Penal battalions and barrier detachments of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. How many people are in a company, battalion, platoon, etc.

In periodicals and published literature, there are a number of myths and legends about penal units of the Red Army: “penal units turned into a kind of military prison”; for them, the Soviet Army “invented reconnaissance in force”; With their bodies, the penalty soldiers cleared minefields; penal battalions were “thrown into attacks on the most inaccessible areas of the German defense”; Penalties were “cannon fodder”; their “lives were used to achieve victory during the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War”; criminals were not sent to penal formations; the penal battalions did not have to be supplied with ammunition and provisions; Behind the penal battalions there were blocking detachments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) with machine guns and others.

The published material reveals on a documentary basis the process of creation and combat use of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments. They were first created in the Red Army during the Civil War. The experience of their creation was used during the Great Patriotic War. The formation of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments began with Order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense (NKO) of the USSR I.V. Stalin dated July 28, 1942. What caused the appearance of this document, dubbed the order “Not a step back!”?

Formation of penal battalions and companies

During the successful counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow and its general offensive that then unfolded, the enemy was thrown back 150-400 km to the west, the threat to Moscow and the North Caucasus was eliminated, the situation in Leningrad was eased, and the territories of 10 regions of the Soviet Union were liberated in whole or in part. The Wehrmacht, having suffered a major defeat, was forced to switch to strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front. However, many operations of the Red Army remained unfinished due to the Supreme High Command's overestimation of the capabilities of its troops and underestimation of the enemy's forces, dispersal of reserves, and inability to create decisive superiority in the most important sectors of the front. The enemy took advantage of this, and in the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 he again seized the initiative.

Miscalculations made by the Supreme Command Headquarters and the command of a number of fronts in assessing the situation led to new defeats of Soviet troops in the Crimea, near Kharkov, southeast of Leningrad and allowed the enemy to launch a major offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. The enemy advanced to a depth of 500-650 km, broke through to the Volga and the Main Caucasus Range, and cut communications connecting the central regions with the south of the country.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces amounted to: irrevocable - 2064.1 thousand people, sanitary - 2258.5 thousand; tanks - 10.3 thousand units, guns and mortars - about 40 thousand, aircraft - more than 7 thousand units. But, despite the heavy defeats, the Red Army withstood a powerful blow and, in the end, stopped the enemy.

I.V. Stalin, taking into account the current situation, on July 28, 1942, as People's Commissar of Defense, signed order No. 227. The order stated:

“The enemy is throwing ever new forces at the front and, regardless of the great losses for him, climbs forward, rushes into the depths of the Soviet Union, captures new areas, devastates and ruins our cities and villages, rapes, robs and kills the Soviet population. Fighting is taking place in the Voronezh region, on the Don, in the south and at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German occupiers are rushing towards Stalingrad, towards the Volga and want to capture Kuban and the North Caucasus with their oil and grain riches at any cost. The enemy has already captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuiki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, and half of Voronezh. Units of the troops of the Southern Front, following the alarmists, left Rostov and Novocherkassk without serious resistance and without orders from Moscow, covering their banners with shame.

The population of our country, who treats the Red Army with love and respect, begins to become disillusioned with it and loses faith in the Red Army. And many curse the Red Army because it is putting our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, while it itself is fleeing to the east.

Some stupid people at the front console themselves by saying that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of land, a lot of population and that we will always have plenty of grain. With this they want to justify their shameful behavior at the front.

But such conversations are completely false and deceitful, beneficial only to our enemies.

Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker must understand that our funds are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR, which the enemy has captured and is trying to capture, is bread and other products for the army and home front, metal and fuel for industry, factories, plants supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, and railways. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, therefore, there are much fewer people, bread, metal, plants, factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million pounds of grain per year and more than 10 million tons of metal per year. We no longer have a superiority over the Germans either in human reserves or in grain reserves. To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our Motherland. Each new piece of territory we leave behind will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defenses, our Motherland, in every possible way.

Therefore, we must completely stop the talk that we have the opportunity to retreat endlessly, that we have a lot of territory, our country is large and rich, there is a lot of population, there will always be plenty of grain. Such conversations are false and harmful, they weaken us and strengthen the enemy, because if we do not stop retreating, we will be left without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw materials, without factories and factories, without railways.

It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat.

No step back! This should now be our main call.

We must stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, defend every position, every meter of Soviet territory, cling to every piece of Soviet land and defend it to the last opportunity.

Our Motherland is going through difficult days. We must stop, and then push back and defeat the enemy, no matter the cost. The Germans are not as strong as the alarmists think. They are straining their last strength. To withstand their blow now, in the next few months, means ensuring victory for us.

Can we withstand the blow and then push the enemy back to the west? Yes, we can, because our factories and factories in the rear are now working perfectly, and our front is receiving more and more planes, tanks, artillery, and mortars.

What do we lack?

There is a lack of order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, tank units, and air squadrons. This is now our main drawback. We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend our Motherland.

We cannot tolerate any more commanders, commissars, and political workers whose units and formations leave combat positions without permission. We cannot tolerate it any longer when commanders, commissars, and political workers allow a few alarmists to determine the situation on the battlefield, so that they drag other fighters into retreat and open the front to the enemy.

Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot.

From now on, the iron law for every commander, Red Army soldier, and political worker must be the requirement - not a step back without an order from the high command.

Commanders of a company, battalion, regiment, division, corresponding commissars and political workers who retreat from a combat position without an order from above are traitors to the Motherland. Such commanders and political workers must be treated as traitors to the Motherland.

This is the call of our Motherland.

To carry out this order means to defend our land, save the Motherland, destroy and defeat the hated enemy.

After their winter retreat under the pressure of the Red Army, when discipline weakened in the German troops, the Germans took some harsh measures to restore discipline, which led to good results. They formed more than 100 penal companies from soldiers who had violated discipline due to cowardice or instability, placed them in dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with blood. They formed, further, about a dozen penal battalions from commanders who were guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, deprived them of their orders, placed them in even more dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins. They finally formed special barrage detachments, placed them behind unstable divisions and ordered them to shoot panickers on the spot if they attempted to leave their positions without permission or if they attempted to surrender. As you know, these measures had their effect, and now the German troops are fighting better than they fought in the winter. And so it turns out that the German troops have good discipline, although they do not have the lofty goal of defending their homeland, but have only one predatory goal - to conquer a foreign country, and our troops, who have the lofty goal of defending their desecrated homeland, do not have such discipline and tolerate due to this defeat.

Shouldn't we learn from our enemies in this matter, just as our ancestors learned from their enemies in the past and then defeated them?

I think it should.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army orders:

1. To the military councils of the fronts and, above all, to the commanders of the fronts:

A) unconditionally eliminate retreating sentiments in the troops and suppress with an iron fist the propaganda that we can and should allegedly retreat further to the east, that such a retreat will supposedly cause no harm;

B) unconditionally remove from post and send to Headquarters to bring to court martial the army commanders who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the front command;

C) form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and place them on more difficult sections of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland.

2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of corps and divisions who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the army command, and send them to the military council of the front to be brought before a military court;

B) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units, to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;

C) form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and place them in difficult areas army to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against their homeland with blood.

3. To commanders and commissars of corps and divisions:

A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of regiments and battalions that allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of units without an order from the corps or division commander, take away their orders and medals and send them to the military councils of the front to be brought before a military court;

B) provide all possible assistance and support to the army’s barrage detachments in strengthening order and discipline in the units.

The order should be read in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams, and headquarters.”

Order No. 227 makes no mention of the experience gained in the Civil War, but makes reference to the experience of the enemy, who practiced the use of penal battalions. The enemy's experience undoubtedly needed to be studied and creatively applied in practice. But Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, who during the Civil War was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Revolutionary Military Council of a number of fronts, had an idea about the creation of similar formations in the Red Army.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, assessing order No. 227, writes in the book “The Work of a Whole Life”: “This order immediately attracted the attention of all personnel of the Armed Forces. I was an eyewitness to how soldiers in units and subunits listened to him, officers and generals studied him. Order No. 227 is one of the most powerful documents of the war years in terms of the depth of patriotic content, the degree of emotional intensity... I, like many other generals, saw some harshness and categorical assessments of the order, but they were justified by a very harsh and alarming time. What attracted us to the order, first of all, was its social and moral content. He attracted attention with the severity of the truth, the impartiality of the conversation between the People's Commissar and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin with Soviet soldiers, from ordinary soldiers to army commanders. Reading it, each of us thought about whether we were devoting all our strength to the struggle. We were aware that the cruelty and categorical demands of the order came on behalf of the Motherland, the people, and what was important was not what penalties would be introduced, although this was important, but that it increased the consciousness of responsibility among the soldiers for the fate of their socialist Fatherland. And those disciplinary measures that were introduced by order had already ceased to be an indispensable, urgent necessity even before the Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive at Stalingrad and the encirclement of the Nazi group on the banks of the Volga.”

Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov in his “Memoirs and Reflections” noted: “In some places, panic and violations of military discipline reappeared in the troops. In an effort to stop the decline in the morale of the troops, I.V. Stalin issued order No. 227 on July 28, 1942. This order introduced tough measures to combat alarmists and violators of discipline, and strongly condemned “retreat” sentiments. It said that the iron law for active troops should be the requirement “Not a step back!” The order was supported by intensified party-political work in the troops.”

During the Great Patriotic War, the attitude towards order No. 227 was ambiguous, as evidenced by documents of that time. Thus, in a special message from the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front, senior state security major N.N. Selivanovsky, sent on August 8, 1942 to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank V.S. Abakumov, it was emphasized: “Among the command staff, the order was correctly understood and appreciated. However, amid the general upsurge and correct assessment of the order, a number of negative, anti-Soviet defeatist sentiments are recorded, manifesting themselves among individual unstable commanders...” Similar facts were cited in the report of the head of the political department of the Volkhov Front, Brigade Commissar K. Kalashnikov, dated August 6, 1942, to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.

After the publication of Order No. 227, measures were taken to bring it to the attention of personnel, to form and determine the procedure for the use of penal and barrage units and units. On July 29, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) A.S. Shcherbakov demanded that the heads of the political departments of the fronts and districts and the heads of the political departments of the armies “personally ensure that the People’s Commissar’s order is immediately communicated to units and subunits, read out and explained to all personnel of the Red Army.” In turn, People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov, in Directive No. 360/sh dated July 30, ordered the commanders of fleets and flotillas to accept Order No. 227 “for execution and management.” July 31, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and USSR Prosecutor K.P. Gorshenin signed Directive No. 1096, which ordered military prosecutors and tribunal chairmen to take “decisive measures to provide the command and political agencies with real assistance in fulfilling the tasks set in the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense.”

Even before the publication of order No. 227, the first penal company was created in the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front on July 25, 1942. On July 28, the day order No. 227 was signed, 5 separate penal companies were created in the active army, on July 29 - 3 separate penal battalions and 24 separate penal companies, on July 30 - 2 separate penal battalions and 29 separate penal companies, and on July 31 - 19 separate penal companies. The Baltic and Black Sea fleets, the Volga and Dnieper military flotillas had their own penal companies and platoons.

Who formed penal battalions and companies

August 10 I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky signed Directive No. 156595, which demanded that personnel convicted of sabotage or sabotage be transferred to penal tank companies, as well as to send “hopeless, malicious selfish tankmen” to penal infantry companies. Penal companies were created, in particular, in the 3rd, 4th and 5th tank armies.

On August 15, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army A.S. Shcherbakov signs Directive No. 09 “On political work to implement NGO Order No. 227 of July 28, 1942.” On August 26, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov issued an order “On the tasks of military tribunals to implement the order of the NKO of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942.” The procedure for recording military personnel assigned to penal battalions and companies was determined in Directive No. 989242 of the Red Army General Staff of August 28.

September 9, 1942 People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin signed order No. 0685, which demanded that “fighter pilots who evade combat with an air enemy should be brought to trial and transferred to penal units in the infantry.” The pilots were sent not only to penal infantry units. In accordance with the regulations developed in the same month at the headquarters of the 8th Air Army, the creation of three types of penal squadrons was envisaged: fighter squadrons on the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 aircraft, attack squadrons on the Il-2, and light bomber squadrons on the U-2.

September 10, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Major General of Artillery V.V. Aborenkov issued an order, according to which it was ordered to immediately send to penal rifle battalions “those guilty of negligent attitude towards the military equipment entrusted to them” from the 58th Guards Mortar Regiment.

On September 26, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense General of the Army G.K. Zhukov approved the provisions “On penal battalions of the active army” and “On penal companies of the active army.” Soon, on September 28, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko issued order No. 298, in which the following were announced to management:

"1. Regulations on penal battalions of the active army.

2. Regulations on penal companies in the active army.

3. Staff No. 04/393 of a separate penal battalion of the active army.

4. Staff No. 04/392 of a separate penal company of the active army...”

Despite the fact that the staff of penal battalions and companies were clearly defined by the relevant provisions, their organizational and staffing structure was different.

Order No. 323 of October 16, 1942, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko, the provisions of Order No. 227 were extended to military districts. Sent to penal units in accordance with Order No. 0882 of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense E.A. Shchadenko on November 12, both those liable for military service and military personnel who feigned illness and so-called “mutilators” were subject to punishment. By order No. org/2/78950 of the Main Organizational and Staff Directorate of the Main Administration of the Red Army dated November 25, a single numbering of penal battalions was established.

December 4, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense A.S. Shcherbakov signs order No. 0931, according to which for “the soulless bureaucratic attitude towards the material and everyday needs of political workers who are in the reserve of GlavPURKKA at the Military-Political School. M.V. Frunze" were removed from their posts and sent to the active army in a penal battalion, the assistant head of the school for logistics, Major Kopotienko, and the head of the school's baggage supply, senior lieutenant of the quartermaster service, Govtvyanits.

According to order No. 47 of January 30, 1943, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Colonel General E.A. Shchadenko, junior lieutenant of the 1082nd Infantry Regiment Karamalkin was sent to a penal battalion for a period of 3 months and demoted to the ranks “for criticism, an attempt to slander his superiors and the corruption of discipline in his unit.”

According to Directive No. 97 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shadenko of March 10, 1943, it was required that “after a quick check, immediately send to penal units” former military personnel who “at one time surrendered to the enemy without resistance or deserted from the Red Army and remained to live in territory temporarily occupied by the Germans, or, finding themselves surrounded at their place of residence, they stayed at home, not wanting to go out with the Red Army units.”

By order No. 0374 of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 31, 1943, it was prescribed by the decision of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front to send to penal battalions and companies “persons of command who are guilty of interruptions in the nutrition of the soldiers or the lack of food supplies to the soldiers.” Employees of the Special Departments did not escape the fate of fines. On May 31, People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Based on the results of an inspection of the work of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, Stalin issued order No. 0089, by which “for criminal errors in investigative work” investigators Sedogin, Izotov, Solovyov were dismissed from counterintelligence agencies and sent to a penal battalion.

By Order No. 413, People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin on August 21, 1943, the command staff of military districts and inactive fronts was given the right to send military personnel to penal formations without trial “for unauthorized absence, desertion, failure to comply with orders, squandering and theft of military property, violation of the statutory rules of guard duty and other military crimes in cases where the usual disciplinary measures for these offenses are insufficient, as well as all detained deserters of sergeants and privates who fled from units of the active army and from other garrisons.

Not only male servicemen, but also women were sent to penal formations. However, experience has shown that it is inappropriate to send female military personnel who have committed minor crimes to penal cells. Therefore, on September 19, 1943, General Staff Directive No. 1484/2/org was sent to the chiefs of staff of fronts, military districts and individual armies, which demanded that female military personnel convicted of crimes not be sent to penal units.

In accordance with the joint directive of the NKVD/NKGB of the USSR No. 494/94 of November 11, 1943, Soviet citizens who collaborated with the occupiers were also sent to penal units.

In order to streamline the practice of transferring convicts to the active army, on January 26, 1944, order No. 004/0073/006/23 was issued, signed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and USSR Prosecutor K.P. Gorshenin.

By order No. 0112 of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal G.K. Zhukov on April 29, 1944, the commander of the 342nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 121st Guards Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel F.A., was sent to a penal battalion for a period of two months. Yachmenev “for failure to comply with the order of the Military Council of the Army, for leaving the enemy advantageous positions and not taking measures to restore the situation, for showing cowardice, false reports and refusal to carry out the assigned combat mission.”

