Participants in the Battle of Borodino in 1812. Day of the Battle of Borodino
The Battle of Borodino (in French history - the Battle of the Moscow River, French Bataille de la Moskova) is the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian army under the command of General M. I. Kutuzov and the French army of Napoleon I Bonaparte. It took place on August 26 (September 7), 1812 near the village of Borodino, 125 km west of Moscow.
During the 12-hour battle, the French army managed to capture the positions of the Russian army in the center and on the left wing, but after the cessation of hostilities, the French army retreated to its original positions. Thus, in Russian historiography it is believed that the Russian troops won, but the next day the commander-in-chief of the Russian army M.I. Kutuzov gave the order to retreat due to heavy losses and because Emperor Napoleon had large reserves that were rushing to the aid of the French army.
The Russian historian Mikhnevich reported the following review of Emperor Napoleon about the battle:
“Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory in it, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible... Of the fifty battles I gave, in the battle of Moscow [the French] showed the most valor and achieved the least success.”
According to the memoirs of French General Pele, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon often repeated a similar phrase: “The Battle of Borodino was the most beautiful and most formidable, the French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians deserved to be invincible.”
It is considered the bloodiest one-day battle in history.
September 8 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the Borodino battle of the Russian army under the command of M.I. Kutuzov with the French army (this date was obtained by erroneous conversion from the Julian calendar to the Gregorian calendar; in fact, the day of the battle is September 7).
Background
Since the beginning of the invasion of the French army into the territory of the Russian Empire in June 1812, Russian troops have been constantly retreating. The rapid advance and overwhelming numerical superiority of the French deprived the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, General of Infantry Barclay de Tolly, of the opportunity to prepare troops for battle. The prolonged retreat caused public discontent, so Emperor Alexander I dismissed Barclay de Tolly and appointed Infantry General Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. However, the new commander-in-chief chose the path of retreat. The strategy chosen by Kutuzov was based, on the one hand, on exhausting the enemy, on the other, on waiting for reinforcements sufficient for a decisive battle with Napoleon’s army.
On August 22 (September 3), the Russian army, retreating from Smolensk, settled down near the village of Borodina, 125 km from Moscow, where Kutuzov decided to give a general battle; it was impossible to postpone it further, since Emperor Alexander demanded that Kutuzov stop the advance of Emperor Napoleon towards Moscow.
On August 24 (September 5) the battle took place at the Shevardinsky redoubt, which delayed the French troops and gave the Russians the opportunity to build fortifications in the main positions.
Alignment of forces at the beginning of the battle
Number of troops
The total number of the Russian army is determined at 112-120 thousand people:
historian Bogdanovich: 103 thousand regular troops (72 thousand infantry, 17 thousand cavalry, 14 thousand artillerymen), 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors, 640 guns. Total 120 thousand people.
from the memoirs of General Tol: 95 thousand regular troops, 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors. In total there are 112 thousand people under arms, “with this army there are 640 artillery pieces.”
The size of the French army is estimated at about 138 thousand soldiers and 587 guns:
According to the Marquis of Chambray, a roll call held on August 21 (September 2) showed the presence of 133,815 combat ranks in the French army (for some of the lagging soldiers, their comrades responded “in absentia”, hoping that they would catch up with the army). However, this number does not take into account the 1,500 sabers of the cavalry brigade of divisional general Pajol, who arrived later, and the 3 thousand combat ranks of the main apartment.
In addition, taking into account the militias in the Russian army implies adding to the regular French army numerous non-combatants (15 thousand) who were present in the French camp and whose combat effectiveness corresponded to the Russian militias. That is, the size of the French army is also increasing. Like Russian militias, French non-combatants performed auxiliary functions - they carried out the wounded, carried water, etc.
It is important for military history to distinguish between the total size of an army on the battlefield and the troops that were committed to battle. However, in terms of the balance of forces that took direct part in the battle of August 26 (September 7), 1812, the French army also had a numerical superiority. According to the encyclopedia “Patriotic War of 1812”, at the end of the battle Napoleon had 18 thousand in reserve, and Kutuzov had 8-9 thousand regular troops (in particular, the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky guards regiments). At the same time, Kutuzov said that the Russians brought into the battle “every last reserve, even the guard by evening,” “all reserves are already in action.”
If we evaluate the qualitative composition of the two armies, we can turn to the opinion of the Marquis of Chambray, a participant in the events, who noted that the French army had superiority, since its infantry consisted mainly of experienced soldiers, while the Russians had many recruits. In addition, the French had a significant superiority in heavy cavalry.
Battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt
The idea of the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, was to inflict as many losses as possible on the French troops through active defense, change the balance of forces, preserve Russian troops for further battles and for the complete defeat of the French army. In accordance with this plan, the battle formation of the Russian troops was built.
The position chosen by Kutuzov looked like a straight line running from the Shevardinsky redoubt on the left flank through the large battery on Red Hill, later called the Raevsky battery, the village of Borodino in the center, to the village of Maslovo on the right flank.
On the eve of the main battle, in the early morning of August 24 (September 5), the Russian rearguard under the command of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, located at the Kolotsky Monastery 8 km west of the location of the main forces, was attacked by the enemy vanguard. A stubborn battle ensued, lasting several hours. After news was received of the enemy's encircling movement, Konovnitsyn withdrew his troops across the Kolocha River and joined the corps occupying a position in the area of the village of Shevardino.
A detachment of Lieutenant General Gorchakov was stationed near the Shevardinsky redoubt. In total, under the command of Gorchakov there were 11 thousand troops and 46 guns. To cover the Old Smolensk Road, 6 Cossack regiments of Major General Karpov remained.
Napoleon's Grand Army approached Borodino in three columns. The main forces: 3 cavalry corps of Marshal Murat, infantry corps of Marshals Davout, Ney, division general Junot and the guard - moved along the New Smolensk road. To the north they were advancing by the infantry corps of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais and the cavalry corps of divisional general Grusha. The corps of Divisional General Poniatovsky was approaching along the Old Smolensk Road. 35 thousand infantry and cavalry, 180 guns were sent against the defenders of the fortification.
The enemy, covering the Shevardinsky redoubt from the north and south, tried to encircle the troops of Lieutenant General Gorchakov.
The French broke into the redoubt twice, and each time the infantry of Lieutenant General Neverovsky knocked them out. Dusk was falling on the Borodino field when the enemy once again managed to capture the redoubt and break into the village of Shevardino, but the approaching Russian reserves from the 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions recaptured the redoubt.
The battle gradually weakened and finally stopped. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, ordered Lieutenant General Gorchakov to withdraw his troops to the main forces beyond the Semenovsky ravine.
Starting position
All day on August 25 (September 6), the troops of both sides prepared for the upcoming battle. The Shevardino battle made it possible for Russian troops to gain time to complete defensive work on the Borodino position, and made it possible to clarify the grouping of forces of the French troops and the direction of their main attack. Leaving the Shevardinsky redoubt, the 2nd Army bent its left flank beyond the Kamenka River, and the army’s battle formation took the form of an obtuse angle. Both flanks of the Russian position occupied 4 km, but were unequal. The right flank was formed by the 1st Army of Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, consisting of 3 infantry, 3 cavalry corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), the front of its position was covered by the Kolocha River. The left flank was formed by the smaller 2nd Army of Infantry General Bagration (34 thousand people, 156 guns). In addition, the left flank did not have such strong natural obstacles in front of the front as the right.
After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt on August 24 (September 5), the position of the left flank became even more vulnerable and relied only on 3 unfinished flushes.
Thus, in the center and on the right wing of the Russian position, Kutuzov placed 4 infantry corps out of 7, as well as 3 cavalry corps and Platov’s Cossack corps. According to Kutuzov’s plan, such a powerful group of troops would reliably cover the Moscow direction and at the same time allow, if necessary, to strike the flank and rear of the French troops. The battle formation of the Russian army was deep and allowed for wide maneuvers of forces on the battlefield. The first line of battle formation of the Russian troops consisted of infantry corps, the second line - cavalry corps, and the third - reserves. Kutuzov highly appreciated the role of the reserves, pointing out in the disposition for the battle: “The reserves should be protected as long as possible, because the general who still retains the reserve will not be defeated.”
Emperor Napoleon, having discovered the weakness of the left flank of the Russian army during a reconnaissance on August 25 (September 6), decided to strike the main blow against it. Accordingly, he developed a battle plan. First of all, the task was to capture the left bank of the Kolocha River, for which it was necessary to capture the village of Borodino in the center of the Russian position. This maneuver, according to Napoleon, was supposed to divert the attention of the Russians from the direction of the main attack. Then transfer the main forces of the French army to the right bank of the Kolocha and, relying on Borodino, which has become like an axis of approach, push Kutuzov’s army with the right wing into the corner formed by the confluence of the Kolocha with the Moscow River and destroy it.
To accomplish the task, Napoleon began to concentrate his main forces (up to 95 thousand) in the area of the Shevardinsky redoubt on the evening of August 25 (September 6). The total number of French troops in front of the 2nd Army front reached 115 thousand. For diversionary actions during the battle in the center and against the right flank, Napoleon allocated no more than 20 thousand soldiers.
Napoleon understood that enveloping Russian troops from the flanks was difficult, so he was forced to resort to a frontal attack in order to break through the defenses of the Russian army in a relatively narrow area near the Bagration flushes, go to the rear of the Russian troops, press them to the Moscow River, destroy them and open up for himself way to Moscow. In the direction of the main attack in the area from the Raevsky battery to the Bagration flashes, which had a length of 2.5 kilometers, the bulk of the French troops were concentrated: the corps of Marshals Davout, Ney, Murat, division general Junot, as well as the guard. To divert the attention of Russian troops, the French planned to carry out auxiliary attacks on Utitsa and Borodino. The French army had a deep formation of its battle formation, which allowed it to build up its striking force from the depths.
Sources point to Kutuzov’s special plan, which forced Napoleon to attack the left flank. Kutuzov’s task was to determine for the left flank the necessary number of troops that would prevent a breakthrough of his positions. The historian Tarle quotes the exact words of Kutuzov: “When the enemy... uses his last reserves on Bagration’s left flank, then I will send a hidden army to his flank and rear.”
On the night of August 26 (September 7), 1812, based on data obtained during the Battle of Shevardin, Kutuzov decided to strengthen the left flank of the Russian troops, for which he ordered the 3rd Infantry Corps to be transferred from reserve and transferred to the commander of the 2nd Army Bagration Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st, as well as an artillery reserve of 168 guns, placing it near Psarev. According to Kutuzov's plan, the 3rd Corps was to be ready to act on the flank and rear of the French troops. However, Kutuzov's chief of staff, General Bennigsen, withdrew the 3rd Corps from the ambush and placed it in front of the French troops, which did not correspond to Kutuzov's plan. Bennigsen's actions are justified by his intention to follow the formal battle plan.
The regrouping of part of the Russian forces to the left flank reduced the disproportion of forces and turned the frontal attack, which according to Napoleon's plan led to the rapid defeat of the Russian army, into a bloody frontal battle.
Progress of the battle
Start of the battle
At five thirty minutes in the morning on August 26 (September 7), 1812, more than 100 French guns began shelling the positions of the left flank. Simultaneously with the start of the shelling, General Delzon’s division from the corps of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, moved towards the center of the Russian position, the village of Borodino, under the cover of morning fog. The village was defended by the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment under the command of Colonel Bistrom. For about an hour, the rangers fought off a four-fold superior enemy, but under the threat of being outflanked, they were forced to retreat across the bridge across the Kolocha River. The 106th line regiment of the French, encouraged by the occupation of the village of Borodino, followed the rangers across the river. But the guards rangers, having received reinforcements, repelled all the enemy’s attempts to break through the Russian defenses here:
“The French, encouraged by the occupation of Borodin, rushed after the rangers and almost crossed the river with them, but the guards rangers, reinforced by the regiments that came with Colonel Manakhtin and the rangers brigade of the 24th division under the command of Colonel Vuich, suddenly turned on the enemy and, together with those who came to They came to their aid with bayonets, and all the French who were on our shore were victims of their daring enterprise. The bridge on the Koloche River was completely destroyed, despite strong enemy fire, and for a whole day the French did not dare to make attempts at the crossing and were content with a shootout with our rangers.”
