10 facts about the Korsun Shevchenko operation. Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation

On February 17, 1944, the destruction of the encircled German group in Right Bank Ukraine was completed.

At the end of December 1943, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin, advancing from the Kyiv bridgehead, defeated the Zhytomyr enemy group (see. Zhitomir-Berdichev operation ) and by the end of January 1944 advanced in the direction of Rivne-Lutsk up to 300 km from the Dnieper. At the same time, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Ivan Stepanovich Konev, advancing from the Kremenchug bridgehead, captured Kirovograd on January 8, 1944. Thus, the so-called Korsun-Shevchenko ledge cutting into our front was formed, which was occupied by a large enemy group, which included the VII and XI Army Corps from the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General Hans-Valentin Hube and the XXXXII Army and XXXXVII Tank Corps from the 8th Army of Infantry General Otto Wöhler. In total, 11 infantry divisions defended the ledge (34th, 57th, 72nd, 82nd, 88th, 106th, 112th, 198th, 255th, 332nd and 389th i), 3rd Panzer Division, SS Viking Panzer Division, SS Motorized Brigade "Wallonia", regiment of the 168th Infantry Division, reinforced by the 202nd, 239th and 265th Assault Gun Battalions, 905th Heavy Assault Gun Battalion.

The fascist German command hoped to use this very Korsun-Shevchenko protrusion to attack the flank and rear of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front operating west of Kiev, and to recapture Right Bank Ukraine - in mid-January the Germans still could not come to terms with the fact that the “eastern The defensive rampart finally collapsed, and continued to count on the restoration of the defense along the Dnieper.

The enemy took vigorous measures to create a stable defense in the area of ​​the Korsun-Shevchenko salient, which would ensure the retention of this area and serve as the starting area for the deployment of offensive operations. It should be emphasized that the terrain in the salient area was very favorable for the creation of a defense. Numerous rivers, streams, ravines with steep banks, and a large number of settlements contributed to the creation of defensive lines to great depths, as well as a number of cut-off positions. The heights, especially in the Kanev area, provided the enemy with good observation conditions.

On January 12, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued an order to the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to encircle and destroy enemy troops.

On January 24, the Korsun-Shevchenko operation began. At dawn, hundreds of guns opened fire on enemy positions. Powerful artillery fire destroyed defensive structures, filled up trenches and communication passages, and destroyed enemy manpower and military equipment.

As soon as the artillery moved the fire into the depths, the advanced battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack.

On January 26, from the opposite side of the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge, troops of the 40th, 27th and 6th tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck.

The actions of the German troops were hampered by the early onset of mud.

Having overcome the resistance of the enemy's 34th, 88th and 198th infantry divisions in the first line, the troops of the front shock group sought to develop a strike into the depth of the defense. The enemy, relying on prepared lines in the depths, resisted fiercely, especially in the zone of the 40th Army. Moreover, with the forces of the 16th and 17th tank divisions, he persistently attacked the right flank of the 40th Army in the direction of Okhmatov. Here, together with units of the 40th Army (50th and 51st Rifle Corps), soldiers of the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade, transferred here from near Bila Tserkva, fought. The front command also regrouped the 11th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army to strengthen the troops in this direction. The corps was transferred to the operational subordination of the commander of the 40th Army.

The offensive of the right-flank formations of the 27th Army (337th and 180th Rifle Divisions) and the units of the 6th Tank Army interacting with them developed somewhat more successfully, and under these conditions the front commander decided to transfer the entire brunt of the main attack to the 6th Tank Army zone. and the 27th Army. For this purpose, from 23:00 on January 27, the 47th Rifle Corps (167th, 359th Rifle Divisions) from the 40th Army was transferred to the subordination of the 6th Tank Army.

On January 31, the 27th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 4th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front met in the Olshany area, thereby closing the encirclement ring.

Russian T-34-76 tanks on the march.

Fiercely resisting, the Germans launched repeated counterattacks in various directions, first in order to stop the advance of the Soviet troops, and from the end of January - in order to cut off our mobile formations from the main forces.

By the end of February 3, Soviet troops completed the complete encirclement of the entire Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group, establishing a continuous front line. On February 4-5, fascist German troops unsuccessfully repeated attempts to break through the encirclement front with attacks in the direction of Shpola. Also unsuccessful were the enemy’s attempts to break through the encirclement in the sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the Rizino area to Lysyanka.

In order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the Soviet command proposed that the Nazi troops surrender on February 8. But, deceived by Hitler’s promises of help, they refused to capitulate and continued to resist. Soviet troops, tightening the encirclement, continued to eliminate the enemy group. Until February 12, the destruction was carried out by the forces of both fronts, and then by the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front alone. On February 11, the enemy launched a large counterattack with five tank divisions from the Yerki area and north of Buka in the general direction of Shanderovka. On February 12, the troops of the encircled group went on the offensive from the Steblev-Tarasha line in the direction of Lysyanka. At the cost of heavy losses, the advancing fascist German divisions managed to reach the Chesnovka-Lysyanka line by February 16. The German troops breaking out from the encirclement at the same time captured the Khilki-Komarovka and Novo-Buda areas, but they still failed to connect with the divisions advancing towards them. The enemy was first stopped, and then defeated and destroyed. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front captured Korsun-Shevchenkovsky with a swift attack on February 14.

Partisan detachments were actively operating in the German rear. The photo shows a group of demolitionists from the Khrushchev detachment near a bridge blown up by partisans.

The last attempt by the Germans to break out of the encirclement took place on February 17. In the first echelon there were three columns: the 5th SS Wiking Panzer Division on the left, the 72nd Infantry Division in the center and Corps Group B on the right flank. The rearguard was the 57th and 88th Infantry Divisions. The main blow fell on the 5th Guards. airborne, 180th and 202nd rifle divisions in the inner ring of encirclement and along the 41st Guards. rifle division on the outer. Basically, German troops broke through between the villages of Zhurzhintsy and Pochapintsy directly to October, but many, due to shelling from Height 239, went south of it and even south of Pochapintsy and reached Gnilomy Tikach, where there were no crossings. This led to major losses both from hypothermia when trying to cross using improvised means, and from shelling by Soviet troops. During the breakthrough, the commander of the encircled German group, artillery general Wilhelm Stemmermann, died.

17 Feb 1944 the entire surrounded group of Nazi troops ceased to exist. As a result of fierce battles, the Germans lost 55 thousand killed and over 18 thousand captured. 40,423 Germans managed to escape. Our irretrievable losses amounted to 24,286 people. Only the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front captured: 41 aircraft, 167 tanks and self-propelled guns, 618 field guns of various calibers, 267 mortars, 789 machine guns, 10 thousand vehicles, 7 steam locomotives, 415 wagons and tanks, 127 tractors and other trophies.

At the end of December 1943, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin, advancing from the Kiev bridgehead, defeated the Zhytomyr enemy group (see Zhitomir-Berdichev operation) and by the end of January 1944 advanced in the direction of Rivne-Lutsk up to 300 km from Dnieper. At the same time, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Ivan Stepanovich Konev, advancing from the Kremenchug bridgehead, captured Kirovograd on January 8, 1944. Thus, the so-called Korsun-Shevchenko ledge cutting into our front was formed, which was occupied by a large enemy group, which included the VII and XI Army Corps from the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General Hans-Valentin Hube and the XXXXII Army and XXXXVII Tank Corps from the 8th Army of Infantry General Otto Wöhler.

The fascist German command hoped to use this very Korsun-Shevchenko ledge to attack the flank and rear of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, operating west of Kiev, and to recapture Right Bank Ukraine - in mid-January the Germans still could not come to terms with the fact that the “eastern The defensive rampart finally collapsed, and continued to count on the restoration of the defense along the Dnieper.

On January 12, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued an order to the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to encircle and destroy enemy troops.

On January 24, the Korsun-Shevchenko operation began. At dawn, hundreds of guns opened fire on enemy positions. Powerful artillery fire destroyed defensive structures, filled up trenches and communication passages, and destroyed enemy manpower and military equipment.

As soon as the artillery moved the fire into the depths, the advanced battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack.
On January 26, from the opposite side of the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge, troops of the 40th, 27th and 6th tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck.

On January 31, the 27th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 4th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front met in the Olshany area, thereby closing the encirclement ring.

By the end of February 3, Soviet troops completed the complete encirclement of the entire Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group, establishing a continuous front line. On February 4–5, fascist German troops unsuccessfully repeated attempts to break through the encirclement front with attacks in the direction of Shpola. Also unsuccessful were the enemy’s attempts to break through the encirclement in the sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the Rizino area to Lysyanka.

In order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the Soviet command proposed that the Nazi troops surrender on February 8. But, deceived by Hitler’s promises of help, they refused to capitulate and continued to resist. Soviet troops, tightening the encirclement, continued to eliminate the enemy group. Until February 12, the destruction was carried out by the forces of both fronts, and then by the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front alone. On February 11, the enemy launched a large counterattack with five tank divisions from the Yerki area and north of Buka in the general direction of Shanderovka. On February 12, the troops of the encircled group went on the offensive from the Steblev-Tarasha line in the direction of Lysyanka. At the cost of heavy losses, the advancing fascist German divisions managed to reach the Chesnovka-Lysyanka line by February 16. The German troops breaking out from the encirclement at the same time captured the Khilki-Komarovka and Novo-Buda areas, but they still failed to connect with the divisions advancing towards them. The enemy was first stopped, and then defeated and destroyed. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front captured Korsun-Shevchenkovsky with a swift attack on February 14.

The last attempt by the Germans to break out of the encirclement took place on February 17. In the first echelon there were three columns: the 5th SS Panzer Division " Viking"on the left, the 72nd Infantry Division in the center and the corps group" B"on the right flank. The rearguard was the 57th and 88th Infantry Divisions. The main blow fell on the 5th Guards. airborne, 180th and 202nd rifle divisions in the inner ring of encirclement and along the 41st Guards. rifle division on the outer. Basically, German troops broke through between the villages of Zhurzhintsy and Pochapintsy directly to October, but many, due to shelling from Height 239, went south of it and even south of Pochapintsy and reached Gnilomy Tikach, where there were no crossings. This led to major losses both from hypothermia when trying to cross using improvised means, and from shelling by Soviet troops. During the breakthrough, the commander of the encircled German group, artillery general Wilhelm Stemmermann, died.

On February 17, 1944, the entire surrounded group of Nazi troops ceased to exist.

Results of the operation

Although the task of destroying the encircled group was not completely solved, the group was nevertheless defeated. The second Stalingrad did not happen, but two German army corps ceased to exist. On February 20, Manstein decided to send all the remnants of the withdrawn divisions to various training and formation centers, for reorganization or to join other units.

For the exploits and courage shown in battles, 23 Soviet units and formations were given the honorary names “Korsun”, 6 formations - “Zvenigorod”. 73 servicemen were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, 9 of them posthumously. For the defeat of the enemy near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Army General I. S. Konev, the first of the front commanders during the war, was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union on February 20, and the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov on February 21 became the first, along with Fedorenko, marshal of armored forces - this military rank was just introduced by Stalin, and Zhukov recommended Rotmistrov for this rank, and Stalin also proposed Fedorenko.

The German side was also not deprived of awards. 48 people received the Knight's Cross, 10 people received the Knight's Cross with oak leaves and 3 people received the Knight's Cross with oak leaves and swords, including Lieutenant General Lieb on February 7 and 18 received successively the first and second awards.

Losses of the parties

As a result of fierce battles, the Germans lost 55 thousand killed and over 18 thousand captured. 40,423 Germans managed to escape.

Our irretrievable losses amounted to 24,286 people. Only the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front captured: 41 aircraft, 167 tanks and self-propelled guns, 618 field guns of various calibers, 267 mortars, 789 machine guns, 10 thousand vehicles, 7 steam locomotives, 415 wagons and tanks, 127 tractors and other trophies.

Let us remember those difficult days of our Fatherland and will never allow destructive fascist ideas to live freely on our land. We will also make every effort so that our children, our youth do not grow up infantile and indifferent to the heroic history of Russia, so that in times of trial they can firmly say “ No "Anyone who will try to encroach on our Motherland, on its integrity, on our faith...

Lord, make our armed forces invincible, order us to be strong in the Orthodox faith, and do not allow pernicious trends in Holy Rus'! Cover our Russian country with Your Grace, strengthen and protect us from all troubles and enemies, visible and invisible!
And rest the souls of the warriors who laid down their heads for faith and the Fatherland in times of fierce trials in Your Heavenly Villages!

With love,
RB Dmitry

Korsun-Shevchenko operation(also Korsun-Shevchenkovsky battle, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky cauldron, Korsun cauldron, Cherkassy cauldron, Cherkassy encirclement) (January 24 - February 17, 1944) - an offensive operation of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, carried out with the aim of destroying Korsun- Shevchenko's enemy group. It is part of the strategic offensive of Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine.

The operation ended with the withdrawal of German troops from encirclement, although with the complete loss of all heavy weapons. The commander of the group, General Stemmerman, died during the breakthrough on the night of February 17-18.

Position of forces

By holding the ledge, the enemy did not allow the fronts to close adjacent flanks and prevented their advance to the Southern Bug. On January 12, the Supreme Command Headquarters, by directive No. 220006, assigned the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts the task of encircling and destroying the enemy group in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky salient.

Planning the operation

The command's plan was to deliver counter attacks by troops from two fronts under the base of the ledge and unite in the area of ​​the cities of Shpola and Zvenigorodka. Part of the forces of the 40th and 27th Armies, the 6th Tank Army and part of the forces of the 2nd Air Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the 52nd, 4th Guards, 53rd Armies, 5th the Guards Tank Army, the 5th Air Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, as well as the 10th Air Defense Fighter Corps of the country. The operation was prepared in a difficult situation, especially for the 1st Ukrainian Front, whose troops at that time were repelling fierce enemy attacks in the area north of Uman and east of Vinnitsa. The early thaw and spring thaw in Ukraine hampered the maneuver of troops, the supply of materiel, and the use of unpaved airfields by aviation.

Combat and numerical strength of the parties

USSR

1st Ukrainian Front (Army General N.F. Vatutin)

• 27th Army (Lieutenant General S. G. Trofimenko)
  • 180th Rifle Division
  • 206th Infantry Division
  • 337th Infantry Division
  • 54th fortified area
  • 159th fortified area
  • 28,348 people, 887 guns and mortars, 38 self-propelled guns.

• left wing of the 40th Army (Lieutenant General F. F. Zhmachenko)
  • 47th Rifle Corps (Major General I. S. Shmygo)
    • 359th Infantry Division
  • 104th Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A. V. Petrushevsky)
    • 133rd Infantry Division
  • 33,726 people, 883 guns and mortars, 26 tanks, 27 self-propelled guns.

