Hanko Peninsula in WWII. Defense of the Hanko Peninsula from the Finns

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With the beginning of the war, the Hanko base (commander of the base garrison, Major General (from September 16, Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service) S.I. Kabanov, military commissar, brigade commissar A.L. Raskin) was tasked with defending and repelling enemy attacks to ensure free action Baltic Fleet in the area.

To repel sea and airborne assaults, the base territory was divided into two combat areas controlled by maneuver groups of ground forces. The ground defense of the base consisted of a system of obstacles on the border of the leased zone, two equipped defensive lines and two lines of direct defense of the city of Hanko itself, one of which was facing the sea and was actually an anti-landing defense line.

The size of the base territory excluded the possibility of achieving sufficient depth of the entire defensive system, but made it possible to create a significant defense density. The total garrison strength of the base was 25,300 people, and there were also about 4,500 Soviet civilians on Hanko.

At the beginning of the war, the 8th Infantry Brigade was located on the peninsula under the command of Colonel N.P. Simonyak: 270th and 335th Infantry Regiments of 2,700 soldiers each, 343rd Artillery Regiment (36 guns), 297th Tank Battalion (33 T-26 tanks and 11 tankettes), 204th anti-aircraft artillery division, engineer battalion, communications battalion. The coastal defense sector had 2 railway artillery batteries (3 super-heavy guns TM-3-12 of 305 mm caliber and 4 heavy guns TM-1-180 of 180 mm caliber), 10 stationary batteries (after the start of the war their number increased to 15) with guns of from 45 to 130 mm, 10 auxiliary boats. The air defense of the base was carried out by the air defense sector: 3 anti-aircraft artillery divisions (12 76-mm batteries, which included 48 guns), 2 anti-aircraft machine gun companies (26 machine guns), 2 searchlight companies.

In addition, there were construction units on Hanko - 4 construction battalions, 1 engineering battalion, 1 road restoration battalion, 1 engineer battalion, 1 separate construction company. There were a significant number of small units: the 8th border detachment of the NKVD of the Baltic border district, a maritime border detachment (4 “small hunter” boats), the 81st separate seaplane squadron (9 MBR-2 seaplanes, 3 towing boats), a commandant’s office with a subordinate separate local rifle company, military railway administration with subordinate railway battalions, 2 hospitals.

Hostilities

The first days of the war

In the Baltic, to support Army Group North and actions against the Soviet Baltic Fleet, the German command allocated about 100 ships, including 28 torpedo boats, 10 minelayers, 5 submarines, patrol ships and minesweepers.

Events in Hanko began to unfold immediately after the start of Barbarossa. On the evening of June 21, a signal from the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy N.G. Kuznetsov was received at Hanko, after which all units were immediately withdrawn from the barracks to defensive positions, anti-aircraft units were prepared to repel an air attack, ship patrols were sent out to sea, and a complete blackout was carried out. From June 22 to June 25, before Finland entered the war, Germany fought against Hanko. Its air force bombed Hanko on the evening of June 22 at 22:30 (20 aircraft took part in the raid) and in the afternoon of June 23 (30 aircraft), while the Finns only watched what was happening from the side. During the period of the so-called “three-day neutrality” of Finland (June 22-25), the German naval forces around Hanko were similarly active. Both detachments of German torpedo boats plied the waters of the Gulf of Finland every night, completely disregarding the diplomatic position of Finland.

The defense of the base forced the already small Finnish naval force to split in two, preventing Finnish end-to-end communications in the Gulf of Finland.

The Hanko naval base was subjected to daily enemy artillery shelling (from 2,000 to 6,000 shells exploded on its territory per day). The largest ships of the Finnish fleet - the coastal defense battleships Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen - were also involved in the shelling of the base. The base was periodically bombed by Finnish aircraft.

From the first moment of the base's existence, it was built with significant land fortifications due to its location in the territory of a potential enemy. The geographical and navigational-hydrographic features of the Hanko naval base area also determined the forms of its defense characteristic of the skerry-island position. To the extent possible, by laying minefields, the maneuver of enemy ships on the skerry fairways was constrained. The capture of 18 islands significantly strengthened the defense of the peninsula. Unsuccessful attempts at direct assaults from land forced the enemy to move on to a long-term siege of the base and to the loss of the opportunity to attack from the flanks (by that time occupied by Soviet marines). The explosion and death of the Finnish coastal defense battleship Ilmarinen at a Soviet minefield on September 13 forced the Finns to abandon shelling of the base from the sea.

The defense of Hanko was favored by the preservation of an airfield on the peninsula. Even the relatively small number of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft that the command of the naval base had at its disposal greatly contributed to the success of coastal artillery fire, landings on the islands and repelling enemy air raids. The base's aviation played an important role in the defense of Hanko. In extremely difficult conditions, it supported the actions of troops and landings, conducted reconnaissance, and attacked enemy ships, batteries and airfields. Between June 22 and August 28, the base's aircraft destroyed 24 enemy aircraft without enemy casualties in the air. One aircraft (I-153) and two pilots were lost as a result of accidents. Fighter pilots A.K. Antonenko (11 victories, including 5 personal), P.A. Brinko (over Hanko - 10 victories, including 4 personal), G.D. Tsokolaev (during the battles for Hanko - 2 personal and 4 group victories), A. Yu. Baysultanov (during the battles for Hanko - 1 personal and 2 group victories). All of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Battles on the land front in July

On July 1, the base came under its first attack from the land front line. After powerful artillery preparation, a reinforced reconnaissance detachment went on the attack (2 companies of Shutskorites, a Swedish volunteer battalion) and attacked the junction of the defense of Soviet battalions at the Lappvik station in order to clear the way for the Finnish strike force. They managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses, but after a 6-hour battle and a strike from Soviet artillery, the attackers were driven back to their original position with losses. On the same day, the Finnish half-company tried to capture the island of Krokan (garrison - 22 soldiers), but was repulsed, losing 9 killed.

On the nights of July 7 and July 8, two more strong Finnish attacks were launched on the land front. Strong Soviet artillery played a decisive role in repelling them. According to Soviet data, in the battle on July 7, Finnish losses amounted to two companies of infantry. After this, active hostilities on the land front ceased. Instead of large-scale battles, there were daily artillery duels and sniper fights (the best Soviet sniper, Red Navy man Grigory Mikhailovich Isakov, destroyed 118 enemy soldiers).