Bagration's flushes
On the eve of the battle, the flushes were occupied by the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division under the command of General Vorontsov. At 6 o'clock in the morning, after a short cannonade, the French began an attack on Bagration's flushes. In the first attack, the French divisions of generals Dessay and Compan, overcoming the resistance of the rangers, made their way through the Utitsky forest, but, barely starting to build on the edge opposite the southernmost flush, they came under grapeshot fire and were overturned by a flank attack of the rangers.
At 8 o'clock in the morning the French repeated the attack and captured the southern flush. Bagration sent the 27th Infantry Division of General Neverovsky, as well as the Akhtyrsky Hussars and Novorossiysk Dragoons to attack the flank, to the aid of the 2nd Consolidated Grenadier Division. The French left flushes, suffering heavy losses. Both division generals Dessay and Compan were wounded, the corps commander, Marshal Davout, was shell-shocked when he fell from a dead horse, and almost all the brigade commanders were wounded.
For the 3rd attack, Napoleon reinforced the attacking forces with 3 more infantry divisions from Marshal Ney's corps, 3 cavalry corps of Marshal Murat and artillery, bringing its number to 160 guns.
Bagration, having determined the direction of the main attack chosen by Napoleon, ordered General Raevsky, who occupied the central battery, to immediately move the entire second line of troops of his 7th Infantry Corps to the flushes, and General Tuchkov 1st to send the 3rd Infantry Division of General Konovnitsyn to the defenders of the flushes . At the same time, in response to the demand for reinforcements, Kutuzov sent to Bagration from the Life Guards reserve the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments, the 1st Combined Grenadier Division, 7 regiments of the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 1st Cuirassier Division. Additionally, the 2nd Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Baggovut began moving from the far right to the left flag.
After strong artillery preparation, the French managed to break into the southern flush and into the gaps between the flushes. In the bayonet battle, the division commanders, generals Neverovsky (27th Infantry) and Vorontsov (2nd Grenadier) were seriously wounded and carried away from the battlefield.
The French were counterattacked by 3 cuirassier regiments, and Marshal Murat was almost captured by the Russian cuirassiers, barely managing to hide in the ranks of the Württemberg infantry. Individual parts of the French were forced to retreat, but the cuirassiers, not supported by infantry, were counterattacked by the French cavalry and repulsed. At about 10 o'clock in the morning the flushes remained in the hands of the French.
A counterattack by Konovnitsyn's 3rd Infantry Division corrected the situation. Major General Tuchkov 4th, who led the attack of the Revel and Murom regiments, died in the battle.
Around the same time, the French 8th Westphalian Corps of Divisional General Junot made its way through the Utitsky forest to the rear of the flushes. The situation was saved by the 1st cavalry battery of Captain Zakharov, which at that time was heading to the flash area. Zakharov, seeing a threat to the flushes from the rear, hastily turned his guns around and opened fire on the enemy, who was forming up to attack. The 4 infantry regiments of Baggovut's 2nd Corps arrived in time and pushed Junot's corps into the Utitsky forest, inflicting significant losses on it. Russian historians claim that during the second offensive, Junot's corps was defeated in a bayonet counterattack, but Westphalian and French sources completely refute this. According to the recollections of direct participants, Junot’s 8th Corps participated in the battle until the evening.
By the 4th attack at 11 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon had concentrated about 45 thousand infantry and cavalry, and almost 400 guns, against the flushes. Russian historiography calls this decisive attack the 8th, taking into account the attacks of Junot’s corps on the flushes (6th and 7th). Bagration, seeing that the artillery of the flushes could not stop the movement of the French columns, led a general counterattack of the left wing, the total number of troops of which was approximately only 20 thousand people. The onslaught of the first ranks of the Russians was stopped and a fierce hand-to-hand battle ensued, lasting more than an hour. The advantage leaned towards the side of the Russian troops, but during the transition to a counterattack, Bagration, wounded by a fragment of a cannonball in the thigh, fell from his horse and was taken from the battlefield. The news of Bagration's wound instantly swept through the ranks of the Russian troops and had a huge impact on the Russian soldiers. Russian troops began to retreat.
General Konovnitsyn took command of the 2nd Army and was forced to finally leave the flushes to the French. The remnants of the troops, having almost lost control, were withdrawn to a new defensive line behind the Semenovsky ravine, through which the stream of the same name flowed. On the same side of the ravine there were untouched reserves - the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky Life Guards regiments. Russian batteries of 300 guns kept the entire Semenovsky stream under fire. The French, seeing the solid wall of the Russians, did not dare to attack on the move.
The direction of the main attack of the French shifted from the left flank to the center, towards the Raevsky battery. At the same time, Napoleon did not stop attacking the left flank of the Russian army. Nansouty's cavalry corps advanced south of the village of Semyonovskoye, north of Latour-Maubourg, while General Friant's infantry division rushed from the front to Semyonovskoye. At this time, Kutuzov appointed the commander of the 6th Corps, Infantry General Dokhturov, as the commander of the troops of the entire left flank instead of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn. The Life Guards lined up in a square and for several hours repelled the attacks of Napoleon’s “iron horsemen”. To help the guard, the cuirassier division of Duki was sent to the south, the cuirassier brigade of Borozdin and the 4th cavalry corps of Sivers to the north. The bloody battle ended in the defeat of the French troops, who were thrown back beyond the Semenovsky Creek ravine.
Russian troops were never completely driven out of Semenovskoe until the end of the battle.
Battle for Utitsky Kurgan
On the eve of the battle on August 25 (September 6), by order of Kutuzov, the 3rd Infantry Corps of General Tuchkov 1st and up to 10 thousand warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias were sent to the area of the Old Smolensk Road. On the same day, 2 more Cossack regiments of Karpov joined the troops. To communicate with the flashes in the Utitsky forest, the Jaeger regiments of Major General Shakhovsky took up a position.
According to Kutuzov's plan, Tuchkov's corps was supposed to suddenly attack the flank and rear of the enemy from an ambush, fighting for Bagration's flushes. However, early in the morning, Chief of Staff Bennigsen advanced Tuchkov's detachment from an ambush.
On August 26 (September 7), the 5th Corps of the French Army, consisting of Poles under the command of General Poniatowski, moved around the left flank of the Russian position. The troops met in front of Utitsa at about 8 o'clock in the morning, at the moment when General Tuchkov 1st, by order of Bagration, had already sent Konovnitsyn's division at his disposal. The enemy, coming out of the forest and pushing the Russian rangers away from the village of Utitsa, found himself on the heights. Having installed 24 guns on them, the enemy opened hurricane fire. Tuchkov 1st was forced to retreat to the Utitsky Kurgan - a more advantageous line for himself. Poniatowski's attempts to advance and capture the mound were unsuccessful.
At about 11 am, Poniatowski, having received support from the 8th Infantry Corps of Junot on the left, concentrated fire from 40 guns against the Utitsky Kurgan and captured it by storm. This gave him the opportunity to act around the Russian position.
Tuchkov 1st, trying to eliminate the danger, took decisive measures to return the mound. He personally organized a counterattack at the head of a regiment of Pavlovsk grenadiers. The mound was returned, but Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st himself received a mortal wound. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Baggovut, commander of the 2nd Infantry Corps.
Baggovut left the Utitsky Kurgan only after the defenders of the Bagration flushes retreated beyond the Semenovsky ravine, which made his position vulnerable to flank attacks. He retreated to the new line of the 2nd Army.
Raid of the Cossacks Platov and Uvarov
At a critical moment in the battle, Kutuzov decided to launch a cavalry raid by generals from the cavalry of Uvarov and Platov into the enemy’s rear and flank. By 12 o'clock in the afternoon, Uvarov's 1st Cavalry Corps (28 squadrons, 12 guns, a total of 2,500 horsemen) and Platov's Cossacks (8 regiments) crossed the Kolocha River near the village of Malaya. Uvarov's corps attacked the French infantry regiment and the Italian cavalry brigade of General Ornano in the area of the crossing of the Voyna River near the village of Bezzubovo. Platov crossed the Voina River to the north and, going to the rear, forced the enemy to change position.
The simultaneous attack by Uvarov and Platov caused confusion in the enemy camp and forced troops to be pulled to the left flank, which stormed Raevsky’s battery on Kurgan Heights. Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais with the Italian Guard and Grouchy's corps were sent by Napoleon against the new threat. Uvarov and Platov returned to the Russian army by 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
The raid by Uvarov and Platov delayed the decisive enemy attack for 2 hours, which made it possible to regroup the Russian troops. It was because of this raid that Napoleon did not dare to send his guard into battle. The cavalry sabotage, although it did not cause much damage to the French, made Napoleon feel insecure about his own rear.
“Those who were in the Battle of Borodino, of course, remember that moment when the tenacity of attacks decreased along the entire enemy line, and we... could breathe more freely,” wrote the military historian, General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky.
Battery Raevsky
The high mound, located in the center of the Russian position, dominated the surrounding area. A battery was installed on it, which at the beginning of the battle had 18 guns. The defense of the battery was entrusted to the 7th Infantry Corps under Lieutenant General Raevsky.
At about 9 o'clock in the morning, in the midst of the battle for Bagration's flushes, the French launched the first attack on the battery with the forces of the 4th Corps of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, as well as the divisions of Generals Morand and Gerard from the 1st Corps of Marshal Davout. By influencing the center of the Russian army, Napoleon hoped to complicate the transfer of troops from the right wing of the Russian army to Bagration's flushes and thereby ensure his main forces a quick defeat of the left wing of the Russian army. By the time of the attack, the entire second line of troops of Lieutenant General Raevsky, by order of Infantry General Bagration, had been withdrawn to protect the flushes. Despite this, the attack was repulsed by artillery fire.
Almost immediately, the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, re-attacked the mound. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, at that moment brought into battle for the Raevsky battery the entire horse artillery reserve in the amount of 60 guns and part of the light artillery of the 1st Army. However, despite the dense artillery fire, the French of the 30th regiment of Brigadier General Bonamy managed to break into the redoubt.
At that moment, the chief of staff of the 1st Army, Ermolov, and the chief of artillery, Kutaisov, were near the Kurgan Heights, following Kutuzov’s orders to the left flank. Having led the battalion of the Ufa Infantry Regiment and joining it with the 18th Jaeger Regiment, Ermolov and Kutaisov attacked with bayonets directly at the redoubt. At the same time, the regiments of Major Generals Paskevich and Vasilchikov attacked from the flanks. The redoubt was recaptured and Brigadier General Bonamy was captured. Of the entire French regiment of 4,100 men under Bonami's command, only about 300 soldiers remained in service. Artillery Major General Kutaisov died in the battle for the battery.
Despite the steepness of the sunrise, I ordered the Jaeger regiments and the 3rd battalion of the Ufa Regiment to attack with bayonets, the favorite weapon of the Russian soldier. The fierce and terrible battle did not last more than half an hour: desperate resistance was met, the high ground was taken away, the guns were returned. Brigadier General Bonamy, wounded by bayonets, was spared [captured], and there were no prisoners. The damage from our side is very great and is far from commensurate with the number of attacking battalions.
Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Ermolov
Kutuzov, noticing the complete exhaustion of Raevsky’s corps, withdrew his troops to the second line. Barclay de Tolly sent the 24th Infantry Division of Major General Likhachev to the battery to defend the battery.
After the fall of Bagration's flushes, Napoleon abandoned the development of an offensive against the left wing of the Russian army. The initial plan to break through the defense on this wing in order to reach the rear of the main forces of the Russian army became meaningless, since a significant part of these troops fell out of action in the battles for the flushes themselves, while the defense on the left wing, despite the loss of the flushes, remained undefeated . Noticing that the situation in the center of the Russian troops had worsened, Napoleon decided to redirect his forces to the Raevsky battery. However, the next attack was delayed for 2 hours, since at that time Russian cavalry and Cossacks appeared behind French lines.
Taking advantage of the respite, Kutuzov moved the 4th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy and the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Major General Korf from the right flank to the center. Napoleon ordered increased fire on the infantry of the 4th Corps. According to eyewitnesses, the Russians moved like machines, closing ranks as they moved. The path of the 4th Corps could be traced by a trail of bodies of the dead.
