At VGK headquarters the idea of ​​a counteroffensive arises. Archive of Alexander N

PLAN-OUTLINE

holding a lecture on patriotic education of the “Warrior” club

TOPIC: on the 72nd anniversary of the start of the counteroffensive near Moscow

QUESTIONS: 1. On the approaches to the capital.

2. Defense of Moscow.

3. Counter-offensive of the Red Army.

TIME: 2 hours.

PLACE: School No. 5 life safety class

Before the start of the performance, the song “Get up, great country” is played and photos are shown through the projector.

…..from filming in 1941

After finishing the viewing, I proceed to present the material:

The entire plan of the war against the USSR was tied to Moscow, so the center of gravity of the efforts of the group of German troops was located in the Moscow direction, in the offensive zone of Army Group Center. This operational-strategic formation of the Wehrmacht contained 36.4% of soldiers and officers, 46.5% of guns and mortars, 53.5% of tanks, 43.3% of combat aircraft of the total number of enemy forces and assets deployed on the Soviet-German front at the time of the invasion of our country. The concentration of such forces in the main direction and the advance in the concentration and deployment of Soviet troops provided the Germans with favorable conditions for delivering the most powerful first strike and quickly developing the success achieved deep into the territory of our country. Tank formations of Army Group Center advanced 255 km by June 22, and up to 400-450 km by July 1. At the same time, the depth of advance of troops of neighboring enemy army groups (North and South) amounted to 140-220 km.

In order to prevent German troops from breaking through to Moscow, the Soviet command was forced to radically restructure plans for conducting military operations. For this purpose, the Headquarters of the High Command (HC) decided on June 25 to deploy a second strategic echelon consisting of the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd reserve armies at the turn of the river. Cold Dvina, Dnieper to Kremenchug. But with such a width of the border, the degree of saturation of the Western direction with troops and military equipment turned out to be clearly insufficient. And therefore, already on June 27, the General Headquarters not only reduced the width of this line by 450 km, but also strengthened the Western direction with three reserve armies (16th, 24th and 28th), paying special attention to organizing the defense of areas along the Enskaya highway and Warsaw Highway, which took the shortest route to Moscow. These decisions of the General Headquarters were essentially the first measures to thwart the enemy’s plans to break through to Moscow and immediately take possession of it.

A number of other urgent measures were also taken. All of them were aimed at doing what was most necessary for the security of the capital: restoring the broken front, creating a new line of defense and delaying Hitler’s avalanche. For this purpose, by the end of the second ten days of July, the General Headquarters deployed the 121st new division in the Moscow direction, taking up defensive positions to a depth of 230 km.

No one in the German camp could have expected this. And although the divisions were poorly equipped and lacked combat experience, their deployment was invaluable for the entire course of the struggle for Moscow. On the Dnieper, near Smolensk and in many other areas of the Western direction, bloody battles began to boil, in which Soviet troops so shocked the most powerful enemy group that they forced the German command to revise operational plans for the first time in World War II. Hitler was forced on July 30 to order a halt to the offensive against Moscow.

Almost simultaneously, the General Headquarters reorganized the defense structure of the Moscow direction. For this purpose, the troops of the Western Front and parts of the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction were united into a single Western Front and a new Reserve Front was created. The armies of the liquidated fronts of the Mozhaisk defense line and reserve armies, as well as the newly formed 43rd Army, were transferred to the latter. Army General G.K. ZHUKOV was appointed commander of the Reserve Front.

On August 25, ZHUKOV received a directive from the Supreme High Command Headquarters with the task: on August 30, the left-flank armies of the Reserve Front should go on the offensive, finish off the enemy’s Yelnya grouping and capture Yelnya, and the remaining armies would develop the occupied defenses on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky defensive line.

ZHUKOV's first independent operation, which he carried out in the war with Nazi Germany, turned out to be quite successful. Having purposefully and comprehensively prepared the troops for the offensive, with their efforts and his iron will, he forced the Germans to retreat from the Elninsky ledge, from where a breakthrough to Moscow was planned.

Using reserves and troops from other sectors of the front, the German command by the end of September brought the composition of Army Group Center to 1,800 thousand people, 14 thousand guns and mortars, 2.7 thousand tanks and 1,390 aircraft, which ensured their overall superiority over the troops three Soviet fronts (Western, Reserve and Bryansk).

The Battle of Moscow includes two periods: defensive (September 30 - December 4, 1941) and offensive (December 4, 1941 - April 20, 1942). In the first of them, the Red Army carried out the Vyazemsk-Bryansk (September 30 - October 31) and Moscow (November 15 - December 4) defensive operations.

In the second - the Moscow offensive (counter-offensive near Moscow on December 4, 1941 - January 7, 1942) and the Rzhev-Vyazma offensive (January 8 - April 20, 1942) operations.

