Mongols and Russ discuss the consequences of Mongol rule. Lesson-discussion on the history of Russia on the topic "Consequences of the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars in Russia

Topic: "Horde dominion"

The purpose of the lesson: determine the attitude of students to the problem under study.

Tasks:

- to establish whether the enslavement of Russia by the Mongol-Tatars was (having considered different versions proposed by Russian scientists of the 19th-20th centuries);

Determine the forms of Mongol-Tatar rule over Russian lands;

Determine the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar yoke;

To consolidate the skills of independent work with historical documents and popular science literature;

Improve communication skills through the organization of work on an individual educational route.

To promote the formation of students' critical, logical thinking, the ability to work with a historical map, a historical source, work in groups, perform a problem task

- to educate students in love for the Motherland, a sense of civic duty, cognitive interest in the subject.

Equipment: multimedia presentation, historical sources.

During the classes

Introduction

Organizing time.

2. Work motivation

In the last lesson, we considered the issue of the attack of the Mongol-Tatars on Russian soil.

"Oh, bright and beautifully decorated, the Russian land! You are glorified with many beauties: clean fields, countless great cities, glorious villages, monastery gardens, God's temples and formidable princes. You are full of everything, the Russian land

" A huge number of people died, many were taken captive, mighty cities disappeared from the face of the earth forever, precious manuscripts, magnificent frescoes were destroyed, the secrets of many crafts were lost ... " (Teacher reads both statements)

Teacher: These two statements characterize Russia in the thirteenth century. Why did this metamorphosis take place, what happened in Russia? This will be discussed in the lesson, the topic of which is “Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russia. Establishment of the Horde yoke”.

Questions for students.

- What questions do you think should be considered when studying this topic? Suggested answers. (What is a yoke? What was it?

What are the consequences of the yoke for Russia?)

II. Main part. Learning new material. Presentation of the topic and objectives of the lesson.

1. To acquaint with different points of view on the essence and role of the yoke in the development of Russia and summarize them.

There are many turning points in Russian history. But the main frontier is the Mongol-Tatar invasion. It divided Russia into pre-Mongolian and post-Mongolian. The Mongol-Tatar invasion and the Horde yoke forced our ancestors to experience such terrible stress that I think it still sits in our genetic memory. And although Russia took revenge on the Horde on the Kulikovo field, and then completely threw off the yoke, but nothing passes without a trace. Mongol-Tatar slavery made the Russian man different. The Russian man did not become better or worse, he became different.

In historical science, there are different points of view on the role of the yoke in Russian history. We have brought to your attention some excerpts from the assessment of the role of the yoke, Read and make a conclusion about the points of view on this issue:

1. V.P.Darkevich: "... the role of the Mongol invasion in the history of the Russian people is completely negative."

2. V.V. Trepavlov: "... the conquest had an equally negative and positive impact on the history of Russia."

3. A.A. Gorsky: “The history of the Golden Horde is part of the history of Russia. It is unscientific to raise the question of the influence of the Mongol invasion on the centuries-old development of Russian statehood on a scale positively or negatively.

4. A.S. Pushkin: “Russia’s destiny was determined: its boundless plains absorbed the power of the Mongols and stopped their invasion at the very edge of Europe: the barbarians did not dare to leave enslaved Russia in their rear and returned to the steppes of their East. The emerging Enlightenment was saved by a torn and dying Russia.

5. P.N.Savitsky: “Without the “Tatars” there would be no Russia. Great happiness that she went to the Tatars. The Tatars did not change the spiritual being of Russia. But in the quality of the creators of states, a military-organizing force, which was distinctive for them in this era, they undoubtedly influenced Russia.

6. N.M. Karamzin: “Moscow owes its greatness to the Khan”

7. S.M. Solovyov: “We notice that the influence of the Mongols here was not the main and decisive one. The Mongols remained to live in the distance ... not at all interfering in internal relations, leaving in complete freedom to operate those new relations that began in the north of Russia before them.

8. V.V. Kargalov: “It was the invasion that caused the temporary backwardness of our country from the most developed states.”

9. VL Yanin: “There is no epoch in the history of medieval Russia more terrible than the tragic beginning of the 13th century, Our past was cut in two by a crooked Tatar saber.”

10. M. Geller: "In the public mind, the time of the Mongol yoke left a clear, unambiguous memory: foreign power, slavery, violence, self-will."