Persons who were careless and uncontrolled were also sent to penal units, as a result of which military personnel died in the rear, for example, according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, signed in May 1944.

Practice has shown that when implementing this order, significant violations were committed, the elimination of which was directed by Order No. 0244, signed on August 6, 1944 by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. Approximately the same kind of order No. 0935, concerning officers of fleets and flotillas, was signed on December 28, 1944 by the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov.

Military units were also transferred to the category of penalties. On November 23, 1944, People's Commissar of Defense Stalin signed order No. 0380 on the transfer of the 214th Cavalry Regiment of the 63rd Cavalry Korsun Red Banner Division (commander of the guard regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Danilevich) to the category of penalties for the loss of the Battle Banner.

The formation of penal battalions and companies was not always carried out successfully, as required by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. In this regard, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. On March 24, 1943, Zhukov sent directive No. GUF/1902 to front commanders, which demanded:

"1. Reduce the number of penal companies in armies. Collect penal prisoners into consolidated companies and, thus, keep them together, preventing them from being aimless in the rear and using them in the most difficult areas of combat operations.

2. In the event of a significant shortfall in penal battalions, introduce them into battle one by one, without waiting for the arrival of new penal battalions from command personnel in order to cover the shortfall of the entire battalion.”

The regulations on penal battalions and companies noted that permanent personnel (commanders, military commissars, political commissars, etc.) were appointed to positions by order of the front and army troops from among the strong-willed and most distinguished commanders and political workers in battle. This requirement, as a rule, was fulfilled in the active army. But there were exceptions to this rule. For example, in the 16th separate penal battalion, platoon commanders were often appointed from among those who had redeemed their guilt. According to the provisions on penal battalions and companies for all permanent personnel, the terms of service in ranks, in comparison with the command, political and command staff of combat units of the active army, were reduced by half, and each month of service in penal formations was counted towards the assignment of a six-month pension. But this, according to the recollections of penal unit commanders, was not always followed.

The variable composition of penal battalions and companies consisted of military personnel and civilians sent to these formations for various offenses and crimes. According to our calculations, made on the basis of orders and directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, People's Commissar of the Navy, Deputy People's Commissars of Defense, People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of State Security, about 30 categories of such persons have been identified.

So, the orders and directives of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies clearly defined the types of offenses for which military personnel and other persons could be sent to penal units, as well as the circle of persons who had the right to send those guilty and convicted to penal units. The fronts and armies also issued orders regarding the procedure for the formation of penal units and subunits. Thus, by order No. 00182 of the commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov dated July 31, 1942, members of the command and political staff of the 85th Infantry Division, who were “the main culprits for the failure to complete the combat mission,” were sent to the front-line penal battalion, and “junior command and rank and file personnel who showed cowardice on the battlefield” were sent to army penal company. On May 6, 1943, Directive No. 005 was issued by the front commander, Colonel General I.I. Maslennikov, who demanded that military personnel who showed cowardice on the battlefield be sent to a penal battalion or tried by a military tribunal.

Published literature and memoirs of front-line soldiers contain information that commanders and superiors did not always adhere to the rules established in orders and directives. This, as the study showed, applied to approximately 10 categories of fines:

1. Unjustly convicted, who were slandered and slandered in order to settle scores with them.

2. The so-called “surrounded people” who managed to escape from the “cauldrons” and reach their troops, as well as those who fought as part of partisan detachments.

3. Military personnel who have lost combat and secret documents.

4. Commanders and superiors guilty of “criminally careless organization of the combat security and reconnaissance service.”

5. Persons who, due to their beliefs, refused to take up arms.

6. Persons who supported “enemy propaganda.”

7. Military personnel convicted of rape.

8. Civil prisoners (thieves, bandits, repeat offenders, etc.).

9. Fraudsters.

10. Employees of defense enterprises who committed negligence.

The published literature provides various information about equipping penal battalions and companies with weapons and military equipment. Some authors write that the penalty officers were armed only with light small arms and grenades, being “light” rifle units.” Other publications provide information about the presence of captured automatic weapons and mortars in the penal units. To carry out specific tasks, artillery, mortar and even tank units were temporarily subordinated to the commander of the penal unit.

Penal prisoners were provided with clothing and food supplies in accordance with the standards established in the army. But, in a number of cases, according to the recollections of front-line soldiers, there were violations in this matter. In some publications, for example I.P. Gorin and V.I. Golubev, it is said that in the penal units there was no normal relationship between permanent and variable personnel. However, the majority of front-line soldiers testify to the opposite: in penal battalions and companies, statutory relationships and strong discipline were maintained. This was facilitated by well-organized political and educational work, which was carried out on the same basis as in other parts of the active army.

Penal formations, staffed mainly from among military personnel of various military specialties, received additional training when there was time so that they were able to solve the tasks assigned to them.

According to the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study,” by the end of 1942 there were 24,993 penal prisoners in the Red Army. In 1943 their number increased to 177,694 people, in 1944 it decreased to 143,457, and in 1945 to 81,766 people. In total, during the Great Patriotic War, 427,910 people were sent to penal companies and battalions. Judging by the information included in List No. 33 of rifle units and units (individual battalions, companies, detachments) of the active army, compiled by the General Staff in the early 60s of the 20th century, then during the Great Patriotic War 65 separate penal battalions were formed and 1028 separate penal companies; a total of 1093 penalty parts. However, A. Moroz, who studied the funds of penal units stored in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, believes that during the war, 38 separate penal battalions and 516 separate penal companies were formed.

The work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study” states: “Penal units of the Red Army existed legally from September 1942 to May 1945.” In fact, they existed from July 25, 1942 to October 1945. For example, the 128th separate penal company of the 5th Army participated in the Harbin-Girin offensive operation, which was carried out from August 9 to September 2, 1945. The company was disbanded based on Directive No. 0238 of the 5th Army Headquarters dated October 28, 1945.

Penal battalions and companies were used in the most dangerous areas

As noted, much speculation exists regarding how penal battalions and companies were used. Moreover, the most common myth is that they served as a kind of “cannon fodder”. This is not true. During the Great Patriotic War, penal companies and battalions solved almost the same tasks as rifle units and subunits. Moreover, as ordered by Order No. 227, they were used in the most dangerous directions. They were most often used to break through enemy defenses, capture and hold important settlements and bridgeheads, and conduct reconnaissance in force. During the offensive, penal units had to overcome various types of natural and artificial obstacles, including mined areas. As a result, the myth that they “cleared minefields” with their bodies gained vitality. In this regard, we note that not only penal units, but also rifle and tank units repeatedly operated in directions where minefields were located.

The penalty units, in general, acted staunchly and courageously in defense. They participated in crossing water barriers, capturing and holding bridgeheads, and in combat operations behind enemy lines.

Due to the fact that penal formations were used in the most difficult sectors of fronts and armies, they, according to the authors of the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study,” suffered heavy losses. In 1944 alone, the total losses of personnel (killed, dead, wounded and sick) of all penal units amounted to 170,298 permanent personnel and penal prisoners. The average monthly losses of permanent and variable personnel reached 14,191 people, or 52% of their average monthly number (27,326 people). This was 3–6 times more than the average monthly losses of personnel in conventional troops in the same offensive operations in 1944.

In most cases, penal prisoners were released within the time limits established by the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies. But there were also exceptions, which were determined by the attitude of the command and military councils of the fronts and armies towards the penal units. For the courage and heroism shown in battles, penal prisoners were awarded orders and medals, and some of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Barrage detachments of the Red Army

In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, leaders of a number of party organizations, commanders of fronts and armies took measures to restore order in the troops retreating under enemy pressure. Among them is the creation of special units that performed the functions of barrage detachments. Thus, on the North-Western Front, already on June 23, 1941, in the formations of the 8th Army, detachments were organized from the withdrawn units of the border detachment to detain those leaving the front without permission. In accordance with the decree “On measures to combat parachute landings and enemy saboteurs in the frontline zone,” adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 24, by decision of the military councils of the fronts and armies, barrage detachments were created from the NKVD troops.

On June 27, the head of the Third Directorate (counterintelligence) of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense, State Security Major A.N. Mikheev signed Directive No. 35523 on the creation of mobile control and barrier detachments on roads and railway junctions in order to detain deserters and all suspicious elements who penetrated the front line.