At dawn on October 2, 1941, the main forces of Army Group Center, having taken their starting position, rushed east and expanded the offensive zone of Guderian's tank divisions, which had launched Operation Typhoon two days earlier. The enemy broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops in three sectors, 150-200 km apart from each other, and began a rapid advance to the rear of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts. On October 7, the Germans closed a ring around the troops fighting west of Vyazma.

The situation for Moscow became extremely threatening; the strategic front in the Western direction was broken through. The gap that formed in the defense reached a width of 500 km. There was nothing to close it. The threat of a sudden appearance of enemy armored forces in the capital became real, because weak cover on the Mozhaisk defense line could not delay them.

The enemy delivered equally powerful blows to the troops of the Reserve and Bryansk Fronts. As a result, two-thirds of the divisions of the Western fronts were surrounded, but they continued to heroically fight the enemy.

During this time, the Supreme High Command Headquarters managed not only to raise reserves, regroup troops and, together with the remnants of 32 divisions that escaped their encirclement, close the gap in the defense, but also restore the Western Front, for the leadership of which ZHUKOV was recalled from Leningrad. At the same time, a new Kalinin Front was formed, the commander of which was appointed Colonel General I.S. KONEV.

By the end of October, at the turn of 70-100 km west of Moscow, Soviet troops stopped the enemy advance.

On November 15, German troops launched a second attack on Moscow. In 20 days they advanced 80-110 km, but by December 5 their forward movement stopped. Soviet troops managed to stop the enemy group literally at the walls of the capital. At that moment, only 12 km separated the enemy from the current border of the city in the Lianozov region and from that victorious finale that the Nazis were so eagerly awaiting.

The idea of ​​a counteroffensive arose at the Supreme Command Headquarters immediately after the failure of the enemy Operation Typhoon. To implement it, on November 1, a decision was made to form 10 reserve armies and other units of military branches in the rear of the country with a commissioning date of December 1. However, the enemy’s renewed offensive on Moscow on November 15 forced us to abandon this idea for a while. To repel enemy tank groups, it was necessary to attract a reserve. And yet, on the evening of November 29, the Supreme Command Headquarters, at the suggestion of General ZHUKOV, decides to attack the numerically superior enemy, without waiting for the reserves to arrive. And on December 5, in a situation when fierce battles were blazing on the outskirts of Moscow, approaching its gates, when German soldiers were looking at Moscow through binoculars from the roofs of houses in villages near Moscow, a completely unexpected, unforeseen and incredible thing happened: the Red Army launched a counteroffensive. Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, severe frosts and deep snow, it developed successfully.

North-west of Moscow, the armies of the Kalinin and Western Fronts inflicted significant damage on the 3rd and 4th Tank Groups and the enemy 9th Army. Kalinin, Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Volokolamsk and other cities were liberated. The exit of Soviet troops to Rzhev created a threat to Army Group Center from the north. South-west of Moscow, the armies of the left wing of the Western Front defeated the 2nd Tank Army and part of the enemy's 4th Army, removed the threat to Tula, liberated Kaluga and reached west of Sukhinichi. The southwestern front, covering Army Group Center from the south, surrounded and eliminated the group of troops of the 2nd German Army in the Yelets area. In mid-December, the armies of the center of the Western Front went on the offensive and liberated Naro-Fominsk, Maloyaroslavets, and Borovsk. By January 7, the enemy was driven back 100-250 km. And on January 3, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to launch a general offensive by Soviet troops, during which they advanced 80-100 km in the Gzhatsky and Yukhnovsky directions, and 250 km in the Vitebsk direction, removing the immediate threat to Moscow.

Thus ended the largest battle in military history in terms of the number of troops, scope and intensity, dynamism and effectiveness. Its prologue, it would seem, left Moscow no chance to withstand the onslaught of fascist troops, and the ending turned out to be unexpected and stunning. The German army suffered its first major defeat in the Second World War, and the myth of its invincibility was dispelled. But, as ZHUKOV said, it really was then the strongest army in the world, better prepared than ours, trained, well armed, and masterfully wielded weapons.

Exactly 75 years ago, on August 30, 1941, the Elninsk offensive operation began. During it, Red Army troops liberated the city of Yelnya and eliminated the ledge that threatened the Western and Reserve fronts. In these battles, the Soviet Guard was born - the four divisions that took part in the battle were awarded this title.

Fierce enemy resistance

On August 30, at 7.30 am, the positions of the German troops were clouded with explosions from exploding shells, including rockets. 30 minutes later, immediately after the end of the artillery barrage, the Soviet infantry went on the attack.

