June 22 declassified documents. The Ministry of Defense declassified and published documents about the first days of the war

Declassified documents about the first days of the war: directives of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) of the USSR (including a copy of Directive No. 1 of June 22, 1941), orders and reports of commanders of military units and formations, orders on awards, trophy maps and decrees of the country's leadership.

On June 22, 1941, a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Semyon Timoshenko was transmitted from Moscow. A few hours earlier, soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant’s office detained a German soldier of the 221st regiment of the 15th Wehrmacht Infantry Division, Alfred Liskov, who swam across the border Bug River. He was taken to the city of Vladimir-Volynsky, where during interrogation he said that at dawn on June 22, the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information was passed on to higher command. ​

Directive text:

“I convey to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies the order of the People's Commissar of Defense for immediate execution:

1. During June 22-23, 1941, a surprise attack by the Germans on the fronts of the Leningrad Military District (Leningrad Military District - RBC), PribOVO (Baltic Special Military District, transformed into the North-Western Front. - RBC), ZapOVO (Western Special Military District, transformed into the Western Front. - RBC), KOVO (Kiev Special Military District, transformed into the Southwestern Front - RBC), OdVO (Odessa Military District - RBC). An attack may begin with provocative actions.
2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
3. I order:

• ​during the night of June 22, 1941, secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
• before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse all aviation, including military aviation, to field airfields, carefully camouflage it;
• Bring all units to combat readiness without additional increase in assigned personnel. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects.

​No other activities will be carried out without special orders.”

The directive was signed by the commander of the Western Front troops Dmitry Pavlov, the chief of staff of the Western Front Vladimir Klimovskikh, and a member of the Military Council of the Western Front Alexander Fominykh.

In July, Pavlov, Klimovskikh, the chief of communications of the Western Front, Major General Andrei Grigoriev, and the commander of the 4th Army, Major General Alexander Korobkov, were accused of inaction and the collapse of command and control, which led to a breakthrough of the front, and were sentenced by the Supreme Court of the USSR to death. The sentence was put into effect in July 1941. After Stalin's death they were rehabilitated.

Text of the order:

“To the Military Councils of LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO.

On June 22, 1941, at 4 o'clock in the morning, German aircraft, without any reason, raided our airfields along the western border and bombed them. At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border.

In connection with the unprecedented attack on the Soviet Union by Germany, I order..."<...>

<...>“The troops are to attack enemy forces with all their might and means and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border.

In the future, until further notice from ground troops, do not cross the border.

Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the concentration areas of enemy aircraft and the grouping of their ground forces.”<...>

<...>“Using powerful strikes from bomber and attack aircraft, destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb the main groupings of its ground forces. Air strikes should be carried out to a depth of 100-150 km on German territory.

Bomb Koenigsberg (today Kaliningrad. - RBC) and Memel (a naval base and port on the territory of Lithuania. - RBC).

Do not carry out raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions are given.”

Signatures: Timoshenko, Malenkov (Georgy Malenkov - member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. - RBC), Zhukov (Georgy Zhukov - Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. - RBC).

“Comrade Vatutin (Nikolai Vatutin - Zhukov’s first deputy. - RBC). Bomb Romania."

Trophy card "Plan Barbarossa"

In 1940-1941 Germany developed a plan for an attack on the USSR, involving a “blitzkrieg war.” The plan and operation were named after the King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I "Barbarossa".

From a brief combat history of the 158th Fighter Aviation Regiment with a description of the exploits of junior lieutenants Kharitonov and Zdorovtsev

The first soldiers to be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the war were pilots Pyotr Kharitonov and Stepan Zdorovtsev. On June 28, on their I-16 fighters, for the first time during the defense of Leningrad, they used ramming attacks against German aircraft. On July 8 they were awarded titles.

Kharitonov's action schemes

After the war, Pyotr Kharitonov continued to serve in the Air Force. He graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1953 and went into the reserves in 1955. He lived in Donetsk, where he worked at the headquarters of the city's Civil Defense.

Scheme of action of Zdorovtsev

After receiving the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on July 8, 1941, Zdorovtsev flew out on July 9 for reconnaissance. On the way back, near Pskov, he entered into battle with German fighters. His plane was shot down and Zdorovtsev died.

Western Special Military District. Intelligence report No. 2

On June 22, 1941, the 99th Infantry Division was stationed in the Polish city of Przemysl, which was one of the first to be captured by German troops. On June 23, units of the division managed to recapture part of the city and restore the border.

“Intelligence report No. 2 headquarters (division headquarters. - RBC) 99 Boratich forest (village in Lviv region. - RBC) 19:30 June 22, 1941

The enemy crosses the San River (a tributary of the Vistula, flowing through the territory of Ukraine and Poland. - RBC) in the Baric area, occupied Stubenko (a settlement in Poland. - RBC) to an infantry battalion. Up to the infantry battalion is occupied by Gurechko (a village on the territory of Ukraine. - RBC), small equestrian groups at 16:00 appeared in Kruwniki (a settlement in Poland. - RBC). At 13:20 the enemy occupied the Przemysl hospital with unknown numbers.