• 2nd Air Army (part of the forces, Aviation Lieutenant General S. A. Krasovsky)
  • 2,709 people, 164 fighters, 92 attack aircraft, 43 day and 192 night bombers, 12 reconnaissance aircraft.

2nd Ukrainian Front (Army General I. S. Konev)

• 52nd Army (Lieutenant General G. A. Koroteev)
  • 73rd Rifle Corps (Major General S. A. Kozak)
    • 254th Rifle Division
    • 294th Rifle Division
  • 78th Rifle Corps (Major General G. A. Latyshev)
    • 373rd Rifle Division
  • 15,886 people, 375 guns and mortars.

• 4th Guards Army (Major General A. I. Ryzhov)
  • 20th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General N. I. Biryukov)
    • 7th Guards Airborne Division
    • 62nd Guards Rifle Division
    • 31st Infantry Division
  • 21st Guards Rifle Corps (Major General P. I. Fomenko)
    • 69th Guards Rifle Division
    • 94th Guards Rifle Division
    • 252nd Rifle Division
    • 375th Infantry Division
  • 45,653 people, 1,083 guns and mortars, 15 tanks, 3 self-propelled guns.

• 53rd Army (Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin)
  • 78th Guards Rifle Division
  • 214th Rifle Division
  • 26th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General P. A. Firsov)
    • 6th Infantry Division
  • 48th Guards Rifle Corps
    • 14th Guards Rifle Division
    • 66th Guards Rifle Division
  • 75th Rifle Corps (Major General A. Z. Akimenko)
    • 138th Infantry Division
    • 213th Rifle Division
    • 233rd Rifle Division
  • 54,043 people, 1,094 guns and mortars, 14 tanks.

• 5th Air Army (Lieutenant General of Aviation S.K. Goryunov)
  • 7,618 people, 241 fighters, 93 attack aircraft, 126 day and 74 night bombers, 17 reconnaissance aircraft.

• Front reserves
  • 5th Guards Don Cossack Cavalry Corps (Major General A. G. Selivanov)
  • 20,258 people, 354 guns and mortars, 6 tanks, 8 self-propelled guns.

Germany

• XI Army Corps (Artillery General W. Stemmerman)
  • 5th SS Volunteer Assault Brigade "Wallonia"
  • 72nd Infantry Division
  • 389th Infantry Division
  • 35,000 people, 319 guns and mortars, 12 self-propelled guns, 55 tanks and assault guns, 7 self-propelled anti-tank guns.

• 47th Panzer Corps (Lieutenant General N. von Vormann)
  • 106th Infantry Division
  • 320th Infantry Division
  • 50,000 people, 300 guns and mortars, 17 self-propelled guns, 158 tanks and assault guns, 10 self-propelled anti-tank guns.

Carrying out the operation

Actions in the sector of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on January 24-28

January 24

In the sector of the German 3rd Tank and 389th Infantry Divisions, the advanced battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. During the battles, they pushed the enemy back by 2-6 km.

The 25th of January

At 7:46 a.m. the main forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. The 389th Infantry Division was attacked by six rifle divisions (31st, 375th, 69th Guards Infantry Division from the 4th Guards Army and 25th Guards, 66th Guards Infantry Division, 1st Guards . airborne division from the 53rd Army) and its southern flank soon collapsed. At 2 p.m., the 20th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards were brought into battle. tank army, which by the end of the day advanced 18-20 km, reaching Kapitanivka and Tishkovka. To help the 389th Division, it was decided to send first the 676th Regiment from the 57th Infantry Division, and then the entire division. Actions against the 3rd Panzer and 106th Infantry Divisions were less successful. Four Soviet divisions (14th Guards, 138th, 213th and 233rd from the 53rd Army), with minimal tank support, were able to advance only 5 km in the 3rd Tank Division zone.

January 26

In the morning, the 20th Tank Corps continued its offensive, drove the German troops out of Kapitanova and continued towards Lebedin, which it reached in the late evening, where it was met only by a group from the rear units of the 389th Division. The 29th Tank Corps occupied Rossohovatka, pushing Langkeit’s battle group (36th Tank Regiment, 1st Battalion of the 103rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment, 1st Division of the 4th Artillery Regiment from the 14th Panzer Division) to the west. Kampfgruppe von Brese (108th Panzergrenadier Regiment, 14th Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Division of the 4th Artillery Regiment, anti-aircraft artillery from the 14th Panzer Division) was surrounded west of Ositnyazhke. At 13 o'clock the first serious counterattacks of the German troops began - units of the 11th Tank Division went on the offensive from Kamenovatka, which by the evening managed to occupy the southern part of Tishkovka.

January 27

At 10 o'clock in the morning, after moving all night, the advanced units of the 8th Guards. and the 155th tank brigade of the 20th tank corps liberated Shpola. The 29th Tank Corps operated southeast of Shpola and liberated Vodyanoye, Lipyanka and Mezhigorka. Meanwhile, the 11th Panzer Division resumed its operations early in the morning at 5:30 and at 9:10 established contact with the encircled von Brese group northeast of Kapitanova. Thus, supply routes to advanced Soviet formations were cut off. The task of restoring contact with the tank corps that had gone forward was assigned to the 18th Tank Corps from the 5th Guards. TA and 5th Guards. cavalry corps, which until now were in the army and front reserve, respectively. 4th Guards The army continued to press the German 389th and 72nd divisions, which were approached by units of the 57th division, as well as a tank group from the SS Viking Panzergrenadier Division. The 53rd Army put pressure on the 3rd Panzer Division, which nevertheless managed to send a tank group to help the 14th Panzer Division, which tried to recapture Rossohovatka, which, however, failed.

28 January

In the morning, the 20th Tank Corps resumed its movement towards Zvenigorodka and in the middle of the day linked up with the 233rd Tank Brigade from the 6th Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the same time, German troops continued to try to take control of the Kapitanivka area. Strong reinforcements arrived at the 11th Tank Division - the 1st battalion of the 26th Tank Regiment, which had 75 Panthers, including 61 combat-ready ones. However, it was not possible to use its striking force. As a result of the battalion's unsuccessful actions, separated from units of the 11th Panzer Division, it lost 44 tanks, including 10 permanently.

Actions of the 1st Ukrainian Front on January 26-28

January 26

In the morning, after a 40-minute artillery preparation, the troops of the 27th, 40th and 6th tank armies went on the offensive in two sectors. The first of them, where the main blow was delivered, was in the Tynovka area, here formations of the 40th Army advanced with the support of the 5th Mechanized and 5th Guards. tank corps. The offensive developed slowly, and tank units suffered serious losses (the German VII Corps announced the destruction of 82 tanks). By the end of the day, the advance in the zone of the 34th Infantry Division near Tynovka was insignificant; in the zone of its northern neighbor, the 198th Division, more serious results were achieved - the first line of defense was overcome, the depth of advance was 8-10 km. However, the most significant success was achieved in the offensive zone of the 27th Army (180th and 337th Infantry Division), where it was able to break through the defenses of the 88th Infantry Division to a depth of 18 km with minimal armored support.

January 27

The offensive resumed early in the morning, but, as on the previous day, it developed slowly in the zone of the main group. The 6th Tank Army, for example, advanced only 10-15 km, while suffering significant losses in men and equipment. Vatutin, in view of the unexpected success of the secondary group, decides to shift the main efforts to the north. For this purpose, the 47th Rifle Corps from the 40th Army was transferred to the 6th Tank Army. At the same time, the 5th Mechanized Corps was withdrawn from the 6th Tank Army, which was supposed to go 100 km southeast to the right flank of the 40th Army to repel the proposed German offensive from the Vinnitsa area. By order of the military council of the front, a mobile group was formed based on the 233rd tank brigade with the 1228th self-propelled artillery regiment, a motorized rifle battalion and an anti-tank battery - a total of 39 tanks, 16 self-propelled guns, 4 anti-tank guns and 200 machine gunners. Her task was to break through to Zvenigorodka through Lysyanka and connect with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Near Tikhonovka, the group liberated the 136th Rifle Division and the 6th Guards from encirclement. motorized rifle brigade, in which they had been since January 10. By midnight, the group occupied the operationally important Lysyanka point.

28 January

At 8 o'clock in the morning the mobile group resumed its advance towards Zvenigorodka and by 13 o'clock in the afternoon managed to break through to it from the north-west and start street battles. At the same time, units of the 155th Tank Brigade of the 5th Guards approached from the southeast. Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Tankers from both fronts took up a perimeter defense with a firm determination to hold the city until the main forces arrived. 5th Guards The tank corps was deployed to advance after the mobile group to build on the success.

The offensive of Soviet troops near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. Encirclement of the German group.

Formation of external and internal fronts of encirclement

To close the internal front of the encirclement, the forces of the 27th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 4th Guards were brought in. army and 5th Guards. cavalry corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On January 31, units of the 180th Infantry Division from the 27th Army and the 5th Guards met in the Olshany area. cavalry corps. On February 3, the main forces of the 4th Guards arrived here. army and a continuous internal front of encirclement was formed. In total, these troops (including the 52nd Army) included 13 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 2 fortified areas, as well as reinforcements. Of the heavy weapons there were approx. 2,000 guns and mortars and 138 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 6th and 5th Guards were used to form an external encirclement front. tank armies. To increase the stability of the defense, they were assigned rifle formations. The 6th Tank Army received the 47th Rifle Corps, and the 5th Guards. tank army - 49th Rifle Corps (6th Guards Airborne Division, 94th Guards and 84th Infantry Division). In addition, the 5th Guards. The tank army was reinforced by the 34th anti-tank brigade (54 guns) and the 5th engineering brigade of the RGK. Later on February 3, the 375th Infantry Division was transferred, as well as a number of artillery units - the 11th anti-tank fighter, 49th light artillery and 27th separate heavy cannon artillery brigades. The 40th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 53rd Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front adjoined the flanks of the tank armies.

Combat and numerical strength of the encircled German group

Two army corps, 42 and XI, were encircled, consisting of six divisions (Corps Group “B”, 88th, 57th, 72nd and 389th Infantry Divisions, 5th SS Viking TD) and one brigade (5th SS brigade "Wallonia"). A number of other units mentioned in Soviet sources were often organizationally included in the above-mentioned divisions. For example, in the 88th Infantry Division, out of three native regiments (245th, 246th and 248th), only the 248th was available. The 245th was sent to the 68th Infantry Division, and from the 246th they formed a battalion in the 248th regiment, the 2nd battalion of which, in turn, was renamed the divisional fusilier battalion. The second full-fledged regiment of the division was the 323rd divisional group of two battalions (591st and 593rd regimental groups). Also assigned to the division were the 417th Infantry Regiment from the 168th Infantry Division (battalion-sized) and two battalions of the 318th Security Regiment of the 213th Security Division. The 389th Infantry was assigned two battalions from the 167th Infantry. On January 28, the 198th Infantry Regiment was temporarily surrounded in the Bosovka-Dashukovka area, but managed to break through to the south. The strength of the group was about 59,000 people, 313 artillery pieces (including 23 self-propelled guns excluding mortars and infantry guns), approximately 70 tanks and assault guns.

Fighting after the group's encirclement

Soviet troops on the internal front of the encirclement sought to dismember and destroy the encircled enemy group with attacks from all directions. German troops tried to retreat to positions advantageous for defense. On the night of January 29, the 88th Infantry Division was ordered to withdraw across the Ros River and take up positions east and north of Boguslav. On the morning of January 29, Soviet infantry from the 337th Rifle Division began a battle to capture Boguslav, but were driven back after the arrival of seven assault guns from the 239th Assault Gun Battalion. In the second half of January 29, Corps Group “B” (in which by that time, after all the withdrawals, only 3 infantry battalions remained) began to be withdrawn to the line of the Rossava River. On February 2, units of the 27th Army crossed Rossava in the Sinyavka-Pilyavy sector and formed a bridgehead 10 km along the front and several kilometers in depth. In the evening, the commander of the 42nd Corps, Lieb, decided to begin the withdrawal of troops from the Dnieper. On the afternoon of February 3, four Soviet machine-gun battalions, with tank support, broke through the German position between Mironovka and Boguslav, forcing German units from the 332nd Divisional Group and the 88th Division to withdraw slightly to the east. Under the threat of encirclement from the north, Boguslav was abandoned by German troops that same evening. After these battles, the northern and western sections of the 42 Corps front remained calm for several days.

On January 28, the 180th Rifle Division, reinforced by a tank brigade, attacked the German garrison in Steblevo, which consisted mainly of a reserve field battalion of the SS Viking division. During the fighting, a number of German positions were surrounded, and on the morning of January 29, Soviet tanks broke into Steblev itself, but were destroyed. In the evening of the same day, reinforcements approached the city in the form of two battalions of the 255th divisional group from Corps Group “B” and part of the 239th assault gun division. On January 28, the German command also decided to strengthen another important point for it - Olshanu. In Olshan itself there were only supply units for the SS Viking division. First of all, a company from the Estonian “Narva” battalion was sent for reinforcement. She was followed by a group of four recovered assault guns. The latter arrived in the village at 18 o'clock in the evening and within an hour counterattacked Soviet units from the 136th Infantry Division, which broke into the village from the north, and knocked them out, declaring the destruction of five self-propelled guns (possibly SU-76) at the cost of the loss of one assault guns. On January 29, the battles for Olshana flared up with renewed vigor and new heavy losses for both sides. On January 30, the 63rd Cavalry Division from the 5th Guards approached and entered into battle. cavalry corps, but the Germans finally received reinforcements in the form of a company from the Narva battalion. The rest of the battalion arrived on January 31, along with an engineer company and tanks from the Viking. On the evening of January 31, Olshana was completely surrounded by Soviet troops, but the decisive assault was postponed until the arrival of larger infantry forces of the 4th Guards. army. February 2, with the arrival of the 5th Guards. airborne and 62nd Guards. rifle divisions, the attacks were resumed. By February 3, despite the serious superiority of Soviet troops in numbers, the city was only occupied by a quarter. Meanwhile, German troops created a new defensive line 10 km north of the village with the help of the Viking, 57th and 389th divisions. The defense of Olshany was no longer needed, and on the night of February 6, German troops abandoned it and broke through to the northeast, where they linked up with the infantry regiment of the 389th division at Petropavlovka. During the breakthrough, the Estonian battalion, which was following in the rearguard and was ambushed, suffered serious losses.

On January 30, units of the 180th Rifle Division occupied Kvitki, located only 10 kilometers south of Korsun and 12 kilometers west of Gorodishche. Lieb ordered the re-occupation of Kvitki, for which the 110th Regimental Group (the size of a battalion) was allocated. On January 31, the group began its attack south, towards Kvitki and occupied Petrushki, 5 kilometers to the north. Late in the evening of February 1, the group launched an attack on Kvitki and took the Soviet units by surprise, quickly capturing the northern part of the village. On the morning of February 2, Schenk's group continued its offensive, but there was no longer enough strength to complete the mission, despite the arrival of three assault guns to help. Over the next few days, both sides received reinforcements. The 337th Infantry Division arrived from near Boguslav, and Schenk’s group was reinforced by the remaining units from the 112th Divisional Group, as well as from the Viking Division. In the course of further fighting, German troops were forced to leave the center of the village and retreat to its northern part, and by February 9 they retreated to Petrushki, where they had started eight days earlier.