11. V. Klyuchevsky: "The power of the Horde Khan gave at least the specter of unity to the smaller and mutually alienated patrimonial corners of the Russian princes."

12. L.N. Gumilyov: “Stories about the complete destruction of Russia ... suffer from exaggeration ... Batu wanted to establish true friendship with the Russian princes ... An alliance with the Orthodox Mongols was needed like air.”

Thus, we can conclude that there are the following points of view on the role of the Mongol yoke in the development of Russia:

1. The Mongol-Tatars had a mostly positive impact on the development of Russia, tk. they pushed for the creation of a unified Muscovite state.

2. The Mongol-Tatars had little impact on the life of ancient Russian society.

3. The Mongol-Tatars had a negative impact, slowed down the development of Russia and its unification.

The impact of the Mongol-Tatars on Russia

Today in the lesson I invite you to think about which point of view you agree with and why.

2. Consider the features of the development of Russia during the period of Mongol dependence.

I offer you the role of historians who should consider the features of the development of Russia during the period of Mongol dependence and draw a conclusion about the influence and consequences of the yoke.

In 1243, the Golden Horde was founded, after the return of Batu from a campaign in Western Europe. The Mongol-Tatars reached the bottom of the Volga and founded the capital of the Horde - the city of Saray. The first Khan of the Golden Horde - Batu. The Golden Horde included: Crimea, the Black Sea region, the North Caucasus, the Volga region, Kazakhstan, the south of Western Siberia and Central Asia. The Russian principalities were not part of the Golden Horde, but were dependent on it - under the yoke. The yoke was established in 1240.

First, let's find out what a yoke is? Yoke is

And now let's see how relations between Russia and the Golden Horde developed and developed in the region:

political development;

economic life;

spiritual life

2.1. Find out the changes in political life.

BUT) Karamzin noted that the Tatar-Mongol yoke played an important role in the evolution of Russian statehood. In addition, he also pointed to the Horde as the obvious reason for the rise of the Moscow principality. Follow him Klyuchevsky also believed that the Horde prevented exhausting internecine wars in Russia. According to L.N. Gumilyov, the interaction of the Horde and Russia was a profitable political union, first of all, for Russia. He believed that the relationship between Russia and the Horde should be called "symbiosis". Analyze the content of the following source: “The Tatars did not change the system of power in Russia, they retained the existing political system, taking the right to appoint a prince. Each Russian prince - the khans never went beyond the Rurik dynasty - had to appear in Saray and receive a label for reigning. The Mongolian system opened up the widest possibilities for indirect control of the country: all princes received a “label” and thus had access to the khan. (Geller m. History of the Russian Empire) "

What changes have taken place in the organization of power?

The conquerors did not occupy the territory of Russia, they did not keep their troops here, the governors of the khan did not sit in the cities. Russian princes were still at the head of the Russian principalities, princely dynasties were preserved, but the power of the princes was limited. Although the ancient Russian norms of inheritance continued to operate, the Horde authorities put them under their control. Only with the permission of the Khan of the Golden Horde did they have the right to occupy the throne, receiving special permission for this - a khan's letter - a label. To obtain a label, one had to go to Sarai and go through a humiliating procedure there - to go through the supposedly cleansing fire that burned in front of the khan's tent and kiss his shoe. Those who refused to do so were killed. And among the Russian princes there were such. Khan thus became the source of princely power.

The first to go to the Horde in 1243 was his brother Yaroslav, who remained the main prince of Vladimir-Suzdal after the death of Yuri. According to the chronicle, Batu "honored him with great honor and his men" and appointed him the eldest of the princes: "May you be older than all the princes in the Russian language." Following the Prince of Vladimir, the others followed.

- IN what was the significance of the ability of the khans to distribute labels?

For the Horde rulers, the distribution of labels for reigning became a means of political pressure on the Russian princes. With their help, the khans redrawn the political map of North-Eastern Russia, kindled rivalry and sought to weaken the most dangerous princes. A trip to the Horde for a label did not always end happily for the Russian princes. So, Prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich Chernigovsky, who reigned in Kyiv during the time of the Batu invasion, was executed in the Horde, as his life tells, because of his refusal to perform the pagan rite of purification: to pass between two fires. Galician Prince Daniil Romanovich also went to the Horde for a label. Yaroslav Vsevolodovich's trip to distant Karakorum turned out to be unsuccessful - he was poisoned there (1246).