Congestion of up to an infantry regiment on the opposite bank of the San River in the Vyshatce area. Accumulation of infantry/small groups/1 km south of Gurechko.

At 16:00 the artillery battalion was under fire from the Dusovce area (a village in Poland. - RBC). At 19:30, up to three battalions of large-caliber artillery fired at the town of Medyka (a village in Poland. - RBC) from the districts of Majkovce, Dunkovicky, Vypatce.

Conclusions: on the Grabovets-Przemysl front there is more than one infantry division (infantry division. - RBC), reinforced with artillery/unspecified numbers.

Presumably the main enemy group is on the right flank of the division.

It is necessary to establish: enemy action in front of the right [inaudible] division.

Printed in 5 copies."

Signatures: Chief of Staff of the 99th Infantry Division, Colonel Gorokhov, Head of the Intelligence Department, Captain Didkovsky.

This is how the war began
The Ministry of Defense has published declassified archival documents about the events of June 22, 1941

On the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense appeared a new section dedicated to the events of June 22, 1941 - the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. It presents archival documents with memories of Soviet military leaders, eyewitnesses of the events of June 22, 1941, and a chronicle of the first days of the USSR war against Germany. All published data was obtained from declassified funds of the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense. More archives and secrets of the Second World War and

___

In 1952, a group was created in the Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky, which began developing a description of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

For a more complete and objective presentation of the events of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, questions were formulated relating to the period of deployment of troops of the Baltic, Kiev and Belarusian special military districts according to the “State Border Defense Plan of 1941” on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

1.

2.

Five main issues were identified:

1. Was the plan for the defense of the state border communicated to the troops as it relates to them? If this plan was communicated to the troops, then when and what was done by the command and troops to ensure the implementation of this plan.

2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to enter the state border and how many of them were deployed to defend the border before the start of hostilities.

3. When the order was received to put troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22. What and when instructions were given to the troops in pursuance of this order and what was done.

4. Why most of the artillery of corps and divisions was in training camps.

5. To what extent was the unit’s headquarters prepared for command and control of troops and to what extent did this affect the course of operations in the first days of the war.
_______

The assignments were sent to the commanders of districts, armies, corps and division commanders who were in charge in the first days of the war.

_______

3.

— “The grouping of fascist German troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region in the last days before the war was known to the district headquarters quite fully and in a significant part of it and in detail.

The uncovered grouping of fascist German troops on the eve of hostilities was regarded by the intelligence department [of the district headquarters] as an offensive group with a significant saturation of tanks and motorized units.”

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Starting from the second week of the war, much attention was paid to the organization of detachments sent behind enemy lines for the purpose of reconnaissance and sabotage, as well as the organization of radio-equipped reconnaissance groups behind enemy lines and radio-equipped points in the territory occupied by our troops, in case of their forced withdrawal.”

“In the following months, the information received from our groups and detachments working behind enemy lines improved all the time and was of great value.

It was reported on the personally observed concentration of Nazi troops in the border areas, starting from the end of February, on the reconnaissance carried out by German officers along the border, the preparation of artillery positions by the Germans, the strengthening of the construction of long-term defensive structures in the border zone, as well as gas and bomb shelters in the cities of East Prussia ."
_______

11.

— “How unexpectedly the war began for the approaching troops can be judged, for example, by the fact that the personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving along the railway at dawn on June 22, arrived at the station. Siauliai, having seen the bombing of our airfields, believed that “the maneuvers had begun.”

And at this time, almost all the aviation of the Baltic Military District was burned at the airfields. For example, from the mixed air division, which was supposed to support the 8th Army, by 15:00 on June 22, only 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained.”

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

I sent the chief of staff of the army to the village. Kelgava with the order to withdraw the Army headquarters to the command post.

“During June 19, 3 rifle divisions (10th, 90th and 125th) were deployed. Units of these divisions were located in prepared trenches and bunkers. Long-term structures were not ready.

Even on the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the chief of staff of the front, KLENOV, in a very categorical form - by dawn on June 22, withdraw the troops from the border, withdraw them from the trenches, which I categorically refused to do and the troops remained in their positions.”
_______

21.

— “The troops directly covering the state border had detailed plans and documentation up to the regiment inclusive. Field positions were prepared for them along the entire border. These troops represented the first operational echelon.”

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

“Their advance entry to prepared positions was prohibited by the General Staff so as not to give a reason for provoking war on the part of Nazi Germany.”
_______

27.

— “While still in Transbaikalia and receiving intelligence reports, we felt an impending threat, since intelligence quite accurately determined the concentration of Nazi troops. I regarded the sudden appointment as Chief of Staff of the 6th Army in Lvov as a necessity of the pre-war period.

Despite the undeniable signs of a large concentration of German troops, the commander of the Kiev Special Military District forbade the deployment of covering units, putting troops on combat readiness, and even more so strengthening them even after the start of shelling of the state border and air raids on the night of June 21-22, 1941. Only during the day. On June 22, this was allowed, when the Germans had already crossed the state border and were operating on our territory.”