The XI Corps, consisting of the 57th, 72nd and 389th divisions, which held the pocket ledge in the Gorodishche area, was subjected to strong attacks from February 2 to 5 by divisions of the 4th Guards. armies, which, however, had virtually no success. On February 6, Soviet troops by the 5th Guards. cavalry corps and units of four rifle divisions from the 4th Guards. The armies tried to strike at Valyava (a village between Gorodishche and Korsun) to cut off the Gorodishche grouping of German troops and thereby cut the cauldron. The stubborn resistance of the German troops did not allow this to be done, but after the capture of Valiava on February 7 and its retention by Soviet troops despite enemy counterattacks, the Germans were forced to retreat from the fortified ledge. The settlement itself was liberated on February 9. On the same day, Stemmerman ordered the temporary disbandment of the 389th Division, whose combat strength had fallen to 200 infantry and three artillery batteries, and its remnants to be incorporated into the 57th Division. By February 8, the territory occupied by German troops was completely covered by Soviet artillery. In order to avoid bloodshed, the Soviet command on February 8 presented the command of the encircled group with an ultimatum demanding surrender. The response was expected on February 9 before 12 o'clock, but the German command rejected it, as they were preparing to break through Shenderovka.

During these same days, the command structure of the encircled German group changed. On February 6, Stemmermann sent a secret radio message to Wehler asking him to appoint someone as commander of the encircled troops, as the situation required. On the morning of February 7, the headquarters of the 8th Army issued an order appointing Stemmerman commander of all encircled troops, including the 42nd Corps. The surrounded troops were called the Stemmermann group. By February 9, they had suffered serious losses - Stemmerman reported to the headquarters of the 8th Army that the average number of riflemen in the infantry regiments had fallen to 150 people, about 10% of their regular strength. On February 8 alone, losses amounted to 350 people and 1,100 wounded were awaiting evacuation by air.

The first attempt by German troops to free the encircled

By February 3, the grouping of Soviet troops on the external front of the encirclement had the following appearance. In the sector from Tinovka to Zvenigorodka, the defense was occupied by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front: the 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army (58th, 133rd, 136th Infantry Division), 47th Rifle Corps (167th, 359th I SD), 5th Guards Tank and 5th Mechanized Corps of the 6th Tank Army (the latter was returned a few days after departure). From Zvenigorodka to Kanizh the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front defended: the 49th Rifle Division (6th Guards Airborne Division, 84th, 94th Guards, 375th Infantry Division), 18th, 20th and 29th th tank corps of the 5th Guards. Tank Army, 53rd Army as part of the 1st Guards. Airborne Division, 6th, 14th Guards, 25th Guards, 66th Guards, 78th, 80th Guards, 89th Guards, 138th, 213th and 214th th sd. A total of 22 rifle divisions, 4 tank and mechanized corps, totaling approx. 150 thousand people, 2,736 guns and mortars, 307 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Manstein, has at his disposal 20 tank formations (1st, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th -I, 16th, 17th, 19th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, “Great Germany”, “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking” ), planned not only to relieve two German corps from encirclement, but also to encircle and destroy the 5th Guards and 6th Tank Armies. The 13th Panzer Division was transferred to the 47th Corps zone of the 8th Army. The 11th Tank Division of the same corps was reinforced by a number of units - the 8th Tank Battalion from the 20th Panzer-Grenadier Division, the 905th and 911th Assault Gun Divisions. To free up the 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions, they were replaced by the 320th Infantry Division, whose defense sector, in turn, was occupied by the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division. The approach of the 24th Tank and 376th Infantry Divisions was expected. The 17th Panzer Division began to be transferred to the VII Corps' area of ​​operations on January 28. It was followed on January 29 by the 16th Panzer Division and the control of the III Panzer Corps. A little later, the 1st SS Panzer Division "LAG" and the Beke heavy tank regiment began transferring. From the 4th Panzer Army, the 1st Panzer Division began transferring, whose approach was expected later. The III Panzer Corps was to launch an offensive on February 3 with the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions and the Becke Regiment, and was to be joined by the SS Leibstandarte Division the next day. The operation was codenamed "Wanda".

On February 1, the 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions launched an offensive to the north and captured a bridgehead at Iskrennoe on the Shpolka River. On February 2, the 3rd and 14th tank divisions also began to approach the bridgehead. On February 3, attacks from the bridgehead resumed, but were very low-intensity, since the commander of the 47th Corps decided to wait until February 4, when the 24th Panzer Division was supposed to arrive and begin the offensive simultaneously with the III Panzer Corps. However, at the last moment the 24th Panzer Division, on Hitler's orders, was sent south to the 6th Army. On February 4, the offensive from the bridgehead resumed and the 11th Panzer Division occupied Vodyanoye, and the 3rd Panzer Division reached Lipyanka. On February 5, most of Lipyanka, except for its district, was captured by the forces of the 3rd and 14th tank divisions. Further advance of the German troops was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On February 8, a decision was made to resume offensive operations on the left flank of the 47th Corps a few days later, which required new regroupings. For the attack from Verbovets to Zvenigorodka, the 11th, 13th and 14th tank divisions were to be used.

III Panzer Corps, due to delays in the concentration of forces, was forced to postpone its offensive for one day. On February 4, a German group consisting of the 16th and 17th tank divisions and the Becke heavy tank regiment went on the offensive. The 16th Panzer Division was further reinforced by the 506th Tiger Heavy Tank Battalion, and the 17th by the 249th Assault Gun Battalion. In total, the group had 126 combat-ready tanks and assault guns (41 Pz.IV, 48 Panthers, 16 Tigers and 21 StuG III). On February 6, the advanced units of the 1st Panzer Division began to arrive in this area, and it was fully concentrated on February 10.

The tank fist did its job and, despite the resistance of the 104th Rifle Corps (58th and 133rd Infantry Divisions), the strike group of the 1st Tank Army was able to wedge into its defenses, occupying Votylevka, Tynovka and the southern part of Kosyakovka on February 4 Rotten Tikacha. On the morning of February 5, the 16th Panzer Division completely occupied Kosyakovka, but the bridges over Gniloya Tikach were blown up. Votylevka was abandoned by parts of Beke's regiment due to lack of ammunition. On the same day, Soviet troops launched their first counterattacks against the 16th Panzer Division, which cut off its advance group at Kosyakovka. By evening, the 17th Tank Division reoccupied Votylevka; Soviet troops managed to hold out only in the eastern part of the village. The 198th Infantry Division, supported by rocket mortars, broke into Vinograd and occupied its southern part, its further advance was stopped by a Soviet tank counterattack. To localize and eliminate the enemy who had broken through, Vatutin ordered the 2nd Tank Army, which had recently arrived from the General Headquarters reserve, to be brought into the battle. The strength of the army on January 25 was as follows: 3rd Tank Corps - 208 T-34-76, 5 Valentine IX, 12 SU-152, 21 SU-76M; 16th Tank Corps - 14 T-34-76; 11th separate guards. TBR - 56 T-34-76; 887th Separate Motorcycle Battalion - 10 "Valentine IX".

On the morning of February 6, the 2nd Tank Army attacked the enemy in the direction of Chervona Zirka, Tynovka and Votylevka, but was unsuccessful. On the same day, the German side restored contact with the group in Kosyakovka and brought into battle Huppert’s combat group from the 1st Panzer Division, which, together with the 198th Infantry Division, occupied Vinograd, except for its eastern part. On February 7, units of the 2nd Tank Army continued their operations against the enemy and, after intense fighting, drove them out of Kosyakovka. The 16th Tank Division completely occupied Tatyanovka on this day. The 17th Tank Division cleared Votylevka from Soviet troops that had made their way into the village. The 198th Infantry Division, together with Hupert's group, tried to advance east of Vinograd, but without success. On February 8, the 8th Guards was advanced to the Lysyanka area to occupy a strong all-round defense. tank brigade from the 20th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards. tank army together with the 1895th self-propelled artillery regiment and one regiment of the 31st iptabr and by 4 o'clock in the morning on February 9 they were in position. In addition, the 20th Tank Corps received the task of covering the roads leading north and south from the villages of Kazatskoye and Tarasovka (15-18 km northeast of Zvenigorodka), the 18th Tank Corps - roads in the Topilno area (12 km north -west of Shpola), 29th Tank Corps - in the Serdegovka area (15 km northeast of Shpola). On February 9, Huppert's Kampfgruppe occupied Tolstye Rogi, and the 17th Panzer Division occupied Repki. Further progress of the latter was stopped by lack of fuel. Also, due to lack of fuel, the 16th Panzer Division stopped its offensive. Due to the slow progress at the headquarters of the 1st German Tank Army, it was decided to change the direction of the offensive, transfer the strike force to the Rizino area and from there advance on Lysyanka.

Second attempt by German troops to free the encircled

At 11 a.m. on February 11, German troops again went on the offensive on the outer front of the encirclement. In the Yerka area, the 47th Tank Corps, with the forces of the 11th, 13th and 14th Tank Divisions (a little more than 30 combat-ready tanks) and the Haak battle group (created from vacationers of the encircled formations), displacing the combat outpost of the 375th Infantry Division, occupied Romanovka , Yerki and the bridge over Shpolka in the direction of Maly Yekaterinopol. On the morning of February 12, units of the 20th Panzer Corps attacked the German bridgehead at Erki, but Haak's group repelled them. By the evening, the 11th and 13th tank divisions occupied Skalevatka and Yurkovka, and a little later the latter, with the support of Haack’s group and dive bombers from the 2nd Immelman squadron, captured command heights five kilometers south of Zvenigorodka, including height 204.8 . Further advance of the German troops was stopped by stubborn resistance and counterattacks by the 49th Rifle Corps and units of the 20th Tank Corps.

In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the III German tank corps, due to a stronger group (1st, 16th, 17th, 1st SS tank divisions with reinforcements numbered at least 155 combat-ready tanks and assault guns), managed to reach and more significant successes. The 16th Panzer Division, reinforced by the Beke regiment, went on the offensive at 7 a.m. on February 11, a few hours later, covering 8-10 km, it reached Buzhanka and Frankovka. In the latter, they managed to capture the bridge across the Rotten Tikach intact. The 1st Panzer Division, which was to the south, went on the offensive at 6:30 and 6 hours later, having covered 15 km, it also reached Buzhanka and captured a bridgehead on the other side of Gnily Tikach with infantry forces. Next, Frank's battle group from the 1st Panzer Division captured the southern part of Lysyanka in a surprise attack in the evening, but the main target of the attack, the bridge, was destroyed by Soviet troops. Vatutin retaliated by attacking the positions of the 34th Infantry and 1st SS Panzer Divisions, but this did not lead to any success.

Continuation of the struggle around the “cauldron”

Meanwhile, in the cauldron, actions were taken to counter traffic. In the area south of Steblevo, forces were gathering for an attack on Shenderovka and Novaya Buda. The first to arrive was the "Germany" regiment from the SS "Wiking" division and in the evening it managed to capture Shenderovka. The main forces of the attackers were units of the 72nd Infantry Division, which carried out a night attack and occupied Novaya Buda, the northern part of Khilek and Komarovka. The advanced units of the III Panzer Corps were less than 20 km away.

The successful actions of the German troops caused a crisis in the Soviet military leadership. According to G.K. Zhukov, Konev, having learned about Vatutin’s failures in the sector of the 27th Army, called Stalin, informed him about this and offered to give him leadership for the liquidation of the entire encircled group. In this case, the 1st Ukrainian Front was left with the defense of the external front of the encirclement. Despite the objections of Vatutin and Zhukov, this decision was made. According to I.S. Konev, Stalin called him himself, since Headquarters had information about a breakthrough in the 27th Army zone, and inquired about the situation and the decisions made. A little later, Stalin called again and suggested the above. Additionally, a telegram from Headquarters was sent to Zhukov and Vatutin indicating the reasons for the situation: “Firstly, there was no general plan for the destruction of the Korsun enemy group through the joint efforts of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.

Secondly, the weak 27th Army was not reinforced in a timely manner.

Thirdly, no decisive measures were taken to carry out the instructions of the Headquarters to destroy first of all the enemy’s Steblevo ledge, from where attempts to break through were most likely to be expected.”

This was followed by a directive from Headquarters, which stated the transfer of the 27th Army in its entirety under the command of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Zhukov was tasked with coordinating the interaction of fronts on the outer front of the encirclement.

After these events, the commanders of both fronts took measures to prevent a further breakthrough by the enemy and to quickly destroy the encircled group. The 27th Army was reinforced by the 202nd Rifle Division, and the 27th Separate Tank Brigade from the 5th Guards was concentrated in the Maidanovka area (10 km southeast of Lysyanka). tank army with the task of preventing a breakthrough from Lysyanka to the encircled group while simultaneously reassigning it to the 4th Guards. army. A little earlier, the same army was transferred to the 80th Tank Brigade from the 20th Tank Corps to strengthen the rifle formations involved in the destruction of the encircled. Instead, the 20th Tank Corps received the 110th Tank Brigade (n/a Oktyabr, 4 km northeast of Lysyanka) from the 18th Tank Corps.

On February 13, the 29th Tank Corps, by order of the commander of the 5th Guards. The tank army went on the offensive with the aim of destroying the enemy in the Steblevo area. The corps together with units of the 5th Guards. On February 14, the cavalry corps liberated Novaya Buda from the enemy and pushed him back in the Komarovka area by 1.5-2 km. On the same day, Konev gave the order to redeploy the main forces of the 5th Guards. tank army from the Zvenigorodka area to the Steblevo and Lysyanka area. By 16:00 on February 14, the redeployment was largely completed. Since regrouping in muddy conditions was complicated by significant difficulties, by order of Rotmistrov, the 20th and 18th tank corps left all faulty tanks in place and went to new areas with 5-14 tanks per brigade. The 49th Rifle Corps was transferred from the 5th Guards. tank army into the 53rd Army and additionally reinforced by the 110th Guards. and the 233rd rifle divisions.

“Agony” of the efforts of Breit’s corps and the breakthrough of Stemmerman’s group

The 16th Panzer Division was virtually inactive on 12 February due to lack of fuel and ammunition, apart from two local attacks that were repulsed by Soviet troops. The 17th Panzer Division made only a small advance. The 398th Infantry and 1st SS Panzer Divisions came under attack by Soviet forces and were forced to abandon most of Vinograd and Repka, respectively. Frank's battle group of the 1st Panzer Division, located at Lysyanka, also did not advance, since its supply lines were under Soviet artillery fire.