Commander of the 8th Army, Major General P.P. Sobennikov, who was operating on the North-Western Front, in his order No. 04 of July 1, demanded that the commanders of the 10th, 11th Rifle and 12th Mechanized Corps and divisions “immediately organize barrage detachments to detain those fleeing from the front.”

Despite the measures taken, there were significant shortcomings in the organization of the barrage service at the fronts. In this regard, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General G.K. Zhukov, in his telegram No. 00533 dated July 26, on behalf of Headquarters, demanded that the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions and the commanders of the front troops “immediately personally figure out how the barrier service is organized and give comprehensive instructions to the rear security chiefs.” On July 28, Directive No. 39212 was issued by the head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, State Security Commissioner 3rd Rank B.C. Abakumov on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line.

During the fighting, a gap formed between the Reserve and Central Fronts, to cover which the Bryansk Front was created on August 16, 1941 under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko. In early September, his troops, at the direction of Headquarters, launched a flank attack with the aim of defeating the German 2nd Panzer Group, which was advancing to the south. However, having pinned down very insignificant enemy forces, the Bryansk Front was unable to prevent the enemy group from reaching the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. In this regard, General A.I. Eremenko turned to Headquarters with a request to allow the creation of barrage detachments. Directive No. 001650 Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated September 5th gave such permission.

This directive marked the beginning of a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. If before that they were formed by the bodies of the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and then by Special Departments, now the decision of Headquarters legitimized their creation directly by the command of the troops of the active army, so far only on the scale of one front. This practice was soon extended to the entire active army. September 12, 1941 Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin and Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov signed Directive No. 001919, which ordered that each rifle division have “a defensive detachment of reliable fighters of no more than a battalion (one company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles." The tasks of the barrage detachment were to provide direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, in stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel, without stopping before using weapons, in eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, etc.

On September 18, the military council of the Leningrad Front adopted resolution No. 00274 “On strengthening the fight against desertion and penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad,” according to which the head of the front’s military rear security was instructed to organize four barrage detachments “to concentrate and check all military personnel detained without documents."

On October 12, 1941, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik sent I.V. Stalin received a note in which he proposed to “organize a command group along each highway going north, west and south from Moscow” to organize the repulsion of enemy tanks, which would be given a “barrage detachment to stop the fleeing.” On the same day, the State Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. 765ss on the creation of a security headquarters for the Moscow zone under the NKVD of the USSR, to which the troops and regional organizations of the NKVD, police, fighter battalions and barrage detachments located in the zone were operationally subordinate.

In May-June 1942, during the fighting, the Volkhov group of troops of the Leningrad Front was surrounded and defeated. As part of the 2nd Shock Army, which was part of this group, barrier detachments were used to prevent escape from the battlefield. The same detachments operated at that time on the Voronezh Front.

On July 28, 1942, as already noted, Order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. was issued. Stalin, which became a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. On September 28, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko signed order No. 298, which announced staff No. 04/391 of a separate barrage detachment of the active army.

Barrier detachments were primarily created on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. At the end of July 1942, I.V. Stalin received a report that the 184th and 192nd rifle divisions of the 62nd Army had abandoned the village of Mayorovsky, and the troops of the 21st Army had abandoned Kletskaya. On July 31, the commander of the Stalingrad Front V.N. Directive No. 170542 of the Supreme Command Headquarters, signed by I.V., was sent to Gordov. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky, who demanded: “Within two days, form barrage detachments of up to 200 people each, using the best composition of the Far Eastern divisions that arrived at the front, which should be placed in the immediate rear and, above all, behind the divisions of the 62nd and 64th armies. The barrage detachments shall be subordinated to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. Place the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments.” The next day, General V.N. Gordov signed order No. 00162/op on the creation within two days of five barrage detachments in the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies, and in the 1st and 4th th tank armies - three defensive ones. At the same time, it was ordered to restore barrage battalions in each rifle division within two days, formed according to the Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 01919. By mid-October 1942, 16 barrage detachments were formed on the Stalingrad Front, and 25 on the Don, subordinate to special departments of the NKVD armies.

On October 1, 1942, Chief of the General Staff Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky sent directive No. 157338 to the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, which spoke about the poor organization of the service of the barrier detachments and their use not for their intended purpose, but for conducting combat operations.

During the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), barrage detachments and battalions on the Stalingrad, Don and South-Eastern fronts detained military personnel fleeing the battlefield. From August 1 to October 15, 140,755 people were detained, of whom 3,980 were arrested, 1,189 were shot, 2,776 were sent to penal companies and 185 penal battalions, and 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

Commander of the Don Front, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, according to the report of the special department of the front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated October 30, 1942, proposed using barrier detachments to influence the infantry of the unsuccessfully advancing 66th Army. Rokossovsky believed that the barrage detachments should have followed the infantry units and forced the fighters to attack by force of arms.

Army barrage detachments and division barrage battalions were also used during the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. In a number of cases, they not only stopped those fleeing the battlefield, but also shot some of them on the spot.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Soviet soldiers and commanders showed massive heroism and self-sacrifice. This, however, does not mean that there were no cases of desertion, abandonment of the battlefield and panic. To combat these shameful phenomena, barrage formations were widely used.

In the fall of 1943, measures were taken to improve the structure of the barrage detachments. In directive 1486/2/org of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, sent on September 18 by the commander of the front forces and the 7th separate army, said:

"1. In order to strengthen the numerical strength of rifle companies, non-standard barrage detachments of rifle divisions, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 of 1941, are to be disbanded.

2. In each army, in accordance with the order of the NKO No. 227 of July 28, 1942, there must be 3-5 full-time barrage detachments according to the state No. 04/391, numbering 200 people each.

Tank armies should not have barrage detachments.”

In 1944, when the Red Army troops were successfully advancing in all directions, barrage detachments were used less and less. At the same time, in the front line they were used to the fullest. This was due to an increase in the scale of outrages, armed robberies, thefts and murders of the civilian population. To combat these phenomena, Order No. 0150 was sent to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky dated May 30, 1944

Barrage detachments were often used to solve combat missions. The incorrect use of barrage detachments was discussed in the order of the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters G.K. Zhukov on March 29, 1943 as commander of the 66th and 21st armies. In the memorandum “On the shortcomings of the activities of the front troops’ detachments,” sent on August 25, 1944 by the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A.A. Lobachev to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel General A.S. Shcherbakov, noted:

"1. The barrier detachments do not perform their direct functions established by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the barrier detachments are used to protect army headquarters, protect communication lines, roads, comb forests, etc.

2. In a number of barrier detachments, the staffing levels of the headquarters have become extremely swollen...

3. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of the barrier detachments, left them to their own devices, and reduced the role of the barrier detachments to that of ordinary commandant companies...

4. Lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most of the barrier detachments, military discipline is at a low level, people have disbanded...

Conclusion: Detachments for the most part do not carry out the tasks specified by the People's Commissar of Defense Order No. 227. Protecting headquarters, roads, communication lines, performing various household works and assignments, servicing commanders, supervising internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the function of barrier detachments of front troops.

“I consider it necessary to raise the question with the People’s Commissar of Defense about the reorganization or disbandment of the barrier detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the current situation.”

However, it was not only the use of barrage detachments to perform tasks unusual for them that was the reason for their disbandment. By the fall of 1944, the situation with military discipline in the active army had also changed. Therefore I.V. On October 29, 1944, Stalin signed order No. 0349 with the following content:

“Due to the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared.

I order:

1. Disband individual barrage detachments by November 15, 1944. The personnel of the disbanded detachments will be used to replenish rifle divisions.

The work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study” notes: “In connection with the change for the better for the Red Army after 1943, the general situation on the fronts also completely eliminated the need for the further existence of barrage detachments. Therefore, all of them were disbanded by November 20, 1944 (in accordance with the order of the USSR NKO No. 0349 of October 29, 1944).

Special forces units during the Great Patriotic War

1st volunteer partisan detachment of the Institute of Physical Culture named after. P.F. Lesgaft (1st DPO IFK named after P.F. Lesgaft) intelligence department of the Northern Front.

Formed on June 29, 1941 by the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District from students and teachers of the IFC named after. P.F. Lesgafta.