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

At dawn, information began to arrive about the landing of German troops to the east, southeast and south of the city of Lvov. The reconnaissance groups sent to these areas found nothing in them. Information about landings during all the months of the initial period of the war turned out to be false; they only irritated the troops and scattered our forces on unnecessary reconnaissance. It is possible that such data was transmitted by German agents sent to us in advance. I raised the question of permission to make another attempt to break through in an organized manner in the previously proposed direction.

“... it was decided to cover the signs on the tank with mud and move along the road to Smela during the day with the hatches closed, along with German vehicles that occasionally passed along the road.

This little trick was a success, and during the day we moved from Zvenigorod to Shpola, with German traffic controllers giving us the way.

Hoping to continue to move with the Germans with impunity, we drove out onto the road leading from metro station Smela to Cherkassy.

The tank reached the blown-up bridge along the dam, but was fired at by German artillery with incendiary shells, and when turning, it slid off the dam and half sank.

Together with the crew, we left the tank and an hour later, having crossed the swamp, we joined up with our units in the sector of the 38th Army.”
_______

49.

— “Before the treacherous attack... I and the commanders of the units of my formation did not know the content of the mobilization plan, the so-called MP-41.

After its opening, in the first hour of the war, everyone was convinced that the defensive work, command and staff exercises with access to the field, proceeded strictly from the mobilization plan of 1941, developed by the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District and approved by the General Staff.”

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

“The covering troops, the first operational echelon, were stationed directly at the borders and began deployment under the cover of fortified areas with the outbreak of hostilities. Their advance entry to prepared positions was prohibited by the General Staff so as not to give a reason for provoking war on the part of Nazi Germany.”
_______

73.

— “Extracts from the plans for the defense of the state border (...) were kept at the headquarters of corps and divisions in sealed “red” bags.

The order to open the red packets from the district headquarters came on June 21. An enemy air strike (3.50 on June 22) caught the troops at the moment of their advance to occupy the defense.

According to the approved state border defense plan of 1941, in connection with the concentration of large German forces to the state border, an increase in the number of troops included in the plan was provided.”

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

At a depth of 250-300 km there were 6 more rifle divisions, 4 of them were on the move.”

“The divisions were not involved in border defense before the start of hostilities. Radio stations in army headquarters were destroyed by bombing.

Control had to be carried out by liaison officers, communications were maintained by U-2, SB aircraft, armored vehicles and passenger cars.”

“The difficulty of maintaining communications using only mobile means of communication was that these means were very limited. In addition, enemy aircraft destroyed these assets both in the air and on the ground.

It is enough to give the following example: on June 26 it was necessary to transmit a combat order to the armies to withdraw to the river line. Shara and further through Nalibokskaya Pushcha.

To deliver the encrypted order, I sent one U-2 plane to each army with the order to sit near the command post and hand over the order; one SB plane to each army with an order to drop a paratrooper near the command post with a coded order for delivery; and one armored vehicle with an officer to deliver the same encrypted order.

Results: all U-2s were shot down, all armored vehicles were burned; and only at the CP of the 10th Army 2 paratroopers with orders were dropped from the Security Council. To clarify the front line we had to use fighters.”
_______

84.

— “At one o’clock in the morning on June 22, 1941, the Corps Commander was called to the telephone and received the following instructions: to alert the division headquarters and regiment headquarters and assemble them at their location. Rifle regiments should not be raised on combat alert, why wait for his order.”

85.

86.

87.

88.

89.

90.

91.

92.

93.

94.

95.

96.

97.

98.

99.

100.

101.

At 2.00, the chief of staff of the division reported information received from the Head of the Nurskaya border outpost that fascist German troops were approaching the Western Bug River and were bringing up transportation means.”

“After the report of the division chief of staff at 2:10 a.m. on June 22, 1941, he ordered the “Storm” signal to be given, the rifle regiments to be alerted and a forced march to occupy sectors and areas of defense.

At 2.40 on June 22, I received an order to open the package of the Corps Commander, stored in my safe, from which I learned - to raise the division on combat alert and act in accordance with the decision I made and the order for the division, which I did on my own initiative an hour earlier.”
_______

The materials received by the Military Historical Directorate, authored by famous Soviet military leaders, were carefully studied and analyzed and formed the basis for fundamental scientific works describing the course of the Great Patriotic War from the point of view of military specialists.

The answers to the first question were mixed. Some commanders reported that the plan was communicated to them in advance as far as it concerned and they had the opportunity to develop their plans with the construction of battle formations and the definition of combat areas. Others responded that they were not familiar with the plan, but received it in sealed packages directly in the first days of the war.

Thus, the chief of staff of the 28th Rifle Corps of the 4th Army of the Belarusian Special Military District, Lukin, explained that “... to check the reality... of the plan and instructions, before the start of the war, approximately in the period March-May 1941, at least two combat verification alarms were carried out in the presence of representatives of the command of the Western Military District...”
_______

The commander of the 45th Rifle Division of the 5th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army of the Kiev Special Military Corps, Sherstyuk, recalled the words of the commander of the 5th Army, conveyed to him by the commander of the 15th Rifle Corps, Colonel I.I. Fedyuninsky: “... The plan for the defense of the state border, the places of the command post and the OP will be received at the right time in a closed package; I prohibit the preparation of mobilization gaps in division garrisons, because this will give rise to panic.”