On February 13, the main attack ram of the III Panzer Corps was the Beke heavy tank regiment, which received fuel and ammunition by air at night. During the morning battle with units of the 2nd Tank Army, Beke's regiment and the 16th Tank Division captured Dashukovka and Chesnovka. The German side announced the destruction of 70 tanks and 40 anti-tank guns at the cost of the loss of five Tigers and four Panthers. Later, height 239.8 was taken sequentially, 5 kilometers north of Lysyanka and Khizhintsy. Another 12 km were covered, and only 10 km remained before Stemmermann’s group. On this day, the 1st Tank Division crossed the Gniloya Tikach and completely captured Lysyanka. The 198th Infantry Division regained control of Vinograd.

On February 14, Beke’s group did not advance due to the difficult terrain east of Khizhintsy and the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops. The 1st Tank Division managed to occupy the bridge over the stream that separated the Oktyabr village a couple of kilometers north of Lysyanka. On February 16, the last attempt was made to defeat the Soviet troops northeast of Lysyanka, but they only succeeded in occupying the Oktyabr farm. The available forces of the III Panzer Corps were completely exhausted. He was separated from Stemmerman's group by 7 km.

Breakthrough of German troops from encirclement

By February 12, the length of the perimeter of the encircled group was only 35 km. On February 14, the 294th Infantry Division and part of the forces of the 206th Infantry Division of the 73rd Rifle Corps of the 52nd Army liberated Korsun-Shevchenkovsky.

On the morning of February 15, at a meeting between Stemmermann and Lieb, a decision was made to make a breakthrough late in the evening of February 16. The breakthrough plan stipulated that the Lieb Corps, consisting of Corps Group B, the 72nd Infantry Division and the SS Viking Division, would be in the vanguard. It will be covered by Stemmermann's corps consisting of the 57th and 88th infantry divisions. From the Komarovka-Khilki area, Lieb's corps should break through along the shortest route to October, where the III Tank Corps was waiting for it. During February 15, the encircled German troops fought fierce battles for the possession of important settlements for the breakthrough - Khilki, Komarovka and Novaya Buda. A night attack by the 105th Regiment from the 72nd Division completely captured Khilki and, despite Soviet counterattacks the next day, held it. To the south there was a struggle for Komarovka and Novaya Buda, and within them themselves.

On the night of February 17, a breakthrough from the boiler began. On a front of 4.5 km, three columns marched in the first echelon: the 5th SS Wiking Panzer Division (11,500 people, including the Wallonia Brigade) on the left, the 72nd Infantry Division (4,000 people) in the center and the corps group "B" (7,430 people) on the right. The rearguard was the 57th (3,534 people) and 88th (5,150 people) infantry divisions. XI Corps headquarters estimated the number of men remaining in the pocket who could go into battle at 45,000. In addition, there were another 2,100 wounded, of whom it was decided to leave almost one and a half thousand who were unable to move independently in Shenderovka under the supervision of volunteer doctors. The main blow fell on the 5th Guards. airborne, 180th and 202nd rifle divisions in the inner ring of encirclement and along the 41st Guards. rifle division on the outer. Basically, German troops broke through between the villages of Zhurzhintsy and Pochapintsy directly to October, but many, due to shelling from Height 239, went south of it and even south of Pochapintsy and reached Gnilomy Tikach, where there were no crossings. This led to major losses both from hypothermia when trying to cross using improvised means, and from shelling by Soviet troops. During the breakthrough, the commander of the German group, General Stemmerman, was killed.

Supplying surrounded troops by air

To maintain the necessary combat readiness, the surrounded units had to receive at least 150 tons of cargo daily. Flights to deliver everything necessary to those surrounded began almost immediately after the ring closed. On the morning of January 29, the first 14 transport aircraft took off from Uman, carrying 30 tons of ammunition. They landed at the Korsun airstrip, which will play an important role in the coming weeks. The wounded were the first to set off on the return journey, of which by January 29 there were already over 2 thousand. Ju-52 aircraft from the 3rd transport squadron were used to deliver cargo. Initially, there was no fighter cover for the transports and they were forced to fly at low altitude to avoid Soviet fighters, although they suffered losses from ground fire. However, on February 1, when returning from Korsun, the Yu-52s flew high and were intercepted by Soviet fighters. As a result, 13 aircraft were shot down, two made emergency landings and one crashed at the airfield. After this incident, aircraft from the 52nd Fighter Squadron were used to provide cover. On average, 36 Yu-52 transports were covered by 3 Me-109 fighters, but they were usually enough to drive away Soviet aircraft. From January 29 to February 3, an average of 120-140 tons of cargo were delivered and 2,800 wounded were evacuated. In the following days, the weather worsened and daytime flights were temporarily suspended due to the impossibility of landing. On February 10, a record was set for the delivery of cargo - 250 tons, and 431 wounded were taken back. February 12 was the last day when landings were made on airfields inside the pocket. After this, all cargo was delivered by parachute. In total, 2,026 tons of cargo were delivered by landing or dropped, including 1,247 tons of ammunition, 45.5 tons of food, 38.3 tons of weapons and medicine and 695 cubic meters of fuel. 1,536 sorties were flown, including 832 Ju-52s, 478 He-111s, 58 FW-190s and 168 Bf-109s. Lost for all reasons, primarily due to Soviet fighters, 50 aircraft, including 32 Ju-52s, another 150 were damaged. According to other sources, 32 Ju-52s, 13 He-111s and 47 fighters were lost. 58 Soviet aircraft were claimed to have been shot down.

Losses of the parties

Soviet troops lost 80,188 people for all reasons during the operation, including 24,286 killed, dead and missing. Losses in armored vehicles are estimated from 606 to 850 tanks and self-propelled guns. During the period from January 20 to February 20, the 1st Ukrainian Front lost 1,711 guns and 512 mortars, and the 2nd Ukrainian - 221 guns and 154 mortars, but not all of these losses (especially the 1st Ukrainian) relate to Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya operations.

The losses of the encircled German troops amounted to approximately 30 thousand people, including about 19,000 killed and captured. Combat losses of units and formations of the 1st Tank Army for February 1-20 amounted to 4,181 people (804 killed, 2,985 wounded, 392 missing). The combat losses of the VII Army Corps for January 26-31 amounted to approximately 1,000 people. The losses of the 8th Army on the external front of the encirclement for January 20 - February 20 amounted to approximately 4,500 people. Losses in armored vehicles amounted, according to Frankson and Zetterling, to about 300 tanks and assault guns, of which about 240 were on the outer front of the encirclement, and about 50 inside the pocket. However, the latter number contradicts the number of tanks and assault guns inside the cauldron given above. Accordingly, according to Russian researcher A. Tomzov, the losses were higher, namely about 320 vehicles.

The result of the work of the Mattenklott group to account for those who escaped encirclement

Results of the operation

Although the task of destroying the encircled group was not completely solved, it was nevertheless defeated. The second Stalingrad did not happen, but two German army corps ceased to exist. On February 20, Manstein decided to send all the remnants of the withdrawn divisions to various training and formation centers, for reorganization or to join other units.

For the exploits and courage shown in battles, 23 Soviet units and formations were given the honorary names “Korsun”, 6 formations - “Zvenigorod”. 73 servicemen were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, 9 of them posthumously. For the defeat of the enemy near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Army General I. S. Konev, the first of the front commanders during the war, was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union on February 20, and the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov on February 21 became the first, along with Fedorenko, marshal of armored forces - this military rank was only introduced by Stalin, and Zhukov recommended Rotmistrov for this rank, and Stalin also proposed Fedorenko.

The German side was also not deprived of awards. 48 people received the Knight's Cross, 10 people the Knight's Cross with oak leaves and 3 people the Knight's Cross with oak leaves and swords, including Lieutenant General Lieb on February 7 and 18 received the first and second awards successively.

Main theaters of war:
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Humanitarian disasters:
Occupation of Soviet territory
Holocaust
Leningrad blockade
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Unit 731
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Anti-Hitler coalition

M.I. Bazilev, G.V. Kiyanchenko, K.O. Shurupov, L.P. Khodchenko, G.M. Yablonsky. Korsun-Shevchenko operation

When planning military operations for the winter of 1944, the goal of the operations of Soviet troops in the southwestern direction was to launch an offensive with the forces of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, to defeat Army Groups “South” and “A” , liberate Right Bank Ukraine and create conditions for Soviet troops to reach the southern state border. The Korsun-Shevchenko operation, carried out from January 24 to February 17, 1944, was aimed at destroying the enemy group in a deep ledge formed as a result of the Zhitomir-Berdichev and Kirovograd operations. This grouping included parts of the forces of the German 1st Panzer and 8th Field Armies of Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, it included 10 infantry, 2 tank divisions, a motorized SS Walloon brigade, 4 assault gun divisions, as well as a large number of artillery and engineering reinforcement units. It was supported by aviation from the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group numbered more than 170 thousand people, 1,640 guns and mortars, 140 tanks and assault guns, and up to 1,000 aircraft.

The enemy kept the largest reserves in the area west and north-west of Kirovograd (4 tank divisions) and in the area south-west of Okhmatov (3 tank divisions of the 1st Tank Army), which made it possible to quickly transfer them to the Zvenigorod-Mironovsky salient.

The enemy was preparing the ledge not only for stable defense, but also as a starting area for offensive operations. By holding it, he did not allow the adjacent flanks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts to close, prevented their advance to the Southern Bug, threatened to strike the flanks of the fronts and counted on restoring the defense along the Dnieper.

German tanks in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area. January 1944

The nature of the enemy defense along the entire perimeter was different. In front of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in the Tynovka-Kagarlyk sector, the enemy did not have time to create a powerful defense, since he was driven back to this line on January 10-12. Nevertheless, he managed to cover the strong points there with barriers. The enemy created the strongest defense with a developed system of defensive structures and various kinds of barriers in the Kagarlyk, Moshny area.

In the offensive zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Moshny and Smela sector, the area was swampy, and therefore the enemy’s defense here consisted of separate strong points that intercepted the main roads. And south of Smila it was more powerful and consisted of two stripes. At the same time, the main strip was equipped with a system of strongholds and resistance centers, covered with minefields and barbed wire. The construction of the second strip was not completed by the beginning of the Soviet offensive. The defending enemy formations and units accumulated a wealth of combat experience and, despite the losses suffered in previous battles, maintained a high degree of combat effectiveness.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) assigned the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts the task of encircling and destroying the enemy group in the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge. To solve it, she reinforced them with troops, especially mobile ones, military equipment, weapons and ammunition. Thus, in January, the 47th Combined Arms and 2nd Tank Armies, the 6th Guards Cavalry and the 5th Mechanized Corps were transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. From January 22 to February 3, 400 new T-34 tanks were sent to complete the tank forces. The 2nd Ukrainian Front was reinforced by the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, redeployed from the offensive zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

The operation involved the 40th, 27th, 6th Tank Armies, part of the forces of the 2nd Air Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the 52nd, 4th Guards, 53rd, 5th Guards Tank, 5 -I Air Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, as well as the 10th Fighter Aviation Corps of the country's air defense (air defense). In total, the group of Soviet troops included 27 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 fortified areas, 4 tank and 1 mechanized corps. It consisted of over 336 thousand people, about 4 thousand guns and mortars, 376 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, over 1000 aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by almost 2 times, in artillery by 2.4 times, and in tanks by 2.7 times, with approximately equality in aviation.

The plan of the operation provided for counter strikes by the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian and the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the base of the ledge in the general direction of Shpola to “encircle and destroy the enemy group in the Zvenigorod-Mironovsky ledge” and create conditions for the development of an offensive towards the Southern Bug.

Based on the general concept of the operation, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the army general, decided to break through the enemy’s defenses in the 27-kilometer section of Tynovka, Koshevatoye, having in the first echelon in the direction of the main attack the 40th, 27th combined arms and 6th tank armies . It was assumed that, given the incompleteness of the enemy’s defense equipment in the selected breakthrough area, a powerful initial strike by infantry and tanks could lead to a quick breakthrough and development of an offensive in depth. By the end of the first day of the operation, it was planned to advance 12-15 km, on the second day to capture Zvenigorodka, and by the end of the third day to unite with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Shpola area. In the future, it was planned to use the 6th Tank Army on the external front of the encirclement, and part of the forces of the 27th Army on the internal one.

The decision of the army general commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front provided for a breakthrough of the enemy defense in the direction of the main attack in the Verbovka, Krasnosilka area in a 19-kilometer area by the adjacent flanks of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies. In the 53rd Army zone, on the first day of the operation, it was planned to bring the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle to complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone and develop the offensive with the goal of reaching the Zvenigorodka area on the third or fourth day of the operation.

To the right of the front's strike group, the 52nd Army was supposed to attack. The 5th Guards Tank and 53rd armies were intended for operations on the external front of the encirclement, and formations of the 4th Guards and 52nd armies on the internal front. To hide the direction of the main attack and pin down enemy forces, it was planned to launch an offensive with the forces of the 5th and 7th Guards armies in the Kirovograd direction the day before the start of the operation.

The front troops were supported by the aviation of the 5th Air Army, and also in the interests of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, part of the aviation forces of the 2nd Air Army (fighter aviation corps, assault and night bomber aviation divisions) was involved. In order to create strike groupings of the fronts, troop regroupings were carried out. In the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 5th Guards Tank Army, a breakthrough artillery division and a number of artillery and engineering units were quickly transferred from the Kirovograd area to the direction of the main attack. Internal regroupings and strengthening of the 27th and 40th armies were carried out in the 1st Ukrainian Front. As a result of this, in the directions of the main attacks of the fronts, even greater superiority over the enemy was achieved: in the 1st Ukrainian - twofold in infantry and threefold in tanks and artillery; in the 2nd Ukrainian Front - more than three times in infantry, six times in artillery and ten times in tanks.

The operation was prepared in a short time (within five to seven days). At the same time, individual formations of the fronts did not stop active combat operations in other directions. The thaw and muddy conditions that began early in Ukraine made it difficult to regroup troops and transport supplies. Dilapidated airfields and inclement weather limited the capabilities of aviation.

During the preparatory period, the headquarters summarized data on enemy defenses and worked out the organization of interaction between troops. Combat and political training classes were conducted with the personnel. The order of the commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front dated January 23, 1944 ordered to take measures to strictly maintain secrecy, strictly camouflage the grouping of troops, artillery and tanks, prohibit the movement of vehicles and troops during the day, and observe blackout. It was forbidden to use radio communications before the start of the offensive. However, these requirements turned out to be late, since the enemy had fairly complete information about the groupings of Soviet troops in the breakthrough areas.