General Miloradovich, commander of the center of Russian troops, ordered Adjutant Bibikov to find Evgeniy of Württemberg and tell him to go to Miloradovich. Bibikov found Yevgeny, but because of the roar of the cannonade, no words could be heard, and the adjutant waved his hand, indicating the location of Miloradovich. At that moment, a flying cannonball tore off his hand. Bibikov, falling from his horse, again pointed in the direction with his other hand.
According to the memoirs of the commander of the 4th Infantry Division,
General Eugene of Württemberg
The troops of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy joined the left flank of the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky Guards regiments, located south of the battery. Behind them were the cavalrymen of the 2nd Corps and the approaching Cavalry and Horse Guards regiments.
At about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the French opened crossfire from the front and flashes of 150 guns at Raevsky's battery and began an attack. 34 cavalry regiments were concentrated to attack against the 24th Division. The first to attack was the 2nd Cavalry Corps under the command of Divisional General Auguste Caulaincourt (the corps commander, Divisional General Montbrun, had been killed by this time). Caulaincourt broke through the hellish fire, went around the Kurgan Heights on the left and rushed to Raevsky’s battery. Met from the front, flanks and rear by persistent fire from the defenders, the cuirassiers were driven back with huge losses (Raevsky’s battery received the nickname “the grave of the French cavalry” from the French for these losses). General Auguste Caulaincourt, like many of his comrades, found death on the slopes of the mound. Meanwhile, the troops of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, taking advantage of Caulaincourt's attack, which fettered the actions of the 24th division, broke into the battery from the front and flank. A bloody battle took place at the battery. The wounded General Likhachev was captured. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Raevsky's battery fell.
Having received news of the fall of Raevsky's battery, Napoleon moved to the center of the Russian army and came to the conclusion that its center, despite the retreat and contrary to the assurances of his retinue, had not been shaken. After this, he refused requests to bring the guard into the battle. The French offensive on the center of the Russian army stopped.
As of 6 p.m., the Russian army was still firmly located in the Borodino position, and the French troops failed to achieve decisive success in any of the directions. Napoleon, who believed that “a general who does not maintain fresh troops on the day following the battle will almost always be beaten,” never brought his guard into the battle. Napoleon, as a rule, brought the guard into battle at the very last moment, when victory was prepared by his other troops and when it was necessary to deliver the final decisive blow to the enemy. However, assessing the situation at the end of the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon saw no signs of victory, so he did not take the risk of bringing his last reserve into battle.
End of the battle
After the French troops occupied the Raevsky battery, the battle began to subside. On the left flank, Divisional General Poniatovsky carried out ineffective attacks against the 2nd Army under the command of General Dokhturov (the commander of the 2nd Army, General Bagration, was by that time seriously wounded). In the center and on the right flank, matters were limited to artillery fire until 7 p.m. Following Kutuzov's report, they claimed that Napoleon retreated, withdrawing troops from captured positions. Having retreated to Gorki (where another fortification remained), the Russians began to prepare for a new battle. However, at 12 o'clock at night Kutuzov's order arrived, canceling preparations for the battle scheduled for the next day. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army decided to withdraw the army beyond Mozhaisk in order to make up for human losses and better prepare for new battles. Napoleon, faced with the fortitude of the enemy, was in a depressed and anxious mood, as evidenced by his adjutant Armand Caulaincourt (brother of the deceased General Auguste Caulaincourt):
The Emperor repeated many times that he could not understand how the redoubts and positions which had been captured with such courage and which we had so stubbornly defended gave us only a small number of prisoners. He asked many times the officers who arrived with reports where the prisoners who were supposed to be taken were. He even sent to the appropriate points to make sure that no other prisoners had been taken. These successes without prisoners, without trophies did not satisfy him...
The enemy carried off the vast majority of their wounded, and we only got those prisoners that I already mentioned, 12 guns of the redoubt ... and three or four others taken in the first attacks.
General Armand Caulaincourt
Result of the battle
Russian casualty estimates
The number of losses of the Russian army has been repeatedly revised by historians. Different sources give different numbers:
According to the 18th Bulletin of the Grand Army (dated September 10, 1812), 12-13 thousand killed, 5 thousand prisoners, 40 generals killed, wounded or captured, 60 captured guns. Total losses are estimated at approximately 40-50 thousand.
F. Segur, who was at Napoleon's headquarters, gives completely different data on the trophies: from 700 to 800 prisoners and about 20 guns.
A document entitled “Description of the battle near the village of Borodino, which took place on August 26, 1812” (presumably compiled by K. F. Tol), which in many sources is called “Kutuzov’s report to Alexander I” and dates back to August 1812, indicates a total of 25,000 people losses, including 13 killed and wounded generals.
38-45 thousand people, including 23 generals. The inscription “45 thousand” is engraved on the Main Monument on the Borodino Field, erected in 1839, and is also indicated on the 15th wall of the gallery of military glory of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.
58 thousand killed and wounded, up to 1000 prisoners, from 13 to 15 guns. Data on losses are given here based on the report of the general on duty of the 1st Army immediately after the battle; the losses of the 2nd Army were estimated by historians of the 19th century, completely arbitrarily, at 20 thousand. These data were no longer considered reliable at the end of the 19th century; they were not taken into account in the ESBE, which indicated the number of losses “up to 40 thousand.” Modern historians believe that the report on the 1st Army also contained information about the losses of the 2nd Army, since there were no officers left in the 2nd Army responsible for the reports.
42.5 thousand people - losses of the Russian army in the book by S. P. Mikheev, published in 1911.
According to the surviving reports from the RGVIA archive, the Russian army lost 39,300 people killed, wounded and missing (21,766 in the 1st Army, 17,445 in the 2nd Army), but taking into account the fact that the data in the reports for various reasons is incomplete (do not include losses of the militia and Cossacks), historians usually increase this number to 44-45 thousand people. According to Troitsky, data from the Military Registration Archive of the General Staff gives a figure of 45.6 thousand people.
French casualty estimates
A significant part of the documentation of the Grand Army was lost during the retreat, so assessing French losses is extremely difficult. The question of the total losses of the French army remains open.
According to the 18th Bulletin of the Grande Armée, the French lost 2,500 killed and about 7,500 wounded, 6 generals killed (2 divisional, 4 brigade) and 7-8 wounded. Total losses are estimated at approximately 10 thousand people. Subsequently, these data were repeatedly questioned, and at present none of the researchers consider them to be reliable.
“Description of the Battle of Borodino,” written on behalf of M. I. Kutuzov (presumably by K. F. Tol) and dated August 1812, indicates more than 40,000 total casualties, including 42 killed and wounded generals .
The most common figure in French historiography for the losses of the Napoleonic army of 30 thousand is based on the calculations of the French officer Denier, who served as an inspector at Napoleon’s General Staff, who determined the total losses of the French for 3 days of the battle of Borodino at 49 generals, 37 colonels and 28 thousand lower ranks, from 6,550 of them were killed and 21,450 were wounded. These figures were classified by order of Marshal Berthier due to a discrepancy with the data in Napoleon's bulletin about losses of 8-10 thousand and were published for the first time in 1842. The figure of 30 thousand given in the literature was obtained by rounding Denier’s data (taking into account the fact that Denier did not take into account 1,176 soldiers of the Grande Armée who were captured).
Later studies showed that Denier's figures were greatly underestimated. Thus, Denier gives the number of 269 killed officers of the Grand Army. However, in 1899, the French historian Martinien, based on surviving documents, established that at least 460 officers, known by name, were killed. Subsequent studies increased this number to 480. Even French historians admit that “since the information given in the statement about the generals and colonels who were out of action at Borodino is inaccurate and underestimated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier’s figures are based on incomplete data.”
The retired Napoleonic general Segur estimated the French losses at Borodino at 40 thousand soldiers and officers. A. Vasiliev considers Segur’s assessment tendentiously overestimated, pointing out that the general wrote during the reign of the Bourbons, without denying her some objectivity.
In Russian literature, the number of French casualties was often given as 58,478. This number is based on false information from the defector Alexander Schmidt, who allegedly served in the office of Marshal Berthier. Subsequently, this figure was picked up by patriotic researchers and indicated on the Main Monument.
For modern French historiography, the traditional estimate of French losses is 30 thousand with 9-10 thousand killed. Russian historian A. Vasiliev points out, in particular, that the number of losses of 30 thousand is achieved by the following calculation methods: a) by comparing data on the personnel of the surviving statements for September 2 and 20 (deducting one from the other gives a loss of 45.7 thousand) with the deduction losses in vanguard affairs and the approximate number of sick and retarded and b) indirectly - by comparison with the Battle of Wagram, equal in number and in the approximate number of losses among the command staff, despite the fact that the total number of French losses in it, according to Vasiliev, is precisely known (33,854 people, including 42 generals and 1,820 officers; under Borodin, according to Vasiliev, the loss of command personnel is 1,792 people, of which 49 generals).
The French lost 49 generals in killed and wounded, including 8 killed: 2 divisional (Auguste Caulaincourt and Montbrun) and 6 brigade. The Russians had 26 generals out of action, but it should be noted that only 73 active Russian generals took part in the battle, while in the French army there were 70 generals in the cavalry alone. The French brigadier general was closer to a Russian colonel than to a major general.
However, V.N. Zemtsov showed that Vasiliev’s calculations are unreliable, since they are based on inaccurate data. Thus, according to the lists compiled by Zemtsov, “during September 5-7, 1,928 officers and 49 generals were killed and wounded,” that is, the total loss of command personnel amounted to 1,977 people, and not 1,792, as Vasiliev believed. Vasilyev’s comparison of data on the personnel of the Great Army for September 2 and 20 also, according to Zemtsov, gave incorrect results, since the wounded who returned to duty in the time elapsed after the battle were not taken into account. In addition, Vasiliev did not take into account all parts of the French army. Zemtsov himself, using a technique similar to that used by Vasiliev, estimated French losses for September 5-7 at 38.5 thousand people. Also controversial is the figure used by Vasiliev for the losses of French troops at Wagram, 33,854 people - for example, the English researcher Chandler estimated them at 40 thousand people.
It should be noted that to the several thousand killed should be added those who died from wounds, and their number was enormous. In the Kolotsky monastery, where the main military hospital of the French army was located, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th linear regiment, Ch. Francois, in the 10 days following the battle, 3/4 of the wounded died. French encyclopedias believe that among Borodin's 30 thousand victims, 20.5 thousand died or died from their wounds.
Overall result of the battle
The Battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century and the bloodiest of all that came before it. According to the most conservative estimates of total losses, about 6,000 people were killed or injured on the field every hour, the French army lost about 25% of its strength, the Russian - about 30%. The French fired 60 thousand cannon shots, and the Russian side - 50 thousand. It is no coincidence that Napoleon called the Battle of Borodino his greatest battle, although its results were more than modest for a great commander accustomed to victories.
The death toll, counting those who died from wounds, was much higher than the official number killed on the battlefield; The casualties of the battle should also include the wounded and later those who died. In the fall of 1812 - spring of 1813, the Russians burned and buried the bodies that remained unburied in the field. According to military historian General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, a total of 58,521 bodies of those killed were buried and burned. Russian historians and, in particular, employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino Field, estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48-50 thousand people. According to A. Sukhanov, 49,887 dead were buried on the Borodino field and in the surrounding villages (without including the French burials in the Kolotsky Monastery).
Both commanders chalked up victory. Napoleon's point of view was expressed in his memoirs:
The Battle of Moscow is my greatest battle: it is a clash of giants. The Russians had 170 thousand people under arms; they had all the advantages: numerical superiority in infantry, cavalry, artillery, excellent position. They were defeated! Undaunted heroes, Ney, Murat, Poniatovsky - that’s who owned the glory of this battle. How many great, how many beautiful historical deeds will be noted in it! She will tell how these brave cuirassiers captured the redoubts, cutting down the gunners on their guns; she will tell about the heroic self-sacrifice of Montbrun and Caulaincourt, who met death at the height of their glory; it will tell how our gunners, exposed on a level field, fired against more numerous and well-fortified batteries, and about these fearless infantrymen who, at the most critical moment, when the general who commanded them wanted to encourage them, shouted to him: “Calm, all your soldiers have decided to win today, and they will win!”
