What is a white lie called? Why white lies don't exist

Chapter forty-four MASS SHOOTINGS OF “ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE” IN THE RED ARMY - HARM TO THE COUNTRY’S DEFENSE IN ’41 OR GOOD? There are two opposing assessments of the mass executions of commanders and commissars of the Red Army in 1937–1938. The regiments skillfully copied from each other

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annotation scientific article on philosophy, ethics, religious studies, author of the scientific work - Mehed Gleb Nikolaevich

In this article, the author examines the problem of lying through the prism of the model situation proposed by Kant in his treatise “On the imaginary right to lie out of love for humanity,” the discussion of which in 2008 became the catalyst for an ongoing debate in the Russian ethical space. In everyday life, we are usually guided by common sense logic, within which we are constantly aimed at finding a compromise. Therefore, it can be very difficult to switch to another logic, the logic of uncompromising morality, when this is necessary to preserve the moral dignity of the individual. However, demonstrating uncompromising behavior in everyday life can be insensitive or even heartless. Therefore, the demand of Kant and his supporters to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth, in any situation, even when an intruder pursuing a friend hidden in your house asks about his whereabouts, does not correspond to ordinary moral intuitions. For Kant, the main value is the internal integrity and moral autonomy of the subject, closed only to himself, to his noumenal, universally human basis. A brief excursion into the specification and typology of normative-ethical absolutism undertaken by the author allows us to define the position of Kant and his supporters as abstract absolutism. At the same time, according to the author, the rejection of the rigid position of abstract absolutism on the problem of lies does not necessarily lead to the rejection of absolutism in general, which is demonstrated in the framework of the analysis of alternative Kantian normative and ethical positions of A. Gevirt and N. Geisler. In conclusion, the author touches upon the question of the possibility of combining negative-absolutist and positive-consequentialist positions within the framework of a single and consistent normative and ethical doctrine.

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The author analyzes the approach to the problem of lie proposed by Kant in the essay “On the alleged right to lie from philanthropy” which caused a vivid discussion in Russian ethics. In everyday life we ​​are usually guided by the logic of common sense and we are constantly focused on searching for compromises. Therefore, it is very difficult to switch to another logic – the logic of uncompromising morality when it is necessary to preserve the human dignity and individual freedom. Nevertheless, it may be heartless to follow the unconditional imperatives of formal morality in usual life. Obviously, the Kantian commitment to tell nothing but the truth in any situation contradicts intuitions of commonsense morality. The main value for Kant is the internal integrity and moral autonomy of the subject, focused only on himself, his noumenal and panhuman basis. A brief excurse into the specification and typology of ethical absolutism taken by the author allows determining the position of Kant and his followers as an abstract absolutism. At the same time, the rejection of abstract absolutist approach to the issue of lie does not necessarily lead to the rejection of absolutism in general, as it is demonstrated in the analysis of alternative ethical positions of A. Gewirth and N. Geisler. In conclusion, the author poses the question of the possibility of combining the deontological and consequentialistic position within a coherent normative doctrine.

Text of scientific work on the topic “Moral absolutism and white lies”

Ethical Thought

Vol. 16. No. 1 / 2016. pp. 130-143

Ethical Thought Vol. 16. No. 1 / 2016, pp. 130-143 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2016-16-1-130-143

G.N.Mehed

Moral absolutism and white lies

Mekhed Gleb Nikolaevich - candidate of philosophical sciences; e-mail: [email protected]

In this article, the author examines the problem of lying through the prism of the model situation proposed by Kant in his treatise “On the imaginary right to lie out of love for humanity,” the discussion of which in 2008 became the catalyst for an ongoing debate in the Russian ethical space. In everyday life, we are usually guided by common sense logic, within which we are constantly aimed at finding a compromise. Therefore, it can be very difficult to switch to another logic, the logic of uncompromising morality, when this is necessary to preserve the moral dignity of the individual. However, demonstrating uncompromising behavior in everyday life can be insensitive or even heartless. Therefore, the demand of Kant and his supporters to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth, in any situation, even when an intruder pursuing a friend hidden in your house asks about his whereabouts, does not correspond to ordinary moral intuitions. For Kant, the main value is the internal integrity and moral autonomy of the subject, closed only to himself, to his noumenal, universally human basis. A brief excursion into the specification and typology of normative-ethical absolutism undertaken by the author allows us to define the position of Kant and his supporters as abstract absolutism. At the same time, according to the author, the rejection of the rigid position of abstract absolutism on the problem of lies does not necessarily lead to the rejection of absolutism in general, which is demonstrated in the framework of the analysis of alternative Kantian normative and ethical positions of A. Gevirt and N. Geisler. In conclusion, the author touches upon the question of the possibility of combining negative-absolutist and positive-consequentialist positions within the framework of a single and consistent normative and ethical doctrine.

Key words: ethics, moral absolutism, deontology, consequentialism, lies, Immanuel Kant, Abdusalam Huseynov, Alan Gewirth, Norman Geisler

A discussion of the situation modeled by Kant in the essay “On the imaginary right to lie out of love for humanity” in 2008 provoked a large-scale discussion among ethicists by Russian standards, which continues to this day with varying degrees of activity1. This discussion made it possible to clarify as much as possible the normative and ethical positions of the researchers themselves and divided them into two unequal camps. The minority were apologists

1 On the right to lie / Ed. R.G. Apresyan. M., 2011. © Mehed G.N.

Kant, the majority are his opponents. The arguments of both were quite diverse, but upon closer examination it should be recognized that this discussion fully fits into the conceptual framework of the confrontation between absolutists, deontologists and consequentialists, which has been going on in English-speaking ethics since the 60s. XX century The Russian specificity of this discussion includes its emphatically historical and philosophical character - one way or another, its participants focused on discussing Kant’s example. Many opponents of Kant, based on an analysis of his works, expressed the opinion that the great Königsberger contradicted himself, while apologists argued the opposite and called for a better study and understanding of the general philosophical premises from which Kant proceeded, again resorting to a historical and philosophical study of his texts .

In general, such a historical and philosophical coloring seems to me not an entirely correct way to pose and discuss the problem. Kant's merit lies precisely in the fact that he extremely sharpened the question of the final limit of morality, about that very zone of transition from compromise to uncompromising logic. Therefore, it does not matter at all how consistently Kant himself in other works adhered to the position he expressed in this essay. However, it seems to me that Kant’s position as a whole is an adequate expression of his entire teaching. It corresponds to the deep principles of his ethical system, which will be discussed in more detail below. However, the importance of this discussion for me is not that it allows Kant to be “convicted” of inconsistency, but that it raises the question of the nature and essence of moral absolutes in general, as well as the forms in which they are presented in structure of moral consciousness.