Fight for the islands

Since mid-July, the main brunt of the struggle has shifted to the numerous islands adjacent to the base. To expand the defense zone of Hanko and worsen the conditions for artillery shelling of Hanko, it was decided to capture the most important islands by landing amphibious assault forces. A battalion under the command of Captain B.M. Granin was assigned for landing operations. Landings were usually landed by the forces of one company using boats, less often - boats. After the capture, the islands were immediately fortified and garrisons were assigned to them from among the base personnel. In total, 18 islands were captured through landings, including:

Evacuation of the base

The commander of the naval base, S.I. Kabanov, at the beginning of August 1941, raised the question of the feasibility of defending Hanko with the command of the Baltic Fleet. He motivated his opinion by the fact that since the beginning of the war Hanko has in fact not been a naval base, but a garrison of a surrounded port. In addition, the task of pinning down large enemy forces at Hanko was not solved - by that time the garrison was confronted from land by one infantry regiment and several battalions of Finns. He proposed evacuating personnel and weapons to Tallinn to strengthen its defense. But then his proposal was rejected.

Defense of Hanko. Part II

The Great Patriotic War

The German command set itself the task of capturing the peninsula as quickly as possible. For this purpose, the Hanko strike group was organized in June 1941. The enemy began attacks on June 26 with powerful artillery shelling and an attempted landing. On the same day, Finnish President Risto Heikki Ryti stated that “Soviet military units on Hanko are the most important forces on land... Hanko is a gun pointed straight at the heart of Finland!”

As Sergei Ivanovich Kabanov recalled in his memoirs:

On the evening of June 24, I received a radiogram from the Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Rear Admiral Yu. A. Panteleev. He told me the order of the fleet commander: on the morning of June 25, to cover the raid of high-speed bombers of the naval air force on Turku airfields with Hanko fighters. By this time, six more planes had landed at our airfield - cannon I-16s under the command of Captain Leonovich. I ordered the chief of staff of the base to carry out the commander’s order and scramble all our fighters in the morning. The commandant of the coastal defense sector is to open artillery fire on June 25 at 8.00, that is, simultaneously with the bombing, and destroy observation towers on the islands of Morgonland and Yussaare. The anti-aircraft batteries of the air defense section of Major G. G. Mukhamedov and the batteries of the 343rd artillery regiment of the 8th brigade of Major I. O. Morozov were ordered to shoot down towers on the land border and neighboring islands, from which our every step was controlled, on the isthmus and far beyond him.

June 25th arrived. And then, at about three o’clock in the morning, I received a notification from the fleet about the start of the war with Mannerheim’s Finland. The alert was marked: 02 hours 37 minutes. Now everything is clear.

Simultaneously with the bombing, we launched an artillery strike. From Cape Uddskatan, Lieutenant Bragin's battery opened fire on the Finnish tower on the island of Morgonland. After the third salvo, the tower was shot down. At the same time, we saw and heard a large explosion: it seemed that our shells hit the ammunition depot on the island. Then it turned out that the shell actually hit a mine warehouse concentrated by the Finns in Morgonland.

At the same time, the batteries of the 30th division opened fire on the tower on the island of Yussaare. The tower collapsed and caught fire. The artillerymen, seeing that the Finns were trying to pull away the burning logs, intensified the fire and did not allow the fire to be extinguished.

Anti-aircraft gunners and artillerymen of the 8th brigade shot down all observation towers on the islands and on the border. The enemy was initially blinded.

The first battles with the Finns on Hanko took place on July 1. The Finns conducted reconnaissance in force at the front line of the Soviet defense line on the isthmus of the peninsula. After two Soviet artillery batteries opened fire on them, the Finns retreated.

On July 7, the Finns again attacked Soviet positions on the isthmus, this time with units of the 55th Infantry Regiment of the Finnish Army. This attack was also repulsed.

On July 26, a transport with ammunition and food arrived at the port of Hanko. The transport was heavily damaged by Finnish artillery fire. In August, fighting continued for the islands around the peninsula - with varying success and losses on both sides. A second line of defense was built on the peninsula, which included 90 bunkers. Construction began on the third line of defense, in the middle of the peninsula.

On August 29, a transport with a construction battalion (1,100 people) on board, as well as the gunboat Laine (armed with two 75 mm guns and machine guns) arrived at the Hanko base from the Paldiski base (captured the day before by the Germans). On September 2, the Finns again conducted reconnaissance in force on the isthmus, in small groups, but along the entire length of the front (about 3 km). This reconnaissance was repulsed by Soviet artillery fire.

Since the supply of food, ammunition, fuel and other things to the Hanko base ceased, a strict economy regime was introduced on September 1. Thus, the daily portion of meat was reduced to 33 grams per person.

On October 18, daily rations at the Hanko base were again reduced. Now it included 750 grams of bread, 23 grams of meat, 60 grams of sugar. Savings on ammunition and fuel for aircraft and cars have also increased.

On October 20-22, the remnants of Soviet troops from the Estonian island of Hiiumaa - 570 people - were evacuated to the Hanko base.

On October 25, three minesweepers and three MoD boats arrived at the Hanko base from Kronstadt. They delivered a small amount of shells for 130 mm guns, gasoline and food, as well as an order to evacuate one rifle battalion from the Hanko base. This battalion (499 people), as well as senior command personnel from among those evacuated from the island of Hiiumaa, was delivered on October 28 to the Oranienbaum bridgehead.

Finnish soldiers attacking Hanko

The number of artillery strikes on the base increased every day; on particularly fierce days, Finnish artillerymen fired up to 8,000 mines and shells. At the same time, due to the shortage, the defenders could spend no more than 100 shells per day. As feared before the war, the base found itself under crossfire. During 164 days of heroic defense, about 800 thousand mines and shells were fired at it - over 40 for each person.

In order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy fire, the command decided to capture the islands adjacent to Hanko, on which observation posts and firing positions were located. For this purpose, a landing force was formed under the command of Captain Granin Boris Mitrofanovich- an experienced officer who was awarded the Order of the Red Banner during the Finnish campaign.

“Children of Captain Granin” - that’s what the paratroopers called themselves. During the period from July to October, thanks to the competent joint actions of coastal artillery and aviation, 13 landings were carried out, which captured 19 islands. The offensive spirit of the defenders of Hanko was amazing, because, being actually deep behind enemy lines, people were eager to fight.

To strengthen the anti-landing defense near Hanko, over 350 mine-layings were carried out.

The operation to capture the lighthouse on the island was less successful. Bengster. From the island and especially from the lighthouse tower, the Finns could calmly observe the movement of our ships in the fairway of the Gulf of Finland. On July 26, a group of paratroopers from among the border guards under the command Senior Lieutenant Kurilov was landed on the island with the aim of capturing it, destroying the garrison and blowing up the lighthouse.