The Mongols introduced into the minds of their tributaries - the Russians - the idea of ​​the rights of their leader (khan) as the supreme owner (patrimony) of all the land they occupied. Then, after the overthrow of the yoke, the princes could transfer the supreme power of the khan to themselves. Only in the Mongol period does the concept of a prince appear not only as a sovereign, but also as the owner of all the land. The Grand Dukes gradually became to their subjects in such an attitude in which the Mongol khans stood in relation to themselves. “According to the principles of Mongolian state law,” says Nevolin, “all the land in general, which was within the dominion of the khan, was his property; the subjects of the khan could only be simple landowners.” In all regions of Russia, except for Novgorod and Western Russia, these principles were to be reflected in the principles of Russian law. The princes, as rulers of their regions, as representatives of the khan, naturally enjoyed the same rights in their destinies as he did in his entire state. With the fall of the Mongol rule, the princes became the heirs of the khan's power, and, consequently, of those rights that were connected with it”

In political terms, according to Karamzin, the Mongol yoke led to the complete disappearance of free-thinking: "Princes, humbly groveling in the Horde, returned from there as formidable rulers." The boyar aristocracy lost power and influence. "In a word, autocracy was born." All these changes were a heavy burden on the population, but in the long run their effect was positive. They brought an end to the civil strife that destroyed the Kievan state and helped Russia get back on its feet when the Mongol empire fell.

The political of this time was characterized by a fierce struggle for a great reign between the most powerful princes: Tver, Rostov and Moscow.

B) a special place among the princes is occupied by A. Nevsky, whose activities had an ambiguous assessment: some called him a traitor, others justified his actions by objective necessity.

1. “Among the exploits of Alexander Nevsky is the answer to the ambassadors who came to him from the Pope “from the great Rome”: “... we will not accept teachings from you” (Geller M. History of the Russian Empire).

Domestic historians gave the following assessment of the activities of Nevsky.

2. N.S. Borisov “His name has become a symbol of military prowess. He was not sinless, but a worthy son of his troubled age.”

3. A.Ya. Degtyarev "He is the ancestor of the revival of Russia."

4. A.N. Kirpichnikov "Rus was lucky with such a ruler, when the very survival of the people was called into question"

- Why does Nevsky's activity cause controversy? (Message by Dobrynin)

IN) In pre-Mongolian Russia, a big role played veche. Does his position change? (Kalinin)

D) in Russia during the period under study there was an institution of Basques. Read textbook p. 133 top paragraph.and determine its value.

Baskak- a representative of the Horde Khan in Russia, who controlled the actions of the princes, was in charge of collecting tribute, the "great Baskak" had a residence in Vladimir, where the political center of the country actually moved from Kyiv.

E) The foreign policy of the princes (speech by a student )

The task. Consider S. Ivanov "Baskaki" - what did the Baskaks collect from the Russian population?

2.2. Historian Katsva L.A. so characterizes economic situation: “According to archaeologists, out of 74 cities that existed in Russia in the XII-XIII centuries, 49 were destroyed by Batu, and 14 were depopulated forever. Many of the survivors, especially artisans, were driven into slavery. Entire professions have disappeared. The heaviest damage was inflicted on the feudal lords. Out of 12 Ryazan princes, 9 died, out of 3 Rostov princes -2, out of 9 Suzdal princes -5. The composition of the squads has changed almost completely.

What conclusion can be drawn from this document?

Vl. Rodionov will tell about the geopolitical situation.

The Russian state was thrown back. Russia turned into a strongly economically and culturally lagging state. Moreover, many elements of the Asian mode of production were "woven" into its economy, which affected the path of the country's historical development. After the Mongols occupied the southern and southeastern steppes, the Western Russian principalities went to Lithuania. As a result, Russia seemed to be cordoned off from all sides. She was cut off from the outside world. The foreign economic and political relations of Russia with the more enlightened Western countries and Greece were disrupted, cultural ties were interrupted. Russia, surrounded by uneducated invaders, gradually grew wild. Therefore, there was such a backwardness from other states and the coarsening of the people, and the country itself stalled in its development. However, this did not affect some northern lands, such as Novgorod, which continued trade and economic relations with the West. Surrounded by dense forests and swamps, Novgorod, Pskov received natural protection from the invasion of the Mongols, whose cavalry was not adapted to wage war in such conditions. In these city-republics, for a long time, according to the old established custom, the power belonged to the veche, and the prince was invited to reign, who was elected by the whole society. If the prince's rule was not liked, then he could also be expelled from the city with the help of the veche. Thus, the influence of the yoke had a huge negative impact on Kievan Rus, which not only became impoverished, but also, as a result of the increased fragmentation of the principalities between the heirs, gradually moved its center from Kyiv to Moscow, which was getting richer and gaining power (thanks to its active rulers)

- What changes have taken place in this area?