In my opinion, Kant and those who support him in this particular case are not entirely right - a homeowner should lie to an intruder in order to save a friend. But this does not mean that all those who oppose Kant are right. Kant's sharp divergence from moral intuition is due to his normative position of abstract absolutism, which, as I have already noted, is generally consistent with the general logic of his ethics.

Many ethical codes of different cultures, along with the ban on killing innocents and theft, also contain a ban on lying. The Judeo-Christian tradition, under the influence of which modern Western civilization was formed, is no exception. However, is this prohibition necessary in all situations? After all, it also happens that a lie can save someone’s life or harmonize interpersonal relationships. In everyday life, we constantly compromise with our conscience and violate the ban on lying without even thinking about it. The ability to find a compromise and sense the boundaries within which this compromise is appropriate is considered by us to be one of the main properties of a well-mannered, respectable person. As a matter of fact, Aristotle’s teaching about virtue as the ability to find a golden mean means nothing more than the ability to find a compromise that is justified from a moral point of view.

Thus, the basic ethical prohibitions - do not kill, do not steal, do not lie, do not commit adultery, etc. - are themselves quite abstract and their application in real, everyday life is mediated by many “buts” and various

with reservations. As R. Hare noted, “learning morality” is impossible without developing the ability to concretize abstract instructions and is reminiscent of the process of learning to drive a car, which is also associated with the ability to apply abstract rules to specific situations, understanding the boundaries within which these rules are appropriate2.

In everyday life, we are usually guided by common sense logic, within which we are constantly aimed at finding a compromise. Therefore, it can be very difficult to switch to another logic, the logic of uncompromising morality. From the point of view of the everyday logic of least resistance, to which we are all accustomed, uncompromising morality seems something irrationally romantic and even heroic.

It must be recognized, however, that sometimes such heroism is required in order to preserve human dignity and freedom. Guided by the logic of compromise, people can turn into Nazi war criminals, organizers and accomplices of mass murder. For example, as was the case with Franz Stangl, whose path of small daily compromises with evil ultimately led to the post of commandant of the Treblinka concentration camp3. It was precisely following the logic of compromise that Soviet citizens, in the era of Stalin’s terror and repression, wrote denunciations against each other and publicly renounced their parents, who were declared enemies of the people. Guided by the logic and morality of compromise, millions of German citizens looked on indifferently to the persecution of Jews and denied them refuge, while a few hid them, rejecting compromise with Nazism, often at the cost of their own lives. The experiments of S. Milgram4 on submission to authority and the Stanford prison experiment of F. Zimbardo5 clearly demonstrated how far logic and the morality of compromise can take an ordinary person in an unusual situation.

It is important to note that compromise morality usually begins with a lie. Moreover, this lie is so natural that it is often not even realized, actually transforming into self-deception. If one can imagine the most banal of all evils, then it would be a lie. If a lie is repeated day after day, it becomes something necessary, without which it is no longer possible to exist. Lies permeate language itself, as illustrated in Orwell's 1984. All totalitarian systems began with lies. And it was precisely the rejection of lies and false ideology that often became the reason for the collapse of these totalitarian regimes. Courageous and decisive rejection of widespread lies became the main weapon in the fight against totalitarianism in Czechoslovakia, the main element of the nonviolent strategy developed by Vaclav Havel.

However, demonstrating uncompromising behavior in everyday life can be, at a minimum, tactless or even heartless. Therefore, Kant’s demand to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth, in any situation, even when the attacker is pursuing, seems so counterintuitive.

Hare R.M. The Language of Morals. Oxford, 1960. P. 76.

See: Tereshchenko M. Such a fragile veil of humanity. The banality of evil, the banality of good. M., 2010. pp. 67-94.

Milgram S. Obedience to Authority. N.Y., 1974.

Zimbardo F. The Lucifer Effect: Why good people turn into villains. M., 2013.

a friend hiding in your house asks about his whereabouts. A Kantian supporter might say, why is it important for us to agree with moral intuition? Should a philosopher look back at everyday consciousness, is it really necessary to always listen to the voice of common sense, which stubbornly tells us that the Sun revolves around the Earth? However, here it can be argued that normative ethics is only a rationalization and systematization of primary moral attitudes and intuitions. Rationalization and systematization occur not on the basis of pure reason, which derives universal laws from itself (this is impossible in principle, as Gödel showed), but on the basis of those very intuitions and attitudes that exist in language, culture, etc. and which constitute primary material for moral reflection. Rationalization can complement or clarify existing moral attitudes and emotions, but it should not turn into their refutation or unnatural radicalization, as happens with Kant, because this erodes the foundations of moral thinking itself.

Kant proceeds from the logic of an ideal situation - in an ideal world, lying is impossible. But in an ideal world, a situation in which an attacker would pursue someone is also impossible. In the ideal world of embodied morality, strictly speaking, morality as reflection generally becomes unnecessary, since the ability to commit evil disappears, the existing merges with the should. It should be remembered that the desire to adjust reality to a scheme, idea, theory is the main temptation of philosophers of all times and peoples. For many philosophers, criticism of existence from the position of what should be and - the latent consciousness of the utopian nature of their constructions - leads to a total denial of reality. As a result, philosophical theory loses its connection with reality, and the reality that the theory is intended to “clarify,” “order,” or “supplement” is replaced by its fictitious model. Very often this happens in practical philosophy, as a result of which this very philosophy generally loses connection with practice. Yes, Kant is right when he says that good will exists regardless of whether it has ever been realized in history. But this good will must be commensurate with the human dimension. Otherwise, the essence of morality - its human, humanistic essence - evaporates.

However, let us return to the problem of compromises in morality. How to identify those situations, how to outline the zone in which it is necessary to leave the everyday logic of compromise morality and “switch” to the logic of uncompromising morality in order to preserve the human appearance? By and large, the justification for the existence of such a zone of transition from compromise to uncompromising logic (and not just the insistence of uncompromising logic) is what distinguishes moral absolutism from moral relativism. To be an absolutist, one does not have to be a rigorist, as some participants in the discussion about the permissibility of white lies based on Kant's essay believe. That is, it is not necessary to strictly oppose what is and what should be; it is enough to recognize the presence in the immensity of existence of a certain zone of what should be. In other words, not only a consequentialist, but also an absolutist may disagree with Kant in his example. However, in order to understand how this can be, it is necessary to take a closer look at what moral absolutism is.