For this purpose, on boat MO No. 113 there was a group of guides and two depth charges, which were supposed to be used to blow up the lighthouse after the capture of the island. When preparing for the operation, the headquarters of the Hanko naval base did not take into account that the enemy, preoccupied with actions against other islands, strengthened the defense on Bengtskär. An incomplete platoon of Lieutenant Luther's rangers was transported to the island, a 20-mm anti-aircraft gun and wire barriers were installed. And while walking, the paratroopers managed to land and even capture the lower part of the lighthouse building; the course of the battle did not turn out in their favor. The landing detachment was surrounded and the last hours of Kurilov’s border guards are known mainly from Finnish documents.

Lighthouse on the island Bengster, photographed after the fight

Soviet patrol boat PK-237 type MO-2 near Hanko. The small hunter PK-237 was part of the Separate Coast Guard detachment of the Hanko Maritime Border Guard; with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, it became part of the 3rd division of patrol boats for the protection of the water area of ​​the Hanko Naval Base

Tactical and technical data of MO-2 type boats

A total of 27 boats were built from 1935 to 1936.

For the command of the Hanko naval base, this operation was a major failure - the “sea hunter” with its entire crew and the landing detachment of border guards were lost. However, operations against the islands continued.

The base's aviation also played an important role in the defense of Hanko. The pilots' task was to conduct aerial reconnaissance of enemy rear areas in the Tallinn-Helsinki-Turku-Moonsund Islands region. Fighters located on the island intercepted Finnish and German planes and stormed ground targets.

Pilot of the 13th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Lieutenant P. A. Brinko and military technician 1st rank F. A. Rubtsov at the airfield during a break between flights

The attempt to destroy the Soviet pilots was unsuccessful for the Finns, and after the battle on November 5, where they lost two of their best pilots, it was decided to stop further battles in the sky. The activity of the air group significantly weakened the air threat, forcing the enemy to stay at a considerable distance from the base.

After the capture of Tallinn by German troops, the situation on Hanko worsened. The supply of ammunition, fuel and food stopped. The approach of winter created difficulties both for the defense of the base itself and for its communication with the outside world. At the end of October, a decision was made to evacuate the garrison. The last ship left Hanko on December 2. At the base itself, all equipment and weapons were blown up. Over 22 thousand people were transported to Leningrad and neighboring cities.

By order of the People's Commissar of the Navy of December 10, 1941, the Hanko naval base was disbanded, its units were transferred to other fleet formations.

The defense of the peninsula made it possible to divert part of the Finnish troops from the attack on Leningrad, and also made it difficult for the enemy fleet to penetrate the Gulf of Finland. The defense of Hanko went down in history as an example of competent, skillful and selfless struggle in the skerry-island region. After Finland left the war in 1944, the Soviet Union refused to lease the peninsula (confirmed in the 1947 peace treaty between the USSR and Finland).

EVACUATION OF HANKO

(November 1941)

In November 1941, the Baltic Fleet carried out an operation to evacuate Hanko (Gangut), leased from Finland.

Soviet losses during 165 days of “heroic defense” amounted to 797 people killed and about 1,200 wounded; enemy losses were “huge.” Almost 28 thousand soldiers and commanders from the Hanko Peninsula and Osmussar Island were subject to evacuation.

The evacuation plan provided for two stages: in the first, several detachments of ships were to remove parts of the second echelons, logistics, equipment and food supplies, in the second - the troops of the front line of defense. Material and objects that were not subject to evacuation were to be destroyed. Due to the drowning of most of the mobilized transports during the “successful” Tallinn breakthrough and the initial absence of special ships in the fleet, they decided to carry out military transportation on warships. It was recommended to cover the journey of almost 140 miles between Gogland and Hanko in the dark, since fighter cover was not provided for the crossing.

The leadership of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the light forces detachment Vice Admiral Valentin Petrovich Drozd.

General Kabanov was responsible for covering the withdrawal of troops from defensive lines, boarding ships, and removing the garrison from Osmussar Island. A rescue squad under the command of I.G. Svyatova.

The main danger continued to be the German, Finnish and Soviet mines that littered the Gulf of Finland. German battleships continued to be a headache for our naval commanders: they devoted the fall to creating a new mine and artillery position on the approaches to Kronstadt. In total, the Baltic forces dumped more than 12 thousand mines into the sea in 1941, almost all of the reserves in their warehouses. At this time, the Germans continued to mine the middle part of the Gulf of Finland with impunity. The Tributs headquarters did not have reliable data on the mine situation; it did not organize minesweeping reconnaissance or systematic mine sweeping, lacking such an opportunity. The manual on the combat activities of minesweepers for the reliable escort of one detachment of ships required the involvement of a squad of nine basic minesweepers; only seven of them remained in the Baltic Fleet, of which only five could go to sea. The route of movement, of course, was laid through the “well-known” Yuminda barrier.

The ensuing period of storms and the appearance of ice also did not contribute to the operation.

Finnish troops did not interfere with the evacuation.

The first contingent of troops was withdrawn on October 26. A detachment of ships consisting of three minesweepers, accompanied by three MoD boats under the command of captain 3rd rank Vasily Petrovich Likholetova To save time (!) I went to Hanko without trawls.

As a result, the T-203 “Patron” was blown up and sank near Keri Island. The rest were delivered to Oranienbaum by a battalion of the 270th Infantry Regiment with light artillery. This allowed the fleet command to report to the Military Council of the Leningrad Front about readiness for the operation. On October 31, the go-ahead was received to begin the evacuation.

By this time, a detachment under the command of Admiral Drozd had been formed in Kronstadt, consisting of the destroyers “Stoyky” and “Strong”, the minelayer “Marti”, five base minesweepers, six patrol boats and three torpedo boats.

To quickly support the transitions, submarines S-9 and Shch-324 were stationed at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, and submarines S-7 were stationed in the Tallinn area. On the night of November 2, a detachment of ships in two groups began moving towards Hanko. The main forces made the transition safely and took on board 4,246 commanders and Red Army soldiers and two field artillery divisions. A group of a minesweeper, three torpedo boats and two patrol boats, which was delayed and left separately, was attacked by German planes. As a result, all torpedo boats - TKA-72, TKA-88 and TKA-102 - were sunk, and the damaged "hunter" was towed to the island of Lavansaari. Drozd's detachment arrived in Kronstadt on November 4 without losses, delivering 4,246 people.