The 24th Army of General Konstantin Rakutin advanced from the south, north and east. It was supposed to cut down the Yelninsky ledge and then divide it in half. Despite the powerful shelling of enemy trenches and trenches, in which all 800 barrels of army artillery participated, the offensive was initially difficult to develop.

The enemy resisted fiercely and in some places launched counterattacks. The Germans understood perfectly well what the success of the Soviet offensive threatened them with, and did not want to be surrounded. Therefore, until September, the successes of Rakutin’s rifle divisions were modest - they managed to advance no more than 2 kilometers into the depths of the German defense.

The tip of the German ram has become dull

Fighting in this area began in mid-July 1941, when Army Group Center, ramming the troops of the Western Front, rushed to the east. After Yelnya, a small regional town in the Smolensk region, was taken, the Germans tried to continue their further offensive. However, 18 kilometers east of the settlement they occupied, they came across strong defenses of Soviet troops and stopped.

The ramming edge of General Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group in the form of the 10th Panzer Division had become dull. For the first time since the beginning of the war, the Germans had to go on the defensive in the main, Moscow direction. The Elninsky ledge was formed, which went deep into the positions of the Red Army and threatened it with a new offensive.

Realizing this, the command of the Red Army ordered the immediate destruction of the enemy bridgehead. The task was entrusted to the newly formed Reserve Front under the command of Army General Georgy Zhukov. For Georgy Konstantinovich, the battles for Yelnya became the first independent operation after the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

In the traditions of the First World War

However, the Germans did not sleep, having managed in a fairly short time to transform the occupied territory into a fortified area - with a carefully thought-out system of trenches for infantry, trenches for tanks and assault guns, as well as positions for guns and howitzers.

As a result, the Yelninsky bridgehead turned out to be a tough nut to crack for the 24th Army. The battles of late July - mid-August 1941 were fierce and at times reminiscent of the trench warfare of the First World War.

Soldiers and commanders learned to beat the enemy. And not only them. 39-year-old Major General Rakutin also learned to command. Konstantin Ivanovich, despite his experience of participating in the civil and Soviet-Finnish wars, was a border guard and before the start of the Great Patriotic War had no experience of commanding a combined arms army.

Secretly prepare a decisive offensive

Recalling these battles, Zhukov admitted that the fire system of the German defense was not fully identified. As a result, Soviet artillerymen and mortarmen often fired not at real, but at perceived enemy firing points. This led to the failure of friendly infantry attacks over and over again.

After consulting with Rakutin and his commanders of the military branches, Zhukov decided to postpone the new offensive for 10-12 days. During this time, it was necessary to thoroughly study the enemy’s front line, bring up two or three fresh divisions and artillery, and provide the troops with ammunition and fuel and lubricants.

To prevent the Germans from suspecting anything, it was decided to exhaust them with constant artillery, mortar, machine gun and small arms fire. In the meantime, prepare the operation secretly, regrouping troops in the right directions.

Guderian's last reserve

The assault on the approaches to Yelnya pursued several goals. First, bring back the occupied city. Secondly, on the scale of the Battle of Smolensk, prevent Guderian’s troops from finally closing the encirclement ring around the 16th Army and the 20th Army, the general leadership of which was carried out by General Pavel Kurochkin.

German tank crews were forced to repel fierce attacks by Soviet troops in the Elninsky direction, where even Guderian’s last reserve, the company guarding his command post, was thrown into battle.

Heavy losses suffered by the subordinates of the German general forced him to demand from the higher command the withdrawal of his troops.

We were talking about the 10th Panzer Division, units of the “Reich” and “Greater Germany”, which were part of the 46th Corps. However, the command of Army Group Center rejected his request.

German castling

As a result, the task force of General Konstantin Rokossovsky managed to release the encircled units of the 16th and 20th armies.

The situation for Guderian changed only towards the end of August 1941. Then the 2nd Tank Group was redirected from Moscow

directions to Kiev, in order, together with the 1st Panzer Group of General Ewald von Kleist, to close a pincer around the Soviet Southwestern Front.

As a result of the German castling, before the new decisive offensive of the 24th Army, key positions on the Yelninsky ledge were occupied by the infantry divisions of the 20th Army Corps. The Soviet troops also had rifle divisions as their main strength. Aviation on both sides was almost not used, since it was involved in other directions.

Five commanders of one army

This time the offensive of the Reserve Front was carried out by the forces of two armies. Rakutinskaya continued to attack the ill-fated ledge, but to the south of it, towards Roslavl, the 43rd Army was advancing.

The latter was chronically unlucky with commanders. During the period from August to September 1941, five generals were replaced in this post. This leapfrog was explained by the fact that some army commanders were transferred to more difficult sections of the Soviet-German front, while others were removed due to dissatisfaction with the successes of the formation.