In its most general form, moral absolutism asserts that the boundary between good and evil is constant and unconditional in all possible worlds. This boundary itself can be established using a universal principle, but in its final normative form it takes the form of a simple prohibition that does not depend on social, natural or other external conditions. For example, killing a person is a moral evil under any circumstances, in any situation and at all times, and recognizing murder as an absolute evil is a necessary minimum condition for good. In contrast to absolutism, relativism asserts that there is no constant boundary between good and evil, that the boundaries between these concepts change dynamically and their meaning is determined by the context of a particular situation.

The deontological approach, traditionally closely associated with absolutism, assumes that from a moral point of view, it is not so much the consequences of an act that are valuable, but rather the act itself, regardless of its possible consequences and any “hypothetical” motives. In this regard, we often talk about the intrinsic value of an action, which is not directly related to its external value, which is determined by the consequences. As C. Fried notes, deontology, instead of the concept of “good”, prefers to operate with such concepts as “ought” and “improper”6. These concepts outline the boundaries of morality, which do not coincide with the boundaries of the empirical world; they “are the foundations of our moral personality”7, the conditions of our existence as rational beings.

The consequentialist (teleological) approach is generally characterized by an assessment of an act from the point of view of its foreseen result, that is, what is important is not so much the act itself as the consequences to which it led and the context of the situation in which the choice is made. In other words, consequentialism proceeds from the fact that it is “the ends, not the means, that determine morality”8 and constitute its essence. An action consistent with duty, but which led to negative consequences, is assessed generally negatively within the consequentialist approach. This does not mean that consequentialism, unlike deontology, is focused only on “external” value determined by consequences; However, consequentialism ascribes the concept of “intrinsic” value only to certain states of affairs in the world9. Therefore, as T. Nagel notes, consequentialism is “primarily concerned with what will happen,” while “absolutism is primarily concerned with what he (the moral subject - G.M.) does”10.

At the same time, one should distinguish the “weak”, non-absolutist version of deontology from the “strong”, i.e. absolutist. When justifying its position, the first may appeal to some other, not necessarily consequentialist conditions. For example, distinguishing between different meanings of a moral requirement - killing an innocent person is always evil, but murder within

Fried C. Right and Wrong as Absolute // Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. Lanham,

1994. P. 73-92. Ibid. P. 74. Ibid.

Williams B. A Critique of Consequentialism // Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. Lanham,

1994. P. 93-107.

Nagel T. War and Massacre // Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. P. 218.

self-defense or while protecting someone from aggression is not murder and can even be presented as a moral duty. Thus, non-absolutist deontologists still condition the execution of a moral prohibition in one way or another. In other words, absolutism appeals to categoricality as an essential characteristic of a moral requirement11. Speaking in Kantian language, from the point of view of absolutism, the subjective maxim of an act should be determined only by the objective form of the law itself. And although this formulation of the question is disputed even by some absolutists, it expresses the internal ideal of absolutism, its essential intention12.

In general, the strategy of the deontological approach (both the “strong” and “weak” versions) is to disavow the consequentialist approach by appealing to simple moral intuitions and proving that the utilitarian or any other consequentialist is ready to go in his de-sacralization of moral prohibitions so far away that the boundary between evil and good will lose all meaning.

The argumentation of consequentialists largely repeats the strategy of absolutists, but with a minus sign. The appeal to intuition remains unchanged, only greater insistence is added in calls to follow common sense. It should be noted that due to its sympathies for absolutism with its dualistic ontology, even the “weak” version of the deontological approach has always had difficulties with the analysis of the so-called “difficult cases”, which were developed in many ways by its opponents and in which the hard (or relatively hard) attachment to the requirement of unconditionality of moral obligation has always led to absurdities and conflicts with common sense and simple moral intuition. It is in the context of the discussion of numerous “hard cases” and moral dilemmas - in the form of constructed thought experiments or real cases - that the debate between modern consequentialists and absolutists is built, which determines its originality.

Kant's example of a man hiding at a friend's house from an attacker is also a difficult case, although Kant most likely would not agree with such an interpretation. His example is aimed at illustrating the degree of unconditionality of the categorical imperative - even in a situation of risk to life (of a friend or the character himself), it is necessary to tell the truth. From a modern point of view, Kant's example looks like a thought experiment designed to test a theory - whether a normative theory corresponds to our moral intuitions. It is interesting that the author of this thought experiment is an absolutist, not a consequentialist, and therefore this thought experiment is not intended to serve as a refutation of absolutism, but to illustrate that even so, absolute morality retains its potential and internal coherence.

What are Kant's motives when he asserts the duty of truthfulness? Kant proceeds from the concept of an autonomous personality, for which internal integrity and one’s own infallibility are more valuable than the good of another person who has trusted

11 Fried C. Right and Wrong as Absolute. P. 76.

12 However, absolutism may differ on the issue of the normative boundaries of this categoricalness. Are all moral standards absolute or only some of them, or perhaps only one of them?

to him. His position is extremely formalistic and legalistic. As M. Tereshchenko quite accurately notes, according to Kant, “self-esteem, self-respect inherent in a person acting as a moral subject, as a supersensible “mind”, is born through the denial, humiliation of that real empirical, concrete individuality that determines human originality”13 . Kant sees the basis of morality in the rejection of empirical individuality, which leads to the recognition of the illusory nature of the framework and boundaries between subjects and the affirmation of a single, general will as a kind of supra-individual source of duty, a meta-subject of morality. Only such a metasubjective will is autonomous, and only to the extent that it is universal. Thus, this autonomous will is both the subject and the object of its legislation.

This means that in Kant’s ethics, moral obligations and responsibility arise only in the space of the abstract and purely logical space of universal law, where all concrete “I” merge into one collective, but only logical subjectivity. The problem is that Kant, not being a mystic, ascribed to this logical metasubjectivity the ability of desire, which contradicted the entire thrust of the critical project of his philosophy. Kant discerned in moral consciousness its important, indeed to some extent inherent, feature - the ability to rise above individual, group, and even national interests, rising to the level of abstract and universal principles. But Kant absolutized this ability, attributing to it, in addition to the important formal-structuring role that it actually performs, also the ability to posit a certain normative content and even the ability of volition. His model of morality is not egoistic, but, as M. Tereshchenko notes, solipsistic14 - for him everything is measured only in relation to the internal integrity and moral autonomy of the subject, closed only to himself, to his noumenal metasubjective, universal basis (humanity as such ). Therefore, the good of another person is not such a big moral problem for Kant.