The commander of the 10th Infantry Division of the Baltic Special Military District, Fadeev, reported: “I knew the plan for the defense of the state border of the Lithuanian SSR in terms of the defense zone of the 10th Infantry Division and the 125th Infantry Division defending on the left behind its right flank.”

The commander of the 8th Army of the Baltic Special Military District, P.P. Sobennikov, recalled: “...having been appointed to a position in March 1941, I, unfortunately, at that time, neither at the General Staff nor upon arrival in Riga at the Headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District, was informed about the “Plan for the Defense of the State Border of 1941.”

Upon arrival at the headquarters of the 8th Army in Jelgava, I also did not find any instructions on this issue. I get the impression that it is unlikely that such a plan existed by this time (March 1941). The division headquarters and regimental headquarters worked out combat documents, orders, combat instructions, maps, diagrams, etc. Units of the division were trained to occupy their defense areas and fire installations from their locations... Artillery fire was planned in directions... Main and reserve command and observation posts from division headquarters to company commanders inclusive were identified and equipped.”

Only on May 28, 1941 (I remember this date very well), when I was called ... to the district headquarters, I was literally hastily familiarized with the “Defense Plan”. All this happened in a great hurry and in a somewhat nervous atmosphere. ... The plan was a rather voluminous, thick notebook, typed. ...My notes, as well as those of my chief of staff, were taken away. ...Unfortunately, after this no instructions were given and we did not even receive our workbooks.

However, the troops stationed on the border... were preparing field fortifications... and were practically oriented about their tasks and areas of defense. Possible options for action were played out during field trips (April-May)..."

If the first question was the same for everyone, then the second question was listed in two versions.

Almost all commanders noted that the units were preparing the defensive lines in advance until June 1941. The degree of readiness of fortified areas varied. Thus, the commander of the 45th Rifle Division of the 5th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army KOVO noted that in May-June 1941, units of the division, subject to great camouflage, built separate machine gun and artillery bunkers near the state border at a distance of approximately 2-5 km , as well as anti-tank ditches... The constructed earthen structures partially ensured the deployment and conduct of combat operations by division units.
_______

The commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the Kyiv Special Military District, Abramidze, reported that: “...the measures taken to strengthen the state border fully ensured the deployment and conduct of combat operations by units of the formation entrusted to me.

All units held the state border in cooperation with the 92nd and 93rd border detachments until June 28, i.e. until we received an order to leave the border..."

In the Baltic Special Military District, a defensive line along the state border on the front of Palanga, Kretinga, Klaipeda Highway and to the south, basically according to the plan, to the depth of the Minia River was prepared.

The defense (forefield) was built by resistance units, strongholds. Wood-earth and stone bunkers were built for all heavy machine guns, as well as regimental and anti-tank artillery.

In the Belarusian Special Military District, the defensive line along the state border consisted of a system of trenches, communication passages and wood-earth defensive structures, the construction of which had not yet been completed at the beginning of the war.

In the fall of 1940, the troops of the 28th Rifle Corps, according to the plan of the commander of the 4th Army, worked on the construction of military filling of the Brest-Litovsk fortified area: bunkers, trenches, and barriers.
______

Fortified area along the eastern bank of the river. The Bug was under construction. Individual structures and areas with completed structures were without garrisons and weapons, and the Brest fortified area, according to an eyewitness, due to its small numbers could not even protect against the penetration of unauthorized persons, as it should have been.

In the Belarusian Special Military District, before the enemy attack, no instructions or orders were received from the higher command, including the district headquarters, to raise troops and withdraw them to occupy defensive lines. Before the attack, all units were in their places of deployment. For example, the commander of the 86th Rifle Division received a personal order from the commander of the 5th Rifle Corps to assemble the division headquarters, regimental and battalion headquarters at 1.00 am on June 22. The same order ordered the unit not to raise a combat alert and to wait for a special order. An hour later, he received an order to open the package of the corps commander, stored in his safe, after which he raised the division on combat alert and acted on the decision and order he made for the division.
_______

A similar situation arose in the Kiev Special Military District, where the order to put units on combat readiness and leave them in their garrisons was received from the higher command.

And even despite cases of shelling by German planes of Soviet troops and battles with border guards, instructions were received from the headquarters of the 5th Army: “Don’t give in to provocation, don’t shoot at the planes... the Germans in some places started fighting our border outposts.

This is another provocation. Don't go for provocation. Raise the troops, but don’t give them any ammunition.”

How suddenly the war began for the troops can be judged, for example, by the fact that the personnel of the heavy artillery regiment, moving by rail at dawn on June 22, arrived at the station. Siauliai, having seen the bombing of our airfields, believed that “the maneuvers had begun.”

The 48th Infantry Division of the Baltic Special Military District, by order of the Commander of the District Troops, set out from Riga on the night of June 19 and moved towards the border with music and, not being aware of the imminent threat of war, was suddenly attacked from the air and by the German ground forces that had broken through. after which it suffered heavy losses and, before reaching the border, was defeated.
_______

At dawn on June 22, almost all PriOVO aviation was burned at the airfields. Of the mixed air division attached to the 8th Army of the District, by 15:00 on June 22, 5 or 6 SB aircraft remained.