This paragraph was dictated in 1816. A year later, in 1817, Napoleon described the Battle of Borodino as follows:
With an army of 80,000, I rushed at the Russians, who were 250,000 strong, armed to the teeth and defeated them...
Kutuzov in his report to Emperor Alexander I wrote:
The battle on the 26th was the bloodiest of all those known in modern times. We completely won the battlefield, and the enemy then retreated to the position in which he came to attack us.
Emperor Alexander I was not deceived about the actual state of affairs, but in order to support the people's hopes for a speedy end to the war, he declared the Battle of Borodino as a victory. Prince Kutuzov was promoted to field marshal general with an award of 100 thousand rubles. Barclay de Tolly received the Order of St. George, 2nd degree, Prince Bagration - 50 thousand rubles. Fourteen generals received the Order of St. George, 3rd degree. All lower ranks who were in the battle were granted 5 rubles each.
Since then, in Russian, and after it in Soviet (except for the period of the 1920-1930s) historiography, an attitude has been established towards the Battle of Borodino as an actual victory of the Russian army. In our time, a number of Russian historians also traditionally insist that the outcome of the Battle of Borodino was uncertain, and the Russian army won a “moral victory” in it.
Foreign historians, who have now been joined by a number of their Russian colleagues, view Borodino as an undoubted victory for Napoleon. As a result of the battle, the French occupied some of the forward positions and fortifications of the Russian army, while maintaining reserves, pushed the Russians from the battlefield, and ultimately forced them to retreat and leave Moscow. At the same time, no one disputes that the Russian army retained its combat effectiveness and morale, that is, Napoleon never achieved his goal - the complete defeat of the Russian army.
The main achievement of the general battle of Borodino was that Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, and in the objective conditions of the entire Russian campaign of 1812, the lack of a decisive victory predetermined Napoleon’s final defeat.
The Battle of Borodino marked a crisis in the French strategy for the decisive general battle. During the battle, the French failed to destroy the Russian army, force Russia to capitulate and dictate peace terms. Russian troops inflicted significant damage on the enemy army and were able to conserve strength for future battles.
Memory
Borodino field
The widow of one of the generals who died in the battle founded a women’s monastery on the territory of the Bagration flashes, in which the charter prescribed “to offer prayers ... for the Orthodox leaders and warriors who in these places laid down their lives for the faith, the sovereign and the fatherland in battle in the summer of 1812.” . On the eighth anniversary of the battle on August 26, 1820, the first temple of the monastery was consecrated. The temple was erected as a monument to military glory.
By 1839, the lands in the central part of the Borodino field were purchased by Emperor Nicholas I. In 1839, at Kurgan Heights, on the site of Raevsky’s battery, a monument was inaugurated, and Bagration’s ashes were reburied at its base. Opposite the Raevsky Battery, a guardhouse was built for veterans, who were supposed to look after the monument and grave of Bagration, keep the Visitor's Book of Records, and show visitors the battle plan and finds from the battlefield.
In the year of celebrating the 100th anniversary of the battle, the gatehouse was rebuilt, and 33 monuments to corps, divisions, and regiments of the Russian army were erected on the territory of the Borodino field.
On the territory of the modern museum-reserve with an area of 110 km² there are more than 200 monuments and memorable places. Every year on the first Sunday of September on the Borodino field, more than a thousand participants recreate episodes of the Battle of Borodino during a military-historical reconstruction.
The study is based on the original “Logistic Theory of Civilization” ©Igor Yu. Shkurin aka Igor Grek
In the official history you will not find a clear explanation for many of the oddities of the military actions of 1812. For example, why, besides the defense of Smolensk, the troops of Alexander 1 did not defend any other city; Russian troops, according to French memoirists, left burned cities behind them when retreating, and entered into battles in an open field?
Why did the troops of Napoleon 1, according to Russian memoirists, do exactly the opposite and, during the retreat, held the defense in almost every city, so much so that only one tower remained of the fortress, as was the case in Vyazma? One way or another, as a result of the war, all cities were completely destroyed, but it is unclear by whom and at what point.
Particular doubt was raised by the Battle of Borodino, which I previously perceived as an unreasonably promoted episode of the war to distract attention from the dramatic siege of Smolensk, the masses of burned cities (usually only known about Moscow) and other significant events of the war.
But quite unexpectedly, analyzing the events of the War of 1812 from the point of view of the communications routes of those times, I discovered important circumstances that, on the one hand, strengthened confidence in the correctness of my reconstruction of the events of the War of 1812, and on the other hand, forced me to radically change my attitude towards the Battle of Borodino, which turned out to be the second key during the war.
The discovery explained all the inconsistencies in the official version of events. But before revealing the main secret of the Battle of Borodino, for a better understanding of it, let’s do a short review of the evidence base on which the official history of the battle is built, let’s see what material evidence exists (archaeological data), documents, testimony (memoirs of participants), examinations, etc. .
General characteristics of the area
To understand the main secret of the Battle of Borodino, it is very important to know the topographical features of the area - you need to pay attention to the Semenovsky stream (more often referred to as the Semenovsky ravine), the swamp and forest near the village of Utitsa. Over the past 200 years, significant man-made changes have occurred - in 1869, a railway, roads, etc. were built, which greatly changed the hydrological regime, swamps, rivers and streams dried up greatly. But relief is a very conservative thing and even now you can see a lot with your own eyes, the main thing is to know where to look.
Common false meme: " And then we found a large field. There is somewhere to roam in the wild"M.Yu. Lermontov's verse. "Borodino"
It’s not clear who it came from – Lermontov, Tolstoy or somewhere else, but “Borodinsky Field” stuck in everyone’s brains as something flat and spacious. A careful look at the map of the site of the battles of Borodino clearly shows that the battles took place on very rough hilly terrain along the Semenovsky stream, which flows into the Koloch River, which in turn flows nearby into the Moscow River. Closer to the village of Utitsa there is a forest and a swamp. And the village of Borodino is generally across the river, off to the side, out of business.
The relief is clearly visible on one of the modern versions of the disposition of troops, superimposed on a map of the area ():
“The Koloch River is the right tributary of the Moscow River, crossing the Borodino field. Length 33 km. The source is near the village. Prokofievo, 5 km southwest of the station. Uvarovka, Belorussian direction of the Moscow Railway, mouth near the village. Staroe Selo on the southern shore of the Mozhaisk Reservoir. After the construction of the reservoir, the lower reaches of the river were supposed to become a bay, the waters of which would flood the Borodino field, so a dam with a pumping station was built in the lower reaches of Kolocha.”
An old postcard printed by Phototype Scherer, Nabholz and Co., Moscow, before 1917, depicting the “Elevated right (Russian) bank of the river. Kolochi near the village of Gorki. Slightly retreating from the edge on the shore, the Russians lined up 4 batteries (34 guns)
Fyodor Nikolaevich Glinka, a participant in the War of 1812, describes the chosen bridgehead for military operations before the Battle of Borodino as follows: “Our battle line stood on the right bank of the Kolocha, facing the Kolotsky Monastery, towards the Smolensk side; with the right wing towards the Moscow River, which meanders in the form of a ribbon at the foot of the Borodino heights... The Voinya River, the Stonets, Ognik and other nameless streams flow into Kolocha. All these rivers and streams have quite high banks, and if we add to this many potholes, ravines, mostly wooded, and various spring cliffs, gullies, then it will be clear why Borodinskaya’s position on a detailed plan seems lumpy, cut, and pitted.
Forests cover the edges, dense bushes and copses are rough along the entire front stretch, and two large (old and new Moscow) roads cut the position, like two hoops, in the direction from Smolensk to Moscow... In the middle of our battle line, two points are noticeable and important: Gorki and the village of Semenovskaya. Between them stretches a sloping height with a slight slope towards the Koloche River... Following with your eyes the extension of the main line to the left side, on the left flank you come across a swamp covered with dense forest. The village of Utitsa is located here. The old Smolensk road, long abandoned, goes through it from the village of Yelny to Mozhaisk” via
How the history of the Battle of Borodino was created
To begin with, anyone who has heard at least something about the history of the War of 1812 can try to answer a completely natural question: “Why is Kutuzov Prince of Smolensky, and not Borodinsky? »
Contemporaries did not at all attach the same importance to the battle of Borodino as they do now. The significance of the Battle of Borodino began to emerge 25 years after.
According to the conclusion of military historian A.A. Kersnovsky Alexander-1 “... somehow especially did not like memories of the Patriotic War<…>In all his many travels, he never visited the battlefields of 1812 and could not stand to have these battles talked about in his presence. On the contrary, the exploits of the foreign campaign, in which he played the main role, were fully appreciated by him (in the list of military honors of the Russian army, Brienne and La Rotière appear, for example, 8 times, while Borodino, Smolensk and Krasny are not mentioned even once).” . ()
“It is incomprehensible to me,” Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky wrote in his diary in 1814, “how on August 26 the Emperor not only did not go to Borodino and did not serve a memorial service in Moscow for the murdered... The Emperor was at a ball with Countess Orlova. The Emperor did not visit a single classic place of the War of 1812: Borodin, Tarutin, Maloyaroslavets...”
So, Napoleon was expelled, “we won,” but for some reason all information about the war was kept secret for many decades. There is nothing about this battle in the memoirs of participants in the War of 1812. Denis Davydov, a participant in the battles, never managed to publish his memoirs during his lifetime. It is believed that Denis Davydov’s book was banned for two reasons. The author wrote about his reluctance to fight in a foreign land under Napoleonic banners. It's better to die in Russia fighting Napoleon. Secondly, there are episodes in the book when peasants fought both with the troops of Napoleon 1 and with the troops of Alexander 1.
All existing “memoirs” were written thirty to forty years later. In the notes of the writer and participant in the events of the War of 1812 Denis Davydov about the Battle of Borodino, there are only two lines, which seem to have been inserted after his death. There is nothing about the death of Bagration, his former boss. Censorship worked here too.
The ban was violated only once as an exception, believed to be due to the Polish uprising of the early 1830s, ideologically supported by France. Then the poems “To the Slanderers of Russia” and “Borodin Anniversary” by Pushkin were immediately published in a separate publication. (“The last liberal nonsense,” as Pushkin himself put it, poems with revolutionary content remained in 1821).
For the 25th anniversary of the battle, in 1837, patriotic poems by M. Lermontov appeared. There is no specific information about the battle in the poem “Borodino”. But the brilliantly written memes are well etched in the memory: “we found a large field...”, “no wonder... Moscow... was given to a Frenchman.”
In its final form, the idea of making the Borodino field an aura of glory for Russian weapons came to the next emperor, Nicholas I - in 1839, during the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the capture of Paris and the foundation of the Spaso-Borodinsky Monastery at the site of the death of General Tuchkov IV. In the same year, the remains of Bagration were transported here (now he officially has two graves), and the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was founded in Moscow.
At the same time, books by military historians Generals D. Buturlin (in French) and A. Danilevsky appeared with detailed information about the military side of the matter. Western researchers, in particular Verne Horatio, began to rely on Danilevsky’s book.
In 1862, exactly 50 years later, the ban was lifted and L. Tolstoy wrote “War and Peace.” The key episode is the Battle of Borodino. When reading the epic novel, the question arises: why does the artillery officer L. Tolstoy, who went through the Crimean War and the Caucasus, describe the Battle of Borodino through the eyes of the blind civilian Pierre Bezukhov, who found himself on the Raevsky battery? Strictly speaking, Tolstoy does not have a description of the battle itself at all. Why is that? Maybe to avoid unpleasant analogies with Sevastopol Tales? (see photo of the Crimean War of 1855)
But the plan for a pantheon of glory was finally realized only in 1912, before the start of a new war. Only then were monuments erected to 34 military units - participants in the entire war, and not just the Battle of Borodino, heroes were reburied, and the remains of General D. Neverovsky, who died in 1813 in the “battle of the nations,” were transported from near Leipzig.
For the 100th anniversary, by order of Emperor Nicholas II, the artist Franz Roubaud painted the panorama “Battle of Borodino”, which in 1918 was dismantled and thrown into some basement and successfully fell into disrepair. Only after a long restoration by the artist P. D. Korin, the panorama was re-opened for the 150th anniversary of the battle in 1962 in a specially built panorama museum building on Kutuzovsky Prospekt.