Kant's main apologist in the discussion about the admissibility of lying in the situation described by the German philosopher is academician A.A. Guseinov15. Why is Kant’s approach close to Guseinov and can his own concept of negative ethics be attributed to the same type of moral absolutism as Kant’s concept? The main axiom on which the logic of Huseynov’s argument is based is that morality is the sphere of individually responsible thinking; that which relates only to the individual himself as such forms its deep basis. Since only my own consciousness is directly accessible to me, I can only be responsible for any event (action) if I am its sole cause. I cannot and should not judge others, I can only judge myself and about myself. Such logic immediately cuts off the possibility

13 Tereshchenko M. Such a fragile cover of humanity. The banality of evil, the banality of good. P. 268.

14 Ibid. P. 266.

15 Guseinov A.A. What Kant said, or Why a white lie is impossible // On the right to lie / Ed. R.G. Apresyan. pp. 108-127.

any social, collective morality in the sense of something united and whole. Public morality consists solely of the sum of individual “morals.”

With this formulation of the problem, within the framework of which morality is taken in its ideal purity - which, of course, is reminiscent of Kant's approach - the area of ​​specific moral responsibility can only be the motives of actions. Even the actions themselves in the area that concerns their implementation in practice are removed from the realm of morality. Huseynov calls this area a zone of special responsibility, borrowing this term from Bakhtin. Therefore, the only form of truly moral action for him is a negative action. Only a negative act can be entirely within the zone of the individual’s free will, since it is always possible to refuse to perform any act - until the act is committed. Thus, based on a certain descriptive characteristic of moral consciousness - the ability of an individual to be entirely and completely responsible for his action, to be its only cause - Huseynov builds the entire logic of his theoretical position and normative ethics. This position is, indeed, very close to the type of moral absolutism to which Kant’s ethics belongs.

As for Kant, for Guseinov moral absolutism is embodied not so much in the sphere of actual actions, of existence, but is aimed exclusively at the ideal-ought, at establishing an absolute boundary between good and evil. Therefore, it is not so important what the real empirical subject of an act is - what is important is his attitude towards this act as a moral subject. The empirical subject is thus not the same as the moral subject. And this dichotomy of the world into what is due and what is, as well as the subject of the act itself - into the moral and the empirical - is a characteristic feature of moral absolutism in general.

From this absolutist logic follows a peculiar attitude towards those situations when one has to choose the lesser evil. This choice, according to Huseynov, is not in the realm of morality at all. In a situation of choosing a greater or lesser evil, a person is forced to be guided by some other, non-moral motives, and therefore, this is not his responsible choice, and is not within the purview of moral responsibility. The essence of Huseynov’s position can be formulated as follows: there is no need to call lesser evil good just because it seems lesser in comparison with greater. It is precisely this calling of evil, albeit lesser, good, according to Huseynov, that is moral relativism, i.e., the position according to which good and evil are intercorrelative concepts, the boundaries between which dynamically change depending on the context and situation. Therefore, if a person has to kill in self-defense or in war, this does not mean at all that he is doing good, and precisely because good cannot be defined positively.

On the one hand, this position allows us to find the “topos ouranios” of morality, in which a person is identical to himself, is a god in an almost literal, non-metaphorical sense. This understanding embodies the great rational-critical tradition of European philosophy. On the other hand, such an understanding of morality, like Kant’s, is, in my opinion, too

com abstract. This is almost complete sterility. Like Kant, Huseynov splits the subject into moral and empirical, while the moral subject turns out to be deprived of anything private, individual. It is an abstract subject, humanity as a kingdom of ends in itself, a subject that is present in every person equally. However, postulating such an abstract, supra-individual or even “meta-subjective” (supersubjective) source of obligation is fraught with the loss of the “human dimension” of morality. Why should such a meta-subject, who has Nagel’s “view from nowhere”16 and whose main characteristic is disinterest, judge from the position of precisely human interests, if by these we mean primarily the desire for goodness and justice? Why shouldn’t such a subject take the point of view of a universal law or some kind of Absolute spirit? It was to counter such an over-abstracting interpretation that Kant introduced the second practical principle of the categorical imperative, which posits the moral agent itself as the highest value and specifies precisely the “human-dimensional” status of morality, and Huseynov introduces a ban on murder and lying. However, even with such a limitation, it remains possible to interpret the highest value of a moral agent as conditioned precisely by participation in the moral law, in the noumenal world, and not as an integral being, an inhabitant of the phenomenal world as well.

But what to do in the event of a conflict between two equally absolute prohibitions? Obviously, some complexity arises here, some conflict with life practice and moral intuition. It is regrettable that many supporters of consistent absolutism in such a situation resort to not entirely transparent argumentation, verbal manipulation and implicit compromises with common sense. Thus, S. Harris, a consistent critic of all types of “white lies,” analyzing Kant’s example, insists on the need to tell the truth even in such a situation and at the same time neutralize the aggressor. (How? For example, cowboy-style intimidation with the heavy barrel of a revolver. However, Harris does not specify what to do for those who do not have a revolver). Very reluctantly, Harris nevertheless acknowledges the possibility of lying, but only as a last resort if you are too physically weak or not resourceful enough to neutralize the aggressor. “But this does not mean at all,” notes Harris, “that someone else, more courageous and quick-witted, would not have been able to get out with the help of the truth.”17 It should be recognized that Huseynov’s position is much more strict and consistent. A lie is a lie, and once we recognize it as morally unacceptable, we must forever exclude it from our repertoire of practical means.

Nevertheless, a positive solution to the problem of conflict of responsibilities, in my opinion, is not necessarily associated with the abandonment of an absolutist position. For some reason, in the minds of most researchers it is the Kantian model of abstract absolutism, with which A.A. obviously identifies. Huseynov, is associated with moral absolutism as such. Although in the history of ethics there have been attempts to construct fundamentally different types of absolute

16 Nagel T. The View From Nowhere. Oxford, 1986.

17 Harris S. Lies. Why telling the truth is always better. M., 2015. P. 51.

Lutism, which would be based not on a closed formal structure, but on a hierarchical model. Representatives of such “hierarchical”, or, better said, “concrete” absolutism include F.M. Dostoevsky, M. Scheler and A. Schweitzer, and among modern philosophers - A. Gewirth and N. Geisler.

A. Gewirth prefers to discuss the moral permissibility in extreme situations of actions prohibited under normal circumstances not in terms of absolute prohibitions, but in terms of absolute rights. “A right is absolute when it cannot be revoked under any circumstances, that is, it can never be justifiably violated and must be respected without any exception,”18 writes Gewirth. As a universal criterion for the validity of moral requirements correlating with rights, Gewirth proposes the “principle of generic consistency” (PGC), which he developed. Basic rights, according to this principle, are necessary conditions for action. In the event of a conflict of rights, priority according to the PGC must be given in favor of the right whose fulfillment is more necessary for the action or deed. The most likely “candidate” for the role of right at the top of the hierarchy, according to the philosopher, is the right to life (on the part of the recipient). Its correlate on the part of the moral agent is the negative duty of refraining from killing a person.

