministry considers this event just "a bloody battle due to another betrayal of another hetman."

The head of the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Vasily Kyrylych, said that the celebration of historical dates, including the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop, is an exclusively internal issue of Ukraine.

Memorial complex in memory of the Battle of Konotop

February 22, 2008 in the village of Shapovalovka, Konotop district, Sumy region, a cross and a chapel were installed on the site of the Konotop battle. On the same day, a museum exposition "The History of the Battle of Konotop in 1659" was opened there.

As part of the preparations for the celebration of the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop, the Ukrainian authorities announced an open competition for the best design proposal for the creation of a historical and memorial complex of Cossack honor and valor in the city of Konotop and in the village of Shapovalivka.

On March 11, 2008, President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree on the celebration of the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop.

In the same decree, Viktor Yushchenko instructed the Council of Ministers of Crimea and the Sevastopol city administration to study the issue of renaming streets, avenues, squares and military units in honor of the heroes of the battle of Konotop. In a long list of holiday events

Especially for Crimea.Realities

Proponents of the concept of “we are one people” and “we have nothing to share” have spilled a lot of ink trying to convince us that the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a misunderstanding. Like, this is “America is trying to quarrel the fraternal peoples,” and ordinary people are far from politics. One of the arguments of this campaign is the thesis that, they say, Russians and Ukrainians lived together for 350 years and did not quarrel, but shoulder to shoulder fought off the attacks of evil foreigners. In fact, this is all nonsense, and the Ukrainians fought with the Russians not much less often than with the rest of their neighbors, and the supposedly “common house” did not interfere with this. We will remember today about the brightest episode of one of these wars - the battle near Konotop on July 8 (June 28, old style), 1659.

It is not true that during the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, there was peace and quiet in Russian-Ukrainian relations and God's grace. Friction between the elders and the boyars right in front of the Pereyaslav Rada almost ruined the planned union of the two states. The Kievan clergy had no regard for the Moscow ones. Cossacks more than once or twice grappled with archers with sabers in the Lvov region and in Belarus. In short, the ground for the next Russian-Ukrainian war was prepared.

Ukraine became the third full-fledged subject of the federal Rzeczpospolita, and retained all social and national freedoms. Moscow could not bear it.

After the death of Khmelnytsky in 1657, Ivan Vyhovsky, a man of outstanding intelligence and subtle political talent, became the hetman of Ukraine. Using the disappointment of the Cossacks from a long fruitless war with the Poles and dissatisfaction with the Moscow order, he managed to turn the steering wheel of foreign policy 180 degrees. Part of the Cossacks did not like this, and in the spring of 1658 a pro-Russian revolt broke out on the Left Bank, suppressed by Vyhovsky. Having strengthened his position, the hetman continued moving on a new course and in the autumn he was able to conclude the Gadyach Union with Poland and Lithuania. By agreement, Ukraine became the third full-fledged subject of the federal Rzeczpospolita, and retained all the social and national freedoms won by Khmelnitsky. Obviously, Moscow could not tolerate this.

Even before the conclusion of the union, the troops of the hetman's brother - Danila Vyhovsky - besieged the Russian garrison in Kyiv, but they could not drive it out of the city. In autumn, the Belgorod governor Grigory Romodanovsky made a series of attacks on Ukraine, and the Cossacks who opposed the hetman joined him. Several cities were burned. Unable to start a war at that moment, Vyhovsky asked for peace, and received it. But at the end of the year, having accepted help from Poland and the Crimea, the hetman himself attacked the Russian troops. At the same time, hostilities were unfolding in Belarus - the tsarist governors besieged the cities defended by the Cossacks. The Crimean cavalry made raids along the Russian border. In general, a big war was unavoidable.

At the end of March 1659, Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy moved his army against Hetman Vyhovsky. Fruitless negotiations on the border continued for a month, after which the Russian army entered the Hetmanate. Her path was blocked by the small fortress of Konotop, defended, however, by a fanatical colonel Grigory Gulyanitsky.

On April 30, Trubetskoy laid siege to Konotop and waited for reinforcements. Nine days later, the Russians went on the attack, but despite the overwhelming superiority in manpower and artillery, the city was not taken. Not wanting to take any more risks, Trubetskoy proceeded to the siege and at the same time sent out detachments to burn down neighboring towns.

By the beginning of June, the food in Konotop was over, and the morale of the defenders had fallen. The Cossacks began to desert, and the townspeople began to rebel. There were threats to open the gates to Russian troops. But help was already on the way.