Even before his return, a detachment of captain 2nd rank Vasily Mikhailovich Narykov began moving to Hanko, consisting of the destroyers “Surovy” and “Smetlivy”, four torpedo and four patrol boats in support of three base minesweepers. He arrived at his destination without incident, received more than 2,000 people, and on the evening of November 4 set off on his return journey. Near the island of Naisaar, the destroyer Smetlivy left the trawled strip and captured two mines at once with paravans. As a result of their explosions, the ammunition on the ship detonated and it sank, killing the commander, captain 2nd rank V.I. Maslov and about 400 officers, Red Army soldiers and Red Navy men. 80 crew members and 233 evacuees were removed from the destroyer. They were returned to Hanko on the T-205 Gafel minesweeper and three sea hunters. The remaining ships of the detachment arrived at Gogland, delivering 1263 people.

On November 9, the third detachment set off on the same route under the leadership of the commander of the battleship "October Revolution" Rear Admiral Mikhail Zakharovich Moskalenko.

The detachment included the leader "Leningrad", the destroyer "Stoikiy", the minelayer "Ural", the transport "Zhdanov", five basic minesweepers and four small "hunters".

The passage began in difficult weather conditions, the wind increased to force seven, the ships often lost sight of each other and could not follow the trawls. Two minesweepers collided, one of them was seriously damaged. The detachment commander decided to return to the roadstead of Gogland Island. On the evening of November 11, the ships again headed for Hanko, accompanied by only three minesweepers, and the largest units, the Ural and Zhdanov, did not have guard paravans.

On the night of November 11-12, the Leningrad leader captured two mines by his guard. From their explosion, the ship suffered damage to the hull and anchored. The Zhdanov transport with a displacement of 3869 tons, which was following in its wake, also stopped. Admiral Moskalenko, 65 miles short of Hanko, turned the detachment on the opposite course to assist Leningrad. At this time, the leader’s commander decided to return to the base on his own. The transport was placed in the lead, and the Leningrad, on which the gyrocompass had failed, lay in its wake. As a result, soon the Zhdanov, which did not have any means of defense, came across a mine and sank 8 minutes later; its crew was removed by a “hunter” who arrived in time.

After a night of ordeal, the surviving ships again concentrated near Gogland.

On the evening of November 13, Moskalenko’s detachment, after being reorganized, again reached Hanko. Now it consisted of the destroyers "Proud" and "Surovy", the minzag "Ural", six boats of the Ministry of Defense and four minesweepers.

Total displacement 5560 tons Diesel power 2200 l. With. Speed ​​12 knots. Dimensions: Maximum length 104 m, width 14.6 m, average depth 5.8 m. Side numbers 288 and 88.

Armament: four 100 mm cannons; four 45-mm anti-aircraft guns; two 12.7 mm machine guns; 264 mines;

Crew: Captain 1st Rank N. I. Meshchersky

The convoy was joined by submarines L-2 and M-98 en route to combat positions. Just after midnight, the minesweeper T-206 Verp was blown up abeam Cape Yuminda. While saving his crew, the MO-301 boat died in a mine. Then the submarine L-2 was blown up twice, and three people were saved from it. The flagship destroyer Surovy received heavy damage from the explosion in the paravan and had to be scuttled. Admiral Moskalenko went aboard a patrol boat guarding two minesweepers and returned to Gogland. The commander of the minelayer division, Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Iosfovich Meshchersky, took command of the remaining ships. By his order, the detachment was led by the destroyer "Proud" in providing one minesweeper. The submarine M-98 separated and went to the position area on its own. An hour later she died with her entire crew. Finally, at 3.26, the destroyer Gordy was hit by two mines and sank. As a result, on the morning of November 14, only the Ural, the T-215 minesweeper and three small “hunters” arrived at the Hanko roadstead.

The death of the third detachment of ships somewhat stimulated the mental activity of the admirals, who decided to change the route and use the northern fairway, which, although it passed close to the Finnish skerries, allowed them to go around the Yuminda barrier. Due to the low activity of enemy aircraft, shallow-draft vehicles, converted trawlers and small-tonnage vessels were involved in the evacuation. Until November 29, three detachments removed about 9,200 people, 18 T-26 tanks, 720 tons of food and 250 tons of ammunition from Hanko. At the same time, the garrison of Osmussar Island was transferred to Hanko. Of the 29 ships and vessels involved in transportation during this period, the Azimuth network minelayer and two converted minesweepers with 728 evacuees were lost to mines. About 12 thousand people remained on the peninsula.

To evacuate the last echelon of troops to Hanko, on November 30, a detachment arrived under the flag of Admiral Drozd, consisting of the destroyers Stoiky and Slavny, six minesweepers, seven patrol boats and the turbo-electric ship Joseph Stalin. The next day, the last detachment arrived under the command of Lieutenant Commander P.V. Shvetsov, which included the Volga gunboat, the Virtsaitis patrol boat, two minesweepers, two MO boats and transport No. 538. On the night of December 1-2, the withdrawal of troops from defensive positions and their embarkation on ships began. The last to leave were the covering units and sappers, who had mined roads and base facilities. The Finns did not provide any obstacles. The minesweeper "Gafel" removed the last 340 defenders from the island of Osmussar.

With the onset of darkness on June 2, Shvetsov's slow-moving ships left Hanko, taking about 3,000 people on board. The detachment reached Gogland relatively safely, having lost to mines patrol ship "Virtsaitis", from which they managed to remove people.

At 10 p.m., Drozd’s detachment left the liquidated base. The ships were loaded beyond all norms. Joseph Stalin took on board 5,589 people, 1,200 tons of food, destroyers - about 600 people each, minesweepers - 300 people or more. At two o'clock in the morning on December 3, on the approach to the island of Naissaar "Joseph Stalin" was blown up by two mines.

The ship, having lost its speed and control, began to drift in a minefield, and soon a third explosion was heard. The attempt of the destroyer "Slavny" to take the turboship in tow was unsuccessful.

In addition, a 305-mm Finnish battery from Mäkiluoto Island opened fire on the convoy. The detachment's ships removed 1,740 people from the transport and continued the transition. The people remaining on the Stalin were supposed to be removed by Svyatov’s detachment, but the rescuers, lacking minesweepers, were unable to get to the ship. The fleet commander was given bald hints that a ship with that name should not fall into the hands of the enemy, but nothing could be done, and Tributs reported that the Joseph Stalin had died as a result of heavy damage from mine explosions and detonation of ammunition. An abandoned, half-submerged turboship ran aground off the Surupi Peninsula and was captured by the enemy. According to German Admiral Friedrich Ruge, “several thousand corpses and living people” were found in the holds of the Stalin.