At the same time, Gewirth draws a fundamental difference between “concrete absolutism,” of which he is a proponent, and “abstract absolutism.” The latter, from Gewirth's point of view, is more concerned with the guilt or innocence of the moral agent, while concrete absolutism is focused more on “basic rights”. Concrete absolutism, when evaluating actions, must necessarily take into account their consequences, but its consequentialism is not absolute, but is limited to basic rights arising from the PGC and which cannot be violated under any circumstances.

It is curious that, in contrast to the doctrine of double effect, which Ge-wirth criticizes, he himself does not make a categorical distinction between negative and positive duties. The latter are no less absolute if they concern basic rights. Therefore, from Gewirth’s point of view, in Kant’s example from the treatise “On the Supposed Right to Lie out of Philanthropy,” it is necessary to lie to the attacker, because the right to truth, to which the offender appeals, is less fundamental than the right to life, which a friend risks.

Although another Anglo-American philosopher, N. Geisler is a supporter of the so-called “Divine command theory”, his normative and ethical position can be described as deontological, more specifically - as “hierarchical absolutism” or, by analogy with Gewirth's approach, "concrete absolutism". The essence of his idea about how to avoid conflicts between moral absolutes comes down to the proposal to build them into a hierarchy according to the degree of conceptual closeness to their own.

18 Gewirth A. Are There Any Absolute Rights? // Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics. P. 129-146; 130.

to his source (God). It is significant that both Geisler and Gewirth insist on using the term “absolute” even to the lowest members of the “vertical of absolutes.” “Every moral law,” writes Geisler, “is absolute in its sphere. For example, lying as such is always wrong. However, when faced with the duty to save life, an exception is made for the principle of truth, although even then the duty of truthfulness itself remains in force. Geisler illustrates this with the example of a magnet - although the force of electromagnetic interaction is many times stronger than gravitational interaction, electromagnetism does not at all cancel the force of gravity, but rather temporarily suspends it.

It seems to me that if we proceed from the absolute prohibition of murder as a certain axiomatic point, the erosion of which threatens to destroy the entire logic of morality, but at the same time is only a negative “base” for a positive consequentialist superstructure, as Gewirth and Geisler propose, then we can move on to an active affirmation of the value of human life and its needs as the highest, irreducible good. Such a synthesis of negative and positive ethics in the concept of concrete absolutism, in my opinion, is quite possible.

Both ways separately have their advantages and disadvantages. In the case of positive ethics, we have a too vague criterion that is quite easy to manipulate. In the case of negative ethics, we have only the absolute boundary between good and evil, but not yet good itself; this boundary becomes pure good only in an extreme, catastrophic situation. In other words, negative ethics defines the boundary of humanity in general, denotes what makes us human, but does not yet give us a universal criterion of good and evil for everyday life at the level of the family, the collective, where consequentialist-compromising logic is most often required.

In addition, there is another problem: is deception in the situation modeled by Kant only a morally possible and justifiable lesser evil, as K. Korsgaard believes20, or is it necessary and obligatory from a moral point of view? In other words, should morality sanction lying as good in a given situation? Gewirth turns out that lying in this situation is declared a positive duty. The need to lie looks precisely like a moral necessity, a duty of a moral agent. However, doesn't this mean sanctioning lying as a moral good - even within the framework of only one situation? This is the problem - and the challenge for the future - for those moralists who would like to make a synthesis of absolutism and consequentialism.

H. Arendt, with her characteristic subtlety, once noticed an interesting correlation between the ideas of Kant and Dostoevsky21. Both saw lies as the beginning of evil, because it is lies - first of all, lies to oneself, to one’s inner voice of conscience - that makes all types of evil, murder, betrayal possible. “Dishonesty,” writes Kant, “is the absence of conscientiousness, i.e., clarity

19 Geisler N. Any absolutes? Absolutely! // Christian Research Institute, 2009, April 17th. URL: http://www.equip.org/articles/any-absolutes-absolutely-/ (access date: 07/20/2014)

20 CorsgaardM.C. The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil // Deontology / Ed. by S. Darwall. 2003. P. 212-235.

21 Arendt H. Some questions of moral philosophy // Arendt H. Responsibility and judgment. M., 2013. P. 100.

confession before your inner judge"22. How close this is to the teachings of Zosya and to the position of Guseinov: “The main thing is don’t lie to yourself. He who lies to himself and listens to his own lies reaches such a point that he no longer discerns any truth either in himself or around him, and therefore begins to disrespect both himself and others.”23 How could Raskolnikov's crime have been committed? First of all, due to Raskolnikov's constant lies to himself - he tried to deceive himself.

Thus, the pathos of moral absolutism in relation to the principle of truthfulness, from my point of view, should not consist at all in lying or not lying when it is necessary to prevent the death of a person - when human life is at stake, one must do everything possible to preserve it , including, of course, lying, but in not replacing concepts by calling lesser evil good, as A.A. warns about this. Guseinov. Evil, even if lesser, must remain evil. And when it is necessary to choose between a lesser and a greater evil, the act of choosing in favor of the lesser evil must not, by necessity, be declared to be good par excellence. Otherwise, it will be a lie, and the worst one at that - a lie to oneself, a lie of compromise morality in an uncompromising situation. Probably the only way to avoid sliding down the inclined plane of evil is to use compromise-consequentialist and uncompromising-absolutist logics in parallel, that is, constantly check your true motives and test them with a high standard of absolute morality, constantly recognize your lies as lies, allowing them only there and then when it is truly the lesser evil.

In part, this approach, where the absoluteness of the basis is provided by the deontological level, and the effectiveness and flexibility in relation to living practice is consequentialist, resembles the principle of the “two-level theory” described by K. Korsgaard24. Korsgaard was able to show how, with the help of this principle, Kant’s ethics could be supplemented in such a way that the formula of a universal law would provide “the point at which morality becomes uncompromising”25. In other words, this mechanism allows us to mediate the relationship between what is and what should be, as between the present and the future, and to set absolute morality as an ideal, albeit utopian, goal. At the same time, this goal does not hover somewhere as some kind of abstraction by itself and for itself, but is in constant “dialogue” with reality, setting its normative boundaries and meaning. It seems to me that only such moral alertness and constant reflection when referring to the deontological level of ethics can prevent the use of compromise logic of lesser evil in situations that require switching to uncompromising logic, and therefore preserve free human individuality and a responsible moral subject.