On June 23–28, 1941, at the institute’s sports base in Kavgolovo, reconnaissance commanders of the LVO briefly familiarized volunteers with small arms (machine gun, self-loading rifle) and the technique of using explosives. Classes were also conducted on the tactics of raids on “headquarters, vehicles, columns of troops and other objects.”

On June 29, 1941, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District, brigade commander P.P. Evstegneev signed secret order No. 005 on the formation of the 1st DPO (volunteer partisan detachment) numbering 254 people (some sources indicate the number of the detachment at 300 people).

The detachment was divided into 12 independent groups of 20–25 people each (later the groups began to be called detachments and received the corresponding numbering from 1 to 12), had 6 walkie-talkies.

Group (detachment) commanders:

No. 1 E.V. Mironov;

No. 2 K.P. Vlasenko;

No. 3 V.N. Zimerberg;

No. 4 M.I. Nemchinov;

No. 5 D.F. Kositsyn;

No. 6 V.M. Wenzel;

No. 7 F.M. Ermolaev;

No. 8 E.S. Bogdanov;

No. 9 V.M. Shamin;

No. 10 A.D. Seleznev;

No. 11 N.K. Ponomarev;

No. 12 I.F. Artamonov.

On June 29, 1941, all groups of the 1st DPO set off in cars along the route Leningrad - Luga - Strugi Krasnye.

The main tasks of the detachment:

“... b) Upon arrival in the specified areas, first of all, secretly locate the groups’ supply bases in the forests of the specified areas, ensuring proper storage of both food and ammunition.

c) When the enemy is detected in the areas where they are located, the groups begin active combat operations by committing minor sabotage - disabling vehicle engines and drivers with armor-piercing bullets, attacking single following vehicles and destroying them, seizing documents from messengers - messengers on motorcycles, etc. - to cause panic in the moving parts of the enemy, to force them to slow down the pace of movement at every step, especially as a result of violating road structures - bridges, gates and creating artificial obstacles - rubble, mining, burning tanks, etc.

d) When large enemy forces are detected, through local Soviet and party organizations, seek to involve the entire local population in the work - collective farmers, employees and workers, who will be used to create artificial obstacles on a large scale - rubble, wolf pits, ditches, etc.

3. Upon receiving information about the enemy and the areas of his advance, it is necessary to urgently inform the center about the areas of concentration, the number of vehicles (tanks) and the direction of the columns. Radio communication - twice a day..."

On June 30, 1941, soldiers of the 1st DPO settled in the forests in the area north and northwest of Pskov and, with the further advance of the fascist troops, remained in their rear.

Group No. 1 – Sloboda district;

Group No. 2 – area northeast of Pskov, 5 km;

Group No. 3 – Patrovo-Terekhovo district;

Group No. 4 – Maromorka district;

Group No. 5 – Voshkovo district;

Group No. 6 – Zarechye district;

Group No. 7 – Kotseritsa area;

Group No. 8 – Panfilovka district;

Group No. 9 – Pokhony district;

Group No. 10 – Ludoni region;

Group No. 11 – Chatkovitsa area;

Group No. 12 – Zapolye district.

In July–August 1941, Group No. 5 operated in the Pskov–Porkhov–Novoselye triangle.

In July–September 1941, the combat groups of the 1st DPO inflicted the following losses on the enemy (according to incomplete data):

over 40 attacks were carried out on columns of tanks, armored vehicles, motorized infantry, convoys, airfields and enemy garrisons;

over 150 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed, 1 tank, 17 trucks, 3 passenger cars, 16 motorcycles, 1 handcar, 2 ammunition depots were blown up (one of them with 6.5 thousand shells), 5 bridges, 5 were derailed trains with manpower, equipment and ammunition, 4 tanks, 1 armored personnel carrier, 2 passenger cars were destroyed, 3 soldiers were captured (handed over to the headquarters of the 41st Corps);

Numerous blockages have been created on the roads, telephone and telegraph communications and the railway track have been damaged in many places;

a group of 200 fighters from the 4th People's Militia Division and the 519th Civil Aviation Regiment (howitzer-artillery regiment) was withdrawn from encirclement;

Valuable intelligence data was transferred to the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Northern Front (from August 23 of the Leningrad Front) (until July 16, regular radio communication was carried out with 6 groups, on July 21, radio communication was regularly maintained with one group, and through delegates, personal contact was established with two groups).

According to incomplete data, the losses of the combat groups of the 1st DPO amounted to 56 people killed and missing, 3 people captured.

On July 2, 1941, the intelligence department of the Northern Front sent the 2nd DPO (53 people) to the southwestern regions of the Leningrad region, and on July 10 - the 3rd DPO (100 people), a significant part of the personnel of which were students and teachers of the Institute. Lesgafta. There is no data on the actions of these units.

By the end of September 1941, most of the groups of the 1st DPO left the front line due to heavy losses. The remaining fighters were used by the Leningrad Front RO for reconnaissance and sabotage in small groups or joined army units.

2nd special brigade of the reconnaissance department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front

One of the first long-term raids on enemy rear lines was carried out by the 2nd Special Brigade. When it appeared in the Velikiye Luki region in January 1942, the Nazis decided that several strong partisan detachments were operating there. But it was one raiding brigade, formed in September 1941, in the midst of the retreat of Soviet troops, on the initiative of the chief of staff of the Northwestern Front N.F. Vatutin and the head of the intelligence department of the front headquarters K.N. Derevianko. The brigade commander was Major Alexey Litvinenko, the assistant was a career intelligence officer, senior lieutenant Alexander German. They met people emerging from encirclement, checked them, selecting fighters for themselves. They were trained by Senior Lieutenant Belash, Chief of Staff of the 2nd Special Forces. The head of communications was Lieutenant Klimanov, the detachment commanders were Lieutenants Tarasyuk and Zagorodnyuk. The headquarters was located in Ostashkovo, Kalinin region. The partisan detachments of the nearest areas were placed at the disposal of the brigade.

In October 1941, the 2nd Special Brigade was sent behind the front line and by November 7 reached the Penovsky district (Kalinin region). The brigade did not set up forest camps; the partisans stopped for the night in villages, having previously knocked out the Germans from them. Soon the brigade was joined by a detachment named after Chkalov, where there were about a hundred soldiers who were surrounded.

Until the end of 1941, the brigade raided the Kalinin and Leningrad regions. The partisans destroyed bridges, weapons depots, posts, and committed sabotage on railways.

“During October - December 1941, it destroyed about 1 thousand people. enemy, captured 39 of his soldiers and officers, destroyed over 50 trucks, 39 motorcycles, 3 ammunition warehouses, 2 fuel warehouses.”

In addition to battles and raids on enemy garrisons, the partisans were engaged in reconnaissance, monitored the movements of troops, reported the situation in the area to the front headquarters and gave recommendations on the organization of reconnaissance, reported information on traitors, and sometimes carried out trials and reprisals themselves. They reported information about the fascist defense along the banks of the Lovat, Volga and Western Dvina rivers.

A warehouse of shells with toxic substances was discovered near the city of Kholm. During the raid, local underground party organizations and partisan detachments came under the command of the brigade.

After the liberation of the Ostashkovsky district, the brigade again went behind the front line, this time to the area of ​​the Novosokolniki railway station. She struck at Art. Nasva on the Novosokolniki - Dno section in the Pskov region, then - at Maevo station on the Riga - Moscow line. At this time, the brigade consisted of about 350 partisans, divided into mounted, ski and fire groups. The Nazis took it for a cavalry corps.

In February 1942, the 2nd special unit operated in the German rear in the Kalinin region. Among the daring exploits of the partisans was such as holding a solemn parade in honor of Red Army Day on February 23, 1942 in the village of Churilovo, when 300 brigade soldiers solemnly marched in front of the assembled peasants. And the enemy was in a neighboring village, but the road was such that the Germans were never able to reach the partisans.

However, the punishers soon pinned them down. The headquarters of the security forces of the German Army Group North sent several regiments against the brigade. The partisans, who by that time had almost no ammunition and medicine, evaded the fighting and left, the Nazis followed them, and on the heels of the Nazis was one of the detachments of the 2nd brigade, which had previously completed a special task. Now they were looking for their own and decided that the easiest way to find them would be to follow the punishers.

On March 3, the brigade fought its last major battle, and at the end of March crossed the front line. For this raid, Major Litvinenko was awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was recalled to the active army and reached Berlin. He celebrated the victory as the commander of the 20th Guards Mechanized Brigade.