Early in the morning of January 24, after a powerful artillery attack, the forward battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack. As a result of stubborn fighting, by the end of the day they had captured strong points in the first and partly in the second position to a depth of 2 to 6 km. On the morning of January 25, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the main forces of the front, including the 5th Guards Tank Army, went on the offensive. Operating in the first echelon, units of the 20th Tank Corps of the Lieutenant General of Tank Forces liberated Lebedin on the night of January 27 and moved on Shpola. The 29th Tank Corps of the Major General of Tank Forces reached Vodyanoy and Lipyanka with its advanced units.

I.S. Konev and P.S. Rotmistrov at an observation post during the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation. Winter 1944

The German command, realizing that the attack by the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the direction of Shpola posed a serious threat to the entire Korsun-Shevchenko group, began hastily creating counterattack groupings of troops in the Novo-Mirgorod area (three tank divisions) and north of Pastorskoye (up to three infantry and one tank division). On January 27, they launched a counter-attack from the north and south in the general direction of Ositnyazhka and closed the gap that had formed in the defense. At the same time, the advanced units of the 20th and 29th tank corps that broke through were cut off from the main forces of the front.

To restore contact with these corps and eliminate the threat of the enemy on the flanks of the breakthrough, the commander of the front forces brought into battle the 25th Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps and the 18th Tank Corps, as well as the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps from the front reserve. Through the joint efforts of these formations and the rifle divisions of the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies, after heavy three-day battles in the area of ​​Kapitonovka and Tishkovka, it was possible to push back the enemy and restore broken communications with the 20th and 29th Tank Corps.

At this time, the mobile troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which had reached the Shpola area, continued to successfully advance forward. At noon on January 28, the 155th Tank Brigade of the 20th Guards Tank Corps was among the first to break into Zvenigorodka. On January 26, the troops of the 40th, 27th and 6th tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front from the opposite side of the base of the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge. Having broken through the first enemy position, the troops of the front's main group rushed deep into its defense. The enemy put up stubborn resistance and, with the help of two tank divisions, launched a counterattack on the right flank of the 40th Army in the direction of Okhmatov. To strengthen it, the commander of the front troops transferred the 11th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army to the operational subordination of the commander of the 40th Army.

Since the offensive of the 27th and 6th tank armies was developing more successfully, the commander of the front forces decided to transfer the main attack to their zone and transferred the 47th Rifle Corps from the 40th Army to the subordination of the lieutenant general of the tank forces. The immediate task of this corps was to capture a strong point of enemy resistance in the village of Vinograd. The 6th Tank Army was tasked with bypassing it from the south and north, by the end of January 28, reaching the Zvenigorodka area and capturing the Ryzhanovka, Chizhovka, Rizino line.

Commander of the 6th Tank Army A.G. Kravchenko (left) with headquarters officers during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Winter 1944

On the morning of January 28, the forward detachment of the 6th Tank Army, under the command of the deputy commander of the 5th Mechanized Corps, Major General of Tank Forces, bypassed the enemy stronghold near the village from the north. Vinograd and, developing the offensive, on January 28 broke into the northwestern outskirts of Zvenigorodka. After stubborn fighting in the western part of the city, at 15:00 the 233rd Tank Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Corps linked up in the Zvenigorodka area with the advanced units of the 20th Tank Corps of the 5th Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Over five days of fighting, counter strikes from troops from two fronts encircled the enemy group at the base of the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge.

On February 1, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front set the task of the 27th Army to defeat the encircled enemy group together with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On the same day, the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front gave a similar order to the troops of the 4th Guards, 52nd Armies and 5th Cavalry Corps. By February 3, a continuous internal front of encirclement by these forces had been created.

On the external front, by this time, in the sector from Tynovka to Zvenigorodka, the 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army, the 47th Rifle Corps, the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Mechanized Corps of the 6th Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front were on the defensive. . From Zvenigorodka to Kanizh the 5th Guards Tank Army, consisting of the 49th Rifle Corps, the 18th, 20th and 29th Tank Corps, as well as the 53rd Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, defended. In total, on the outer, 120-kilometer encirclement front, the enemy was confronted by 22 rifle divisions, 4 tank and mechanized corps, numbering about 150 thousand people together with reinforcements, 2,736 guns and mortars, 307 tanks and self-propelled artillery units.

The German command hoped to break through the outer front of the Soviet troops with a strike from tank divisions and release the encircled group. For this purpose, by January 27, four tank divisions of the 8th Army were concentrated in the Novo-Mirgorod area, and two tank divisions of the 1st Tank Army began moving into the Rizino area from the area west of Okhmatovo. The commander of the 11th Army Corps, General W. Stemmerman, who led the encircled troops, was ordered to fight to the last bullet.

At the end of January - early February, the enemy persistently tried to break through to the encircled troops in the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the areas of Novo-Mirgorod and Tolmach. An encircled group from the Gorodishche area (10 km north of Vyazovki) attacked them in a southern direction. However, with the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, enemy attacks on the external front were repulsed, and soon the troops of the 52nd and 4th Guards armies eliminated the Gorodishche resistance center. After this, the German command transferred its main efforts to the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, to the Ryzhanovka, Rizino area. Here, the commander of the 1st Panzer Army, General G. Hube, concentrated a strong group of four tank divisions, two heavy tank battalions and four assault gun divisions and planned to break through to the encircled troops through Lisyanka. The fact is that it was in this direction that the encircled group holding the Steblevo ledge was closest to the external front.

On February 4, the enemy struck in the Rizino area and, at the cost of heavy losses, managed to penetrate the defenses of the 47th Rifle Corps. There was a danger of the enemy breaking through to the encircled divisions. The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front ordered the 2nd Tank Army (3rd and 16th Tank Corps) to be brought into battle under the command of a lieutenant general of tank forces. On the morning of February 6, it, in cooperation with formations of the 40th and 6th Tank armies, launched a counteroffensive. As a result, the enemy's advance was stopped, in a number of areas he was thrown back, and some enemy units were surrounded and destroyed in the Kosyakovka, Kuchkovka area. But the enemy’s penetration into the defense of the Soviet troops remained. Moreover, an additional tank division and three divisions of assault guns were brought to this area. To repel a new enemy offensive, by the morning of February 9, the Soviet command advanced to the Lisyanka area the 8th Guards Tank Brigade of the 20th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced by a self-propelled artillery regiment and one regiment of the 31st Anti-Tank Destruction Brigade. At the same time, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army received the task of organizing tank and artillery ambushes on the roads. In addition, anti-tank strong points were organized on the basis of anti-tank artillery units in the corridor separating the encircled enemy troops from the external front. The defense was ready to meet the next enemy offensive, and it did not keep him waiting.

By February 11, the enemy managed to create several strike groups in the areas: Rizino - from the 1st German Tank Army, Yerki - from the forces of the 8th Army, Steblevo - from the encircled enemy group (parts of two infantry divisions, a heavy tank battalion of a tank division SS "Viking" and motorized brigade of SS "Wallonia"). With counter strikes, the enemy command intended to release their encircled formations and at the same time encircle the Soviet troops operating in the Ryzhanovka, Lisyanka, and Zvenigorodka areas. The enemy offensive began on the outer front of the encirclement on the morning of February 11. In the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, its units advancing from the Yerki area managed to occupy the Zvenigorodka station and a number of other settlements by the end of the day. But later the enemy was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops defending there. In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in the Rizino area, the enemy’s counterattack group broke through the defenses of the 47th Rifle Corps and reached the Lisyanka area. The Marshal of the Soviet Union explained this fact in his report by the loss of control on the part of the commander of the 6th Tank Army and the commander of the 47th Rifle Corps. He ordered Army General N.F. Vatutin to quickly subordinate them to the commander of the 27th Army. In addition, by the morning of February 12, the main forces of the 2nd Tank Army concentrated in this area. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were also transferred there. The 202nd Infantry Division was deployed in the Lisyansky direction. Reserve self-propelled artillery regiments also operated here. On the Gniloya Tikich River, along which the second line of defense of the created group of Soviet troops passed, the enemy was stopped, and his attempt to release the encircled group failed. At this time, Soviet troops were actively operating on the internal front of the encirclement (13 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 fortified areas, about 2 thousand guns and mortars, 138 tanks and self-propelled artillery units). With attacks from various directions, they cut off and then destroyed individual groups and garrisons of the encircled enemy. They were helped by partisan detachments.

The encirclement ring tightened, and by February 8, the territory occupied by enemy troops was completely covered by Soviet artillery. On this day, in order to stop the bloodshed, the Soviet command presented an ultimatum to the encircled troops demanding surrender. However, the ultimatum was rejected. Moreover, the blocked enemy troops, counting on outside help, made attempts to break out of the encirclement.

Once again they struck from the Steblevo area to the southwest on February 12, hoping to break through the internal front of the Soviet troops and link up with their tank divisions in the Lisyanka area. Fierce battles broke out, as a result of which the enemy, suffering numerous losses, managed to reach the Shanderovka area. The encircled group was separated by some 10-12 km from the tank divisions that had broken through to the Lisyanka area.

Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation January 24 - February 17, 1944

Having analyzed the situation, the Supreme Command Headquarters, in its directive, pointed out to its representative a number of shortcomings in the coordination of troops. It was noted, in particular: the absence of a general plan for the destruction of the enemy’s Korsun-Shevchenko group by the joint efforts of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, the insufficient combat strength of the 27th Army and the failure to take decisive measures to eliminate, first of all, the enemy’s Steblevo ledge, from where the threat came from breakthrough. The Supreme Command headquarters required taking effective measures to destroy the encircled enemy group. Following these instructions, additional formations and units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Cavalry Corps, as well as other rifle, tank, artillery and engineering units were urgently transferred to the threatened areas.

On February 12, 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters made a decision to subordinate all troops to the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to destroy the encircled enemy. In accordance with this directive, the 1st Ukrainian Front was entrusted with the task of defense on the external front of the encirclement in its own zone. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was charged with coordinating the actions of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to repel enemy attempts from the outside to release the encircled troops.

On February 14, formations and units of the 52nd Army liberated the regional center of the Kiev region - the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, capturing 15 transport aircraft, a lot of other equipment and weapons, as well as warehouses with ammunition and food. Following this, Soviet troops captured several more heavily fortified enemy strongholds, among them Yablonovka, Tarashcha, Steblev. By February 16, the encircled enemy troops occupied only Shanderovka, Khilki and Komarovka. They were hit by aviation and artillery. And yet, early in the morning of February 17, German troops again tried in three columns on a front section of about 4.5 km to break out of the encirclement.

The artillerymen of the 438th Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment showed exceptional bravery and courage in repelling enemy attempts to break out of encirclement. While holding their positions, they successfully repelled attacks by up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers, and destroyed two enemy tanks and one gun. The cadets of the training battalion of the 41st Guards Rifle Division, Major General, fought bravely, killing several dozen Germans and taking 43 prisoners. Based on the results of the battle, the most distinguished soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

While the rifle units repelled the enemy's onslaught from the front, formations of the 18th, 29th Tank and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps went on the attack from the flanks. With a powerful blow they destroyed scattered columns and groups of the enemy. Only a small number of his tanks and armored personnel carriers managed to break into Lisyanka. By the end of February 17, the enemy group, surrounded in the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge, was eliminated.

Destroyed German equipment after the battle of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. February 1944

In general, during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, Soviet troops defeated 10 enemy divisions and 1 brigade. This greatly weakened and demoralized his group in the southwestern strategic direction. The figures for German losses in men, equipment and weapons during the operation vary. The irretrievable losses of Soviet troops in the operation amounted to more than 24 thousand people.

German prisoners after the defeat of the Korsun-Shevchenko group. February 1944

The main results of the operation include not only the defeat of a powerful enemy group that threatened the flanks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, but also a significant reduction in the front line in the middle reaches of the Dnieper and its transfer a considerable distance to the west. Most of the territory of Soviet Ukraine and the population living on it were liberated from the enemy. The Red Army captured the strategically important railway road on the right bank of the Dnieper: Fastov - Belaya Tserkov - Korsun-Shevchenkovsky - Znamenka - Dnepropetrovsk. The inhabitants of the liberated area gained freedom.

The operation of the Soviet troops to encircle and destroy a large enemy group in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area went down in the history of military art as a brilliant example of this method of defeating the enemy. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief called it “the new Stalingrad.” In the most difficult conditions of winter and muddy roads, Soviet troops demonstrated high maneuverability and speed of action, courage and endurance of soldiers.

To break through the enemy's tactical defense zone, the front commands managed to create powerful groupings of forces and assets, especially tanks and artillery, in a very short time. The density of artillery in the directions of the main attacks of the fronts in the breakthrough areas reached 100 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. This largely determined the successful breakthrough of the main line of defense.

The distinctive point in the art of this operation is the use of tank armies in the first echelon together with rifle formations to break through enemy defenses. This is how the 6th Tank Army was used in the offensive zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 5th Guards Tank Army as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. This was largely due to the lack of direct infantry support tanks on the fronts, and the objectives of the operation required a high rate of breakthrough. Subsequently, tank armies were used to solve a traditional task - developing tactical success into operational success. It was the rapid actions of the tank corps that ensured the creation of both internal and external fronts of encirclement. Thus, tank troops were used in the operation both at the stage of breaking through the enemy’s defenses and for its development.

The massive use of tank forces largely determined the equally massive use of anti-tank weapons, represented in the operation by both engineering troops and anti-tank artillery. In difficult conditions of muddy roads and impassability, a rapidly changing situation, the Soviet command had to quickly maneuver these forces and means in order to create a strong anti-tank defense in the enemy’s path.

The success of the operation, of course, was not possible without the selfless efforts of the “mother infantry.” Only to the outer front of the encirclement, 13 rifle divisions were quickly transferred to the outer front of the encirclement, which covered the off-road route on foot. Such maneuverability of tank and engineering troops, rifle formations and artillery predetermined the positive outcome of the operation of the Soviet troops. They not only managed to react in time to the enemy’s actions, but also preempted them in many ways.

The aviation of the 2nd and 5th Air Armies, as well as the 10th Air Defense Corps of the country, made a significant contribution to the successful completion of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Almost a third of all 11.3 thousand sorties were carried out to maintain operational air superiority. To support ground forces on the battlefield, strike enemy reserves and conduct aerial reconnaissance, more than 6.5 thousand sorties were flown, or over 60% of their total number. About 1.2 thousand sorties were involved in air transportation of cargo, taking into account off-road conditions.

Without a doubt, the highly maneuverable nature of the operation required incredible efforts by rear workers to supply the troops with fuel and lubricants, ammunition and food, and to evacuate the wounded. And they generally coped with this task.