22 Kant I. Metaphysics of morality // Kant I. Soch. On him. and Russian language: in 4 volumes / Ed. N. Motroshilova, B. Tushlinga. T. 3. M., 1997. P. 824.

23 Dostoevsky F.M. Brothers Karamazov // Dostoevsky F.M. Collection cit.: in 15 volumes. T. 9. L., 1991. P. 50.

24 Christine M. Corsgaard. The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil. R. 235.

25 Ibid. P. 231.

Bibliography

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Tereshchenko M. Such a fragile cover of humanity. The banality of evil, the banality of good. M.: ROSSPEN, 2010. P. 67-94.

Harris S. Lies. Why telling the truth is always better. M.: Alpina Publisher, 2015. 143 p.

On the right to lie / Ed. R.G. Apresyan. M.: ROSSPEN, 2011. 392 p. CorsgaardM. Christine. The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil // Deontology. Ed. by S. Darwall. Blackwell Publishing, 2003, pp. 212-235.

Fried C. Right and Wrong as Absolute // Absolutism and its consequentialist critics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield publishers, 1994. pp. 73-92.

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Hare R.M. The Language of Morals. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960. 202 p. Milgram S. Obedience to Authority. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1974. 256 p. Nagel T. War and Massacre. Absolutism and its consequentialist critics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield publishers, 1994. pp. 217-237.

Williams B. A Critique of Consequentialism // Absolutism and its consequentialist critics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield publishers, 1994. pp. 93-107.

Moral Absolutism and Noble Lie

PhD in Philosophy; e-mail: [email protected]

The author analyzes the approach to the problem of lie proposed by Kant in the essay "On the alleged right to lie from philanthropy" which caused a vivid discussion in Russian ethics. In everyday life we ​​are usually guided by the logic of common sense and we are constantly focused on searching for compromises. Therefore, it is very difficult to switch to another logic - the logic of uncompromising morality when it is necessary to preserve the human dignity and individual freedom. Nevertheless, it may be heartless to follow the unconditional imperatives of formal morality in usual life. Obviously, the Kantian commitment to tell nothing but the truth in any situation contradicts intuitions of commonsense morality. The main value for Kant is the internal integrity and moral autonomy of the subject, focused only on himself, his noumenal and panhuman basis. A brief excurse into the specification and typology of ethical absolutism taken by the author allows determining the position of Kant and his followers

as an abstract absolutism. At the same time, the rejection of abstract absolutist approach to the issue of lie does not necessarily lead to the rejection of absolutism in general, as it is demonstrated in the analysis of alternative ethical positions of A. Gewirth and N. Geisler. In conclusion, the author poses the question of the possibility of combining the deontological and consequentialistic position within a coherent normative doctrine.

Keywords: ethics, moral absolutism, deontology, consequentialism, lie, Immanuel Kant, Abdusalam Guseinov, Alan Gewirth, Norman Geisler

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Corsgaard, M.Cr. "The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil," Deontology, ed. by S. Darwall. Oxford: Blackwell Publ., 2003, pp. 212-235.

Dostoevskii, F.M. Brat"ya Karamazovy, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 9. Leningrad: Science Publ., 1991. (In Russian)

Fried, C. "Right and Wrong as Absolute", Absolutism and its consequentialist critics, ed. by J.G. Haber. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield publishers, 1994, pp. 73-92.

Geisler, N. "Any absolutes? Absolutely!", Christian Research Institute, 2009 (April). Available at: http://www.equip.org/articles/any-absolutes-absolutely-/ (accessed on 07/20/2014)

Gewirth, A. "Are There Any Absolute Rights?", Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics, ed. by J.G. Haber. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield publishers, 1994, pp. 129-146.

Guseinov, A.A. "What govoril Kant, ili Pochemu nevozmozhna lozh" vo blago", O prave lgaf, ed. by R.G. Apressyan. Moscow: ROSSPEN Publ., 2011, pp. 108-127. (In Russian)

Hare, R.M. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960. 202 pp. Kant, I. "Osnovopoloshenie Metafiziki nravstvennosti", Sochineniya na Nemetskom i Russkom yazykah, ed. by N. Motroshilova, B. Tushling, vol. 3. Moscow: Moscow Philos. Fund Publ., 1997. pp. 39-275. (In Russian)

Kharis, S. Lozh." Pochemu govorit" pravdu vsegda luchshe, trans. by E. Bakusheva. Moscow: Alpina Publ., 2015. 143 pp. (In Russian) Milgram S. Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 256 pp. Nagel, T. "War and Massacre", Absolutism and its consequentialist critics, ed. by J.G. Haber. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield publishers, 1994, pp. 217-237.

Apressyan R.G. (ed.) Oprave lgat". Moscow: ROSSPEN Publ., 2011. 392 pp. (In Russian)

Tereshchenko, M. Takoi khrupkii pokrov chelovechnosti. Banal "nost" zla, banal "nost" dobra . Moscow: ROSSPEN Publ., 2010, pp. 67-94. (In Russian)

Williams, B. A "Critique of Consequentialism" in: Absolutism and its consequentialist critics. Ed. By J. G. Haber. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield publishers, 1994, pp. 93-107.

Zimbardo, F. Effekt Lyutsifera. Pochemu khoroshie lyudi prevrashchayutsya v zlodeev, trans. by A. Svivka. Moscow: Alpina non-fiction Publ., 2013. 740 pp. (In Russian)

White lies.