As for the participation of artillery in the first days of the war, most of it was at district and army gatherings in accordance with orders from district headquarters. As soon as active clashes with the enemy began, artillery units arrived on their own in the combat areas and took up the required positions. The units that remained in the places where their units were deployed took a direct part in supporting our troops as long as there was fuel for tractors. When the fuel ran out, the artillerymen were forced to blow up the guns and equipment.

The conditions in which our troops entered the war are described by all participants in the first battles in one word: “unexpectedly.” The situation was the same in all three districts. In the Belarusian Special Military District, the command staff of the 28th Rifle Corps was supposed to arrive for a demonstration exercise of the commander of the 4th Army at the artillery range in Medyn (Brest region) at 5.00 am on June 22.

At the time of the attack in Brest-Litovsk, electrical and telephone communications immediately stopped working, since the corps headquarters did not have field communications with the divisions, and control was disrupted. Communication was maintained by sending messages in officers' vehicles. In the same Belarusian Special Military District, the commander of the 330th Infantry Regiment of the 86th Infantry Division of the 5th Infantry Corps of the 10th Combined Arms Army reported at 8.00 on the morning of June 22 that he counterattacked the enemy on the move with a force of more than two battalions and in cooperation with a separate reconnaissance battalion of the division, border commandant's office and outposts put the enemy to flight and restored the lost position with frontline border outposts in the Smolekhi, Zaremba section along the state border of the USSR.
_______

Units of the 99th Infantry Division of the 26th Army of the Kiev Special Military District were located on the state border, being in constant combat readiness and in a very short time could occupy their harrow areas, but conflicting orders coming from the high command did not allow our artillerymen to open fire against the enemy until 10.00 am on June 22. And only at 4.00 am on June 23, after a 30-minute artillery barrage, our troops knocked the enemy out of the city of Przemysl they occupied and liberated the city, where there were many Soviet citizens, including families of officers.

Units of the divisions of the 5th Army of the Kiev Special Military District entered into battle with the Germans in extremely difficult conditions, since the fighting began suddenly and came as a surprise, while one third of the troops were on defensive work, and the corps artillery was at an army camp gathering.

In the Baltic Special Military District, the Germans began the war at 4.00 am on June 22 with artillery preparation and direct fire at bunkers, border outposts, and populated areas, creating many fires, after which they went on the offensive.

The enemy concentrated his main efforts in the Palanga-Libava direction, along the Baltic Sea coast bypassing the city of Kretinga, along the Klaipeda highway.

Units of the 10th Infantry Division repelled German attacks with fire and repeatedly launched counterattacks and fought stubborn defensive battles throughout the entire depth of the forefield to the river. Miniya, Plungi, Retovas.

In view of the current situation, by the end of June 22, the division commander received an order from the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps to withdraw.
_______

From June 22 to September 30, 1941, this division retreated and fought in the Baltic states, after which it was loaded onto transport in Tallinn and withdrawn to Kronstadt and Strelno.

In general, all participants in the first days of the war noted the readiness of the headquarters to control troops. Having recovered from the sudden blow, the headquarters took over the leadership of the fighting. Difficulties in command and control of troops were manifested in almost everything: understaffing of some headquarters, lack of the required number of communications equipment (radio and transport), headquarters security, vehicles for movements, broken wire communications. Management of the rear was difficult due to the “district-regiment” supply system that remained from peacetime.

The memories of eyewitnesses and direct participants in the first days of the war are certainly not without subjectivity, however, their stories are proof that the Soviet government and high command, realistically assessing the situation in the period 1940-1941, felt that the country and army were incompletely prepared to repel an attack from the side of Nazi Germany - a strong and well-armed enemy due to the robbery of the countries of Western Europe, with two years of experience in combat operations. Based on the objective reality of that time, by ordering the troops to be put on full combat readiness, the country's leadership did not want to give Hitler a reason to start a war in extremely unfavorable conditions for us, they hoped to delay the war.
_______

Russian Ministry of Defense, 2017

On the eve of Victory Day, the Russian Ministry of Defense published unique archival documents that provide evidence of Nazi crimes on the territory of the USSR.
Kherson region: occupied in 1941, liberated in 1944
The Kherson region was occupied by the Germans for most of the Great Patriotic War. After liberation, investigators began working there; they documented the crimes of the fascist troops, which they could confirm. This is how the report of the head of the political department of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General Mikhail Rudakov, was born, which was declassified on the eve of the 62nd anniversary of the victory. He wrote “On the facts of the monstrous atrocities committed by the Nazi occupiers in the city of Kherson” to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.
Here are some excerpts from a document published by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

“On September 23, 1941, 8.5 thousand Jews were imprisoned and taken in cars outside the city, where they were all shot at the agricultural colony site. According to numerous testimonies, it was established that the Germans killed children under 12 years old with a poisonous liquid that they smeared on their lips. The Germans also threw those who were still alive into pits and covered them with earth.”