The local population provided enormous assistance in this regard. Residents of the liberated areas not only helped repair roads, build defensive structures, and deliver ammunition, but also fought with weapons in their hands. In the village of Kvitki alone, 500 men voluntarily joined the 180th Infantry Division. At the same time, in certain areas of Right Bank Ukraine, Soviet troops encountered fierce resistance from nationalist formations. Despite the appeal on February 12, 1944 by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR to lay down their arms, they did not do so. Therefore, units intended to protect the rear of the active army were forced to fight Ukrainian nationalists. Thus, on February 16, 1944, a detachment of border troops protecting the rear of the 1st Ukrainian Front, combing the forest in the area of ​​Romeyka, Perespa, Bolshoye Verbche, encountered an armed gang of the UPA (“Ukrainian Insurgent Army”) numbering up to 300 people. The assistant chief of staff of the 2nd Border Regiment, who commanded the detachment, decided to encircle and destroy the gang, despite its numerical superiority. As a result of the battle, 46 bandits were killed and up to 100 wounded. Against this background, today the attempts of some forces in Western Ukraine to elevate to national heroes those bandits who fought against Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War look blasphemous.

On February 18, 1944, Moscow saluted the troops who had completed the liquidation of a large enemy group. Many units and formations received the honorary name “Korsun-Shevchenkovsky”. For courage and heroism, dozens of Soviet soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Based on the results of the operation, Army General I.S. Konev, the first of the front commanders, was awarded the title “Marshal of the Soviet Union,” and the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army was awarded the military title “Marshal of Armored Forces.”

Reducing the length of the front line in the Korsun-Shevchenko direction made it possible to free up a significant number of troops and use them to perform other tasks. During the operation, troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts pinned down 25 enemy divisions, including 9 tank divisions, which created favorable conditions for launching an offensive in the Rivne-Lutsk and Nikopol directions.

Today, a huge number of monuments and memorials remind us of the heroic victory of Soviet troops in the Korsun-Shevchenko battle. For example, near the village of Steblev, a 7.5-meter reinforced concrete ring was built - a symbol of the encirclement of German units. It’s hard to even list how many tank monuments there are in this area. In the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, in the palace of the princes Lopukhin-Demidov, there is a museum of the history of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky battle. It contains a diorama of the battle, a huge number of documents, weapons and equipment of those times.

Memorial complex to those killed during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Cherkasy region, Zvenigorodka

Vladimir Khokhlov,
Researcher at the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation,
member of the Writers' Union of Russia

Korsun-Shevchenko operation(also Korsun-Shevchenkovsky battle, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky cauldron, Korsun cauldron, Cherkassy cauldron, Cherkasy encirclement) (January 24 - February 17, 1944) - an offensive operation of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, carried out with the aim of destroying Korsun- Shevchenko's enemy group. It is part of the strategic offensive of Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine.

The operation ended with the defeat of the encircled group (34% of the soldiers died), part of which managed to escape from the encirclement. The commander of the group, General Stemmerman, died during the breakthrough on the night of February 17-18. SS-Brigadeführer Gille took command.

Position of forces

As a result of the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and the Kirovograd operation of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (Army General I.S. Konev), a deep ledge was formed, which was defended by a large enemy group, which included VII and the XI Army Corps from the 1st Tank Army and the 42nd Army and 47th Tank Corps from the 8th Army of Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein).

By holding the ledge, the enemy did not allow the fronts to close adjacent flanks and prevented their advance to the Southern Bug. On January 12, the Supreme Command Headquarters, by directive No. 220006, assigned the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts the task of encircling and destroying the enemy group in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky salient.

Planning the operation

The command's plan was to deliver counter strikes under the base of the ledge with troops from two fronts and unite in the area of ​​the cities of Shpola and Zvenigorodka. Part of the forces of the 40th and 27th Armies, the 6th Tank Army and part of the forces of the 2nd Air Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the 52nd, 4th Guards, 53rd Armies, 5th the Guards Tank Army, the 5th Air Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, as well as the 10th Air Defense Fighter Corps of the country. The operation was prepared in a difficult situation, especially for the 1st Ukrainian Front, whose troops at that time were repelling fierce enemy attacks in the area north of Uman and east of Vinnitsa. The thaw and spring thaw that began early in Ukraine made it difficult for troops to maneuver, transport material, and use airfields of unpaved airfields.

Combat and numerical strength of the parties

USSR

1st Ukrainian Front (Army General N.F. Vatutin)

• 27th Army (Lieutenant General S. G. Trofimenko)
• 180th Rifle Division
• 206th Infantry Division
• 337th Infantry Division
• 54th fortified area
• 159th fortified area
• 28,348 people, 887 guns and mortars, 38 self-propelled guns.
• left wing of the 40th Army (Lieutenant General F. F. Zhmachenko)
• 47th Rifle Corps (Major General I. S. Shmygo)
• 167th Rifle Division
• 359th Infantry Division
• 104th Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A. V. Petrushevsky)
• 58th Infantry Division
• 133rd Infantry Division
• 33,726 people, 883 guns and mortars, 26 tanks, 27 self-propelled guns.
• 6th Tank Army (Lieutenant General A. G. Kravchenko)
• 5th Mechanized Corps (Lieutenant General M.V. Volkov)
• 5th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General V. M. Alekseev)
• 24,423 people, 179 guns and mortars, 192 tanks, 52 self-propelled guns. There are other data on the number of armored vehicles in the army - 107 tanks and self-propelled guns; 282 tanks and self-propelled guns; 160 tanks, 59 self-propelled guns.
• 2nd Air Army (part of the forces, Aviation Lieutenant General S. A. Krasovsky)
• 2,709 people, 164 fighters, 92 attack aircraft, 43 day and 192 night bombers, 12 reconnaissance aircraft.

2nd Ukrainian Front (Army General I. S. Konev)

• 52nd Army (Lieutenant General K. A. Koroteev)
• 73rd Rifle Corps (Major General S. A. Kozak)
• 254th Rifle Division
• 294th Rifle Division
• 78th Rifle Corps (Major General G. A. Latyshev)
• 373rd Rifle Division
• 15,886 people, 375 guns and mortars.
• 4th Guards Army (Major General A. I. Ryzhov)
• 20th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General N. I. Biryukov)
• 5th Guards Airborne Division
• 7th Guards Airborne Division
• 62nd Guards Rifle Division
• 31st Infantry Division
• 21st Guards Rifle Corps (Major General P. I. Fomenko)
• 69th Guards Rifle Division
• 94th Guards Rifle Division
• 252nd Rifle Division
• 375th Infantry Division
• 45,653 people, 1,083 guns and mortars, 15 tanks, 3 self-propelled guns.
• 53rd Army (Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin)
• 78th Guards Rifle Division
• 214th Rifle Division
• 26th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General P. A. Firsov)
• 1st Guards Airborne Division
• 25th Guards Rifle Division
• 6th Infantry Division
• 48th Guards Rifle Corps
• 14th Guards Rifle Division
• 66th Guards Rifle Division
• 89th Guards Rifle Division
• 75th Rifle Corps (Major General A. Z. Akimenko)
• 138th Infantry Division
• 213th Rifle Division
• 233rd Rifle Division
• 54,043 people, 1,094 guns and mortars, 14 tanks.
• 5th Guards Tank Army (Colonel General of Tank Forces P. A. Rotmistrov)
• 18th Tank Corps (Major General K. G. Trufanov)
• 20th Tank Corps (Lieutenant General I. G. Lazarev)
• 29th Tank Corps (Major General I. F. Kirichenko)
• 22,301 people, 311 guns and mortars, 207 tanks, 10 self-propelled guns. There are other data on the number of armored vehicles in the army - 205 tanks and self-propelled guns; 242 tanks and self-propelled guns; 156 combat-ready tanks and self-propelled guns and 80 tanks and 11 self-propelled guns under repair as of 01/21/44.
• 5th Air Army (Lieutenant General of Aviation S.K. Goryunov)
• 7,618 people, 241 fighters, 93 attack aircraft, 126 day and 74 night bombers, 17 reconnaissance aircraft.
• Front reserves
• 5th Guards Don Cossack Cavalry Corps (Major General A. G. Selivanov)
• 20,258 people, 354 guns and mortars, 6 tanks, 8 self-propelled guns.

Germany

Army Group South (Field Marshal E. von Manstein)

1st Panzer Army (right wing, General of the Panzer Forces G.-W. Hube)

• 42 Army Corps (Lieutenant General T. Lieb)
• Corps group "B"
• 88th Infantry Division
• 30,000 people, 147 guns and mortars, 5 self-propelled anti-tank guns.
• VII Army Corps (General of Artillery E. Hell)
• 34th Infantry Division
• 75th Infantry Division
• 198th Infantry Division
• 25,000 people, 225 guns and mortars, 23 assault guns, 5 self-propelled anti-tank guns.

8th Army (left wing, Infantry General O. Wöhler)

• XI Army Corps (Artillery General W. Stemmerman)
• 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking"
• 5th SS Volunteer Assault Brigade "Wallonia"
• 57th Infantry Division
• 72nd Infantry Division
• 389th Infantry Division
• 35,000 people, 319 guns and mortars, 12 self-propelled guns, 55 tanks and assault guns, 7 self-propelled anti-tank guns.
• 47th Panzer Corps (Lieutenant General N. von Vormann)
• 3rd Panzer Division
• 11th Panzer Division
• 14th Panzer Division
• 106th Infantry Division
• 320th Infantry Division
• 50,000 people, 300 guns and mortars, 17 self-propelled guns, 158 tanks and assault guns, 10 self-propelled anti-tank guns.

Carrying out the operation

Actions in the sector of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on January 24-28

January 24

In the sector of the German 3rd Tank and 389th Infantry Divisions, the advanced battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. During the battles, they pushed the enemy back by 2-6 km.

The 25th of January

At 7:46 a.m. the main forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. The 389th Infantry Division was attacked by six rifle divisions (31st, 375th, 69th Guards Infantry Division from the 4th Guards Army and 25th Guards, 66th Guards Infantry Division, 1st Guards . airborne division from the 53rd Army) and its southern flank soon collapsed. At 2 p.m., the 20th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards were brought into battle. tank army, which by the end of the day advanced 18-20 km, reaching Kapitanivka and Tishkovka. To help the 389th Division, it was decided to send first the 676th Regiment from the 57th Infantry Division, and then the entire division. Actions against the 3rd Panzer and 106th Infantry Divisions were less successful. Four Soviet divisions (14th Guards, 138th, 213th and 233rd from the 53rd Army), with minimal tank support, were able to advance only 5 km in the 3rd Tank Division zone.

January 26

In the morning, the 20th Tank Corps continued its offensive, drove the German troops out of Kapitanova and continued towards Lebedin, which it reached in the late evening, where it was met only by a group from the rear units of the 389th Division. The 29th Tank Corps occupied Rossohovatka, pushing Langkeit’s battle group (36th Tank Regiment, 1st Battalion of the 103rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment, 1st Division of the 4th Artillery Regiment from the 14th Panzer Division) to the west. Kampfgruppe von Brese (108th Panzergrenadier Regiment, 14th Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Division of the 4th Artillery Regiment, anti-aircraft artillery from the 14th Panzer Division) was surrounded west of Ositnyazhke. At 13 o'clock the first serious counterattacks of the German troops began - units of the 11th Tank Division went on the offensive from Kamenovatka, which by the evening managed to occupy the southern part of Tishkovka.

January 27

At 10 o'clock in the morning, after moving all night, the advanced units of the 8th Guards. and the 155th tank brigade of the 20th tank corps liberated Shpola. The 29th Tank Corps operated southeast of Shpola and liberated Vodyanoye, Lipyanka and Mezhigorka. Meanwhile, the 11th Panzer Division resumed its operations early in the morning at 5:30 and at 9:10 established contact with the encircled von Brese group northeast of Kapitanova. Thus, supply routes to advanced Soviet formations were cut off. The task of restoring contact with the tank corps that had gone forward was assigned to the 18th Tank Corps from the 5th Guards. TA and 5th Guards. cavalry corps, which until now were in the army and front reserve, respectively. 4th Guards The army continued to press the German 389th and 72nd divisions, which were approached by units of the 57th division, as well as a tank group from the SS Viking Panzergrenadier Division. The 53rd Army put pressure on the 3rd Panzer Division, which nevertheless managed to send a tank group to help the 14th Panzer Division, which tried to recapture Rossohovatka, which, however, failed.

28 January

In the morning, the 20th Tank Corps resumed its movement towards Zvenigorodka and in the middle of the day linked up with the 233rd Tank Brigade from the 6th Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the same time, German troops continued to try to take control of the Kapitanivka area. Strong reinforcements arrived at the 11th Tank Division - the 1st battalion of the 26th Tank Regiment, which had 75 Panthers, including 61 combat-ready ones. However, it was not possible to use its striking force. As a result of the battalion's unsuccessful actions, separated from units of the 11th Panzer Division, it lost 44 tanks, including 10 permanently.

Actions of the 1st Ukrainian Front on January 26-28

January 26

In the morning, after a 40-minute artillery preparation, the troops of the 27th, 40th and 6th tank armies went on the offensive in two sectors. The first of them, where the main blow was delivered, was in the Tynovka area, here formations of the 40th Army advanced with the support of the 5th Mechanized and 5th Guards. tank corps. The offensive developed slowly, and tank units suffered serious losses (the German VII Corps announced the destruction of 82 tanks). By the end of the day, the advance in the zone of the 34th Infantry Division near Tynovka was insignificant; in the zone of its northern neighbor, the 198th Division, more serious results were achieved - the first line of defense was overcome, the depth of advance was 8-10 km. However, the most significant success was achieved in the offensive zone of the 27th Army (180th and 337th Infantry Division), where it was able to break through the defenses of the 88th Infantry Division to a depth of 18 km with minimal armored support.

January 27

The offensive resumed early in the morning, but, as on the previous day, it developed slowly in the zone of the main group. The 6th Tank Army, for example, advanced only 10-15 km, while suffering significant losses in men and equipment. Vatutin, in view of the unexpected success of the secondary group, decides to shift the main efforts to the north. For this purpose, the 47th Rifle Corps from the 40th Army was transferred to the 6th Tank Army. At the same time, the 5th Mechanized Corps was withdrawn from the 6th Tank Army, which was supposed to go 100 km southeast to the right flank of the 40th Army to repel the proposed German offensive from the Vinnitsa area. By order of the military council of the front, a mobile group was formed based on the 233rd tank brigade with the 1228th self-propelled artillery regiment, a motorized rifle battalion and an anti-tank battery - a total of 39 tanks, 16 self-propelled guns, 4 anti-tank guns and 200 machine gunners. Her task was to break through to Zvenigorodka through Lysyanka and connect with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Near Tikhonovka, the group liberated the 136th Rifle Division and the 6th Guards from encirclement. motorized rifle brigade, in which they had been since January 10. By midnight, the group occupied the operationally important Lysyanka point.