Whether we like it or not, we are faced with lies every day. Relatives, friends, colleagues, neighbors and acquaintances are capable of telling lies, while hiding information that concerns you directly. Everyone is familiar with the expression white lie, and many actively use it under any pretext. However, can a lie really be saving and useful to a person, because the secret sooner or later becomes apparent, then the understanding comes that he was deliberately deceived, and begins to consider the lie as a betrayal, this gives rise to distrust in others.
A lie is deliberately untrue information that, by and large, should make a situation or a person better than he is. From early childhood, braggarts appear, and later people grow up for whom any lie is good. A feature of the psyche is the avoidance of unpleasant situations, as well as feelings of guilt and shame, so it is easier to hide an action than to experience a whole bunch of unpleasant sensations; there is a fear of exposure and shame, this becomes a reason for new lies. The most banal fear and irresponsibility in relation to their actions encourage more and more people to lie.
Of course, life is very unpredictable and multifaceted, and there are situations in which the truth may not really matter much, but a person should know it. By hiding the truth, you make decisions for someone else, mistakenly thinking that you understand their needs. If a person is dying and wants to know how much time he has left, would it not be a crime on your part to take away his last days, when he thinks that there is still time. Sometimes we take on too much and hurt our family and friends. Of course, you need to help, but only when asked, and you see that it is necessary in other cases, let the person decide for himself what is good for him.
A lie in itself carries a negative connotation; by deceiving, you yourself stop trusting people and begin to look for a catch. The fact that the prefix for good is added to the word lie does not change its meaning. We try to justify our actions, not wanting to admit even to ourselves that it is wrong and not good. A lie gives rise to a lie in response; if you constantly leave things unsaid, evade an answer, hide information, then you should not expect that there will be honest and decent people in your environment. After all, like attracts like, and people probably understand everything, and more often they subconsciously feel it, noticing changes in facial expressions, gestures and voice.
People who constantly tell white lies are easy to pick out from a crowd or recognize in a direct conversation. They behave extremely unnaturally, speak quickly, their voice changes timbre and intonation, there is no clear logical connection in their speech, and of course boasting, which is considered a harmless lie. During the conversation there are no answers to the questions asked, basically a monologue takes place in which the interlocutor is trying to convince you of something in which he himself does not believe. It is very difficult to communicate with such people; as a rule, they are selfish and outcasts in the team, which forces you to once again remind them of their merits.
Before you commit a white lie next time, think carefully about whether your perception of reality matches the one you want to help. And if you are tired of lies and want to change, stop lying to yourself, accept and love yourself the way nature created you. Then deep personal changes and a reassessment of life values ​​will take place within you, you will notice how the world around you will change, everything will be filled with purity and trust, without which the creation of good is not possible.

For Judas, the truth is destructive, but lies are sometimes necessary. It is absolutely necessary. To say that she is a savior would be wrong. Indeed, in a situation when a man with a club runs up to you, there is another option for behavior - to be a martyr of the truth and answer: “There was a man here, I know where he is, but I won’t tell, even if I have to die.” The only question is, is everyone capable of this?

Archpriest Georgy Gorbachuk, rector of the Vladimir Theological Seminary, rector of the Transfiguration Church at the Golden Gate, Vladimir

Is the truth always saving?

The answer would seem obvious. Lying is a sin, therefore, it cannot be salutary.

But is everything so clear? Is the truth always saving?

Let's turn to the Gospel. Judas didn't lie. He did not kiss Peter, saying that it was Jesus, and not Thomas... But the truth, spoken at the wrong time, not for benefit, not for good, is a betrayal and is considered a grave sin. Such truth is a direct path to hell and it cannot be salutary.

And if the truth is not always salutary, it is logical to assume that sometimes it is better to lie than to tell the truth.

To clarify this statement, I will give the following example.

In Soviet times, I was repeatedly summoned to the State Security Committee for “processing” (it was located in the building where the Vladimir Theological Seminary is now located). One day they showed me a list of names and asked if I had baptized the people named there.

If I had told the truth and admitted to performing the sacrament, the people on the list would have been processed at party meetings, deprived of bonuses, removed from the queue for apartments, etc. Therefore, I answered the KGB officer that I did not baptize those named in list, and explained the essence of the problem as follows: “A man is running past me in great fear, I see him hiding in the bushes. Soon another one comes running, with a club in his hands, and asks: “Did anyone run through here?” If I show the wrong direction, the one hiding will be saved. Therefore, I answer: I did not baptize any of the persons you indicated.” He was indignant, but that was the end of the matter.

So, Judas truth is destructive, and lies are sometimes necessary. It is absolutely necessary. To say that she is a savior would be wrong. Indeed, in a situation when a man with a club runs up to you, there is another option for behavior - to be a martyr of the truth and answer: “There was a man here, I know where he is, but I won’t tell, even if I have to die.” The only question is, is everyone capable of this?

Archpriest Alexander Sorokin, rector of the Church of the Feodorovskaya Icon of the Mother of God, chairman of the Publishing Department of the St. Petersburg Diocese, St. Petersburg

Define "lesser evil"

If anyone thinks that “white lies” is a quote from the Bible, then he is mistaken. This is a distorted quote from Psalm 32: A king cannot be saved by much strength, and a giant cannot be saved by the abundance of his strength. A horse lies for salvation, but in the abundance of its strength it will not be saved (Ps 33:16-17), in Russian: A horse is unreliable for salvation. Lozh - in this case, a Slavic short adjective of the masculine gender (in the Russian Synodal translation it is translated as “unreliable”). We are talking, as we see, about a horse, but the proverb has a completely different meaning. Another example of the use of the same word (and again in the Psalter) is Psalm 115: But I said in my anger: every man is a liar (Ps 115:2), that is, again, “unreliable.” It seems to me that when we are faced with the question “to lie or not to lie” and at the same time various considerations about the good or overcoming some harm incline us in favor of “lying”, we are faced with the classic situation of choosing the “lesser evil”. We know that, in principle, lying is bad, it’s a sin, and for this, one way or another, if it doesn’t gnaw at you, then it pricks your conscience. But there are situations when on the opposite side of the scale (“don’t lie”) there are prospects for even worse consequences. The main question here, as always, is to determine what is the “lesser evil” in a given situation. In fact, will this particular lie be a lesser sin and do less harm than the “womb truth”, which a person is ready to “cut” in full in any case? Not to mention the fact that it is difficult and uncomfortable for a conscientious person to lie even “for salvation”, even in some small detail, so he often deceives rather ineptly, and in the end this can result in even greater evil.

To specify the problem, it must be said that lying “in one’s own favor” is prohibited, and primarily because it is most often “used” to avoid unpleasant consequences, punishment for a crime, or retribution for any mistake. It is permissible to lie to save the life of a neighbor, hiding him from persecution; sometimes it is permissible to evade the truth when speaking about the diagnosis of a terminally ill person (I emphasize - sometimes, since a lot depends on a wide variety of additional circumstances). In general, if a “white lie” can be justified in some specific rare situations by love for one’s neighbor, then in general it is a very dangerous tool that “blurs” the eye between love for one’s neighbors and some “good” according to one’s own understanding.

Priest John Okhlobystin, screenwriter, writer, Moscow

There can be no white in black

It seems to me that when talking about lies, we must clearly distinguish between two concepts - “lie” and “concealment”. A white lie is impossible, but concealment - yes, in some cases it really is saving. Suppose a person is terminally ill - this is a force majeure situation in which hiding the terrible truth is sometimes the only way to prevent him from losing heart.