The Joseph Stalin liner, used as a military transport VT-521, was blown up by a mine on December 3 during the evacuation of Hanko and captured by the Germans

In total, 88 ships and vessels took part in the operation to evacuate the Hanko naval base, of which 25 were lost (including 3 destroyers, 1 patrol boat, 5 minesweepers, 2 icebreakers, 5 torpedo and 7 patrol boats), mainly due to mines . Losses during the crossing amounted to about 5,000 people, including 500 sailors. 22,822 people, 26 tanks, 14 aircraft, 72 guns, 56 mortars, 854 machine guns, about 20 thousand rifles, 1000 tons of ammunition and 1700 tons of food were delivered to Kronstadt and Leningrad. The operation is considered very “successful”.

“Despite the heavy losses,” Khozin and Zhdanov reported to Moscow, “we believe that the result exceeded all expectations.”

The 8th Rifle Brigade became part of the 23rd Army and took up defensive positions on the Karelian Isthmus.

By decision of the ground command, without any pressure from the enemy, garrisons were evacuated from the islands of the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland - Bolshoy and Maly Tyuters, Bjerke, Gogland, Sommers. About 10 thousand people were taken from them and immediately thrown into the trenches. Before the end of the evacuation from Hanko, about 400 people remained on Gogland; on December 11, they were also removed. At the same time, TKA-12 and TKA-42 were crushed by ice.

In the Oranienbaum “patch” in January, the 168th Infantry Division was added, the 2nd and 5th Marine Brigades became the 48th and 71st Infantry. The 50th Infantry Brigade was formed on the basis of the 3rd Marine Regiment.

During the evacuation of the Hanko base, 4,987 soldiers and garrison commanders were lost.

By order of the NK Navy dated December 10, 1941, the Hanko naval base was disbanded.

Results of the functioning of the Hanko base

Initial task: defense of the northern flank of the mine-artillery position at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland and defense of the base itself from sea, land and air.

· the base could not defend the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, since most of its naval and air forces were withdrawn before the start of the war and in the first days of the war. Moreover, even before the withdrawal, these forces were very limited. In addition, the German fleet did not enter the Gulf of Finland, so there was no possibility of shooting at it, or bombing or torpedoing it.

· there was practically no need to defend the base from sea, land and air, since it was practically never attacked. Finnish troops (one infantry regiment and units of border guards and militia) conducted only reconnaissance in force on the isthmus. Finnish naval forces (two coastal defense battleships) shelled the territory of the Hanko Peninsula four times in July, firing a total of 160 254 mm shells across the area, but the base’s artillery did not return fire because it did not see the targets. The Finns had practically no aviation in the area near Hanko.

The subsequent task (set on July 10, 1941): “to attract as many enemy troops as possible, with your activity to force the enemy to strengthen the group opposing Hanko.”

· this task was not completed, since the Finnish command considered that one regiment and border guards with militias were enough to block the isthmus of the Hanko Peninsula. The Finns simply could not place more than two battalions at the same time on that section of the front - there was not enough space.

· regarding “activity” - General Kabanov considered carrying out an action with the forces of a tank battalion to invade deep into Finnish territory, but considered (quite reasonably) that this would have no practical benefit.

As a result, the possession of this base did not bring any military benefit to the USSR. Only expenses. Obviously, having realized this, the leadership of the USSR after the war no longer began to operate the Hanko base, although its period of existence under the agreement with Finland of 1940 expired only in 1970.

See the beginning on the website: WWII - Battles - Defense of Hankyu. Part I

Fighting on the Peninsula

The guns of the Hanko railway batteries, in cooperation with the batteries of Osmussaar Island and the Tahkuna Peninsula, the island of Hiuma (Dago), provided reliable defense of the central mine-artillery position. Located on the main skerry fairway, the base did not allow enemy ships and vessels, mainly Finnish, to cross from the Gulf of Bothnia to the Gulf of Finland and back. Therefore, the Finns’ desire to capture Hanko as quickly as possible is understandable.

In the period from June 22 to June 29, the Finns were not active. There were flights of single aircraft that dropped bombs on the city and harbor; the damage from these bombs was minor.

On the Finnish side, explosions were heard and intensive construction of wire fences, forest debris, trenches, bunkers and pillboxes was observed.

By June 29, the Finnish army completed its concentration on the border with the USSR. On this day, an official message was received about the start of military operations by Finland. From that time on, the Finns began to conduct intensive mortar and artillery shelling of the Hanko Peninsula and nearby islands.

The enemy gradually brought his batteries into operation. He began with systematic shelling of the city, the port, the defense line of the 8th Infantry Brigade and the islands. Soon all the enemy batteries opened fire and the entire territory of the base came under fire.

As it turned out later, the enemy from different directions used 31 batteries of caliber from 76 to 203 mm against the Hanko garrison against our 17 batteries. In addition, 254-mm guns of Finnish battleships operated against the base for more than two months.

The former commander of the base, General S.I. Kabanov, recalled: “It is unbearable to fight when the rear of the base, roadstead, port, city are accessible not only to fire, but also to visual control of enemy observation posts located nearby - on islands and lighthouses. So, of course, it was impossible to select and determine the boundaries of the base. Even assuming that Finland would not fight against us, although such an assumption is unlikely, we should have thought about our flanks in the skerry area.”

The summer of 1941 was hot and dry. The forest, which covered more than four-fifths of the peninsula's territory, was burning from shelling. Thousands of soldiers, cut off from the construction of defense lines and other equally important facilities, extinguished these fires. The enemy acted insidiously: having caused a fire in a forest or city with incendiary shells, he immediately switched to shelling the burning areas with high-explosive fragmentation shells.

Each of our batteries had two observation posts. Observers sat on them around the clock, detecting enemy firing points. There were also observation posts in the divisions. As a rule, they were located on tall buildings, on specially built towers, on the tops of mighty trees. The observers were armed with binoculars and stereo scopes. All survey data were carefully recorded. A map of the coordinates of enemy batteries was created, indicating the caliber, range and rate of fire.

At the sector command post and on the batteries there were maps of individual areas of the front line. The squares marked with multi-colored pencils had conventional names. All these squares were sighted in advance. There were initial data for each goal.

The most active Finnish batteries were distributed among the SBO batteries, loaded guns were aimed at them in advance, and with the first salvo of the enemy, fire from several of our batteries instantly fell on them.

This method of suppression forced the enemy to change their firing tactics. He began to fire with 8–12 batteries simultaneously, firing no more than 2–3 salvos from each battery, without following any sequence. But by the second salvo, the SBO duty batteries were already opening fire back.

The situation on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War changed quickly. On June 29, our troops left Libau. On the same day, the Finns launched an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. On June 30, Nazi units reached the river line. Daugava and took Riga. The Baltic Fleet lost two naval bases.

As early as June 28, aerial reconnaissance established that the enemy was concentrating troops in the Västervik area on the Podvalandet Peninsula, probably for a landing on the island of Horsen.