During the Elninsky offensive operation, the 43rd Army did not prove itself. Its troops moved forward with difficulty, and some divisions were surrounded and almost completely destroyed, such as the 109th Tank or 145th Rifle.

Surrounding the enemy

Things were much more successful with the 24th Army. On September 3, 1941, it resumed its offensive and, with attacks from the south and north, sharply narrowed the corridor through which the Yelninsky ledge was supplied.

The commander of the 20th Corps, General Friedrich Materna, was an experienced warrior. He fought in the First World War, went through the Polish 1939 and French campaigns of 1940. He was awarded the highest order of the Third Reich - the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. The general immediately realized that his troops were in danger of being surrounded, and gave the order to withdraw.

Covered by strong barriers, the Germans began to retreat from the suddenly dangerous territory. On September 5, the 100th Rifle Division of General Ivan Russiyanov bypassed Yelnya from the north, and the 19th Division under the command of General Yakov Kotelnikov began an assault on the city itself.

Birth of the Soviet Guard

On September 6, Yelnya was liberated, and by the end of September 8, the Yelnya ledge finally ceased to exist. The losses of Soviet troops in killed, wounded, captured and missing amounted to more than 30 thousand people. The Germans lost about 10 thousand soldiers and officers.

10 days later, on September 18, 1941, by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, two rifle divisions that distinguished themselves in battles in the Elninsky direction were awarded the title of Guards. These were the first formations of the Red Army to be awarded this high title.

The country's leadership highly appreciated the results of the Elninsky operation, which, at the height of a powerful German offensive on all fronts, became the first symptom of the future victory of the Soviet Union.

From the diary of 16-year-old Dieter Borkovsky.

“... At noon we left on a completely crowded S-Bahn train from Anhalt station. There were many women on the train with us - refugees from the Russian-occupied eastern regions of Berlin. They carried with them all their belongings: a stuffed backpack. Nothing else. Horror froze on their faces, anger and despair filled the people! I have never heard such curses before...

Then someone shouted over the noise: “Quiet!” We saw a nondescript, dirty soldier with two iron crosses and a gold German cross on his uniform. He had a patch on his sleeve with four small metal tanks, which meant that he had knocked out 4 tanks in close combat.

“I want to tell you something,” he shouted, and there was silence in the train car. “Even if you don't want to listen! Stop whining! We must win this war, we must not lose courage. If others win - Russians, Poles, French, Czechs - and do to our people even one percent of what we did to them for six years in a row, then in a few weeks not a single German will be left alive. This is being told to you by someone who himself spent six years in the occupied countries!” The train became so quiet that you could have heard a hairpin drop.”

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 2202821 TO THE TROOPS COMMANDER
2nd UKRAINIAN FRONT ABOUT ATTITUDE TO THE POPULATION
AND TO THE REBEL PARTS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
December 18, 1944 02.15 min

1. Explain to all military personnel that Czechoslovakia is our ally and the attitude of the Red Army troops towards the population of the liberated areas of Czechoslovakia and towards the rebel Czechoslovak units should be friendly.
2. Prohibit troops from unauthorized confiscation of cars, horses, livestock, shops and various property.
3. When deploying troops in populated areas, take into account the interests of the local population.
4. Everything necessary for the needs of our troops can be obtained only through the local bodies of the Czechoslovak civil administration or through the command of the Czechoslovak rebel units.
5. Persons who violate this order will be subject to severe liability.
6. Report the measures taken.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. STALIN A. ANTONOV
TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 167. L. 137. Original.

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 11072 TO THE COMMANDERS
TROOPS OF THE 1st AND 2nd BELARUSIAN AND 1st UKRAINIAN
FRONTERS ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF HUMANE TREATMENT
TO THE GERMAN POPULATION AND PRISONERS OF WAR

April 20, 1945 20:40

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. Demand that the troops change their attitude towards the Germans, both military personnel and civilians, and treat the Germans better.

Harsh treatment makes them afraid and makes them stubbornly resist without surrendering.

The civilian population, fearing retaliation, organizes into gangs. This situation is not beneficial for us. A more humane attitude towards the Germans will make it easier to conduct combat operations and reduce the stubbornness of the Germans in defense.

2. Create a German administration in the regions of Germany and appoint burgomasters in the liberated cities. Ordinary members of the National Socialist Party, if they are loyal to the Red Army, should not be touched, but only the leaders should be detained if they did not manage to escape.

3. Improving attitudes towards Germans should not lead to a decrease in vigilance and familiarity with the Germans.

I. STALIN

ANTONOV"

I order:

1. The directive must be communicated to every officer and soldier of the active troops and institutions of the front no later than April 21, 1945.

2. Pay special attention to ensure that people do not go to the other extreme and do not allow facts of familiarity and politeness with German prisoners of war and the civilian population.