- How did business develop? Listen to Anvarova V. and draw a conclusion about the consequences of the Mongol invasion in the field of economy.

Researchers note in Russia during the yoke the decline of stone construction and the disappearance of complex crafts, such as the production of glass jewelry, cloisonne enamel, niello, granulation, and polychrome glazed ceramics. "Rus was thrown back several centuries, and in those centuries when the guild industry of the West was passing to the era of primitive accumulation, the Russian handicraft industry had to pass part of the historical path that had been done before Batu for the second time."

2.3. Tributary relationship. How do you understand the essence of the following historical source: “The population of Russian lands was taxed from their homes. Preparation for the introduction of the tax system in Russia was the census. In addition to the monetary tax, the yamskaya duty was added: providing carts and horses for the yamskaya service - mail. (Geller m. History of the Russian Empire).

As you remember, already near Ryazan, the Mongols demanded payment of tribute, and not having received it, they continued their campaign against other Russian cities and villages, burning and devastating on their way.

How were tributary relations established and developed? Listen to Druzhinina I.

For almost 20 years, there was no clear procedure for paying tribute. In 1257, clerks were sent to North-Eastern Russia to conduct a census in order to determine the internal resources of the population for use in military campaigns and organize an orderly collection of tribute. Since that time, annual tribute payments, called output, have been established. The population was taxed in accordance with their property status. The Italian monk Plano Carpini wrote that "... anyone who does not give this should be taken to the Tatars and turned into their slave." Initially, tenants, centurions, thousanders and temniks were appointed from local residents, who were supposed to monitor the flow of tribute from the yards assigned to them. The direct collection of tribute was carried out by Muslim merchants - tax-farmers, who had long traded with the Mongols. In Russia they were called infidels. They paid the khans at once the entire amount from this or that region, and themselves, having settled in one of the cities, collected it from the population, of course, in a larger amount. Since popular uprisings began against the Basurmans and the constant presence of Mongol troops was required to maintain the existing system, the khan eventually transferred the collection of the Horde tribute to the Russian princes, which led to new problems. The expenses associated with frequent trips to the Horde ruined the petty princes. Not receiving payment of debts, the Tatars completely ruined entire cities and volosts. In addition, strife arises, as princes often use trips to the Horde to weave intrigues against each other. The next step in the development of the Horde tribute collection system was the recognition by the khan of the exclusive right of the Grand Duke of Vladimir to receive and deliver output from all Russian lands to the Horde.

- What do you think are the consequences of this tribute payment procedure? (raising the status of the Grand Duke, centralizing the collection of tribute)

2.3. Find out the attitude of the people to their position

- How did the Russian people treat the oppressors?

The masses resisted the Horde oppression. Strong unrest occurred in Novgorod land. In 1257, when they began to collect tribute there, the Novgorodians refused to pay it. However, Alexander Nevsky, who considered it impossible to openly clash with the Horde, brutally cracked down on the rebels. However, the Novgorodians continued to resist. They refused to be "given in number", to be recorded during the census. Their indignation was also caused by the fact that the boyars "do it easy for themselves, but evil for the lesser." It was possible to put smaller people in the number only in 1259. But in 1262, in many cities of the Russian land, in particular in Rostov, Suzdal, Yaroslavl, Ustyug the Great, Vladimir, there were popular uprisings, many tribute collectors were Baskaks and Muslim merchants, to whom the Baskaks handed over the collection of tribute at the mercy, were killed. Frightened by the popular movement, the Horde decided to transfer a significant tribute to the specific Russian princes with tea.

Thus, the popular movement forced the Horde to go, if not to the complete abolition of Basqueism, then at least to limit it, and the obligation to collect tribute passed to the Russian princes.

2.5. Consider the development of culture.

BUT) The role of the church : “The privileged position of the church was ensured by the fact that the metropolitan, as princes, had direct access to the khan. This gave him the opportunity to influence politics. In Russian churches they prayed for the "free tsar", as the khan was called. Having received a label from the khan, the metropolitan was independent of the prince. (Geller m. History of the Russian Empire).