The lack of reliable defensive fortifications, continuous fires, the small number of the garrison, the presence of enemy islands nearby and convenient crossings for its capture forced the base command to decide to remove the garrison from Horsen and transfer it to the island of Meden, which was carried out on the night of June 29-30. As it turned out later, this was a wrong decision by the base command. The island of Horsen was immediately occupied by the Finns.

The plan for ground and anti-landing defense, built on deep echeloning of defensive structures and troops operating there, was correct and ensured the rigidity of the defense and the difficulty of overcoming it by the enemy.

Its disadvantages include the small number of garrisons and the weakness of the islands' engineering equipment, which in the first period of the war did not provide not only reliable protection of these islands, but even reliable observation of the enemy. The hasty abandonment of the island of Horsen and the capture of the island of Älmholm by the Finns were the result of this lack of defense.

The base command had information that regiments of the 17th Finnish Infantry Division, as well as individual unknown units, were standing in front of its front. It was urgent to find out the composition of the enemy group; it was necessary to take prisoners. The head of reconnaissance of the 8th OSB, Captain I. I. Trusov, had already prepared a plan for conducting an reconnaissance operation, but it was not necessary to carry it out.

On the night of June 30 to July 1, the enemy attacked the base from the isthmus for the first time. After powerful artillery preparation, the enemy launched an offensive on the right flank near Lappvik station. In this place there was a junction of both roads leading deep into the peninsula - the highway and the railway.

He delivered the main blow in the sector of the 2nd battalion of the 335th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Captain Ya. S. Sukach. Having a significant superiority in forces, the enemy rushed forward, regardless of losses. But none of the Soviet soldiers flinched. The company of Lieutenant I.P. Khorkov especially distinguished himself in this battle.

The company was supported by two batteries and a machine gun company of the regiment. The attack on enemy batteries followed immediately. The shelling of our battle formations stopped, but machine-gun and machine gun fire increased. The enemy infantry, despite heavy losses, continued to fiercely attack the firing points located on the front line.

Battalion commander Ya. S. Sukach sought to destroy the advancing enemy soldiers without revealing his fire system. The commander of the platoon of 76-mm guns, Lieutenant D.F. Kozlov, was given orders to roll out one of his guns from cover and, shooting direct fire with shrapnel, hit the advancing infantry. This gun, which fired over two hundred aimed shots, was commanded by Sergeant F. Gnatenko.

After a two-hour battle, the enemy battalion, which had suffered heavy losses, began to retreat. Up to 40 of his corpses remained at the wire fence. When interviewing prisoners, it turned out that a specially equipped enemy reconnaissance detachment was supposed to break through the defenses of the defenders of the peninsula at the junction of the 2nd and 3rd battalions and capture the village and the Lappvik railway station. After this, a special group of enemy troops was supposed to enter the breakthrough with the task of breaking into the depths of the peninsula and capturing the port and city of Hanko.

The fighting on the isthmus of the peninsula lasted more than six hours. The offensive, on the success of which the enemy obviously had high hopes, completely failed. Two companies of Shyutskorites, who, despite heavy losses, managed to overcome the wire fence and wedge into our defenses, were destroyed. The captured soldiers from the Swedish volunteer battalion confirmed that their unit was part of the 17th Infantry Division of the Finnish Army.

In this defensive battle, the commander of the 335th regiment, Colonel N. S. Nikanorov, and the chief of staff of the regiment, Major S. M. Putilov, thoughtfully and clearly led the military operations. Both of them knew well the capabilities of their troops and the personal qualities of all the commanders subordinate to them, skillfully organized the interaction of units and managed them.

The enemy's plan to break through to the peninsula from land was thwarted thanks to the courage and steadfastness of Hanko's defenders. In this battle, Red Army soldiers Pyotr Sokur and Nikolai Andrienko from the 4th company of Lieutenant I.P. Khorkov distinguished themselves. Being hidden near a wire fence, they were the first to discover the advancing enemy and opened fire with rifles. The attackers, not paying attention to the secret, rushed to the wire, cut it and rushed into the depths of our defense. P. Sokur and N. Andrienko remained in the rear, both fighters held a perimeter defense in their trench. When the 4th company, reinforced by reserves, launched a counterattack, the Finns began to retreat. P. Sokur and N. Andrienko met them with grenades and fire from rifles and a captured machine gun. Moreover, they managed to capture one officer and four soldiers.

For the heroism and courage shown in the first battle, many soldiers and commanders of the 8th Separate Rifle Brigade received orders and medals. A soldier of the 4th company of the 2nd battalion of the 335th rifle regiment, P. T. Sokur, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The successful repulsion of the attack was greatly facilitated by the SBO artillery, which had pre-targeted lines on the land sector and accurately fired at the enemy.

At 04.26 on July 1, a small group of Finns, numbering up to half a company, landed on the island of Krokan under the cover of mortar fire. This small island was separated from the neighboring island on which the Finns were located by a strait twenty meters wide. There was a tiny garrison on Krokan - 22 soldiers and sergeants of the 8th rifle company of the 3rd battalion of the 335th regiment and the command of the SNiS post. It was impossible to build any fortifications on the rocky island. Hiding behind the rocks, the island’s defenders opened aimed fire at the enemy, and grenades were thrown at the enemy soldiers from above. The enemy paratroopers wavered and ran back to the water, to the boats, leaving nine dead in place.

During these days, a sniper movement began along the entire land border, which played a large role in the defense of Gangut. The best shooters of the brigade and the border guards who remained in the defense on the land sector acquired sniper rifles with optical sights. Changing positions every now and then, they successfully hunted for enemy soldiers and officers. In just one day, July 1, 22 enemy soldiers were killed by snipers. The famous Gangut sniper Grigory Isakov killed 118 enemy soldiers and officers during the defense of the base.

In the defense sector of the 270th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel N.D. Sokolov, the enemy fired artillery at the battle formations on July 3. The positions of Captain V. S. Polyakov’s battalion were subjected to the heaviest fire, but as soon as the Shyutskorites rose to attack, the regiment’s firing points came to life and destroyed the enemy soldiers who had broken through.

The naval base was still officially called Hanko, but the defenders of the peninsula themselves called themselves Ganguts, and the base was increasingly unofficially called Gangut. Even the basic newspaper “Boevaya Vakhta” changed its name to “Red Gangut”.

In the naval defense sector in the first months of the war, the main enemy was the Finnish coastal defense battleships Ilmarinen and Väinemäinen. On July 3 and 4, while in the area west of the island of Ére, they shelled the city and port, firing 18 main caliber (254 mm) shells. As a result of the shelling, there was destruction and fires at the base, and four houses burned down.