3. The chiefs of staff, together with the heads of political departments, in the morning of April 23, 1945, should check the knowledge of comrade’s instructions in the units. Stalin by all categories of military personnel.

* * *
Cipher telegram

To the heads of political departments of the corps

and divisions

By 24-00 23.4.45, report on the work carried out in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters on changing attitudes towards the Germans and the responses of personnel to it.

Beginning PO (15) 71 armies

* * *
Head of the Political Department of the 47th Army

Colonel Comrade Kalashnik

Political report

On April 23, 1945, upon receipt of instructions from the Army Military Council, in furtherance of Headquarters order No. 11072 dated April 20, 1945, in order to eliminate arbitrariness and self-will in relation to the Germans, I held a meeting of the heads of the division’s political departments, at which the instructions of the Army Military Council were communicated.

1. On ending the unauthorized confiscation of personal property, livestock and food from Germans.

2. On taking under military protection all property, food supplies in warehouses and stores, collecting abandoned livestock and transferring them to military commandants for use for the needs of the troops and providing food for the civilian population.

3. On the decisive fight against illegal self-procurement of food and strict punishment of those involved in this, as well as those who give permission for illegal procurement.

4. On the organized eviction of Germans from buildings intended to house headquarters and command, isolating the rest of the population from military units in separate buildings and providing the resettled Germans with their existing food supplies, personal property and preserving it in the houses and apartments they left behind.

5. On organizing the collection of property abandoned by the Germans and issuing it to units as a parcel fund only with the permission of the Military Council of the Army and corps commanders.

6. On providing assistance in the organization of local authorities.

7. On the seizure of weapons from the local population, etc.

Beginning political department

125th Rifle Corps

Colonel KOLUNOV

ORDER:

For the information of all personnel, let us know that I will not approve lenient sentences and will demand exclusively capital punishment for all murderers, rapists, robbers and looters - execution!

Commander of the 136th Rifle Corps

Hero of the Soviet Union

Lieutenant General LYKOV

Directives of the Supreme Command Headquarters:
dated April 2, 1945 No. 11055:
“Give instructions to the troops operating on the territory of Austria not to offend the population of Austria, to behave correctly and not to confuse the Austrians with the German occupiers.”

No. 165. Report of the military prosecutor of the 1st Belorussian Front to the Military Council of the Front on the implementation of directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the Military Council of the Front on changing attitudes towards the German population

Upon receipt of the directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the directive from the Military Council of the front, the military prosecutor's office, in two encrypted telegrams and a detailed directive, demanded that the military prosecutors of the armies and formations take personal control over the implementation of these particularly important instructions and ensure their implementation by all means.

Following this, the entire operational staff of the front military prosecutor's office went to the armies and divisions to carry out this work. Separately, the military prosecutor's office of the front and rear organized an inspection in order to provide practical assistance to a significant number of military commandant's offices both in the army and in the front rear.

All mass legal work of military prosecutors was switched to topics related to changes in attitudes towards the German population. Special plans for carrying out mass and legal work were developed, coordinated with political agencies.

In a number of armies, based on materials from military prosecutors, special orders were issued citing specific facts of incorrect attitude towards the German population; decisions were made to bring the perpetrators to trial, etc.

This, approximately, is the organizational work of the military prosecutor's office of the front to ensure the implementation of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the directive of the Military Council of the front.

A significant change has certainly been achieved in the attitude of our military personnel towards the German population. The facts of aimless and [unjustified] executions of Germans, looting and rape of German women have significantly decreased, however, even after the publication of directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the Military Council of the front, a number of such cases were still recorded.

If executions of Germans are currently almost never observed, and cases of robbery are isolated, then violence against women still occurs; The scavenger hunt has not yet stopped, consisting of our military personnel walking around junk apartments, collecting all sorts of things and objects, etc.

Here are a number of facts recorded in recent days:

On April 25, in the city of Falkensee, the deputy commander of the 1st battery for the technical unit of the 334th Guards was detained. heavy self-propelled artillery regiment Art. Lieutenant Enchivatov, who went from house to house while drunk and raped women.

Enchivatov was arrested, the case was completed by the investigation and transferred for hearing to a military tribunal.

Red Army soldiers of the outpost of the 157th separate border regiment Ivanov and Manankov in the city of Fronau, being drunk, entered the house of a German. In this house, Manankov raped a sick German woman, Lieselet Lure. April 22 p.m. g. she was raped by a group of our servicemen, after which she poisoned her one and a half year old son, her mother was poisoned and she herself tried to poison herself, but was saved. In a state of illness after poisoning, Manankov raped her. At this time, Ivanov raped the German woman Kirchenwitz.

Ivanov and Manankov were arrested, the case was completed by the investigation and transferred to a military tribunal for hearing.