28 January

At 8 o'clock in the morning the mobile group resumed its advance towards Zvenigorodka and by 13 o'clock in the afternoon managed to break through to it from the north-west and start street battles. At the same time, units of the 155th Tank Brigade of the 5th Guards approached from the southeast. Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Tankers from both fronts took up a perimeter defense with a firm determination to hold the city until the main forces arrived. 5th Guards The tank corps was deployed to advance after the mobile group to build on the success.

Formation of external and internal fronts of encirclement

To close the internal front of the encirclement, the forces of the 27th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 4th Guards were brought in. army and 5th Guards. cavalry corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On January 31, units of the 180th Infantry Division from the 27th Army and the 5th Guards met in the Olshany area. cavalry corps. On February 3, the main forces of the 4th Guards arrived here. army and a continuous internal front of encirclement was formed. In total, these troops (including the 52nd Army) included 13 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 2 fortified areas, as well as reinforcements. Of the heavy weapons there were approx. 2,000 guns and mortars and 138 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 6th and 5th Guards were used to form an external encirclement front. tank armies. To increase the stability of the defense, they were assigned rifle formations. The 6th Tank Army received the 47th Rifle Corps, and the 5th Guards. tank army - 49th Rifle Corps (6th Guards Airborne Division, 94th Guards and 84th Infantry Division). In addition, the 5th Guards. The tank army was reinforced by the 34th anti-tank brigade (54 guns) and the 5th engineering brigade of the RGK. Later on February 3, the 375th Infantry Division was transferred, as well as a number of artillery units - the 11th anti-tank fighter, 49th light artillery and 27th separate heavy cannon artillery brigades. The 40th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 53rd Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front adjoined the flanks of the tank armies.

Combat and numerical strength of the encircled German group

Two army corps, 42 and XI, were encircled, consisting of six divisions (Corps Group “B”, 88th, 57th, 72nd and 389th Infantry Divisions, 5th SS Viking TD) and one brigade (5th SS brigade "Wallonia"). A number of other units mentioned in Soviet sources were often organizationally included in the above-mentioned divisions. For example, in the 88th Infantry Division, out of three native regiments (245th, 246th and 248th), only the 248th was available. The 245th was sent to the 68th Infantry Division, and from the 246th they formed a battalion in the 248th regiment, the 2nd battalion of which, in turn, was renamed the divisional fusilier battalion. The second full-fledged regiment of the division was the 323rd divisional group of two battalions (591st and 593rd regimental groups). Also assigned to the division were the 417th Infantry Regiment from the 168th Infantry Division (battalion-sized) and two battalions of the 318th Security Regiment of the 213th Security Division. The 389th Infantry was assigned two battalions from the 167th Infantry. On January 28, the 198th Infantry Regiment was temporarily surrounded in the Bosovka-Dashukovka area, but managed to break through to the south. The size of the group was about 59,000 people, 313 artillery pieces (including 23 self-propelled guns excluding mortars and infantry guns), approximately 70 tanks and assault guns.

Fighting after the group's encirclement

Soviet troops on the internal front of the encirclement sought to dismember and destroy the encircled enemy group with attacks from all directions. German troops tried to retreat to positions advantageous for defense. On the night of January 29, the 88th Infantry Division was ordered to withdraw across the Ros River and take up positions east and north of Boguslav. On the morning of January 29, Soviet infantry from the 337th Rifle Division began a battle to capture Boguslav, but were driven back after the arrival of seven assault guns from the 239th Assault Gun Battalion. In the second half of January 29, Corps Group “B” (in which by that time, after all the withdrawals, only 3 infantry battalions remained) began to be withdrawn to the line of the Rossava River. On February 2, units of the 27th Army crossed Rossava in the Sinyavka-Pilyavy sector and formed a bridgehead 10 km along the front and several kilometers in depth. In the evening, the commander of the 42nd Corps, Lieb, decided to begin the withdrawal of troops from the Dnieper. On the afternoon of February 3, four Soviet machine-gun battalions, with tank support, broke through the German position between Mironovka and Boguslav, forcing German units from the 332nd Divisional Group and the 88th Division to withdraw slightly to the east. Under the threat of encirclement from the north, Boguslav was abandoned by German troops that same evening. After these battles, the northern and western sections of the 42 Corps front remained calm for several days.

On January 28, the 180th Rifle Division, reinforced by a tank brigade, attacked the German garrison in Steblevo, which consisted mainly of a reserve field battalion of the SS Viking division. During the fighting, a number of German positions were surrounded, and on the morning of January 29, Soviet tanks broke into Steblev itself, but were destroyed. In the evening of the same day, reinforcements approached the city in the form of two battalions of the 255th divisional group from Corps Group “B” and part of the 239th assault gun division. On January 28, the German command also decided to strengthen another important point for it - Olshanu. In Olshan itself there were only supply units for the SS Viking division. First of all, a company from the Estonian “Narva” battalion was sent for reinforcement. She was followed by a group of four recovered assault weapons. The latter arrived in the village at 18 o'clock in the evening and within an hour counterattacked Soviet units from the 136th Infantry Division, which broke into the village from the north, and knocked them out, declaring the destruction of five self-propelled guns (possibly SU-76) at the cost of the loss of one assault guns. On January 29, the battles for Olshana flared up with renewed vigor and new heavy losses for both sides. On January 30, the 63rd Cavalry Division from the 5th Guards approached and entered into battle. cavalry corps, but the Germans finally received reinforcements in the form of a company from the Narva battalion. The rest of the battalion arrived on January 31, along with an engineer company and tanks from the Viking. On the evening of January 31, Olshana was completely surrounded by Soviet troops, but the decisive assault was postponed until the arrival of larger infantry forces of the 4th Guards. army. February 2, with the arrival of the 5th Guards. airborne and 62nd Guards. rifle divisions, the attacks were resumed. By February 3, despite the serious superiority of Soviet troops in numbers, the city was only occupied by a quarter. Meanwhile, German troops created a new defensive line 10 km north of the village with the help of the Viking, 57th and 389th divisions. The defense of Olshany was no longer needed, and on the night of February 6, German troops abandoned it and broke through to the northeast, where they linked up with the infantry regiment of the 389th division at Petropavlovka. During the breakthrough, the Estonian battalion, which was following in the rearguard and was ambushed, suffered serious losses.

On January 30, units of the 180th Infantry Division occupied Kvitki, located only 10 kilometers south of Korsun and 12 kilometers west of Gorodishche. Lieb ordered the re-occupation of Kvitki, for which the 110th Regimental Group (the size of a battalion) was allocated. On January 31, the group began its attack south, towards Kvitki and occupied Petrushki, 5 kilometers to the north. Late in the evening of February 1, the group launched an attack on Kvitki and took the Soviet units by surprise, quickly capturing the northern part of the village. On the morning of February 2, Schenk's group continued its offensive, but there was no longer enough strength to complete the mission, despite the arrival of three assault guns to help. Over the next few days, both sides received reinforcements. The 337th Infantry Division arrived from near Boguslav, and Schenk’s group was reinforced by the remaining units from the 112th Divisional Group, as well as from the Viking Division. During further fighting, German troops were forced to leave the center of the village and retreat to its northern part, and by February 9 they retreated to Petrushki, where they had started eight days earlier.

The XI Corps, consisting of the 57th, 72nd and 389th divisions, which held the pocket ledge in the Gorodishche area, was subjected to strong attacks from February 2 to 5 by divisions of the 4th Guards. armies, which, however, had virtually no success. On February 6, Soviet troops by the 5th Guards. cavalry corps and units of four rifle divisions from the 4th Guards. The armies tried to strike at Valyava (a village between Gorodishche and Korsun) to cut off the Gorodishche grouping of German troops and thereby cut the cauldron. The stubborn resistance of the German troops did not allow this to be done, but after the capture of Valiava on February 7 and its retention by Soviet troops despite enemy counterattacks, the Germans were forced to retreat from the fortified ledge. The settlement itself was liberated on February 9. On the same day, Stemmerman ordered the temporary disbandment of the 389th Division, whose combat strength had dropped to 200 infantry and three artillery batteries, and its remnants to be included in the 57th Division. By February 8, the territory occupied by German troops was completely covered by Soviet artillery. In order to avoid bloodshed, the Soviet command on February 8 presented the command of the encircled group with an ultimatum demanding surrender. The response was expected on February 9 before 12 o'clock, but the German command rejected it, as they were preparing to break through Shenderovka.

During these same days, the command structure of the encircled German group changed. On February 6, Stemmermann sent a secret radio message to Wehler asking him to appoint someone as commander of the encircled troops, as the situation required. On the morning of February 7, the headquarters of the 8th Army issued an order appointing Stemmerman commander of all encircled troops, including the 42nd Corps. The surrounded troops were called the Stemmermann group. By February 9, they had suffered serious losses - Stemmerman reported to the headquarters of the 8th Army that the average number of riflemen in the infantry regiments had fallen to 150 people, about 10% of their regular strength. On February 8 alone, losses amounted to 350 people and 1,100 wounded were awaiting evacuation by air.

The first attempt of German troops to liberate the encircled

By February 3, the grouping of Soviet troops on the external front of the encirclement had the following appearance. In the sector from Tinovka to Zvenigorodka, the defense was occupied by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front: the 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army (58th, 133rd, 136th Infantry Division), 47th Rifle Corps (167th, 359th I SD), 5th Guards Tank and 5th Mechanized Corps of the 6th Tank Army (the latter was returned a few days after departure). From Zvenigorodka to Kanizh the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front defended: the 49th Rifle Division (6th Guards Airborne Division, 84th, 94th Guards, 375th Infantry Division), 18th, 20th and 29th th tank corps of the 5th Guards. Tank Army, 53rd Army as part of the 1st Guards. Airborne Division, 6th, 14th Guards, 25th Guards, 66th Guards, 78th, 80th Guards, 89th Guards, 138th, 213th and 214th th sd. A total of 22 rifle divisions, 4 tank and mechanized corps, totaling approx. 150 thousand people, 2,736 guns and mortars, 307 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Manstein, has at his disposal 20 tank formations (1st, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th -I, 16th, 17th, 19th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, “Great Germany”, “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking” ), planned not only to relieve two German corps from encirclement, but also to encircle and destroy the 5th Guards and 6th Tank Armies. The 13th Tank Division was transferred to the 47th Corps zone of the 8th Army. The 11th Tank Division of the same corps was reinforced by a number of units - the 8th Tank Battalion from the 20th Panzer-Grenadier Division, the 905th and 911th Assault Gun Divisions. To free up the 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions, they were replaced by the 320th Infantry Division, whose defense sector, in turn, was occupied by the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division. The approach of the 24th Tank and 376th Infantry Divisions was expected. The 17th Panzer Division began to be transferred to the area of ​​operations of the VII Corps on January 28. It was followed on January 29 by the 16th Panzer Division and the control of the III Panzer Corps. A little later, the 1st SS Panzer Division "LAG" and the Beke heavy tank regiment began transferring. From the 4th Tank Army, the 1st Tank Division began transferring, whose approach was expected later. The III Panzer Corps was to launch an offensive on February 3 with the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions and the Becke Regiment, and was to be joined by the SS Leibstandarte Division the next day. The operation was codenamed "Wanda".

On February 1, the 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions launched an offensive to the north and captured a bridgehead at Iskrenne on the Shpolka River. On February 2, the 3rd and 14th tank divisions also began to approach the bridgehead. On February 3, attacks from the bridgehead resumed, but were very low-intensity, since the commander of the 47th Corps decided to wait until February 4, when the 24th Panzer Division was supposed to arrive and begin the offensive simultaneously with the III Panzer Corps. However, at the last moment the 24th Panzer Division, on Hitler's orders, was sent south to the 6th Army. On February 4, the offensive from the bridgehead resumed and the 11th Panzer Division occupied Vodyanoye, and the 3rd Panzer Division reached Lisyanka. On February 5, most of Lisyanka, except for its district, was captured by the forces of the 3rd and 14th tank divisions. Further advance of the German troops was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On February 8, a decision was made to resume offensive operations on the left flank of the 47th Corps a few days later, which required new regroupings. For the attack from Verbovets to Zvenigorodka, the 11th, 13th and 14th tank divisions were to be used.

III Panzer Corps, due to delays in the concentration of forces, was forced to postpone its offensive for one day. On February 4, a German group consisting of the 16th and 17th tank divisions and the Becke heavy tank regiment went on the offensive. The 16th Tank Division was additionally reinforced by the 506th Tiger heavy tank battalion, and the 17th by the 249th assault gun battalion. In total, the group had 126 combat-ready tanks and assault guns (41 Pz.IV, 48 Panthers, 16 Tigers and 21 StuG III). On February 6, the advanced units of the 1st Panzer Division began to arrive in this area, and it was fully concentrated on February 10.

The tank fist did its job and, despite the resistance of the 104th Rifle Corps (58th and 133rd Infantry Divisions), the strike group of the 1st Tank Army was able to wedge into its defenses, occupying Votylevka, Tynovka and the southern part of Kosyakovka on February 4 Rotten Tikiche. On the morning of February 5, the 16th Panzer Division completely occupied Kosyakovka, but the bridges over Gniloy Tikich were blown up. Votylevka was abandoned by parts of Beke's regiment due to lack of ammunition. On the same day, Soviet troops launched their first counterattacks against the 16th Panzer Division, as a result of which its advance group at Kosyakovka was cut off. By evening, the 17th Tank Division reoccupied Votylevka; Soviet troops managed to hold out only in the eastern part of the village. The 198th Infantry Division, supported by rocket mortars, broke into Vinograd and occupied its southern part, its further advance was stopped by a Soviet tank counterattack. To localize and eliminate the enemy who had broken through, Vatutin ordered the 2nd Tank Army, which had recently arrived from the General Headquarters reserve, to be brought into the battle. The strength of the army on January 25 was as follows: 3rd Tank Corps - 208 T-34-76, 5 Valentine IX, 12 SU-152, 21 SU-76M; 16th Tank Corps - 14 T-34-76; 11th separate guards. TBR - 56 T-34-76; 887th Separate Motorcycle Battalion - 10 "Valentine IX".