The situation was approximately the same with the Borodino Museum itself - it was either created, then abandoned, then remembered again on the occasion of some important anniversary. Symbols rule the world and few people care how these symbols correspond to reality...
About documents from the time of the Battle of Borodino
Primary sources, that is, military maps of 1812, do not exist. They began to analyze the events of 1812 in more or less detail only 100 years later, on the anniversary of the war. I quote a fairly authoritative source that was once subject to the general’s censorship: “Borodin’s position in his very first descriptions and on his very first maps was subject to such distortion that only now is it possible to document the truth. The first map of the Battle of Borodino depicting the battle formations of both opponents dates back to 1814. It was drawn by order of the then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Tol. All the roughness of the Russian disposition was smoothed out on it. The formation of the troops was shown in such a way that even the 1st Army addressed the enemy not with its flank, but with its front.” (Military encyclopedia. / Edited by K.I. Velichko, V.F. Novitsky, A.V. Von-Schwartz and others. In 18 volumes. St. Petersburg, 1911–1915. T. V. P. 20).
This explains the zero reliability of the signature on such a drawing, as if hinting that these sketches (sketch, diagram) of the disposition of troops at Borodino were made on August 25, 1812 (:
By the way, the official history states that the troops in the Battle of Borodino defended the Old and New Smolensk roads. I wonder on what primary sources they draw these roads in relation to 1812, if they can’t even decide on the location of the troops? On different diagrams these roads are drawn differently.
The old Smolensk road was formed from dotted portages (land sections between waterways on the watershed) and on the territory of the Battle of Borodino there is only one clearly land section - on the Yandex map it is shown from No. 2 (the beginning of the Semenovsky stream near the village of Semenovskoye) to No. 3 at the village of Utitsa near the Utitsa swamp. All sorts of more or less permanent land roads were formed exactly after the 1820s. with the development of postal services and stagecoaches. There were no fools to transport goods along such roads along rivers (read Adam Smith). So for now, in the absence of evidence, the continuous roads drawn in 1812 have to be considered the fruit of someone’s imagination.
Instead, you are loaded with a detailed listing of the events of the battle with all sorts of picturesque stories: “five horses were killed or wounded under him,” “he tried to show the direction of advance with his hand, but it was torn off by a shell fragment, then he showed the direction with his other hand.” Ah-hah. This adds nothing to the understanding of the essence of the battle; it is informational chewing gum, so to speak.
Archeology of the sites of the Battle of Borodino (material evidence)
Oddly enough, for almost 200 years no professional archaeological excavations of burial sites have been carried out at this site, although it is believed that at least 50 thousand people are buried there and it seems there should not be much of a problem finding at least something.
The first attempt was made on his own initiative by an amateur digger, an employee of the State Borodino Military Historical Museum-Reserve: “On July 9, 1966, GBVIMZ employee Konstantin Nikolaevich Pchelin, the greatest enthusiast and dedicated worker, procured several soldiers from the nearest military unit for two days for laying pits for two supposed burials of 1812.” ().
It also says: “The places of such burials were also not recorded; in any case, apart from the 1912 survey plan by Kozhevnikov and Grishkevich, no graphic materials on this topic were found in the archives.”
The second attempt was made already in 2009-2011 by professional archaeologists according to all the rules of this science. "Archaeological excavations in Borodino: for the first time since 1812."
A word from archaeologist Igor Kondratiev:
“No one was particularly looking for these bones, although everyone knew that they lay somewhere nearby. A curious thing: the Borodino field was created in the 1830s as a field of military glory (for the first time, by the way, in Europe). In addition to the landscape, the basis of such a memorial should be the graves of the victims. But the Borodino field is full of monuments that stand on empty land, not on graves. The burial places of these ordinary heroes have not yet been found. It is known that there are about three hundred common graves here. They were searched for, but only a few individual remains were found, and then only by accident. The sanitary burials we excavated in the basements of two burnt houses are the first conscious discovery.” ()
By “conscious discovery” we do not mean that this place was identified; in fact, so-called “protective excavations” were carried out, which are mandatory at the site of new construction in a protected historical area. And this time they were just lucky.
The results of the excavations were widely publicized, because everything was done on the eve of the 200th anniversary of the war, and a scientific conference was held. True, the information about the results is different everywhere, it turns out that the skeletons of 15-30 horses and 3-10 people were discovered, including one from the burial of the Second World War, bullets, buttons and other small items, but no uniforms, boots, boots or other uniforms...
In comparison with the total losses at Borodino in 1812, which, according to various estimates, ranged from 80 to 105 thousand people plus about 35,000 horses, the results over 200 years are little more than nothing. Of course, the so-called “black diggers” are actively working; they have more finds, but for obvious reasons they do not advertise the locations.
Why did the general battle take place at Borodino?
For a long time, there was an opinion in the literature about the supposedly spontaneous occurrence of the Battle of Borodino. Foreign historians (Vandal, Sorel, Madeleine, etc.) persistently argued that Napoleon, having the strategic initiative and striving to defeat the Russian army at all costs, forced Kutuzov to go to this battle. Their arguments basically boil down to the fact that Napoleon, developing an attack on Moscow, put the Russian army in a hopeless situation, that the advancing Napoleonic army pressed the Russians so hard that they simply had nowhere to go.
Another, rather large group of historians argued that the reason for the battle at Borodin was the need to satisfy public opinion and that Kutuzov, contrary to military considerations, to please only the tsar and the nobility, decided to go to this bloody battle. Clausewitz wrote: “Kutuzov probably would not have given the Battle of Borodino, in which, apparently, he did not expect to win, if the voices of the court, the army and all of Russia had not forced him to do so. One must assume that he looked at this battle as a necessary evil.”
We know from the same memoirs that Barclay de Tolly planned to give a general battle at Tsarev Zaimishche, but Kutuzov, who took command of the army there, drove the troops further. Then the position was planned at the Kolotsky Monastery, but upon detailed inspection it was considered unsuccessful. Konovnitsyn’s rearguard was left at this place, and the army retreated towards Borodino. 12 kilometers from him, Colonel Tol outlined a new position, but Kutuzov did not like it, because the area was replete with forests, which made it difficult for cavalry and infantry to maneuver. Ahead of the army, Kutuzov arrived in Borodino and there he finally chose a position for battle.
Such stories are intended to convince you of only one thing - as if the choice of the position of the general battle at Borodino was determined only by the decision of Kutuzov, who “considered this position advantageous” and that’s all, take for granted the plans of the geniuses of military strategy, which you still will not understand.
Some questions that await detailed research:
— doesn’t it seem strange that they managed to build powerful defensive fortifications at Borodino, but did not bother to destroy the bridge across the Koloch River? Many lines of passionate memoirists are devoted to the battle for the bridge. There is the classic cliche “on a burning bridge” and the heroism of the defenders... So, was there a boy at all? (see 1812 On the role of pioneers in the war)
- why both sides of the Borodino battle simultaneously believed that they had won it.
The location of the battle is in Borodino - inevitable
In fact, everything is elementary simple and if you know the transport logistics of that time, it is easy to figure out what really happened. We don't even need ready-made troop deployment diagrams. Any detailed map is needed, and for the convenience of studying the topic, it is proposed to use an almost empty modern one with only three drawn reference points (how would it be inserted onto the page or would it be more convenient to open it in a separate window?).
After a short preliminary explanation of the geographical, transport and historical nuances, anyone, even those who have never read anything about the Battle of Borodino and who do not have any military knowledge, can easily understand why the decisive battle took place in this particular place, why the troops of the defenders and attackers were positioned exactly this way, and also, on an empty map, he will always be able to recreate the general picture of the Battle of Borodino, understand the logic of the further development of events and, most importantly, will never forget anything, since everything is elementary simple if you know what actually happened. You just need to point your finger once and the one who just LOOKS will finally SEE:
So, we open in a separate window the Yandex map of the places of the Battle of Borodino or the map of all the battles of 1812 in Russia and, moving or scaling it for our convenience, we search for and consider the geographical and historical objects we need:
- first we find the Koloch River (unfortunately, all the maps show the hydroelectric objects palely, so we focus on the settlements of Fomkino, Borodino, Gorki, Novoe Selo located on the Kolochi River);
- the enemy is advancing from the west (on the map from left to right), moving in the direction of the Kolocha River (the battle at the Kolotsky Monastery naturally took place before Borodino);
— the Koloch River, very close to the village of Borodino, flows into the Moscow River, that is, by rafting along the Koloch, you can easily get to Mozhaisk and further to Moscow, which in official history was the main goal of the enemy. In other words, in this way the enemy captured the trade route to the Oka along the Koloch - Moscow - Klyazma rivers;
— now we are studying a key point that nowhere in official history is associated with the Battle of Borodino. The fact is that the area near the village of Borodino is a fork from where a trade route went along the rivers, also to the Oka, but through the Protva River. The cities on the Protva itself and its tributaries became the scene of hostilities in the second phase of the War of 1812, when “the French were retreating.” We list the cities downstream of the Protva as they are seen from the village of Borodino: Tsarev Borisov city (now the village of Borisovo), Vereya, Borovsk, Maloyaroslavets (on the right tributary of the Protva, the Luzha River). There are also nearby the villages of Tarutino and Fominskoye on the Nara River, which flows directly into the Oka;
- that is, the whole essence of the Battle of Borodino is that the defending troops defended two directions of trade routes at once - to Mozhaisk (Moscow River) and to Tsarev Borisov Town (Protva River), so the Battle of Borodino took place there, and not “a kilometer to the right- kilometer to the left";
— Mozhaisk is well known as an enemy target, but another target needs at least a brief explanation, since it is a figure of silence. Tsarev-Borisov town (Tsareborisovskaya fortress) was built by Boris Godunov on the high left bank of the Protva as a powerful fortification structure by the standards of that era, surrounded on three sides by deep ditches, and on the fourth by the Protva River. The fortress included four towers and a unique church (74 meters), topped with an octagonal tent, at that time the tallest structure, taller than the Ivan the Great Bell Tower in Moscow ():
There is depressingly little information about the town of Tsarev-Borisov. In 1812, the French allegedly defended themselves in the fortress. After the war, the city is called Borisov and still has the status of a normal city at the level of Mozhaisk, Vereya, Dmitrov and others, as can be seen on the map of 1821, where these cities are signed in the same large font:
fragment of a map of the Moscow province of 1821 indicating postal and major roads, stations and distances between them (2 MB)
In 1830, the fortress and temple in Borisov were dismantled, and the bricks were used for the construction of administrative buildings in Mozhaisk (10 km away) and Vereya (downstream, easy to raft), and from that moment on the city, which once claimed the status of the capital , began to inexorably fade into oblivion.
Currently, the former fortress and the once normal city are in the status of the village of Borisovo, there are only pitiful remains of the former earthen rampart of the fortress, the events of 1812 Borisov are mentioned only in the sense that residents took part in the construction of protective structures at Borodino and were engaged in burial places of the dead.
— we add the most important element: the site of the Battle of Borodino and the town of Tsarev-Borisov are directly connected by the Mzhut River, a tributary of the Protva;
- now pay attention to the Yandex map of the places of the Battle of Borodino, on which under No. 3 the beginning of that same Mzhut river near the village of Utitsa is indicated. It is recommended to move the map and follow the path downstream to see for yourself how the water road leads to the modern village of Borisovo, where the town of Tsarev-Borisov was previously located;
- the shortest route for transporting cargo from the Kolocha River (Moscow River basin) to the Mzhut River (Protva River basin) runs along the Semenovsky Stream, which was then also called Semenovsky Tsarsky (proof). The mouth of the Semenovsky stream (the place where it flows into Koloch) is designated No. 1, the beginning of the Semenovsky stream is designated No. 2 near the village of Semenovskoye, the portage is conventionally designated by a red line with a length of 4.7 km, although de facto it passed along the stream in the Semenovsky ravine;
- those who remember the history of the Battle of Borodino apparently already understood everything, but for the rest we will continue the explanation. The enemy, as we remember, is attacking from the left, the defending side must protect two objects: 1. the portage from Kolocha to Mzhut (the path to Tsarev-Borisov town) and 2. the Koloch river itself (the path to Mozhaisk). Therefore, the line of defense must inevitably be built from the village of Utitsa (the left flank of the defenders), then along the portage on the right side of the Semenovsky ravine to the Koloch River (protection of the 1st object) and then in an arc along the Koloch River itself (protection of the 2nd object);
- this is exactly how and exactly in the listed places the line of defense was built before the Battle of Borodino, as can be seen in the following diagrams caught on the Internet. Now, armed with the logic of building a defense, you will easily notice how very different the schemes are and pay attention to many absurdities that historians do not care about at all.