Commander of the mortar company of the 216th regiment of the 76th division of Art. Lieutenant Buyanov arbitrarily declared himself the head of the Bernau patrol and, while drunk, stopped all passing Germans, taking away valuables from them.

Buyanov was put on trial by a military tribunal.

The chief of staff of the 278th regiment of the 175th division, Lieutenant Colonel Losyev, sent a lieutenant subordinate to him to the basement where the Germans were hiding, so that he would select and bring to him a German woman. The lieutenant carried out the order, and Losyev raped the woman brought to him.

By order of the Military Council of the Army, Lieutenant Colonel Losyev was removed from his post and appointed with demotion.

On April 22, in the village of Shenerlinde, the gun commander of the 695th artillery regiment of the 185th infantry division, Sergeant Major Dorokhin, drunk and threatened with a weapon, raped a 15-year-old girl in front of her parents.

Dorokhin was arrested and tried by a military tribunal.

On April 25, the head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 79th Corps, Lieutenant Kursakov, in the presence of her husband and children, tried to rape an elderly German woman.

Criminal prosecution has been initiated against Kursakov.

A whole series of similar facts can be cited for other compounds.

I think it is necessary to emphasize a number of points:

1. Commanders of formations and military councils of armies are taking serious measures to eliminate the facts of the disgraceful behavior of their subordinates, however, individual commanders are complacent in the fact that some turning point has been achieved, completely forgetting that reports reach their attention only about a part violence, robbery and other outrages committed by their subordinates.

Due to the fact that different formations pass through the same sector, individual commanders are not averse to blaming the outrages that take place and about which they become aware of, on other units. In conversations with commanders, this tendency often slips through.

2. Violence, and especially robbery and spoliation, is widely practiced by repatriated people traveling to repatriation points, and especially by Italians, Dutch and even Germans. At the same time, all these outrages are being blamed on our military personnel.

3. There are cases where the Germans engage in provocation by claiming rape when this did not occur. I myself have identified two such cases.

No less interesting is that our people sometimes, without verification, report to the authorities about violence and murders that have taken place, whereas when verified, this turns out to be fiction.

This kind of fact is worthy of interest: when I was in the 3rd Shock Army on April 27, it was reported that the commander of the 85th Tank Regiment, Chistyakov, in a drunken state, brought German women to his place, raped them, and when, at the cry of one German woman, the servicemen wanted to go into house where Chistyakov was, he gave the order to deploy a self-propelled gun and opened fire, killing 4 people and wounding 6 of our servicemen.

I ordered the deputy military prosecutor of the army and the military investigator to immediately go to the place.

It is necessary to briefly dwell on the analysis of the reasons that still contribute to the failure to comply with the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the Military Council of the Front:

1) Directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated April 20 and the Military Council of the Front dated April 22 this year. g. are not fully communicated to all soldiers and officers.

In some small units, especially where the majority of personnel are on the move, these important documents are communicated formally and many military personnel do not know them.

In parts where there are many nationalities, these documents are not even properly explained. Representatives of the political department and the military prosecutor's office of the front in the 301st division, where there are many Latvians and Moldovans, established that these servicemen had heard something about the presence of such documents, but they did not really know what exactly was said in them.

2) The appointment of commandants to settlements occupied by our troops is carried out extremely slowly; patrolling in these populated areas is poor; A very small number of people are assigned to patrol, they are given a large area and they essentially walk through the streets, not knowing what is happening in the houses and on other streets. Thus, this patrol essentially turns into a fiction.

Here are the facts:

In Ebersdorf, occupied by our troops on April 21, there was no commandant on April 27: in Herzfeld, Karlshorst, Schoneweid, Adlershof, Rudov and in a number of other points there were no commandants on April 28.

Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the work of commandants. The military prosecutor's office of the front and military prosecutors of the armies checked the implementation of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the directive of the Military Council of the front in approximately 50 commandant's offices. This check revealed circumstances that undoubtedly deserve attention.

A number of commandants do not know the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the Military Council of the Front (commandant of the city of Petershagen, senior lieutenant Pashchenko, commandant of the city of Friedrichshegen, senior lieutenant Nevolin, commandant of the city of Erker, Major Lebedev, etc.), other commandants only know about these documents according to rumors.

I already pointed out above that commandants are appointed with great delay. To this we must add that in a number of areas the selection of commandants is very unsuccessful.

From the 8th Guards. The army received a report that the commandant of Ransdorf Art. Lieutenant Zinovienko, together with the mayor, issued an announcement for our military personnel, which said: “From this date, the robberies will stop.”

On April 25, the headquarters of military unit No. 70594 issued a temporary certificate to former police chief lieutenant Max Kiper, which reads: “Based on the order of Major General Mikhalitsyn, the bearer of this, Max Kiper, is temporarily appointed commandant of the city of Ezechwalde.” Signed by Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Anisov.