Not only were the armadillos not visible, but their location was also unknown. From the flashes it was only possible to determine the direction from which they were firing. Our BO batteries, due to ignorance of the battleship’s mooring location, could not return fire, and there were no torpedo boats in the base to attack it, since they were recalled to the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland. There were no bombers in the base that could bomb the battleships. Thus, the enemy carried out these attacks with complete impunity.

It was not possible to detect the battleship immediately. Repeated attempts by groups of 4–6 fighters to comb the skerries were unsuccessful. Then the pilots noticed the somewhat unusual shape and color of the northern coastal edge of Bengtskär Island.

A couple - L. Belousov and P. Biskup - flew to the island to check the suspicions. They approached the target at low level. The Seagulls met anti-aircraft fire. At this moment, the coastal defense battleship Ilmarinen was spotted. It stood near a steep bank, covered with nets the color of pine crowns, eight 105-mm anti-aircraft guns, four 40-mm and eight 20-mm machine guns of the battleship opened fierce fire on the scouts. However, having descended to the water itself, they escaped unharmed.

The base command asked the naval air force to bomb the battleship. On July 5, 14 SB planes took off to bomb the battleship. Not finding a ship in the skerries, they dropped bombs on a reserve target - in an area where enemy troops were gathering on the isthmus.

In order to counter possible attempts to break through by light forces and to strengthen the anti-landing defense of Hanko, mine laying was carried out. In the database for this there were 400 small German mines from the First World War.

The base command gave the OVR the order to mine all the approach channels to the peninsula. Only the secret fairways for the passage of our ships should have been left untouched. The mine laying was supervised by the flagship miner of the OVRA A. N. Bashkirov.

Unfortunately, the naval base did not have special ships either for laying minefields or for carrying out minesweeping operations. An ordinary barge was adapted to lay mines.

Late in the evening of June 28, to the west of the peninsula, the first minefield was laid from the R-55 barge towed by the Volna GISU. The staging was provided by two boats - PK-237 and MO-311. The next day, the I-17 tug and the P-55 barge, accompanied by boats, laid an anti-landing minefield in Grossarsbukten Bay. On June 28 and 29, 100 small German mines with a depth of 3 feet (about 1 m) were deployed.

On July 1, the OR-1 tugboat laid two mine cans, 5 minutes each, southwest of the Hanko Peninsula, where the movement of enemy watercraft had previously been observed.

On July 8 and 9, in order to protect the approach to the base from the sea, a minefield was placed south of Russare Island. The mines were placed from a barge towed by the Volna GISU.

20 days later, on July 29, the OR-1 tug and the PK-239 boat laid out several mine cans. In total, the base's boats and auxiliary vessels laid 367 mines.

The enemy did not resist the laying of minefields. All minefields were well covered by fire from BO batteries.

The ship's patrols monitored the enemy. At the same time, the “small hunters” boats, which carried out patrols, carried out anti-submarine defense on the approach fairways to Hanko.

However, using the entire stock of mines in the base only for anti-landing defense in the form of laying mines directly off one’s shores was not enough. It was necessary, using torpedo boats and MoD boats, to place some of the mines on the routes of the enemy’s military and merchant ships, as well as in the areas of his skerry maneuver bases. Due to the absence of active minelaying, the enemy fleet was not constrained in its actions and carried out both shelling of the base and assistance to the garrisons of its islands with impunity.

The OVR sailors not only laid mines. They were given a new task - to destroy floating mines driven by waves from the Baltic. During fairly frequent storms, mines placed in the throat of the Gulf of Finland by German, Finnish and Soviet ships often broke loose from their anchors and, drifting in the gulf at the will of the wind and currents, posed a threat to ships stationed in the port. As a rule, after each storm, one or two drifting mines appeared in the area of ​​the Khankov raid. They created a serious threat to ships stationed in the roadstead and in the port. The water area adjacent to the island of Gustavsvern was carefully monitored. The same observation was carried out from other OVR observation posts. A special demolition team was created to destroy the discovered mines. It was headed by Sergeant Major Andreev. On the raid boat KM, with a boat in tow, the demolition men went out to carry out a combat mission. To destroy a mine, you need to shoot it from a cannon. A machine gun and rifle are not suitable for this task. Through bullet holes, water can enter the body of the mine, and then it, acquiring zero buoyancy, will remain hidden under the surface of the sea and create an even greater threat to shipping. There were no guns on the "kaemkas". Therefore, there was only one way left: to approach the floating mine on a boat, hang a demolition cartridge on its horns, then light the fuse fuse and row as quickly as possible to a safe distance.

Control trawling of the fairways was carried out by KM boats. However, their limited seaworthiness made it possible to combat mines only on fairways located inside the skerry area. But since there were no other watercraft, the “kaemki” also dared to trawl the exit fairways outside the skerry area.

Due to the enemy's precise knowledge of the main fairways and navigational signs in the Hanko area and in order to hinder his possible actions, all peacetime navigational signs were destroyed, the beacons were extinguished, and minefields were placed on the fairways.

In this regard, the base's hydraulic department was tasked with laying new fairways and providing them with reliable fencing for the navigation of their ships both day and night.

For night navigation, in the closed area of ​​the Hanko base, handling points were equipped on the islands of Stura-Stenscher and Lindscher, and a buoy with a fire was installed at the 5-meter Sytin bank, which fenced off the bank and the southwestern edge of the minefield.

On the inner fairways, the standard night lighting was not turned on at all, and the daytime fencing was removed and replaced with conditional pokes. Manipulation points were turned on only by order of the operational duty officer (OD) of the naval base headquarters. The order was transmitted by radio using conventional signals directly to the aid stations, which were serviced by the personnel of the hydraulic district. To enter the base, ship commanders were required to inform the base headquarters OD in advance by radio. Having received permission, the ships had to approach the approach point, where they were met by a special ship, in the wake of which they followed to the base, or they accepted a pilot from this ship and, under his guidance, proceeded independently to their destination.

Three new fairways were laid from the approach point, accessible for the passage of ships with a draft of up to 8 m. The newly laid fairways were examined by control sounding and trawling. The main turns were fenced off with conditional bumps.

The entry, exit and placement of ships according to disposition were entrusted to the base's flagship navigator S.F. Menshikov, who was assigned personnel of the military pilot service. Pilotage service was provided by an MO boat or tugboat, and later by the gunboat Laine, which went to the approach point for receiving and escorting ships.

In those conditions when the opening of control posts was undesirable, to orient their ships (by prior agreement) they used the illumination of searchlights at the zenith, the firing of the Russare and Heste-Busset batteries, as well as the exit of a guard ship with sector colored fire.