The Battle of Borodino in 1812 is a battle that lasted only one day, but has been preserved in the history of the planet among the most important world events. Napoleon took this blow, hoping to quickly conquer the Russian Empire, but his plans were not destined to come true. It is believed that the Battle of Borodino was the first stage in the fall of the famous conqueror. What is known about the battle that Lermontov glorified in his famous work?
Battle of Borodino 1812: background
This was a time when Bonaparte’s troops had already managed to subjugate almost all of continental Europe, and the emperor’s power even extended to Africa. He himself emphasized in conversations with those close to him that in order to gain world domination, all he had to do was gain control over Russian lands.
To conquer Russian territory, he assembled an army of approximately 600 thousand people. The army rapidly advanced deeper into the state. However, Napoleon's soldiers died one after another under the attack of peasant militias, their health deteriorated due to the unusually difficult climate and poor nutrition. Nevertheless, the advance of the army continued, the French goal being the capital.
The bloody Battle of Borodino in 1812 became part of the tactics used by Russian commanders. They weakened the enemy army with minor battles, biding their time for a decisive blow.
Main stages
The Battle of Borodino in 1812 was actually a chain consisting of several clashes with French troops, which resulted in huge losses on both sides. The first was the battle for the village of Borodino, which is located approximately 125 km from Moscow. On the Russian side, de Tolly took part in it, and on the enemy side, the Beauharnais corps.
The Battle of Borodino in 1812 was in full swing when the battle took place. It involved 15 divisions of French marshals and two Russians, led by Vorontsov and Neverovsky. At this stage, Bagration received a serious wound, which forced him to entrust command to Konovnitsyn.
By the time the Russian soldiers left the flashes, the Battle of Borodino (1812) had already been going on for about 14 hours. A summary of further events: the Russians are located behind the Semenovsky ravine, where the third battle takes place. Its participants are people who attacked flushes and defended them. The French received reinforcements, which became the cavalry under the leadership of Nansouty. Uvarov's cavalry hastened to help the Russian troops, and the Cossacks under the command of Platov also approached.
Battery Raevsky
Separately, it is worth considering the final stage of such an event as the Battle of Borodino (1812). Summary: the battles for what went down in history as the “grave of the French cavalry” lasted about 7 hours. This place really became the grave for many of Bonaparte's soldiers.
Historians remain perplexed as to why the Russian army abandoned the Shevadinsky redoubt. It is possible that the commander-in-chief deliberately opened the left flank in order to divert the enemy's attention from the right. His goal was to protect the new Smolensk road, using which Napoleon’s army would quickly approach Moscow.
Many historically important documents have been preserved that shed light on such an event as the war of 1812. The Battle of Borodino is mentioned in a letter that was sent by Kutuzov to the Russian emperor even before it began. The commander informed the Tsar that the terrain features (open fields) would provide the Russian troops with optimal positions.
Hundred per minute
The Battle of Borodino (1812) is briefly and extensively covered in so many historical sources that one gets the impression that it took a very long time. In reality, the battle, which began on September 7 at half past six in the morning, lasted less than a day. Of course, it turned out to be one of the bloodiest among all the short battles.
It’s no secret how many lives the Battle of Borodino took and its bloody contribution. Historians have not been able to establish the exact number of those killed; they call 80-100 thousand dead on both sides. Calculations show that every minute at least a hundred soldiers were sent to the next world.
Heroes
The Patriotic War of 1812 gave many commanders their well-deserved glory. The Battle of Borodino, of course, immortalized a man like Kutuzov. By the way, Mikhail Illarionovich at that time was not yet a gray-haired old man whose one eye did not open. At the time of the battle, he was still an energetic, albeit aging man, and was not wearing his signature headband.
Of course, Kutuzov was not the only hero who was glorified by Borodino. Together with him, Bagration, Raevsky, and de Tolly entered history. It is interesting that the last of them did not enjoy authority among the troops, although he was the author of the brilliant idea to field partisan forces against the enemy army. If you believe the legend, during the Battle of Borodino, the general lost his horses three times, which died under a barrage of shells and bullets, but he himself remained unharmed.
Who has the victory?
Perhaps this question remains the main intrigue of the bloody battle, since both sides participating in it have their own opinion on this matter. French historians are convinced that Napoleon's troops won a great victory that day. Russian scientists insist on the opposite; their theory was once supported by Alexander the First, who proclaimed the Battle of Borodino an absolute victory for Russia. By the way, it was after him that Kutuzov was awarded the rank of Field Marshal.
It is known that Bonaparte was not satisfied with the reports provided by his military leaders. The number of guns captured from the Russians turned out to be minimal, as was the number of prisoners that the retreating army took with them. It is believed that the conqueror was completely crushed by the morale of the enemy.
The large-scale battle, which began on September 7 near the village of Borodino, has inspired writers, poets, artists, and then directors who covered it in their works for two centuries. You can recall both the painting “The Hussar Ballad” and the famous creation of Lermontov, which is now being taught at school.
What was the Battle of Borodino 1812 really like and how did it turn out for the Russians and French? Buntman and Eidelman are historians who created a laconic and accurate text that covers the bloody battle in detail. Critics praise this work for its impeccable knowledge of the era, vivid images of the heroes of the battle (on both sides), thanks to which all the events are easy to imagine. The book is a must read for those seriously interested in history and military affairs.
The Battle of Borodino is the most important battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the armies under the command of General M.I. Kutuzov, on the Russian side, and Napoleon I Bonaparte, on the French side. This battle took place on August 26 according to the old style (at the time of the battle this corresponded to September 7 according to the new style; today, this corresponds to September 8 according to the new style) 1812 not far from the village of Borodino. About 125 kilometers from Moscow.
During the 12-hour battle, the French army captured the Russian positions in the center, as well as on the left wing, although after the end of the battle the French army returned to their original positions. Taking this into account, Russian historiography believes that the Russian army won the Battle of Borodino. But, despite this, the next day the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, ordered a retreat due to huge losses. It is considered the bloodiest one-day battle in history.
Events leading up to the Battle of Borodino
After the French invasion of Russian territory in June 1812, the Russian army had to constantly retreat. The retreat caused public discontent, and Emperor Alexander I appointed a new commander-in-chief, General Kutuzov.
At the beginning of the Battle of Borodino, the size of the Russian army was determined to be approximately 115 thousand people and about 640 guns, the French - about 140 thousand soldiers and about 600 guns.
Military history takes into account not only the size of the army, but also the number that was brought into battle. But even according to these indicators - the number of forces that took part in the battle, the French army had a numerical superiority.
Before the main battle there was a battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt
The idea of Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov was to conduct an active defense, inflict the greatest possible losses on the French troops, that is, change the balance of forces, and also preserve the Russian army for further battles, for the complete defeat of the French army.
On the night of August 26 (September 7), 1812, using data obtained during the Battle of Shevardin, Kutuzov decides to regroup Russian troops.
The course of the Battle of Borodino - the main, key moments of the battle
Early in the morning (at 5:30) on August 26 (September 7), 1812, over 100 guns from the French side began shelling the positions of the left flank. Also, when the shelling began on the Russian position, the village of Borodino, General Delzon’s division launched a diversionary attack. Borodino was defended by the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment, commanded by Colonel Bistrom. For more than an hour, the rangers fought off the superior enemy, but under the threat of being flanked, they were forced to retreat beyond the Kolocha River. But the guards rangers were able to receive reinforcements and repelled all enemy attempts to break through the Russian defenses.
One of the battles is the battle for Bagration’s flushes.
These flushes were occupied by the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division, commanded by General Vorontsov. In the morning, at six o'clock, after a short shelling, the attack on Bagration's flushes began. Already the first attack allowed the French divisions to overcome the resistance of the rangers and break through the Utitsky forest, although having begun formation at the edge of the southernmost flush, they found themselves under grapeshot fire and were overturned from the flank by the attack of the rangers.
At about 8 o'clock, French troops repeated the attack and managed to capture the southern flush. And although attempts to take flushes did not stop on the part of the French army, they did not end in success.
As a result, the bloody battle ended in the defeat of the French troops, who were thrown back beyond the Semenovsky Creek ravine.
Russian units, although not completely, remained in Semenovskoye until the end of the battle.
Another battle that battered the French was the battle for the Utitsky Kurgan.
Raevsky's battery showed courage in defending Russian soil.
The highest mound, which was in the center of the Russian position, had a dominant position over the surrounding area. The battery was installed on this mound, which had 18 guns at the beginning of the battle. The defense of the battery was entrusted to the 7th Infantry Corps under Lieutenant General Raevsky.
Simultaneously with the battle for Bagration's flushes, French troops organized an attack on the battery. But this attack was repelled directly by artillery fire. And despite all the courage, Raevsky’s battery was nevertheless taken by the French.
Despite some successes for the French army, it did not gain an overwhelming advantage. The French offensive in the center of the Russian army stopped.
Thus, by 18 o'clock the Russian army was still unshakably in the Borodino position. The French troops failed to achieve decisive success in any direction.
End of the battle, results of the battle
When French troops captured Raevsky's battery, the battle began to fade. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army gave the order to withdraw the army beyond Mozhaisk in order to make up for human losses, as well as prepare for new battles. But Napoleon, who was faced with the fortitude of the enemy, was in a depressed and anxious mood.
The losses of the Russian army have been revised many times by historians. Different sources provide different data.
Due to the loss of the archive during the retreat of the French army, the question of the losses of the French army still remains open.
The Battle of Borodino is the bloodiest battle of the 19th century. That is why Napoleon recognized the battle of Borodino as his greatest battle, although its results were very modest for this great commander.
And although there are many assessments of this battle, the Battle of Borodino, both commanders chalked up the victory in it to their own account...
A Day of Military Glory dedicated to the Battle of Borodino was established
In Russia, a day of military glory is established on September 8 - the Day of the Borodino battle of the Russian army under the command of M.I. Kutuzov with the French army.
battle of Borodino - the main battle of the Patriotic War of 1812, which took place on September 7 (August 26, old style) 1812.
Russian Imperial Army
Commander-in-Chief - Infantry General, Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov. The main forces of the Russian army were regular troops, united in the 1st Western Army under the command of an infantry general M. B. Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Western Army under the command of infantry general P.I. Bagration.
Grand Army
The commander-in-chief is the Emperor of France Napoleon Bonaparte. In addition to the French troops, the Grand Army included contingents from the states of the Rhineland, Westphalia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Cleve, Berg, Prussia, Saxony, the Netherlands, Nassau, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Spain, the Kingdom of Naples, the Swiss Confederation, Portugal, Neuchâtel and others European states that were dependent on the French Empire.
Number of warring parties
There are two main versions of the calculation of the number of French troops participating in the battle. According to the so-called “Gzhatsky account”, the Great Army before the battle numbered 135,000 people with 900 guns. However, according to the second version, the number of French troops was close to 185,000 people. with 1200 guns, these data are indicated on the Central Monument on the Borodino Field. This difference in numbers is explained by the fact that during the transition from Gzhatsk to the Kolotsk Monastery, the Great Army was overtaken by reserve units, which gradually joined the army and were not counted during the roll call in Gzhatsk.
The number of Russian troops who took part in the battle is less controversial and amounts to 118,000 people. with 600 guns, including 10,000 warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias. It is impossible to consider the militias as full-fledged fighters, since they were practically unarmed and untrained, and were used as support personnel in the construction of fortifications and for collecting and removing the wounded from the battlefield.