The commandant of the Berlin city district, Tempelhof, appointed as burgomaster a person who, under the Germans, held the position of deputy burgomaster.

These facts sufficiently indicate that some commandants are politically completely unprepared to perform such important functions.

And from an economic point of view, a whole series of commandants do not correspond to their purpose.

At a meeting in the 8th Guards. The army commandant of the city of Kepennik, Lieutenant Colonel Titov, stated that he had a supply of bread to feed the population for 3 - 4 months. Through further questioning, it was established that in this settlement there are over 100,000 inhabitants and that its reserves amount to 35 tons.

During my time in the army, I received a telephone assignment from a member of the Front Military Council, Lieutenant General Telegin, to establish the structure of local government in Berlin and all settlements that are included in the city zone.

I consider it necessary to highlight this issue in this report.

I talked with a number of Germans who are well aware of the structure of local government bodies. This diagram looks like this:

At the head of the city of Berlin was the main president of the city. The mayor is subordinate to him. Berlin and the settlements that fall within its zone are divided into 20 administrative districts. Each of these districts had a burgomaster, who was subordinate to the mayor of Berlin. Each administrative district unites 5 - 6 settlements.

The district burgomaster's office consists of a number of departments, the main of which are: food, which is in charge of food distribution, card system, etc.; economic, which is in charge of providing the population with clothing, shoes, and utilities; department for youth education, which is in charge of schools and issues of educating youth in the fascist spirit; department for work among women, etc. These departments are already directly connected with the population.

This local authority was closely linked in its work and carried out its functions through the police.

The police structure is as follows:

The Berlin police are headed by the chief police president, who reports to the chief president of Berlin and is in the same position as the mayor. About 350 police stations are subordinate to him (according to the number of settlements included in the city zone). Each police station had 40 - 50 police officers, headed by a lieutenant, captain or senior officer (depending on the importance of a particular locality).

As for the structure of the judicial bodies, it is presented as follows: the main court is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice; the next judicial link is the regional court, operating within the region.

Having studied this issue and talked with a number of army leaders, I came to the conclusion that the following structure would be the most harmonious.

The city's military commandant should be at the head of Berlin. At his discretion, the President of Berlin should be appointed. Military commandants should be appointed in 20 districts of the city.

The President of Berlin, in agreement with the Commandant of Berlin and in accordance with the candidates submitted by the district commandants, appoints district burgomasters according to the number of districts; District military commandants appoint burgomasters of populated areas.

Just as the burgomaster of Berlin is subordinate to the military commandant of Berlin, so the district burgomasters and burgomasters of populated areas must be subordinate to the district military commandants.

In each locality, a civil police force of approximately 10 to 20 people should be organized (depending on the size of the locality). This militia must be subordinate to the burgomaster and military commandant.

To communicate with the population in each quarter, a quarterly commissioner must be appointed from the population and in each house a person responsible for fulfilling all the requirements for the residents of the house.

These are considerations relating to the organization of power in Berlin and its zone.

Military prosecutors of armies and formations, in accordance with the instructions of the military prosecutor's office of the front, continue to work to verify the implementation of the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 20 and the Military Council of the front of April 22. about changing attitudes towards the German population.

On May 5, I present to the Front Military Council another memorandum on this matter, in which I will give a detailed analysis of all the facts of incorrect attitude towards the German population that will be recorded during the period from the beginning of the publication of these documents.

Military Prosecutor of the 1st Belorussian Front, Major General of Justice L. Yachenin

On this page of the document there is a handwritten resolution by G.K. Zhukov: “Comrade. Shestakov. I demand from you: immediately remove from commandantship all commandants who are not fit for purpose. Keep in mind that the Germans, observing the commandants and their work and behavior, judge our army. Demand that the commandants do not disgrace the officer corps of the Red Army." Zhukov 4.5.45"

RF. F. 233. Op. 2380. D. 40. L. 1-7. Script.

Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the SVAG - Commander-in-Chief of the GSOVG G.K. Zhukov, member of the Military Council of the GSOVG K.F. Telegin to the military councils of the armies, commanders of corps, branches of the military, the head of the political department of the GSOVG and the head of the Office of Military Commandants on maintaining order and stopping robberies, violence and arbitrariness against the local population.
June 30, 1945
Top secret
A copy of telegrams No. 16549 - 16551, transmitted in code.
Military Councils of the Armies
To the Commander of the 16th Air Force
Corps commanders
To the heads of the military branches
Head of the Political Department
Head of the Office of Military Commandants
Copy: Comrades SEROV, KURASOV