By implementing these measures, the free navigation of our ships was achieved and the navigation of enemy ships was made difficult.

The closure of all known fairways, the destruction of peacetime landmarks and lights, the blocking of fairways with mines, the establishment of completely new fairways, strict regimes and navigation rules were the right measures and fully justified themselves.

An attempt by enemy torpedo boats to break into the base along peacetime fairways failed.

During the hostilities and until the end of the evacuation of Hanko, over 130 ships and vessels were brought into and out of the base, and among them there were ships of large displacement: the turbo-electric ship "Joseph Stalin", the minelayers "Marti" and "Ural", the floating workshop "Sickle and Molot" ", transports and destroyers.

At 8.00 on July 4, four transports from Tallinn arrived at the port - Vilsandi, Someri, Aegna and Abruka, escorted by the patrol ship Burya, BTShch-214 Bugel and four torpedo boats. Half an hour later, the warships left for Tallinn. The transports delivered ammunition, gasoline, food, engineering equipment and a machine gun company. Its 12 heavy machine guns were distributed between the island of Heste-Busse, which needed strengthening of defense, and the second combat area. The defenders of the base hastily strengthened the fire protection of the northern coast of the peninsula from landings.

During the day, the enemy fired at the airfield and the islands of Kuen, Meden, Hermanse and transports in the port.

On July 4, three enemy aircraft were destroyed in the sky over Hanko: one by anti-aircraft gunners and two by pilots. I-16 A.K. Antonenko and P.A. Brinko were on duty at the airfield. Two Yu-88 bombers appeared in the sky above the base. Antonenko and Brinko took off and shot them both down. Only four minutes passed from the moment of takeoff to the outcome of the battle. Alexey Antonenko and Pyotr Brinko were the first in the Baltic to establish the excellent maneuverability of a pair in air combat instead of a three-aircraft flight.

The gunsmiths placed PC missile launchers under the planes of the fighters. This significantly increased the firepower of the aircraft and their effectiveness when operating against ground and sea targets.

On July 5, the same pilots shot down another Yu-88; the air battle lasted only a minute. The crash site of the Junkers was spotted by anti-aircraft gunners. Divers recovered the pilots' bodies from the water. According to the documents found on them, it was established that the pilots fought in Spain, France, and flew over England and the Balkans. They flew in from an airfield in Latvia.

At 4.30 on July 5, a landing group of 45 people, supported by SBO artillery and MBR-2 aircraft, captured the island of Walterholm. The enemy retreated as the landing party approached. This was the first of the islands taken by the Khankovites (in total, they took 18 islands before October).

On this day, 15 DB-3 bombed a coastal battery on the island of Skogby in the Hanko area. At 19.40 three schooners with cargo arrived at Hanko.

On the night of July 7, the enemy attacked the front line on the left flank with significant forces, in the Sogars area in the defense zone of the battalion of Captain Ya. S. Sukach. And again, the barrage fire that opened in time helped: it was conducted by batteries of the 343rd artillery regiment and mortars of the 2nd battalion of the 335th rifle regiment. The attack was successfully repulsed, the enemy lost up to two companies.

The next day - July 8 - the enemy again, after strong artillery bombardment, attacked units of the 8th Brigade, but on the right flank, in the Lappvik area. And again, having suffered losses, the Finns returned to their original positions.

On July 7, MBR-2 seaplanes were used as bombers for the first time. Senior Lieutenant Ignatenko, Lieutenants P.F. Streletsky and S. Volkov bombed the Finnish battle formations, resulting in large forest fires. SBO artillery fired on the island of Storholm.

On July 8, A. Antonenko and P. Brinko flew to Tallinn. Along the way they shot down one Yu-88. While returning to Hanko, they noticed two Fiats heading towards the base and also shot them down. On July 14, A.K. Antonenko and P.A. Brinko were the first among the Baltic pilots to become Heroes of the Soviet Union. Comrades in arms called A.K. Antonenko “the Baltic Chkalov.”

Other Hanko pilots also fought heroically. On July 5, A. Baysultanov and A. Kuznetsov flew to reconnaissance of the Turku area on I-16. Noticing four Fokker D-21 fighters taking off from the airfield, they attacked the enemy at an altitude of 200–300 m and shot down two Fokkers, which fell on their own airfield. The other two avoided the fight. Returning to Hanko, A. Baysultanov and A. Kuznetsov discovered a boat with soldiers in the skerries, attacked it and sank it.

There were 15–16 aircraft at Hanko airfield and there was not a single shelter for them. Since the enemy fired at the airfield with guns of 152–203 mm caliber, the airfield after the shelling was covered with craters two deep and up to four meters in diameter. The Finns opened fire immediately after the planes took off. It was necessary to constantly maintain a construction battalion of 1,000 people at the airfield. His fighters, working under fire, managed to fill up the craters and keep the runway ready.

But the planes also suffered while parked. On July 6, an I-153 fighter was destroyed by a direct hit, and three similar aircraft were disabled.

The engineering service proposed building a second runway perpendicular to the main one. In a short time, a kilometer-long strip was cleared of forest and huge boulders, leveled, and on July 9, the squadron commander, Captain L. G. Belousov himself, tested it on the I-153. Taking off from the new runway, he went into battle. The enemy, not yet figuring out where the plane had taken off from, opened fire on the main airfield. But a stray shell also landed on the reserve runway; it was not noticed in time and the crater was not filled up. When landing, L.G. Belousova's "seagull" capped and crashed. The pilot survived, having escaped with bruises.

The enemy spent two, three, four thousand mines and shells a day, and later reached six thousand. Hanko's artillerymen could not afford such luxury. The defenders of the base had little ammunition, and the position of the defenders forced them to think about the future. They spared no ammunition to repel the assault, but they could not return fire with fire. They tried to conduct each shooting accurately and prudently. One hundred, two, or at most three hundred shells and mines - this is our daily norm.

From the first days of the war, it was necessary to take into account the consumption of ammunition, and the headquarters strictly monitored this important matter. If they received anything from Tallinn, it was mainly for anti-aircraft and coastal batteries. The rifle brigade and other units received nothing. I had to save money.

According to the latest intelligence reports from fleet headquarters, the 163rd German division is concentrated in the Hanko area. The base commander asked the brigade commander what had been done to successfully repel an attack by an entire division. N.P. Simonyak reported: two rifle regiments of the brigade occupy a defense line up to three kilometers deep. The 94th and 95th engineering and construction battalions transferred to the brigade and the 219th engineer battalion were consolidated into a rifle regiment. This regiment, together with the border detachment and the 297th separate tank battalion, form the reserve of the brigade.