Vygovsky had few forces of his own, only 10 colonels with 16 thousand Cossacks turned out to be loyal to him and able to go on a campaign. They were joined by up to one and a half thousand soldiers - Polish allies and European mercenaries. It was not possible to defeat the Russians with such forces.

Once again, the hopeless situation was saved by the Crimean Khanate. Ruler Mehmed Giray IV at the head of 30,000 troops came to the aid of Hetman Vyhovsky

To this day, there are disputes about how many troops Trubetskoy brought with him, an unrealistic 150 and even a fantastic 300 thousand people were called, in reality everything was much more modest. A little more than 30 thousand soldiers arrived from the Moscow kingdom, and 7 thousand pro-Moscow Cossacks of Ivan Bezpaly joined them on the spot.

But once again the hopeless situation was saved by the Crimean Khanate. Ruler Mehmed Giray IV at the head of 30,000 troops came to the aid of Hetman Vyhovsky. Thanks to this, the Allied forces outnumbered the Russian army, but Trubetskoy did not notice this and did not retreat.

On the morning of July 8, the Crimean cavalry attacked the guard patrols around the camps of Trubetskoy's army and retreated beyond the Sosnovka River. In pursuit of them, 4,000 selected Moscow cavalry of Prince Semyon Pozharsky and 2,000 Bespaly Cossacks were sent. The main forces with artillery remained to besiege Konotop.

Behind the crossing through Sosnovka stood Nureddin Adil Gerai with his detachment and mercenaries. Pozharsky crossed the river, attacked the Crimeans and overturned them with unexpected ease. However, inspired by the first victory, the prince did not realize that he had fallen into a trap prepared in advance.

As soon as the entire Russian-Cossack detachment was on the other side, at a considerable distance from the crossing, the entire khan's army came out of the ambush and destroyed the enemy with one swift blow. As the chronicler noted, "hardly the one who had a winged horse escaped."

Up to 5 thousand Russians under the command of Grigory Romodanovsky dug in near the crossing to prevent the victorious Crimean-Ukrainian army from going to the other side - to the camps, but everything was useless. The Cossacks stormed the crossing, and the Crimean cavalry began to bypass the Russian troops from the rear. Not wanting to be surrounded, Romodanovsky withdrew.

All the next day on July 9, Vygovsky besieged Trubetskoy's camp, and at night, not wanting to let the enemy leave, he went on an assault. But the advantage of Russian artillery did not allow this plan to be realized. After an unsuccessful attack, a two-day lull was established between the parties. On July 12, Trubetskoy lifted the siege of Konotop and retreated. Cossacks and Crimeans tried twice more to defeat the Russians, but to no avail. July 14-16, 1659, the defeated army returned home.

On the day of the decisive battle and during the retreat, Trubetskoy lost up to 5 thousand people killed and captured, Bespaly - 2 thousand Cossacks. Vygovsky on the first day was left without a thousand Cossacks and 3 thousand Crimeans, and unsuccessful assaults on the enemy camp cost him another 3 thousand Cossacks.

But the psychological effect of the victory was amazing. As the eminent Russian historian Sergei Solovyov later wrote about this:

Never after that was the Tsar of Moscow in a position to lead such a strong militia into the field.

Sergei Solovyov

“The color of the Moscow cavalry, who made happy campaigns in the 54th and 55th years, a fold in one day! Never after that was the Tsar of Moscow in a position to lead such a strong militia into the field. In a sad dress, Alexei Mikhailovich went out to the people, and horror attacked Moscow. The blow was the heavier, the more unexpected; he followed such brilliant successes! Trubetskoy, on whom there was the most hope, "a reverent and graceful man, happy in the army and terrible to enemies," ruined such a huge army! After the capture of so many cities, after the capture of the capital of Lithuania, the reigning city trembled for its own safety: in August, according to the sovereign's decree, people of all ranks hurried to earthworks to strengthen Moscow. The tsar himself with the boyars was often present at the work; the surrounding residents with their families and belongings filled Moscow, and there was a rumor that the sovereign was leaving for the Volga, for Yaroslavl.

But as often happened in Ukrainian history, the hetman could not take advantage of the fruits of victory. The intrigues of the colonels and the money of Moscow did what the Russian army could not. At the end of the year at the Rada, Vyhovsky renounced the mace, and the Cossacks once again became subjects of the Moscow Tsar.

The views expressed in the "Opinion" section convey the point of view of the authors themselves and do not always reflect the position of the editors