Numerous complaints continue to be received from local German authorities, peasant communities and individual residents about arbitrariness, violence and individual facts of direct manifestations of banditry by persons in the uniform of Red Army soldiers and repatriates.
In many rural places, German women do not go out to field work and haymaking for fear of being raped or robbed. Complaints were received from the districts of PRIGNITZ and SEELOW about the confiscation of horses and agricultural equipment by military personnel, which jeopardizes the most important harvesting and haymaking activities.
Despite the repeated and strict demands of the Military Council for the most severe struggle against arbitrariness and arbitrariness, the Military Councils of the armies, commanders of formations and units, military commandants and rear security troops have still not truly fulfilled these requirements, they have not established order and with their indecisiveness and softness , in essence, encourage the criminal behavior of their subordinates.
I am forced for the last time to give the strictest warning to the Military Councils of the armies, commanders and heads of political agencies of formations and units, military commandants, that if proper order is not restored in the next 3-5 days and the robberies, violence and arbitrariness against the local population are not stopped, then the most serious conclusions will be drawn, regardless of position and merit.
A commander who is not able to understand his task and fulfill the requirements of the senior command, to establish proper order and discipline in his unit, he is not worthy of holding such a post, he must be removed from his position and independent work.
Considering that in connection with the demobilization of older people, the withdrawal of some field commands of armies and units to the territory of the USSR, as well as the sending of several hundred thousand repatriates in marching order, an increase in the facts of self-will and arbitrariness is not excluded, -
I ORDER:
1. To the Military Councils of the 61st, 49th, 70th, 69th and 3rd armies:
a) prohibit vacations and dismissal from the yard of all military personnel;
b) establish an officer patrol along the streets in each populated area of ​​the location and overnight stays;
c) ensure that before each departure from a populated area from a place of deployment or overnight stay on the territory of Germany and Poland, the commander and head of the unit and institution, or responsible officers on their behalf, go around the residential buildings used for accommodation and interview housewives about claims for their immediate analysis on the spot;
d) in all populated areas through which troops will pass, have mobile patrols led by officers. Anyone lagging behind or entering houses should be detained and severely punished. It is strictly prohibited to stop convoys, vehicles and convoys (or individual carts) in populated areas along the route.
2. Military Councils of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th Shock, 8th Guards, 47th Armies, 1st and 2nd Guards Tank and the Commander of the 16th Air Force ] a [army], commanders of special forces camps:
a) by July 3, 1945, in areas where troops are located, in settlements that do not have military commandant’s offices, establish a round-the-clock patrol, assigning responsibility for order in these points personally to the commanders of the relevant units and rear institutions;
b) restore mobile patrols on the roads in the army zone with the tasks provided for by Directive No. BC/0143 of March 1, 1945, using for this purpose the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear, as directed by the chief of the NKVD troops for [the] protection of [the] rear ];
c) unconditionally detain all individuals and groups of military personnel who find themselves outside the location of their unit, without written permission from the commander of a separate unit;
d) submit to me, by July 10, 1945, lists of unit commanders and heads of institutions who are unable to establish proper order in their units, with a view to removing them from their posts and appointing them with demotion;
e) draw the attention of military prosecutors to the unsatisfactory measures on their part to combat these phenomena and indecisiveness in fulfilling the demands of the Military Council.
3. To the Chief of Logistics, Lieutenant General of the Quartermaster Service ANTIPENKO:
a) together with the head of the NKVD troops, Major General ZIMIN, by July 3, 1945, organize in the front zone, outside the rear of the armies, a sufficient number of mobile patrols on cars, motorcycles and bicycles to monitor order on the roads used by troops and in populated areas;
b) assign specific areas under the responsibility of commanders of individual units stationed in the rear of a group of forces to maintain order in them, together with military commandant’s offices;
c) print and, through the headquarters of the VT and MV1 of the armies and the front, by July 15, 1945, issue a permit for the right to use bicycles for official needs and individually to officers: all persons who do not have these permits by July 15, 1945, have their bicycles taken away, and those guilty of failure to comply with these requirements will be transferred to unit commanders for punishment.
4. Head of the Department of Military Commandants, Colonel SHESTAKOV
a) demand from military commandants more decisive measures to maintain order in their areas and settlements. All those unable to ensure this by July 10, 1945 should be removed from office and replaced with energetic, strong-willed commanders;
b) take measures to provide the necessary safety to the population during field work and prevent the seizure of agricultural equipment and taxes;
c) report to me about all cases of arbitrariness and arbitrariness, indicating the measures taken.
5. This directive should be immediately communicated to the entire officer corps against signature, obliging the commanders of individual units to personally announce it to the entire sergeant and rank and file before the formation.
Report to me on the measures you have taken under this directive on July 3, 1945.
G. Zhukov
Telegin
RGVA. F. 38816 Op. 1 D. 39 L. 10-12 Certified copy