But still, it is very difficult to decide on your own, relying only on your idea of ​​the good, whether a lie in a particular case will be salvation. The world exists according to certain laws, and the series of events is a manifestation of these laws; accordingly, it is under the patronage of God. One way or another, if the situation occurred, it means it was pleasing to the Lord, or was provoked by our own actions with God’s permission. By telling a lie, we distort the truth: there can be no white in black.

Archpriest George Blatinsky, rector of the Church of the Nativity of Christ and St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, Florence, Patriarchate of Constantinople

False truth

No, I believe that lies, no matter how they are served, are unacceptable. The Gospel says that the father of lies is the devil (John 8:44). If we tell a lie, thinking that we are saving someone or something, that is deception. Lies, or in other words deceit, cannot lead anyone to good in any way. Deceit is not accomplished by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, we must try to prevent lies in our speeches or actions.

But, of course, there are situations in life when the truth, spoken to one’s face, can greatly hurt a person and cause pain. In this case, I prefer to simply not say anything, to postpone the truthful conversation until another time. I think that not to say - this is, in rare cases, still a possible way. I would really like not to do this, but in life not everything works out the way you want. Therefore, I reserve this option for myself as a last resort.

Archpriest Igor Pchelintsev, press secretary of the Nizhny Novgorod diocese, Nizhny Novgorod

Decayed rags of glossy lies

I understand that people who use the expression “white lie” most often mean concealing or distorting the real state of affairs for the sake of peace of mind, for example, for people who are seriously ill or in some other critical situations. In matters where it is unprofitable to reveal the truth, but no one will suffer from ignorance. That is, it does not mean some kind of conscious betrayal, serving the “father of lies and the main liar.”

Such things, alas, are possible in our fallen world, and this is very sad. For example, diplomacy (both human relations diplomacy and international diplomacy) is also often a “white lie.” The use of this technique is one of the evidences of the unbearable division of our world. Like the death penalty - a “necessary, unavoidable evil”, killing in the name of the “happiness” of the survivors. And the soul can only grieve and cry for that happy time when it will not be necessary to hide the truth in the decayed rags of glossy untruth.

At the same time, “lying for the sake of deliverance” is evil. A lie is a lie, and you must answer for it as if it were a sin. For example, the Grand Duchess and Martyr Elisaveta Feodorovna in her Martha and Mary Convent tried to make efforts of the heart to prepare a hopelessly ill person for Christian death, rather than leaving him in the dark about his tragic situation.

Priest Evgeniy Likhota, rector of the Holy Nativity Church, Brest

You can't lie to God

We live in a world that lies in evil. The laws of sinful tangles often operate in it, where lies beget lies. Christianity offers an option to break the chain of lies - repentance. Another question is to tell a child that he will die soon? Is hiding the truth or not telling the truth a lie? This is a matter of everyone's conscience.

Abba Dorotheos wrote in his teachings that “when such a great need occurs to deviate from the word of truth, then even then a person should not remain careless, but should repent and cry before God and consider such an occasion as a time of temptation.”

It seems to me that the problem of modern people is to break the circle of lies in their own lives. A person puts on one mask when communicating with loved ones, another at work, another one when surrounded by friends, and, worst of all, he puts on a mask when he begins to read a prayer rule or goes to church. He begins to lie to God and loses himself. In this lie his own soul disintegrates. As much as a person develops spiritually, he becomes freed from all lies.

Priest Alexander Ryabkov, cleric of the Church of the Holy Great Martyr Demetrius of Thessaloniki, St. Petersburg

For what purpose is the lie spoken?

A lie told once is not a lie itself. Anyone can stumble, get scared, or come under pressure. e more powerful. A lie is an internal attitude, an established worldview, or even deliberate service to the “father of lies.” The lie is based on an incorrect life orientation. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish - for what purpose is the lie spoken?

If I hide a person's location from people who want to abuse him, is that a lie? No, because at the core there is a desire to serve the truth. Did underground heroes serve a lie by not betraying their comrades? Will we serve lies if we protect our children from corrupting information? Of course not. But if, in the process of raising them, we do not correct our shortcomings, but simply hide them by all means, this will be a lie. Will we serve the lie, saving a person who has taken the path of correction from his former connections that corrupt him? No, for example, we have the right to tell old friends that the one for whom we are fighting is not at home or has left.

But can we not tell a person that he is terminally ill? If a person is morally sick, you cannot hide it from him. If a person is physically ill and his days are numbered, he should also be notified of this. He needs to reconcile with God and his neighbors, realize the reality of meeting another world and be prepared for it. And often in this situation, loved ones choose the path of “talking their teeth.” “We deceive him for his sake.” But there is deceit here. To create a calm atmosphere for a person to comprehend the path he has traveled and to dispose him to repentance is a big and serious job. And we don’t want to take on this psychological burden as well.

Archimandrite Alexy (Shinkevich), responsible officer of the Belarusian Exarchate for media relations, Minsk

To remain silent for the sake of love

Unfortunately, in pastoral life there are situations when you have to not tell the real truth, but only in those cases when it is more dangerous and destructive than a lie. But the situation is no less responsible when you have to reveal the truth, no matter how unpleasant it may be. The decision to remain silent requires special moral struggles and experiences. I recall the words of Father Pavel Florensky, who noted that even truth, even truth, is antinomic, contradictory.

For there cannot be unrighteousness with God (Job 34:10).

Here you need to have a special spiritual reasoning, a special inner voice of God promoting truth and righteousness, or, as the Apostle John says, here you need a mind that has wisdom (Rev 17:9).

Hieromonk Nikon (Bachmanov), teacher of the Stavropol Orthodox Theological Seminary, Stavropol

A lie is something that doesn't exist

For a reflective person, the answer is obvious, no sin (and lying is a sin) can make us closer to God, because a lie is an evil invention of Satan, a lie is, in essence, something that does not exist. Holy Scripture condemns lies in any form: all untruth is sin (1 John 5:17). But when we have to descend from the realm of reflection to the realities of life, then our fallen nature fails. Every man is a liar (Rom 3:4), the Apostle Paul tells us about our nature. There is, however, no contradiction here. If we turn to the Holy Scriptures and the lives of the saints, we will see that in them lies and cunning are either clearly condemned or have disastrous consequences. For example, the Old Testament Jacob, for deceiving his father, had to endure a long wandering away from his home and the hatred of his brother. And the church canons themselves do not exempt from responsibility those who, although out of necessity, sinned by deception (Sequence on Confession. Breviary). It is impossible to say, of course, whether a white lie is possible. But to the question of whether a lie will lead to the salvation of our soul, the answer is unequivocal - no! “Lies close the doors to prayer. A lie drives faith out of a person's heart. The Lord moves away from the person who lies” (St. Theophan the Recluse).