Reasons for the battle
During the campaign of 1812 Napoleon Bonaparte planned to draw the Russian army into a general battle, during which, taking advantage of a significant superiority in numbers, defeat the enemy and force Emperor Alexander I to capitulate. But the Russian army systematically retreated deeper into its territory, avoiding a decisive battle. However, the lack of serious battles had a detrimental effect on the morale of both soldiers and officers, so Infantry General Kutuzov, recently appointed commander-in-chief, decided to give Bonaparte a general battle. He took into account that the French troops were forced to disperse their forces, and therefore the Grand Army was seriously reduced in number. At the same time, he had no illusions about the enemy’s strength and capabilities and understood that Bonaparte as a commander was extremely dangerous, and his soldiers had extensive combat experience and were eager to fight. However, he also could not help but give a general battle, since a further retreat to Moscow without a serious battle would have undermined the morale of the troops and would have caused distrust of the army in society. Considering all these factors, Kutuzov had no right to make a mistake and could not lose the upcoming battle, and these conditions predetermined the choice of the battle location.
Battlefield
The location of the upcoming battle was not chosen by Russian quartermasters by chance. Their task was to choose a position that would neutralize the superiority of the Great Army in numbers, especially in the number of artillery, while allowing reserves to maneuver covertly. The flanks of the position had to exclude the possibility of deep detours; it was also important, if possible, to cover all the most important roads leading to Moscow through Mozhaisk, i.e. the Old and New Smolensk roads, as well as the Gzhatsky tract. The battlefield can be considered an area stretching from north to south from Novy Selo to the village of Artemki and from west to east from Fomkino to Novaya Selo. The terrain is distinguished by a large number of streams, rivers and ravines crossing the battlefield from south to north. The Russian position was located in such a way that the attacking enemy, before reaching rifle range, was forced to cross the ravines of the Kamenka River and Semenovsky Stream on the left flank and in the center, as well as the valley of the Koloch River on the right flank, which were under Russian artillery fire. This allowed Russian troops to prevent the enemy from carrying out coordinated attacks and slowed down his advance to key points of the position.
Engineering equipment positions. Fortification
The very nature of the area suggested the use of various fortifications to enhance its defensive potential. During August 23-25 (September 4-6), 1812, Russian engineers carried out a huge amount of work. On a hill near the village of Shevardino, a redoubt for 5 guns was built, intended to cover the main Russian position and to divert the enemy’s attention from preparing the Russian army for the decisive battle. On August 24, French troops attempted to capture this fortification; this event went down in history as the Battle of the Shevardinsky Redoubt. The extreme right flank of the Russian position was covered by flashes near the village of Maslovo; the crossing of the Koloch River near the village of Borodino was covered by earthen batteries near the village of Gorki. In the center of the position, on Kurgan Heights, a fortification was erected, known as the Raevsky Battery. Further south, in the village of Semenovskoye, an earthen fortification was also built. In the space between the Semenovsky ravine, the Utitsky forest and the ravine of the Kamenka River, several lunettes were erected, which became famous as Bagration's flashes. In the Utitsky forest, a system of apertures was organized that made it difficult for the enemy to move through the forest. Russian fortifications were distinguished by the use of the principle of crossfire, as well as the widespread use of wolf pits on the approaches to them. Another feature of Russian fortifications was the impossibility of the enemy using them for their own purposes.
Plans of the parties
The Battle of Borodino, compared to most other battles of that era, is distinguished by the extreme ferocity of the combatants, largely due to the objectives of the warring parties. Defeat was unacceptable for both Kutuzov and Bonaparte. The defeat of the Russian army meant defeat in the war, since Kutuzov did not have any reserves capable of making up for losses and were not expected to do so in the near future. Bonaparte also believed that in the event of defeat, he had no chance of a quick victory in the war; in order to carry out his plan and capture Moscow, from which he intended to dictate the terms of peace, it was absolutely necessary for him to defeat the Russian army. Both commanders also understood that they were facing a strong, stubborn and dangerous enemy, and it would not be easy to achieve victory in the upcoming battle. The Russian commander-in-chief hoped to wear down the enemy, who was forced to attack a heavily fortified position, relying on a powerful system of fortifications. Drawn into the assault on Russian fortifications, enemy troops found themselves vulnerable to counterattacks by both infantry and cavalry. An important condition for success was the preservation of the combat effectiveness of the Russian army after the battle.
Bonaparte, on the contrary, intended to break through the Russian positions, capture its key points, and thereby, disorganizing the Russian battle formations, achieve victory. Preserving the combat effectiveness of the Grand Army was also a prerequisite for him, since it was almost impossible to count on replenishing losses and the ability to restore the combat effectiveness of his troops deep in hostile territory. He also understood that without replenishing supplies of provisions, fodder and ammunition, he would not be able to conduct the campaign for long. He did not know what reserves Kutuzov had, and how soon he could make up for his losses, so victory in the battle, and not just a victory, but the defeat of the Russian army, was the only possible way out of this situation for him.
Comparison of warring parties
For more than ten years, Russian troops periodically clashed with the French on the battlefield, so the Russian command was familiar with the enemy’s tactics, as well as the fighting qualities of the French soldiers. The Russian infantry, seasoned in wars with the Turks and the French, represented a formidable force. Despite the fact that Russian infantry battalions were inferior in numbers to French ones, they were distinguished by greater mobility and maneuverability. The traditional qualities of the Russian soldier - perseverance, perseverance and courage - were noted even by opponents. The Russian cavalry was distinguished by a good composition of horses, good training of riders, as well as a large number of brave and enterprising commanders. The artillery, equipped with the latest technology of the time, had good tactical flexibility due to a convenient organizational structure and good training of commanders. The great advantage of the Russian troops was the high fighting spirit and moral unity of the personnel. The absence of language barriers and national contradictions, a single organizational structure simplified the leadership of troops, which was also a significant advantage compared to the enemy.
The Great Army, in contrast to the Russian Imperial Army, presented a very motley picture. In addition to the French units, it also included troops from Bonaparte’s satellite countries, who were often not at all eager to fight for interests completely alien to them, and often experienced mutual hostility towards the French or their other allies. The French units were mostly made up of veterans who had been through many previous campaigns and had vast combat experience. French soldiers, unlike their allies, idolized Bonaparte and were ready to carry out any of his orders. French infantry traditionally operated in dense combat formations in large numbers, which, coupled with offensive impulse and high morale, made it an extremely dangerous enemy. However, the quality of the French cavalry left much to be desired, both in terms of the training of the cavalrymen themselves and the unsatisfactory condition of the cavalry, so Bonaparte relied more on the German and Polish cavalry. The national diversity of the Grand Army could not but be reflected in the artillery, represented by many different systems and calibers. A major disadvantage of the Grande Armée was also the fact that the allied contingents were organized according to their own traditions and ideas about military structure, which made their organization into divisions and corps, as well as their management, difficult due to linguistic and national differences.
Progress of the battle
The Battle of Borodino began in the early morning of August 26 (September 7), 1812 at about 6 am. French artillery opened fire along almost the entire front, shelling Russian positions. Almost simultaneously with the opening of fire, the French columns began to move, moving to the starting lines for the attack.
The first to be attacked by the Life Guards was the Jaeger Regiment, which occupied the village of Borodino. General Delzon's division, consisting of the 84th, 92nd and 106th line infantry regiments, taking advantage of the morning fog, attempted to dislodge the Guards Jaegers from their positions, but encountered stubborn resistance. However, as a result of a flank attack by the 106th Line Regiment, the rangers were forced to leave Borodino and retreat across the Koloch River. The French tried to cross after them, but came under counterattack by the 1st, 19th and 40th Jaeger Regiments and the Guards crew and, having suffered significant losses, were forced to retreat. The bridge over Koloch was burned by the sailors of the Guards crew, and until the end of the battle, the French made no attempts to advance in this area.
Bagration's flushes on the left flank of the Russian position were occupied by troops of the 2nd Consolidated Grenadier Division of Major General Vorontsov, as well as artillery of the 32nd and 11th battery companies. In front of the flushes along the Kamenka River there were chains of Russian rangers. In the Utitsky forest, the flashes were protected from flanking by three Jaeger regiments under the command of Prince I.A. Shakhovsky. Behind the flashes the 27th Infantry Division under Major General Neverovsky was placed. The Semenovsky Heights were occupied by the 2nd Grenadier Division of Major General Duke Karl of Mecklenburg, as well as the 2nd Cuirassier Division of Major General Duka. They were opposed by the corps of Marshals Davout and Ney, General Junot, as well as the cavalry of Marshal Murat, supported by significant artillery forces. Thus, the number of enemy troops intended for operations against Bagration’s flushes reached 115,000 people.
At about 6 o'clock in the morning, the divisions of Generals Dessay and Compan from the corps of Marshal Davout began to move to their original positions for the attack. However, the French infantry faced devastating Russian artillery fire and a counterattack by the Jaegers, and was forced to abandon the attack.
Having regrouped, at about 7 a.m. the French launched a second attack. During this attack, the enemy again encountered fierce resistance from the flush defenders. Despite considerable losses, infantrymen from Kompana's division managed to break into one of the flushes, but as a result of a well-coordinated attack by Russian infantry and cavalry of the Akhtyrsky Hussar and Novorossiysk Dragoon regiments, the French were forced to roll back again. The intensity of the battle is evidenced by the fact that by this time generals Rapp, Dessay, Compan and others had already been wounded, and Marshal Davout himself was shell-shocked.
Bagration, seeing that the enemy was concentrating forces for a third, even more powerful attack, pulled up the 3rd Infantry Division of Major General Konovnitsyn to the flushes, and Kutuzov from the army reserve allocated several battalions of the 1st Consolidated Grenadier Division, the Lithuanian Life Guards and Izmailovsky regiments, as well as the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 1st Cuirassier Division. Meanwhile, Bonaparte had already concentrated more than 160 guns against the flashes, as well as three infantry divisions from Marshal Ney’s corps and several cavalry formations of Marshal Murat.
Around 8 o'clock in the morning the third flush attack began. Russian artillery, firing grapeshot from short distances, regardless of enemy fire, inflicted huge losses on the French columns. Despite this, French infantry from the divisions of Compagne and Ledru managed to break through to the left flush and into the intervals between other fortifications. However, a counterattack by the 27th Infantry and 2nd Consolidated Grenadier Divisions, supported by the cavalry of the 4th Cavalry Corps, forced the French to hastily retreat to their original positions.
Around 9 a.m. Bonaparte launched his fourth flush attack. By this moment, the space in front of the flushes, dug up with cannonballs and littered with dead and dying people and horses, was already a terrible sight. Dense columns of French infantry again rushed to attack the Russian fortifications. The battle for the flushes turned into hand-to-hand combat on the parapets, Neverovsky's infantrymen and Vorontsov's grenadiers fought with amazing tenacity, noted even by the enemy. Any available means were used, bayonets, cutlasses, artillery accessories, rifle ramrods. However, despite all the efforts of the defenders, by 10 o'clock in the morning the enemy managed to capture the flushes. However, Bagration brings into battle the 2nd Grenadier Division of Major General, Duke Karl of Mecklenburg and the 2nd Cuirassier Division of Major General Duca. The remnants of Vorontsov's grenadiers and Neverovsky's infantry also joined the counterattack. The French, who suffered severely from Russian artillery fire and were unable to use the captured fortifications, could not withstand the organized attack of the Russian units and abandoned the flushes. The attack of the Russian cuirassiers was so swift that Marshal Murat himself barely escaped capture, managing to hide in a square of light infantry.
At about 11 o'clock in the morning the next, fifth flush attack begins. With powerful artillery support, the French infantry again managed to occupy the flushes, but then the 3rd Infantry Division of Major General Konovnitsyn entered the battle. During this counterattack, Major General Tuchkov 4th died heroically, leading the attack of the Revel and Murom infantry regiments with a banner in his hands. The French are again forced to leave flushes.