“Before the war, a well-equipped psychiatric hospital operated seven kilometers from the city. Having occupied the city of Kherson, Hitler’s executioners plundered the property of the hospital, and shot the 1,200 mentally ill people who were being treated, dumping them in quarries.”

“During the occupation of Kherson, Hitler’s villains shot and tortured up to 17 thousand peaceful Soviet citizens in the Gestapo.”

“A German soldier raped the old woman Kharaimova Glikeria Zakharovna... The German soldier-beast molested the five-year-old girl Svetlana, the daughter of a water station worker Pyotr Ivanovich Gavrilov...”



“Eyewitnesses A. M. Smetankina and O. M. Doroshenko, who lived near the prison, said that in February 1942, on one day, the Germans took corpses out of the camp in 50 carts. Many were still breathing, stretching out their hands in the air and whispering something in an unconscious state... Before their retreat from the city, trying to cover up the traces of monstrous crimes, the Germans dug up several graves, doused the corpses with a special liquid and burned them.”

“In the period from December 17, 1943 to March 12, 1944... All things and products belonging to the residents of the city were looted and taken to Germany... All churches in Kherson were robbed. Church utensils - icons, chasubles, gospels in silver frames, silver crosses, carpets and much more - were stolen by German soldiers.”

“... Noteworthy is the female corpse with a bent arm, in whose arms there is a child wrapped in a blanket... The absence of any damage on the child’s corpse makes us think about another method of killing, perhaps burying alive, poisoning, etc.... The presence of six-pointed stars on The clothing of most of the corpses indicates that they belonged to the Jewish nation. The discovery of household utensils (kettles, pots, etc.) in the pits ... gives the right to assume that the dead were evacuated to the place of execution under the guise of relocation or other reasons.”

“Photography of any kind of execution is strictly prohibited. In particularly exceptional cases, when it is necessary to take photographs for purely official purposes, this requires the permission of an officer at least with the rank of division commander... When carrying out such executions, the relevant military departments are obliged... To remove all spectators.”

On June 22, the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow, a unique electronic information resource dedicated to the events of the first days of the bloodiest war of the 20th century appeared on the official website of the Ministry of Defense. All documents have so far been classified and are being published for the first time. They contain a story about the first battles of the Great Patriotic War, about the directives of the USSR NGOs, about the first award documents with descriptions of feats.

We list the most relevant archival photographic images due to numerous fake news and false fabrications about the beginning of the war. First of all, this is the first copy of the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR N1 dated June 22, 1941, published on the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense, signed by Zhukov and Timoshenko and handed over on the night of June 22 to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 10th armies.

Also worthy of special attention is the declassified copy of the handwritten Combat Order of the People's Commissar of Defense N2 dated June 22, 1941, personally compiled by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Georgy Zhukov three hours after the start of the war - at 7:15 am. The order instructs the Red Army troops to “use all forces and means to attack enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border,” and bomber and attack aircraft to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and ground forces groupings “to a depth of German territory of up to 100- 150 kilometers." At the same time, it was stated that “no raids should be made on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions are given.” On the back of the last page of this document there is a note from Zhukov: “T[ov]. Vatutin. Bomb Romania.”

What does it mean: first don’t bomb Romania, then bomb it? Employees of the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation explain that before us, in fact, is the first combat order of the People's Commissariat of Defense and between its lines the attentive reader will see the colossal tension and tragedy of the first hours of the war that broke out.

A trophy map of the initial stage of the “Plan Barbarossa”, where, in addition to the detailed deployment of groupings of Nazi troops near the borders of the USSR, the planned directions of the main attacks of the Wehrmacht troops in the first days of the war are indicated - another exhibit of the virtual exhibition. As you know, the blitzkrieg failed.

Here's a story from the trenches. In one of the first battles, a battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Borisov destroyed 6 enemy tanks with direct fire. The platoon of junior lieutenant Brykl also set fire to 6 tanks, and when the platoon’s guns were disabled, the officer fired from a gun discovered nearby, which was left without a crew, and destroyed 4 more tanks. After the shells ran out, the junior lieutenant placed the heavy machine gun on the tractor and, together with its driver, continued to fight until the last cartridge.

Published reports from the heads of the political departments of the 42nd and 6th Infantry Divisions, which took the blow of the Nazi troops in the western direction, will tell about the course of the fighting in the Brest area and for the legendary Brest Fortress. The details of the combat operations of these formations will become real revelations even for professional historians.

Wehrmacht officers were advised to avoid future clashes with the 99th Infantry Division, which was covering Przemysl. Selected and consisting of the bravest soldiers - this is exactly the assessment given to her by the German command following the results of the first days of fighting for the city. Combat orders and reports, also presented on the Ministry of Defense website, give an idea of ​​the tenacity and valor of these soldiers:

“On June 22, the division was in the city of Przemysl, where it received the first blow from the armored masses of the Nazi troops. As a result of the treacherous attack, the city was captured by the Nazis, but on June 23, units of the division, together with other units, recaptured the right-bank Soviet part of the city and restored the border.”