The chief of staff of the brigade, Alexander Viktorovich German, remained with the partisans - on the basis of the 2nd Special Brigade, the 3rd Leningrad Partisan Brigade was formed, German became its commander, and died in battle in 1943. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (1944).

3rd Special Purpose Regiment of the Intelligence Department of the Northern Front Headquarters

Commander: Makovkin I.A., captain.

He acted on the communications of the 4th Tank Group - the Plyussa - Lyady highway and other communication routes west of Luga (Leningrad Region).

88th separate rifle brigade (88th OSB).

It began to be created in mid-1941 for reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind Japanese troops.

The brigade was formed on the basis of two special camps: Northern, or camp “A”, located near the city of Voroshilov (now the city of Ussuriysk, Primorsky Territory), and Southern, or camp “B”, located on the outskirts of the city of Kerki (Turkmenistan), where interned Chinese and Korean communists, active participants in the guerrilla movement against the Japanese occupiers in Northeast China. The brigade's personnel were also recruited from Soviet citizens of Chinese and Korean origin from various regions of the Soviet Union, Russians and representatives of national minorities.

By mid-1942, one unit of the 88th OSB was formed in the Southern camp. It consisted of three separate rifle battalions, a separate sapper company, a separate anti-tank rifle company, a separate auto delivery company, one mortar and two artillery battalions, a separate reconnaissance company, a separate communications battalion, a separate machine gun company, a separate air defense platoon, a separate NKVD platoon, a medical sanitary company, field postal station and unit control.

At the same time, another part of the 88th OSB was formed in the Northern camp. The combat composition of this unit consisted of a headquarters and administration, a political department, four separate rifle battalions, a separate company, a battalion of machine gunners, a separate artillery battalion, a separate reconnaissance company, a separate communications battalion, a separate sapper company, a separate auto delivery company, rear services and a military prosecutor's office.

All combat training of the unit was aimed at practicing the tasks of preparing small reconnaissance and sabotage detachments for operations in the Japanese rear. Soldiers and commanders systematically carried out forced marches, parachute jumps, and studied radio communications and demolition. During almost the entire Great Patriotic War, the personnel of the 88th OSB, based on two camps - Southern and Northern - were actively preparing to participate in the fight against the Japanese occupiers. However, for a number of objective reasons of a political nature, the 88th OSB was not involved in hostilities.

In October 1945, the brigade was disbanded.

For political purposes, a group of Chinese consisting of 378 people was sent from the disbanded brigade to Manchuria. Another group consisting of Koreans, led by the former commander of the 1st battalion of the brigade (North Camp) Jing Zhicheng (aka Kim Il Sung, the future leader of the DPRK) was sent to North Korea for the same purposes.

In 1946, with the outbreak of the Third Civil War in China, almost the entire Chinese composition of the former 88th RSF returned to their homeland and took an active part in the battles against the Kuomintang. Together with them, the Korean brigade departed to Manchuria, and later, with the formation of the DPRK, to Korea.

9903rd military unit of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front.

In reconnaissance and sabotage work on the Western Front, a special unit “military unit 9903” (later the 3rd (sabotage) department of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters), formed in June 1941, played a huge role. Then it was a small group of seven commanders: the head was Colonel A.E. Svirin, comrade-in-arms of Y.K. Berzina, a participant in the war in Spain, Major A.K. Sprogis, captain A.Ya. Azarov, senior lieutenants I.N. Banov, F.I. Kovalenko, I.I. Matusevich, A.K. Shrew. The command staff of the unit was staffed by students of military academies. The unit was supposed to engage in active reconnaissance, sabotage - explosions on railways and highways, destruction of bridges, warehouses, communications, and the creation of partisan detachments.

It was difficult to work. In the chaos of the retreat, there was no point in even thinking about maintaining stable contact with the sabotage groups - they had to be released “in a free search.” There was no experience of reconnaissance work behind enemy lines. In the summer, several groups were prepared and sent to the German rear, but contact was maintained with only three.

At the end of August 1941, Major Sprogis was appointed commander of the unit, and regimental commissar N.D. was appointed military commissar. Dronov. They managed to restructure the work. First of all, the problem of personnel was solved by recruiting Komsomol volunteers from Moscow and the Moscow region. About three thousand people went through the selection commission, of which two thirds were enrolled in the unit.

During the Battle of Moscow and the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops, military unit 9903 trained more than 45 combat units for operations in the German rear. In total, during this time, 86 trips to the German rear were made, some groups went behind the front line two or three times. In September 1941, 8 exits took place, in October - 11, in November - 36, in December - 14, in January and February 1942 - 17.

In the fall of 1941, four special forces units, each consisting of 100–120 people, also operated in the German rear.

Particularly distinguished were the groups of Mikhail Ostashev, operating in the Dorogobuzh region, Grigory Sizakov and Matvey Gusakov in the Mogilev region, Korneev in the Gomel region, Ilya Shary in the Kalinkovichi region, Boris Krainov in the Polotsk region, Fyodor Morozov in the Glusk region. These groups derailed an average of 10–12 enemy trains and helped local partisans.

Operations center under the command of I.F. Topkin, who operated in the Brest region, united around himself and led the activities of several partisan detachments. Some groups themselves became detachments. And Grigory Sazonov’s group became a partisan brigade with several hundred people.

After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, military unit 9903 began to engage in slightly different activities - it trained groups of 10-12 people, usually equipped with radio communications, which were transferred by plane to deep behind enemy lines. In August–September 1942, four operational centers of 35 people each were prepared and sent to the German rear.

In December 1942, unit 9903 was transferred to the disposal of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, and in the summer of 1943, several groups and detachments again came under the control of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front.

For heroism shown behind enemy lines, Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, Lela Kolesova, Ivan Banov, Grigory Linkov, Nikita Dronov were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, about 500 people were awarded orders and medals.

"Arap" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Deployed behind enemy lines in April 1944.

"Arthur" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Baltic Front

Landed in September 1944 on the territory of East Prussia.

"Ataman" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Baltic Front

The group commander is captain Fedor Filimonovich Konnik.

Number of people: 9 people.

"Boris" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander: Boris Grigorievich Emchenko, captain.

Number of people: 7 people.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in the summer of 1942.

It operated in the area of ​​the city of Luga, the Warsaw railway and the Kyiv highway (Leningrad region).

She stayed in the occupied territory for over a hundred days.

"Brook" - operational intelligence center

In the summer of 1943, an operational intelligence center of the Intelligence Directorate was created, headed by A.P. Brinsky (“Brook”), operating in the area of ​​​​the cities of Kovel and Kamenets-Podolsky. An extensive intelligence network was formed here, which regularly sent valuable information to the Center about the groupings of German troops and their transfers. Brinsky's information was important, for example, for the planning and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation of 1944. Here are just some of the messages he sent to the Center:

“11/15/43. From Korosten to Shepetovka, the Nazis are transferring one infantry regiment from the 339th Infantry Division... Brook.”

“7.12.43. During December 5–7 this year. The 24th Division was transferred by rail from Rovno to Kovel. During this time, 189 tanks, more than 180 guns, 426 trucks and cars, and about 70 motorcycles were transported. 182 carriages with personnel were noted... Brook.”

"1.2.44. Tank and motorized units are being transferred along the highway from Kolka to Vladimir-Volynsky. In Lutsk, a large concentration of enemy troops was noted, which are expected to be transferred to the Vladimir-Volynsky area. The movement of troops along the Rivne-Kovel railway stopped... Brook.”

Vasilyeva Yu.V. reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Northern Front

In July - August 1941, it operated in the Tsapelka - Dvorki - Podborovye area of ​​the Leningrad region.

In August 1941, as a result of an ambush on a highway organized by the detachment's fighters, the commander of the SS police division, Police General Mühlerstedt, was killed.

In October 1941, she continued to be behind enemy lines.

"Vol" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Sergeant Major Valuev Pavel Mikhailovich.

"Voronkin" - reconnaissance and sabotage group

Landed behind enemy lines in August 1944 on Polish territory.

"Groza" - reconnaissance and sabotage group

The group commander is Sergeant Major Vasily Semenovich Korotkov.

Number of people: 13 people.

"Jack" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Number of people: 10 people.