The establishment of the political domination of the conquerors over Russia somewhat changed the position of the church. She, like the princes, became a vassal of the khans. But at the same time, the Russian hierarchs got the opportunity to defend their interests in the Horde, regardless of the princely power, which made them active participants in the political struggle in Russia. This was facilitated by the loyal attitude of the Mongols towards all religious cults and their servants, and the release of the latter from paying tribute to the Horde, whichall other subjects of the Mongol Empire. This circumstance put the Russian Church in a privileged position, but for this she had to recognize the power of the Khan as given by God and call for obedience to her. The thirteenth century was a time of decisive penetration of Christianity into the masses of the population (the people sought protection and patronage from God), and the terrible decades of foreign conquest and yoke probably contributed to this process.

Thus, the influence of the yoke had a huge negative impact on Kievan Rus, which not only became impoverished, but also, as a result of the increased fragmentation of the principalities between the heirs, gradually moved its center from Kyiv to Moscow, which was getting richer and gaining power (thanks to its active rulers)

B) Development of culture Listen to Tolstoy

The influence of the Mongol conquest on cultural development is traditionally defined in historical writings as negative. According to many historians, cultural stagnation set in in Russia, expressed in the cessation of chronicle writing, stone construction, etc. Karamzin wrote: “At the same time, Russia, tormented by the Mughals, strained its forces solely in order not to disappear: we had no time for enlightenment!”. Under the rule of the Mongols, the Russians lost their civic virtues; in order to survive, they did not shy away from deception, love of money, cruelty: “Perhaps the very present character of the Russians still shows the stains placed on it by the barbarity of the Mughals,” wrote Karamzin. If any moral values ​​were preserved in them at that time, then this happened solely thanks to Orthodoxy.

While recognizing the existence of these and other negative consequences, it should be noted that there are other consequences that cannot always be assessed from a negative point of view. The Tatar-Mongols tried not to openly encroach on the spiritual way of life of the Russian people, and above all on the Orthodox faith, although they destroyed churches. To some extent, they were tolerant of any religion, outwardly and in their own Golden Horde did not interfere with the performance of any religious rites. The Russian clergy, not without reason, were often considered by the Horde as their allies. Firstly, the Russian Church fought against the influence of Catholicism, and the Pope was an enemy of the Golden Horde. Secondly, the church in Russia in the initial period of the yoke supported the princes who advocated coexistence with the Horde. In turn, the Horde freed the Russian clergy from tribute and supplied the ministers of the church with letters of protection for church property. Later, the church played a significant role in rallying the entire Russian people to fight for independence.

The Russian scholar Alexander Richter draws attention to the Russian adoption of Mongolian diplomatic etiquette, as well as evidence of influence such as the isolation of women and them, the spread of inns and taverns, food preferences (tea and bread), methods of warfare, the practice of punishment (beating with a whip) , the use of extrajudicial decisions, the introduction of money and a system of measures, ways of processing silver and steel, numerous language innovations.

Eastern customs spread uncontrollably in Russia during the time of the Mongols, bringing with them a new culture. It changed in a general way: from white long Slavic shirts, long trousers, they switched to golden caftans, to colored trousers, to morocco boots. A great change in life made that time in the position of women: the domestic life of a Russian woman came from the East. In addition to these major features of everyday Russian life of that time, abacus, felt boots, coffee, dumplings, the uniformity of Russian and Asian carpentry and joinery tools, the similarity of the walls of the Kremlin of Beijing and Moscow, all this is the influence of the East. Church bells, this is a specific Russian feature, came from Asia, from there and pit bells. Before the Mongols, churches and monasteries did not use bells, but beat and riveted. The foundry art was then developed in China, and bells could come from there.

III. Consolidation.

1. So, we examined the features of the development of Russia in the period of the 13th - 14th centuries. Which point of view, in your opinion, most accurately reflects the changes that have taken place? Why

2. What do you think, what are the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar yoke? (Students answer, then write in notebooks):

Many Russian people were killed.

Many villages and towns were devastated.

The craft has fallen into disrepair. Many crafts are forgotten.

Funds were systematically extorted from the country in the form of an “exit”.

The disunity of the Russian lands increased, because. the Mongol-Tatars pitted the princes against each other.

Many cultural values ​​\u200b\u200bare lost, there was a decline in stone construction.

A consequence hidden from contemporaries: if in pre-Mongol Russia feudal relations developed according to the general European scheme, i.e. from the predominance of state forms to the strengthening of patrimonial ones, then in post-Mongolian Russia, the pressure of the state on the individual increases, and state forms are conserved. This is due to the need to find funds to pay tribute.