“On June 22, Red Army soldier E.M. Balakar was on guard guard at points in the city. At the time of the attack, he did not lose his head, occupied a pillbox, installed a heavy machine gun, and for a day and a half repelled the enemy with machine gun fire and prevented him from crossing the San River.”

“In the first few days of fighting, the city changed hands three times. All this time, the enemy brought reserves into the battle, persistently trying to seize the initiative into their own hands... The division command decided to prevent the enemy from breaking through (...), continuing to hold the state border. It was thanks to professionalism command and directly the commander, Colonel N.I. Dementyev, parts of the division were able not only to withstand the massive onslaught of the enemy, but also to put him to flight."

Among the published documents are dozens of award sheets for Red Army soldiers and commanders who distinguished themselves in those first bloody battles. Among them are descriptions of the exploits of fighter pilots of the 158th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Leningrad Military District, junior lieutenants Pyotr Kharitonov and Stepan Zdorovtsev, who carried out the first rams of fascist bombers in the sky over the city of Ostrov on June 26, 1941. For these air battles, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 8, 1941, they were awarded the high title of Heroes of the Soviet Union.

© still from the film "Match" / Kinopoisk.ru

The football match that took place in occupied Kyiv on August 9, 1942 was hardly a sport. However, it became one of the most famous events in the history of Soviet football, books are written and films are made about it, and even people who are extremely far from sports life know the phrase “death match”. What exactly happened then?

In 1941, when the war began, the fate of Soviet athletes differed little from the general one. Some went into evacuation, others went to the front as part of the Red Army or joined destroyer battalions. Already in the summer of 1941, the front began to approach Kyiv. And in September, the Red Army suffered one of the largest disasters in its history - the Kiev Cauldron. The main forces of the Southwestern Front were defeated east of the Ukrainian capital. Kyiv itself fell without intense fighting - the troops went east to break out of the ring. The occupation began.

There are many players from local teams left in Kyiv. Since many athletes served in local paramilitary organizations, after the encirclement and capture of Kyiv, those who managed to avoid capture simply returned to their homes.

However, for the most part, the Red Army soldiers surrounded near Kiev simply died or were captured. Among the prisoners was, for example, Nikolai Trusevich. He was just over thirty, he was born and had previously lived in Odessa for quite a long time. Before the war, Trusevich played as a goalkeeper for Dynamo Kiev. Ivan Kuzmenko, a midfielder of the same Dynamo, had a similar story. He served in the destroyer battalion of the Kyiv fortified area, then encirclement and captivity followed. Quite a lot of players from different clubs ended up in prisoner camps or at home in Kyiv.

Oddly enough, some of them owe their salvation - at least temporarily - to the collaborationists. The occupation administration of the city specifically asked for some players, and the Germans agreed to release them, deciding that holding on to a dozen prisoners was stupid, and such a story could help the image of the occupation administration. However, the “best sports masters of Ukraine” did not have any privileges. They were left under suspicion and had to earn their own living.

Meanwhile, player and coach Georgy Shvetsov, who also remained in Kyiv, decided to cooperate with the Nazis and developed vigorous activity to restore sports life in the city. Many refused to work with him, some for ideological reasons, some out of fear. Although Shvetsov had something to offer - at least food rations, which was serious in the starving occupied territory. Nevertheless, he managed to recruit a certain number of people and founded a team called “Rukh”. However, he has competitors.

A certain Josef Kordik, a Czech by birth, worked as the director of a bakery in Kyiv. Kordik turned out to be a rather slippery guy - he managed to convince the Nazis that he himself was a “Volksdeutsche”, that is, a German, and got a job as director of a bakery. Kordik was also a football fan. He knew many of the players of the pre-war Kyiv teams by sight and, having accidentally met Trusevich on the street, offered to work at his enterprise. Through Trusevich, several more football players got jobs at the same bakery - Klimenko, Kuzmenko, Sviridovsky and others. Kordik assigned them to positions as laborers and loaders, and he began to work on creating a sports team. The city government shrugged and agreed.

This is how the Start team appeared, which included several former professional football players. Including players who played for Dynamo in 1941.

There was a specific situation with this club. The fact is that this sports community was created under the patronage of the NKVD. Dynamo, of course, were not real security officers, but if something happened, the Germans would not have looked into it. Many players played for Dynamo in 1941 or earlier - Makar Goncharenko, Fyodor Tyutchev, Mikhail Putistin, Start captain Mikhail Sviridovsky and others.

However, for now, belonging to Beria’s department was not the main problem. The football players lived from hand to mouth, despite the fact that they worked at a bakery - an attempt to carry food could easily end in execution. So football for Start members provided at least the opportunity to get at least some increase in their rations. The training took place at the Zenit stadium, where previously captured Red Army soldiers were kept. And in the summer of 1942, Shvetsov began organizing matches of new teams among themselves and between the teams of the occupation garrisons.

© Public domain

Hungarian and numerous German units were stationed in Kyiv. They became Start’s rivals. The Kievans played with the Hungarians, the “team” of the German artillery unit. “Start”, most of whom were professionals, although hungry, naturally usually won. “Rukh” performed worse - there weren’t that many football players there. Well, on August 6 and 9 “those” games took place.