Commanders: Captain Krylatykh Pavel Andreevich (“Jack”) - died on July 30, 1944; Lieutenant Shpakov Nikolai Andreevich ("Hedgehog") - died in September 1944, foreman Melnikov Ivan Ivanovich ("Mole") - was removed by order of the Center from command of the group due to his inability to read topographic maps, from November 13, 1944, Lieutenant Morzhin ( "Gladiator") - sent from behind the front line.

Tasks of the group: “Jack” was instructed to monitor railways and highways, establish the level of transport capacity, determine the state of communication lines, their saturation and branching, identify the presence of fortified enemy defensive lines, the number of garrisons and their weapons, detect aircraft concentration areas, equipment, warehouses and headquarters of the German troops, reveal the enemy’s preparations for the use of chemical weapons, as well as find out his plans for further combat operations, analyze the mood of the local population and the level of discipline in military units.

Area of ​​activity: rear of the East Prussian group of enemy forces. And to be absolutely precise, the area where Adolf Hitler’s “Wolf’s Lair” headquarters was located at that time.

Landed behind the front line on the night of June 26-27, 1944 in the area of ​​the Koeningsberg-Tilsit (now Sovetsk) highway.

In mid-November 1944, she received permission from the Center to enter Poland. On December 27, 1944, "Jack" was surrounded and almost completely destroyed. In fact, the group ceased to exist as an independent unit. At the end of January 1945, only two scouts from the “Jack” group were able to reach the Soviet rear.

Sabotage and reconnaissance companies (DRR) of the 24th Army of the Reserve Front

Formed by order of the army commander, Major General K.I. Rakutin dated July 28, 1941.

The main tasks of the DRR:

sabotage and reconnaissance activities behind enemy lines;

assistance to army units in combat operations.

Sabotage and reconnaissance companies were formed from among volunteers of the 19th, 120th, 103rd, 106th, 105th divisions of the 24th Army. The composition of the companies was 120–150 people, armed with machine guns or self-loading rifles, light machine guns at the rate of one per three people, grenades, signal flares, two or three rounds of ammunition, dry rations designed for a couple of days.

The combat activities of the DRR began simultaneously with the Elninsky offensive operation of the troops of the 24th Army of the Reserve Front (August 30 - September 8, 1941).

During the attack on the city of Yelnya, the actions of the DRR were highly praised by the command of the divisions and the 24th Army. During the battle for height 251.1, in the area of ​​​​the villages of Dubovezhye and Vyazovka, reconnaissance saboteurs in a captured German armored vehicle burst into the enemy’s location, where they set fire to four enemy tanks with combustible bottles. A daring raid by reconnaissance saboteurs contributed to the capture of an important height by Soviet troops.

In turn, the commander of the Reserve Front, Army General G.K. Zhukov repeatedly pointed out to the command of the 24th Army the enemy’s poor reconnaissance during the offensive.

"Doc" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group size is 8 people.

Landed on October 13 (according to other sources), October 24, 1944 in the Insterburg area. All members of the group are missing.

"Iskra" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Group commander - ml. Lieutenant Gushchin Konstantin Ivanovich.

Number of people: 7 people.

"Kashtan" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Group commander - Art. Lieutenant Misnik Nikolai Martynovich.

Number of people: 11 people.

Kivshika I.F. - reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Northern and Leningrad fronts

Commander - Kivshik I.F., lieutenant.

Number of people: 250 people.

From a message from the Sovinformburo dated August 12, 1941: “The partisan detachment under the command of Comrade. Kivshika tracked down and captured two enemy tanks that had lagged behind his unit, and destroyed 7 German motorcyclists.”

In July–August 1941 he operated on the Gdov–Slantsy road in the Leningrad region.

In August 1941 he returned to the Soviet rear.

The detachment was withdrawn from the front line for the second time in September 1941. Main task: to discover the headquarters of Major General Andrei Nikitich Astanin; commander of the Southern Operational Group, which was surrounded. Kivshik’s group complied with the command’s order. The headquarters was provided with radio communications, and possible routes to escape the encirclement were reported.

"Klen" - reconnaissance group (later operational center "Onegin") of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Commander – Shorokhov N.P.

"Klen" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 2nd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Sergeant Major Konstantin Aleksandrovich Tsepkov.

Number of people: 11 people.

"Fang" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is captain Nikolai Ivanovich Petrov.

Number of people: 7 people.

"Cross" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Major Mikhail Ivanovich Mednikov.

Number of people: 9 people.

"Los" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Group commander - Art. Lieutenant Ugarov Ivan Trofimovich.

Number of people: 11 people.

"Lvov" - reconnaissance and sabotage group

Deployed behind enemy lines in April 1944 on Polish territory.

"Leonid" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Commander – Lesnikovsky S.F.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in the summer of 1944.

"Maxim" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Commander - Major Vladimir Ivanovich Maksimov.

Number of people: 20 people.

The area of ​​deployment is East Prussia.

Only five people returned from the mission.

Medvedev reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the reconnaissance department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander – Sergey Andreevich Medvedev, associate professor.

The number of members of the unit is 29 people. It was staffed by students of the Leningrad Mining Institute. All fighters had practical experience in drilling and blasting operations during training practice. Unlike most similar units that were withdrawn behind enemy lines in the first months of the war, about a month was spent on special training for the fighters of this unit.

In September - October 1941 he operated in the Luga and Tosnensky districts of the Leningrad region.

In October 1941, an ambush destroyed a headquarters convoy and killed a Wehrmacht colonel. Documents were confiscated from him containing data on “the situation of the Nazi troops (18th Army of the Wehrmacht. – Note auto.), their composition and grouping on a huge front from Moscow to Leningrad. Tables of call signs of associations, formations and other documents were no less valuable.”

The detachment was withdrawn to the Soviet rear in December 1941.

"Michigan" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Baltic Front

It was withdrawn into the territory of East Prussia behind enemy lines in September 1944.

“Moroz” is a reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

Group commander - Art. Lieutenant Pavlov Joseph Artemyevich.

Landed on the night of July 25, 1944 at 02.30 near the village of Rosenwalde with 14 people. The main task - to establish contact with the station located in the occupied territory - was completed.

"Moroz" - reconnaissance and sabotage group

Commander: Tarasov A.F..

“Morskaya” - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 2nd Baltic Front

Commander - Rosenblum Sh.P..

"Neman" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Group commander - ml. political instructor Pavel Petrovich Nikiforov.

Number of people: 10 people.

"Ovin" - reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 4th Belorussian Front

Commander - Bratchikov Gennady Ivanovich (“Gadfly”), major.

Operated in the rear of the 2nd German Army.

"Om" - reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Commander – Skripka I.I.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in the summer of 1944.

Omega - Operations Center

Since January 1943, in the detachment N.P. Fedorov, the operational center of military intelligence "Omega" began to operate. He controlled the areas of Pripyat, Kyiv, Piryatin, Bakhmach and promptly sent information to Moscow about the groupings of German troops in these areas.

It was his intelligence officers who operated in the Minsk region on the basis of the special military intelligence detachment “Dima” under the command of D.I. Keimakh, participated in the liquidation of the General Commissioner of Belarus, Wilhelm Kube, in Minsk in 1943. The direct executors of the action are E.G. Mazanik, who worked as a servant in the Kube house, and M.B. Osipova, who handed her the mine. The mine was placed under the mattress of the Gauleiter's bed, and at 2:20 a.m. on September 22, 1943, Kube was killed. For this feat, Mazanik and Osipova were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and Fedorov was awarded the Order of Lenin.

After this operation, Fedorov was sent to Rovno with the task of destroying the Reich Commissioner of Ukraine Koch. However, the operation did not take place. Then Fedorov led a special forces detachment in the Kovel region, where, in cooperation with other partisan detachments, he established control over the railway lines. (In 1943, partisan detachments controlled such railway junctions in Ukraine and Belarus as Luninets, Zdolbunov, Korosten, Kovel, Brest, Sarny.) His people not only sent important information to the Center, but also committed numerous acts of sabotage behind enemy lines.

In 1944, Fedorov’s detachment crossed the Western Bug and reached the Lublin region, where, having established contact with Polish partisans, they began to carry out sabotage on railways and highways. April 17, 1944 N.P. Fedorov died in battle. On November 21, 1944, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

"Orion" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Baltic Front

Commander - Captain Denisov Vladimir.