On the morning of February 6, the 2nd Tank Army attacked the enemy in the direction of Chervonoya Zirka, Tynivka and Votylivka, but was unsuccessful. On the same day, the German side restored contact with the group in Kosyakivka and brought into battle Huppert’s battle group from the 1st Panzer Division, which, together with the 198th Infantry Division, occupied Vinograd, except for its eastern part. On February 7, units of the 2nd Tank Army continued their operations against the enemy and, after intense fighting, drove them out of Kosyakivka. The 16th Tank Division completely occupied Tatyanovka on this day. The 17th Tank Division cleared Votylivka from Soviet troops that had made their way into the village. The 198th Infantry Division, together with Hupert's group, tried to advance east of Vinograd, but without success. On February 8, the 8th Guards was advanced to the Lysyanka area to occupy a strong all-round defense. tank brigade from the 20th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards. tank army together with the 1895th self-propelled artillery regiment and one regiment of the 31st iptabr and by 4 o'clock in the morning on February 9 they were in position. In addition, the 20th Tank Corps received the task of covering the roads leading north and south from the villages of Kazatskoye and Tarasovka (15-18 km northeast of Zvenigorodka), the 18th Tank Corps - roads in the Topilno area (12 km north -west of Shpola), 29th Tank Corps - in the Serdegovka area (15 km northeast of Shpola). On February 9, Huppert's Kampfgruppe occupied Tolstye Rogi, and the 17th Panzer Division occupied Repki. Further progress of the latter was stopped by lack of fuel. Also, due to lack of fuel, the 16th Panzer Division stopped its offensive. Due to the slow progress at the headquarters of the 1st German Tank Army, it was decided to change the direction of the offensive, transfer the strike force to the Rizino area and from there advance on Lysyanka.

Second attempt by German troops to liberate the encircled

At 11 a.m. on February 11, German troops again went on the offensive on the outer front of the encirclement. In the Yerka area, the 47th Tank Corps, with the forces of the 11th, 13th and 14th Tank Divisions (a little more than 30 combat-ready tanks) and the Haak battle group (created from vacationers of the encircled formations), displacing the combat outpost of the 375th Infantry Division, occupied Romanovka , Yerki and the bridge over Shpolka in the direction of Maly Yekaterinopol. On the morning of February 12, units of the 20th Panzer Corps attacked the German bridgehead at Erki, but Haak's group repelled them. By the evening, the 11th and 13th tank divisions occupied Skalevatka and Yurkovka, and a little later the latter, with the support of Haack’s group and dive bombers from the 2nd Immelman squadron, captured command heights five kilometers south of Zvenigorodka, including height 204.8 . Further advance of the German troops was stopped by stubborn resistance and counterattacks by the 49th Rifle Corps and units of the 20th Tank Corps.

In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the III German tank corps, due to a stronger group (1st, 16th, 17th, 1st SS tank divisions with reinforcements numbered at least 155 combat-ready tanks and assault guns), managed to reach and more significant successes. The 16th Panzer Division, reinforced by the Beke regiment, went on the offensive at 7 a.m. on February 11, a few hours later, covering 8-10 km, it reached Buzhanka and Frankovka. In the latter, they managed to capture the bridge across Gniloy Tikich intact. The 1st Panzer Division, which was to the south, went on the offensive at 6:30 and 6 hours later, having traveled 15 km, also reached Buzhanka and captured a bridgehead on the other bank of Gnily Tikich with infantry forces. Next, Frank's battle group from the 1st Panzer Division captured the southern part of Lysyanka in a surprise attack in the evening, but the main target of the attack, the bridge, was destroyed by Soviet troops. Vatutin retaliated by attacking the positions of the 34th Infantry and 1st SS Panzer Divisions, but this did not lead to any success.

Continuation of the struggle around the “cauldron”

Meanwhile, in the cauldron, actions were taken to counter traffic. In the area south of Steblevo, forces were gathering for an attack on Shenderovka and Novaya Buda. The first to arrive was the "Germany" regiment from the SS "Wiking" division and in the evening it managed to capture Shenderovka. The main forces of the attackers were units of the 72nd Infantry Division, which carried out a night attack and occupied Novaya Buda, the northern part of Khilek and Komarovka. The advanced units of the III Panzer Corps were less than 20 km away.

The successful actions of the German troops caused a crisis in the Soviet military leadership. According to G.K. Zhukov, Konev, having learned about Vatutin’s failures in the sector of the 27th Army, called Stalin, informed him about this and offered to give him leadership for the liquidation of the entire encircled group. In this case, the 1st Ukrainian Front was left with the defense of the external front of the encirclement. Despite the objections of Vatutin and Zhukov, this decision was made. According to I.S. Konev, Stalin called him himself, since Headquarters had information about a breakthrough in the 27th Army zone, and inquired about the situation and the decisions made. A little later, Stalin called again and suggested the above. Additionally, a telegram from Headquarters was sent to Zhukov and Vatutin indicating the reasons for the situation: “Firstly, there was no general plan for the destruction of the Korsun enemy group through the joint efforts of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.

Secondly, the weak 27th Army was not reinforced in a timely manner.

Thirdly, no decisive measures were taken to carry out the instructions of the Headquarters to destroy first of all the enemy’s Steblevo ledge, from where attempts to break through were most likely to be expected.”

This was followed by a directive from Headquarters, which stated the transfer of the 27th Army in its entirety under the command of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Zhukov was tasked with coordinating the interaction of fronts on the outer front of the encirclement.

After these events, the commanders of both fronts took measures to prevent a further breakthrough by the enemy and to quickly destroy the encircled group. The 27th Army was reinforced by the 202nd Rifle Division, and the 27th Separate Tank Brigade from the 5th Guards was concentrated in the Maidanovka area (10 km southeast of Lysyanka). tank army with the task of preventing a breakthrough from Lysyanka to the encircled group while simultaneously reassigning it to the 4th Guards. army. A little earlier, the same army was transferred to the 80th Tank Brigade from the 20th Tank Corps to strengthen the rifle formations involved in the destruction of the encircled. Instead, the 20th Tank Corps received the 110th Tank Brigade (n/a Oktyabr, 4 km northeast of Lysyanka) from the 18th Tank Corps.

On February 13, the 29th Tank Corps, by order of the commander of the 5th Guards. tank army went on the offensive with the aim of destroying the enemy in the Steblevo area. The corps together with units of the 5th Guards. On February 14, the cavalry corps liberated Novaya Buda from the enemy and pushed him back in the Komarovka area by 1.5-2 km. On the same day, Konev gave the order to redeploy the main forces of the 5th Guards. tank army from the Zvenigorodka area to the Steblevo and Lysyanka area. By 16:00 on February 14, the redeployment was largely completed. Since regrouping in muddy conditions was complicated by significant difficulties, by order of Rotmistrov, the 20th and 18th tank corps left all faulty tanks in place and went to new areas with 5-14 tanks per brigade. The 49th Rifle Corps was transferred from the 5th Guards. tank army into the 53rd Army and additionally reinforced by the 110th Guards. and the 233rd rifle divisions.

“Agony” of the efforts of Breit’s corps and the breakthrough of Stemmerman’s group

The 16th Panzer Division was virtually inactive on 12 February due to lack of fuel and ammunition, apart from two local attacks that were repulsed by Soviet troops. The 17th Panzer Division made only a small advance. The 398th Infantry and 1st SS Panzer Divisions came under attack by Soviet forces and were forced to abandon most of Vinograd and Repka, respectively. Frank's battle group of the 1st Panzer Division, located at Lysyanka, also did not advance, since its supply lines were under Soviet artillery fire.

On February 13, the main attack ram of the III Panzer Corps was the Beke heavy tank regiment, which received fuel and ammunition by air at night. During the morning battle with units of the 2nd Tank Army, Beke's regiment and the 16th Tank Division captured Dashukovka and Chesnovka. The German side announced the destruction of 70 tanks and 40 anti-tank guns at the cost of the loss of five Tigers and four Panthers. Later, height 239.8 was taken sequentially, 5 kilometers north of Lysyanka and Khizhintsy. Another 12 km were covered, and only 10 km remained before Stemmermann’s group. On this day, the 1st Tank Division crossed the Gniloy Tikich and completely captured Lysyanka. The 198th Infantry Division regained control of Vinograd.

On February 14, Beke’s group did not advance due to the difficult terrain east of Khizhintsy and the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops. The 1st Tank Division managed to occupy the bridge over the stream that separated the Oktyabr village a couple of kilometers north of Lysyanka. On February 16, the last attempt was made to defeat the Soviet troops northeast of Lysyanka, but they only succeeded in occupying the Oktyabr farm. The available forces of the III Panzer Corps were completely exhausted. He was separated from Stemmerman's group by 7 km.

By February 12, the length of the perimeter of the encircled group was only 35 km. On February 14, the 294th Infantry Division and part of the forces of the 206th Infantry Division of the 73rd Rifle Corps of the 52nd Army liberated Korsun-Shevchenkovsky.

On the morning of February 15, at a meeting between Stemmermann and Lieb, a decision was made to make a breakthrough late in the evening of February 16. The breakthrough plan stipulated that the Lieb Corps, consisting of Corps Group B, the 72nd Infantry Division and the SS Viking Division, would be in the vanguard. It will be covered by Stemmermann's corps consisting of the 57th and 88th infantry divisions. From the Komarovka-Khilki area, Lieb's corps should break through along the shortest route to October, where the III Tank Corps was waiting for it. During February 15, the encircled German troops fought fierce battles for the possession of important settlements for the breakthrough - Khilki, Komarovka and Novaya Buda. A night attack by the 105th Regiment from the 72nd Division completely captured Khilki and, despite Soviet counterattacks the next day, held it. To the south there was a struggle for Komarovka and Novaya Buda, and within them themselves.

On the night of February 17, a breakthrough from the boiler began. On a front of 4.5 km, three columns marched in the first echelon: the 5th SS Wiking Panzer Division (11,500 people, including the Wallonia Brigade) on the left, the 72nd Infantry Division (4,000 people) in the center and the corps group "B" (7,430 people) on the right. The rearguard was the 57th (3,534 people) and 88th (5,150 people) infantry divisions. XI Corps headquarters estimated the number of men remaining in the pocket who could go into battle at 45,000. In addition, there were another 2,100 wounded, of whom it was decided to leave almost one and a half thousand who were unable to move independently in Shenderovka under the supervision of volunteer doctors. The main blow fell on the 5th Guards. airborne, 180th and 202nd rifle divisions in the inner ring of encirclement and along the 41st Guards. rifle division on the outer. Basically, German troops broke through between the villages of Zhurzhintsy and Pochapintsy directly to October, but many, due to shelling from height 239, went south of it and even south of Pochapintsy and reached Gnilomy Tikich, where there were no crossings. This led to major losses both from hypothermia when trying to cross using improvised means, and from shelling by Soviet troops. During the breakthrough, the commander of the German group, General Stemmerman, was killed.

Supplying surrounded troops by air

To maintain the necessary combat readiness, the surrounded units had to receive at least 150 tons of cargo daily. Flights to deliver everything necessary to those surrounded began almost immediately after the ring closed. On the morning of January 29, the first 14 transport aircraft took off from Uman, carrying 30 tons of ammunition. They landed at the Korsun airstrip, which will play an important role in the coming weeks. The wounded were the first to set off on the return journey, of which by January 29 there were already over 2 thousand. Ju-52 aircraft from the 3rd transport squadron were used to deliver cargo. Initially, there was no fighter cover for the transports and they were forced to fly at low altitude to avoid Soviet fighters, although they suffered losses from ground fire. However, on February 1, when returning from Korsun, the Ju-52s flew high and were intercepted by Soviet fighters. As a result, 13 aircraft were shot down, two made emergency landings and one crashed at the airfield. After this incident, aircraft from the 52nd Fighter Squadron were used to provide cover. On average, 36 Ju-52 transports covered 3 Bf-109 fighters, but they were usually enough to drive away Soviet aircraft. From January 29 to February 3, an average of 120-140 tons of cargo were delivered and 2,800 wounded were evacuated. In the following days, the weather worsened and daytime flights were temporarily suspended due to the impossibility of landing. On February 10, a record was set for the delivery of cargo - 250 tons, and 431 wounded were taken back. February 12 was the last day when landings were made on airfields inside the pocket. After this, all cargo was delivered by parachute. In total, 2,026 tons of cargo were delivered by landing or dropped, including 1,247 tons of ammunition, 45.5 tons of food, 38.3 tons of weapons and medicine and 695 cubic meters of fuel. 1,536 sorties were flown, including 832 Ju-52s, 478 He-111s, 58 FW-190s and 168 Bf-109s. Lost for all reasons, primarily due to Soviet fighters, 50 aircraft, including 32 Ju-52s, another 150 were damaged. According to other sources, 32 Ju-52s, 13 He-111s and 47 fighters were lost. 58 Soviet aircraft were claimed to have been shot down.

Losses of the parties

Soviet troops lost 80,188 people for all reasons during the operation, including 24,286 killed, dead and missing. Losses in armored vehicles are estimated from 606 to 850 tanks and self-propelled guns. During the period from January 20 to February 20, the 1st Ukrainian Front lost 1,711 guns and 512 mortars, and the 2nd Ukrainian - 221 guns and 154 mortars, but not all of these losses (especially the 1st Ukrainian) relate to the Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya operations.

The losses of the encircled German troops amounted to approximately 30 thousand people, including about 19,000 killed and captured. Combat losses of units and formations of the 1st Tank Army for February 1-20 amounted to 4,181 people (804 killed, 2,985 wounded, 392 missing). The combat losses of the VII Army Corps for January 26-31 amounted to approximately 1,000 people. The losses of the 8th Army on the external front of the encirclement for January 20 - February 20 amounted to approximately 4,500 people. Losses in armored vehicles amounted, according to Frankson and Zetterling, to about 300 tanks and assault guns, of which about 240 were on the outer front of the encirclement, and about 50 inside the pocket. However, the latter number contradicts the number of tanks and assault guns inside the cauldron given above. Accordingly, according to Russian researcher A. Tomzov, the losses were higher, namely about 320 vehicles.

Results of the operation

Although the task of destroying the encircled group was not completely solved, the group was nevertheless defeated. The second Stalingrad did not happen, but two German army corps ceased to exist. On February 20, Manstein decided to send all the remnants of the withdrawn divisions to various training and formation centers, for reorganization or to join other units.

For the exploits and courage shown in battles, 23 Soviet units and formations were given the honorary names “Korsun”, 6 formations - “Zvenigorod”. 73 servicemen were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, 9 of them posthumously. For the defeat of the enemy near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Army General I. S. Konev, the first of the front commanders during the war, was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union on February 20, and the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov on February 21 became the first, along with Fedorenko, marshal of armored forces - this military rank was just introduced by Stalin, and Zhukov recommended Rotmistrov for this rank, and Stalin also proposed Fedorenko.

The German side was also not deprived of awards. 48 people received the Knight's Cross, 10 people received the Knight's Cross with oak leaves and 3 people received the Knight's Cross with oak leaves and swords, including Lieutenant General Lieb on February 7 and 18 received successively the first and second awards.

In the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, the Museum of the History of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Battle was opened, in the places of the most fierce battles there are monuments that made up the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky memorial complex.

In culture

• Documentary film “Victory in Right-Bank Ukraine” (1945), scriptwriter - A. P. Dovzhenko.
• Feature film “If the enemy does not surrender...” (1982), director - T.V. Levchuk.
• Essay "Stalingrad on the Dnieper", author - writer Sergei Sergeevich Smirnov