Start's opponent was the Luftwaffe air force team. However, in this case they were not pilots, but anti-aircraft gunners - they also belonged to Goering’s department. Even the name - “Flakelf” - from “Flak”, “anti-aircraft gun”, indicates the “anti-aircraft” origin of the German team. The Kiev team won the first game easily. Tempers ran high for the rematch.

It is around this game that the most myths are swirled. There was a story about a German officer who allegedly threatened the players, demanding to lose, about the subsequent execution, about the requirement to shout “Heil”.

In fact, the match itself was tense, but within the bounds of decency. About two thousand people gathered to watch the game, which is a lot by the standards of the place and time. The Germans opened the scoring, the Soviet players equalized it and took the lead, then the anti-aircraft gunners caught up again, but in the end the game ended with a score of 5:3 in favor of Start.

Actually, this tension of the game became the main feature of the match at that time. Various “scary” details ultimately turned out to be fictitious or exaggerated.

So, the German officer actually went into the locker room and talked with the players, but about what and in what terms remained unknown. There were no machine guns or guards with dogs either. And judging was common for non-professionals. The only thing that went beyond the bounds of decency was the escapade of some high-ranking officer, shouting that the Soviet players were uncultured bandits. The atmosphere at the stadium was perhaps not particularly warm and friendly, but in general there were no incidents. And after the match, the players did not go to the concentration camp, but to their homes.

So, was the legend of the “death match” born out of nowhere? Alas, everything is not so simple.

On August 18, 1942, Trusevich, Kuzmenko, Sviridovsky and several other people were arrested right at the bakery where they worked. Others were taken one by one. In total, 10 players were dealt.

However, the reasons for the arrest remained questionable. According to Makar Goncharenko, a player who survived the war, Shvetsov complained about the Start players, angry at the constant losses of his Rukh.

Others called Georgiy Vyachkis. Before the war, Vyachkis was an athlete, but not a football player, or a swimmer. During the occupation, he discovered new talents in himself and did not find anything smarter than joining the Gestapo. True, Vyachkis’ motives look rather vague - the Start players didn’t give him any trouble. However, it was he who was named not only by the players, but also later by collaborators who were captured and brought to trial. It is possible, by the way, that there was no special reason - the collaborator simply wanted to curry favor, and the football players, after the victory over the Germans, acquired some kind of fame not only among the people of Kiev, but also among the occupiers.

The fact is that the author of the denunciation brought to light the Dynamo players’ past. In the “anonymous letter,” the former Dynamo players were declared active NKVD employees who remained in Kyiv for reconnaissance and sabotage. The Germans, of course, could already know what kind of department founded the club, but they, of course, did not see the point in bothering themselves with the “correct” investigation. Moreover, they soon found “irresistible” evidence.

One of the football players, Nikolai Korotkikh, actually once served in the NKVD for about two years. True, he most likely did not carry out any special mission during the occupation. The fact is that Korotkikh gave himself away extremely stupidly - a photograph was found right in his apartment showing him in uniform. For this carelessness, he paid a monstrous price - trying to extract information about a non-existent sabotage group, the Gestapo tortured him to death. All the rest were kept under lock and key for about three weeks; nothing was really found, but just in case they were sent to the Syretsky concentration camp.

The commandant of the camp was a certain Paul Radomsky. This guy joined the SS very early, when there were literally a couple of thousand people there. However, for a truly serious career, Radomsky was dull and, in addition, abused alcohol. But what he lacked in intelligence he made up for with sadism. He did not hesitate to torture and kill prisoners personally.

Until February 24, 1943, the situation of the arrested football players was almost normal by the standards of the camp. Some were able to find work as fitters or shoemakers, and relatives were even allowed to carry packages.

But on the ill-fated day of February 24, a certain incident occurred, which is still not known in all details. However, the general meaning is clear - one of the prisoners tried to drive away the guard dog. In the scuffle, a German officer who came out in response to the noise was also hurt. The Nazis reacted in their usual way: they lined up the prisoners, counted on the first, second, third, and killed those who were unlucky. Among others, Nikolai Trusevich, Alexey Klimenko and Ivan Kuzmenko were unlucky.

Other players of the ill-fated “Start” still broke free. Commandant Radomsky was an excellent torturer and executioner, but he was a so-so administrator and commander - in the fall of 1943, the prisoners managed to stage a mass escape. The former participants in the “death match” managed to reach their own.

During the war, two former “starters”, Timofeev and Gundarev, managed to serve in the police, were arrested and convicted. The traces of another player, Pavel Komarov, are subsequently lost. He was the only one whom the Germans eventually drove to the west when the Red Army approached. Commandant Radomski was killed by Red Army soldiers in Hungary in March 1945.

Well, the surviving players, who did not stain themselves with crimes, became heroes. True, their history has been incredibly mythologized. Ultimately, the victory over the German anti-aircraft gunners in a football match was not the direct cause of death for any of them. However, the story of these athletes turned out to be terrible and dramatic in reality, and in the end it turned into a real tragedy. People who played football were caught in an event with stakes much more terrible than those of sports competitions.