Number of people: 10 people.

In September 1944 it operated in East Prussia.

Only three remained alive.

Special detachment of the reconnaissance department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander – Usmanov A.M.

Sent to enemy lines on September 9, 1941. He was behind the front line for 30 days.

Separate mountain rifle detachments (OGSO) of the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front

They began to form in August 1942 by order of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Army General I.V. Tyuleneva.

The formation of the detachments was entrusted to the commander of the 46th Army, Lieutenant General K.N. Leselidze. Since August 15, 1942, formations and units of the army fought defensive battles to hold the passes in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range.

The personnel of the OGSO were recruited from volunteers of reserve units and internal troops of the NKVD. Each detachment had experienced climber-instructors. Specially armed and equipped detachments consisting of a company-battalion (50–150 people) were intended to conduct combat operations in isolation from the main forces in the most difficult areas in the mountains.

By the end of 1942, 12 OGSOs were formed in the 46th Army. During the same period, in accordance with the order of the USSR NCO, a large number of climbers were recalled from the units where they served and sent to the disposal of the Transcaucasian Front. Work to send climbers to the Caucasus was also carried out by the All-Union Committee for Physical Education and Sports and the Moscow NKVD Troops Station (1st NKVD Regiment). In total, more than 200 highly qualified climbers were concentrated in the Caucasus. The climbers were used by the command to organize and conduct mountain training in mountain rifle units, and worked as instructors in the school of military mountaineering and skiing created on the Transcaucasian Front. They participated in the development of special instructions on warfare in the mountains, compiling reference books and memos about the natural dangers of the mountains. They were entrusted with the organization and control of the security service against avalanches and rockfalls in the area where the troops were located. Climbers were used by the command as terrain consultants when planning combat operations in the mountains. They took a personal part in these operations (as part of the OGSO or in individual mountaineering groups), conducted ground and air reconnaissance in the mountains, participated in the evacuation of the population of Nalchik and mountain villages, and in the transfer of troops through the Donguz-Orun and Becho passes in the winter of 1942/43 .

Since December 1942, OGSO took part in special operations in Klukhor (Klukhor pass), Elbrus (southern slopes of Mount Elbrus, Khotyu-Tau, Chiper-Azau passes), Marukh (Marukhsky pass), Sanchar (group of Sanchar passes), Umpyr (passes Umpyrsky, Aishkha, Pseashkha) and Belorechensky (Belorechensky pass) directions in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range.

In the period January 5–12, 1943, fearing encirclement due to the successful offensive of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, the enemy began to leave the passes of the Main Caucasus Range and fight to withdraw its units in the Khadyzh-Apsheron direction.

At the end of January - beginning of February 1943, most of the OGSO were transformed into separate battalions of machine gunners, which became part of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front.

Special Forces Detachment No. 1 of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters

Commander - Nikita Vasilievich Radtsev, senior political instructor.

Squad structure:

headquarters (8 people):

chief of staff;

military paramedic;

medical instructor;

two radio operators;

Five platoons (including reconnaissance and sapper).

The number of the detachment is 115 people.

Formed on the basis of the 273rd airfield service battalion of the 20th air base area.

It was first deployed behind the front line on September 10, 1941, north of the city of Andreapol near the village of Moscow, Kalinin Region.

During October and until November 10, 1941, the detachment carried out missions in the areas of Toropovets - Andreapol - Kholm - Velikiye Luki (the junction of the Novgorod and Kalinin regions).

The second time behind the front line was in November - December 1941 (Istra - Novopetrovskoye region, Moscow region).

Special Forces Detachment No. 2 of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters

Commander - Shevchenko Alexander Iosifovich, captain.

Squad structure:

headquarters (8 people):

chief of staff;

military paramedic;

medical instructor;

four radio operators;

The number of the detachment is 93 people.

Manned by soldiers of the 57th Tank Division.

Place of deployment of the detachment: north-west of the Smolensk region.

From December 12 to 18, 1941, the detachment was behind the front line for the second time, now in the Novopetrovsk area (Moscow region).

Special Forces Detachment No. 3 of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters

Commander - Andrey Alekseevich Alekseev, captain.

Squad structure:

headquarters (8 people):

chief of staff;

military paramedic;

medical instructor;

four radio operators;

Three platoons. Each platoon has three sections of 9 people.

The total number of the detachment is 94 military personnel (7 officers and 87 privates).

The detachment was formed in the Uvarovka area from personnel of the 17th Tank Division.

He was withdrawn behind enemy lines on October 4, 1941, near the city of Bely. He returned to the Soviet rear on December 20, 1941.

Special Forces Detachment No. 4 of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters

Commander – Khudyakov Pavel Nikolaevich, captain.

The total number of the detachment is about 100 people.

Formed in August 1941 in Yukhnov from the ground personnel of the bomber regiment, which suffered significant losses, and some other units.

The task of the detachment: “Cross the front line and march to the area of ​​Velikie Luki, Kholm, Toropets, where to begin carrying out combat missions in cooperation with local partisans.”

The detachment returned to the Soviet rear in the second half of November 1942.

“Sergey” – reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Commander – Petrov I.P.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in the summer of 1944.

Svetov reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander - Svetov.

Skorodumov reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander - Skorodumov.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in September 1941.

"Spartak" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Karelian Front

Commander – Nazarov V.V.

"Falcon" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Sergei Yakovlevich Prokhorov.

Number of people: 8 people.

Special battalion of miners of the 56th Army of the Southern Front

Formed in January 1942 for reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines in the defense zone of the 56th Army.

The initiator of the creation of the special battalion was the head of the operational engineering group (OIG) of the Southern Front, Colonel I.G. Starinov.

Commander of the special battalion - Art. Lieutenant N.I. Moklyakov.

The unit was formed from JIU volunteers and the 26th Brigade of the 8th Engineer Army. The total strength of the battalion is 500 people, of which 26 people. - Spanish internationalists, participants in the Spanish Civil War (at the insistence of Starinov, the Spaniards pretended to be Uzbeks). The battalion units were stationed in the city of Yeisk, the settlements of Shabelskoye and Port Katon.

In February - March 1942, fighters of the special battalion (combat groups of sailors of the Azov military flotilla took part in some operations) made 110 forays behind enemy lines (the northern shore of the Taganrog Bay); laid 744 mines on enemy communications; killed over 100 soldiers and officers; 56 vehicles and 2 tanks were disabled; 74 telegraph poles, 2 bridges, 2 barges and 4 searchlight installations were blown up.

As a result of the actions of the special battalion, an important communication line between Mariupol and Rostov-on-Don was disabled. The enemy was forced to deploy two infantry divisions on the northern coast of Taganrog Bay to defend their rear areas.

In the second half of March 1942, the special battalion was disbanded.

Tatarinova I.V. reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Northern Front

Deployed behind enemy lines in July 1941.

"Steel" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Sergeant Major Ignatov Semyon Konstantinovich.

Number of people: 4 people.

"Tiger" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is captain Radyuk Alexander Ivanovich.

Number of people: 9 people.

Tretyakova N.A. reconnaissance and sabotage group of intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Northern and Leningrad fronts

Commander - Tretyakov Nikolai Aleksandrovich, sergeant.

It was deployed behind enemy lines for the first time in early August 1941. She was parachuted from the wing of an R-5 aircraft north and east of Lake Syaberskoye.

At the end of September 1941, she was parachuted behind enemy lines in the Vyritsa area (Leningrad region).

"Ural" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Vladimir Nikolaevich Dokshin.

Number of people: 10 people.

"Charon" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the 1st Baltic Front

The group commander is foreman Matvey Tikhonovich Shiryaev.

Number of people: 11 people.

"Chaika" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in August 1942. It operated in the occupied territory of Belarus until 1944.

"Yuri" - raid detachment of the reconnaissance department of the Northern Front headquarters

Commander – V.S. Znamensky, captain.

From a message from the Sovinformburo dated August 12, 1941: “The partisan detachment under the command of Comrade. Znamensky made a bold raid on the headquarters of the fascist unit. The detachment's soldiers destroyed an enemy tank, 5 soldiers and 4 officers and captured 2 staff vehicles. In the village of M., the partisans killed 20 German soldiers and captured two trucks and two heavy machine guns.”

He was withdrawn to the Soviet rear in August 1941.