Bonaparte, seeing that the next attack again ended in failure, brought into battle the corps of General Junot, which included Westphalian units. Poniatowski's corps, which, according to Napoleon's plan, was supposed to bypass the flushes from the rear, got bogged down in battles near the village of Utitsa on the Old Smolensk road, and did not complete its task; the infantry of Davout and Ney suffered heavy losses and was exhausted, just like the supporting Their actions were carried out by Murat's cavalry, but their target - Bagration's flushes - still remained in the hands of the Russians. The sixth attack of the flushes began with the advance of the Westphalians of Junot through the Utitsky forest into the flank and rear of the Russian fortifications. Despite the fierce resistance of the Russian rangers, the German infantrymen, who made their way through the abatis, still managed to complete their task. However, as soon as they emerged from the forest, the Westphalians were met by fire from a horse-artillery battery of Captain Zakharov. Without having time to reorganize for the attack, the Westphalian infantry suffered heavy losses from grapeshot volleys and was immediately subjected to a counterattack by the Russian cavalry. The approach of the 2nd Corps of Lieutenant General Baggovut stabilized the situation. Meanwhile, the attack of the flushes from the front by the infantry of Ney and Davout was again repulsed.
The seventh flush attack was carried out by Bonaparte according to the same plan. The attack by Ney and Davout from the front and Junot from the flank again encountered fierce resistance. At the edge of the Utitsky forest, the Brest and Ryazan infantry regiments went into bayonet mode, thwarting another Westphalian attack. The losses of the Grand Army became heavier, attacks followed attacks, but the flushes were never taken.
At 12 noon the eighth flush attack begins. On the French side, about 45,000 infantry and cavalry personnel, supported by the fire of up to 400 artillery pieces, are participating in it; Russian troops concentrated in this area reached barely half of this number. The French infantry rushed into a frontal attack on the Russian fortifications; their numerical superiority allowed them to ignore the artillery fire. Then Bagration, seeing that the situation was becoming critical, personally led a counterattack of the Russian infantry, during which he was wounded in the thigh and dropped out of the battle. The 2nd Western Army was led by General Konovnitsyn. Realizing that further holding of the half-destroyed and littered with the bodies of killed flashes is inappropriate, Konovnitsyn withdraws the surviving troops beyond the Semenovsky ravine. An attempt by the French, on the shoulders of retreating Russian troops, to break into Semenovskoye was repelled by dagger fire from Russian artillery stationed on the hills near the village.
At about 9 o'clock in the morning, at a time when the battle for Bagration's flushes was already in full swing, Bonaparte began an attack on the center of the Russian position - Kurgan Heights, on which there was a fortification that went down in history as the Raevsky Battery. The battery contained 18 guns, as well as infantry from the 26th Infantry Division under Major General Paskevich. The remaining formations of the 7th Infantry Corps under Lieutenant General Raevsky covered the battery from the flanks. According to Bonaparte's plan, the 4th (Italian) corps of his stepson, Prince Eugene Beauharnais, was to operate against the battery.
After a prolonged artillery bombardment of the battery, the divisions of generals Morand and Gerard moved into the attack, but their onslaught was repelled by hurricane fire from Russian guns. At about 10 a.m., Beauharnais brings Broussier's division into battle. During the attack, the 30th Line Regiment and the 2nd Baden Regiment managed to break into the battery. The Russian infantry began to roll back in confusion, but the chief of artillery of the 1st Western Army, Major General Kutaisov, who happened to be nearby, was able to inspire the soldiers by personally leading a counterattack of the Russian infantry. During a short but fierce bayonet battle, the fortification was cleared, and Brigadier General Bonamy, who was at that moment on the battery, was captured. However, Kutaisov himself was killed in this battle.
Barclay de Tolly sent the 24th Infantry Division of Major General Likhachev to strengthen the defense of the battery, and the 7th Infantry Division of Major General Kaptsevich took up the defense to the right of the battery. Beauharnais also regrouped his forces, but the planned third attack on Raevsky’s battery was delayed for two hours due to the cavalry of Uvarov and Platov suddenly appearing in the rear of the Grand Army. Taking advantage of the moment, Kutuzov moved the 4th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy and the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Major General Korf, as well as the Life Guards Horse and Cavalry Regiments, to the battery area.
Convinced that the threat to his rear had passed, Eugene Beauharnais launched a third attack on Raevsky's battery. The Italian Guard, supported by the cavalry of General Grouchy, takes part in it. At the same time, the cavalry of generals Caulaincourt and Latour-Mobourg rushed into the interval between the village of Semenovskoye and Kurgannaya Heights. Their task is to break through the Russian line, go to the flank of the battery and attack it from the rear. However, during this attack, General Caulaincourt is killed, the attack of the French cuirassiers is repelled by Russian artillery fire. At the same moment, the infantry of Beauharnais begins an assault on the fortification from the front. Infantrymen from the 24th Infantry Division of General Likhachev fought with unprecedented tenacity, however, by 4 pm the battery was taken, and Likhachev himself, wounded several times, was captured. A fierce cavalry battle broke out between the village of Semenovskoye and Kurgannaya Heights; the Saxon cuirassiers of Lorzh and the Polish lancers of Rozhnetsky tried to break through the square of Russian infantry. Cavalrymen from the 2nd and 3rd cavalry corps of the Russian army came to her aid. However, despite strong resistance, Lorge's cuirassiers managed to break through into the depths of the Russian troops. At this moment, the Life Guards Horse and Cavalry Guard regiments entered the battle. Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, the Russian Horse Guards rushed into a decisive counterattack. After a bloody battle, the Russian guards forced the Saxons to retreat.
General Kaptsevich's 7th Infantry Division at the same time withstood attacks by French, Italian and German cavalrymen from Grusha's corps. Surrounded on all sides, the Russian infantry desperately fired back until the cavalry guards and Horse Guards, as well as cavalrymen from the 2nd and 3rd cavalry corps, came to their aid. Unable to withstand the desperate counterattack and suffering huge losses, the French light cavalry was forced to retreat.
At the same time, there was a battle for the Semenovsky ravine. Having captured the flashes, Bonaparte realized that he could not achieve anything with this - the Russian troops occupied a new line of defense along the steep and swampy Semenovsky ravine and were ready to continue the battle. To the right of the ruins of the village of Semenovskoye, the remnants of the 27th Infantry and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions were located, touching their right flank with the Tobolsk and Volyn infantry regiments. At the site of the village, units of the 2nd Grenadier Division took up defense, and the 3rd Infantry Division was located to the south of it. Their left flank was covered by the still fresh Life Guards Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments. These forces were commanded by Lieutenant General Dokhturov, who replaced Konovnitsyn, who took command of the 2nd Western Army in place of the seriously wounded Bagration
Marshals Ney, Davout and Murat were well aware that their exhausted troops were unable to overcome this line and turned to Napoleon with a request to bring the last reserve into battle - the Old Guard. However, Bonaparte, rightly believing that such a risk was too great, refused, but placed the Guards artillery at their disposal.
At about one o'clock in the afternoon, Friant's division attacked the village of Semenovskoye to no avail. The French infantry rolled back with heavy losses. At the same time, the heavy cavalry of General Nansouty entered the battle - in the space between the Utitsky forest and the village of Semenovskoye. However, their way was blocked by a square of the Life Guards of the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments. Being under heavy enemy artillery fire, the Guards infantry withstood three attacks by French cuirassiers. General Duca's cuirassiers came to the aid of the guard, driving back the French heavy cavalry with a decisive blow. A breakthrough by Latour-Maubourg's cavalry in the center was also prevented, and the battle began to fade.
On the extreme left flank of the Russian position, on the Old Smolensk Road, a detachment operated under the command of Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st, consisting of the 3rd Infantry Corps, six Cossack regiments of Major General Karpov 2nd and warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias. The task of the detachment was to cover the Old Smolensk road and prevent a possible deep bypass of the left flank of the Russian army. The detachment occupied positions on a hill near the village of Utitsa, which later became known as the Utitsa Kurgan.
At about 8 o'clock in the morning, the forward detachments of Marshal Poniatowski's corps, consisting of Polish units and subunits, appeared on the Old Smolensk Road. Poniatowski's goal was a deep envelopment of the Russian left flank, and Russian troops unexpectedly appeared on his road and prevented him from carrying out this maneuver. At this point, Tuchkov 1st sent Major General Konovnitsyn's 3rd Infantry Division to help the flush defenders, weakening his forces. Poniatovsky, with the support of artillery, tried to knock down the detachment of Tuchkov 1st from his positions on the move, but had no success. At about 11 o'clock in the morning the Poles resumed their attacks and achieved temporary success, capturing the Utitsky Kurgan. However, Tuchkov 1st, having led the attack of the Pavlovsk Grenadier and Belozersky and Vilmanstrand infantry regiments, forced the Poles to retreat to their original positions, and Tuchkov 1st himself was mortally wounded during this counterattack. Command of the troops of his detachment passed to Lieutenant General Baggovut.
Having regrouped, at about one o'clock in the afternoon Poniatowski again tried to defeat the Russian detachment, outflanking it. However, the Tauride Grenadier and Minsk Infantry Regiments thwarted this maneuver with a desperate counterattack. Until dusk, the Poles did not abandon their attempts to defeat the enemy, but General Baggovut, Karl Fedorovich / Baggovut, with bold and decisive actions, repulsed all their attacks, forcing them to retreat beyond the village of Utitsa and go on the defensive.
On the extreme right flank of the Russian army, events developed less dramatically. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, when the onslaught of French troops along the entire line began to intensify, Kutuzov ordered Lieutenant General Uvarov and Ataman Platov to carry out a cavalry raid into the rear of the Great Army in order to distract the enemy and ease his pressure on the Russian defense. At about one o'clock in the afternoon, cavalrymen from Uvarov's 1st Cavalry Corps, to the great surprise of the French, suddenly appeared near the village of Bezzubovo. General Ornano's cavalry division hastily retreated beyond the Voina River, but in the way of the Russian cavalry were squares of the 84th Line Regiment, which was in the area after the morning battle for the village of Borodino. After withstanding several unsuccessful attacks, the French infantry were forced to retreat under fire from Russian horse artillery. Meanwhile, Platov’s Cossacks along forest roads went deep into the rear of the Great Army, appearing near the village of Valuevo, where the main rear services of the French were located. Their appearance caused great concern to Bonaparte, who was forced to temporarily suspend active operations in the center. In order to eliminate the threat on his left flank, Napoleon decided to remove about 20,000 people from the direction of the main attack, thereby giving the Russian troops a much-needed respite.
The end of the battle. Results
Around 6 pm the battle gradually ended. By 9 o'clock the French made a last attempt to bypass the Russian positions through the Utitsky forest, but were met with well-aimed fire from riflemen from the Finnish Life Guards Regiment, and were forced to abandon their plans. Napoleon realized that even after capturing the flushes and Kurgan Heights, he could not break the resistance of the Russian Imperial Army. The capture of these points did not change the situation in his favor, since the main line of Russian troops was not broken through, and the main forces of the Grand Army were spent on their assault. Already at dusk, the French emperor gives the order to abandon the captured Russian fortifications and retreat to their original positions. Having cost such huge losses, Bagration's flushes and Raevsky's Battery turned out to be useless for the French. The losses of the Grand Army amounted to 58,000 soldiers, 1,600 officers and 47 generals killed, wounded and missing. The battle cost Russian troops the loss of 38,000 soldiers, 1,500 officers and 29 generals killed, wounded and missing.
For Napoleon, the general battle ended in vain. He did not achieve any of his goals, the Russian army retained its combat capability, and Bonaparte could not call the battle a victory either. Most of the experienced, seasoned soldiers were killed in the battle, and no reserves could make up for this loss. The future of the campaign also remained in doubt. The morale of the army fell.
On the contrary, Kutuzov had every reason to consider the battle a success. Despite heavy losses, his army did not allow itself to be defeated and maintained high morale until the end of the battle. The line of Russian troops was not broken, and the enemy was exhausted and bleeding. However, despite everyone's desire to continue the battle the next day, Kutuzov ordered a general retreat. He understood that without the approach of reserves and proper rest, the army was unable to continue the campaign and bring the war to a decisive victory, while Bonaparte’s losses were irreparable, and every extra day of the war further distances him from a successful outcome for him.
M.I. Kutuzov wrote about the results of the battle as follows: “The battle that took place on the 26th was the bloodiest of all those known in modern times. We completely won the battlefield, and the enemy then retreated to the position where he came to attack us.”
And here is Napoleon’s assessment: “The Battle of the Moscow River was one of those battles where the greatest merits were demonstrated and the least results were achieved. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians earned the right to be invincible.”