The position of the Vladimir prince is strengthening.

IV. Summing up the lesson. Consequences of the Mongol conquest:

a) Economic: The agricultural centers (“wild field”) were deserted. After the invasion, many production skills are lost.

6) Social: The country's population has drastically declined. Many people were killed, no less were taken into slavery. Many cities have been destroyed.

Different categories of the population suffered losses to varying degrees. Apparently, the peasant population suffered less: the enemy could not even get into some villages and villages located in dense forests. The townspeople died more often: the invaders burned the cities, killed many inhabitants, took them into slavery. Many princes and combatants - professional warriors - died. in)Cultural : The Mongol-Tatars took away many artisans and architects into captivity, there was a constant outflow of significant material resources to the Horde, the decline of cities.

d) Loss of communication with other countries : The invasion and the yoke threw the Russian lands back in their development.

Evaluation of student activities

V. Homework. P. 15-16, p.130-135

Do you agree that: “The Mongol-Tatars swept over Russia like a cloud of locusts, like a hurricane crushing everything that was in its path. They ravaged cities, burned villages, plundered. It was during this unfortunate time, which lasted about two centuries, that Russia allowed Europe to overtake itself.

Golden Horde yoke(1243-1480) - the system of exploitation of Russian lands by the Mongol-Tatar conquerors.

“Horde Exit”

taxable population census

Basques

label

military service

tribute, which the Russian principalities Golden Horde.

Accounting for the taxable population in Russia. (no tribute was taken from the clergy)

military protection of the tribute collectors.

a charter to reign, issued to a Russian prince by the Mongol Khan.

the male population should participate in the conquests of the Mongols.

The Mongol-Tatar yoke delayed the development of Russia, but did not stop it at all? Why do you think?

Mongol-Tatars did not settle on Russian lands (forests and forest-steppe are not their landscape, it is alien to them).

Tolerance of pagan Tatars: Russia retained its religious independence. The only requirement for the ROC is prayers for the health of the great khan.

Russian princes did not lose power over the population of their lands. They became vassals of the Khan of the Golden Horde, recognizing his supreme power (the autonomy of Russia).

Slide 24. Slide 25. Khan's governors were sent to Russia, who

Materials "The establishment of the Mongol - Tatar yoke."

“The Horde maintained power over Russia with the help of constant terror. In the Russian principalities, cities, the Horde punitive detachments, led by the Baskaks, settled down; their task is to maintain order, the obedience of the princes and their subjects, the main thing is to monitor the proper collection and flow of tribute from Russia to the Horde - the "Horde Exit". (Sakharov A.N. Buganov V.I. History of Russia)”.

Discussions about the Horde yoke in Russian historiography concern the negative and positive aspects of the influence of the yoke, the degree of inhibition of the objective processes of the country's historical development. Of course, Russia was plundered and for several centuries was forced to tribute, but, on the other hand, it is noted in the literature that the preservation of the church, church institutions and property contributed not only to the preservation of faith, literacy, church culture, but also to the growth of the economic and moral authority of the church. Comparing the conditions of the Tatar-Mongolian control of Russia, in particular, with the Turkish (Muslim) conquests, the authors note that the latter, of course, caused much more damage to the conquered peoples. A number of historians note and emphasize the importance of the Tatar-Mongol yoke for the formation of ideas of centralization and for the rise of Moscow. Supporters of the idea that the Tatar-Mongol conquest sharply slowed down the unifying tendencies in the Russian lands are opposed by those who point out that strife and separation of the principalities existed even before the invasion. They also argue about the degree of "moral decline" and the national spirit. We are talking about the extent to which the manners and customs of the Tatar-Mongolians were adopted by the local subjugated population, to what extent it "roughened morals". Almost no dispute, however, the idea that it was the Mongol-Tatar conquest of Russia that became the factor that determined the difference in the development of Russia from Western Europe, created a specific “despotic”, autocratic rule in the Muscovite state subsequently.

The Mongol-Tatar yoke left an indelible mark on the history of Russia, dividing it into two eras - before the "Batu invasion" and after it, pre-Mongolian Russia and Russia after the invasion of the Mongols.

P. 3. Question to the students.

Students complete the task assigned to them at the beginning of the lesson: in Russian historiography there are three points of view on the role of the yoke in Russian history; write,

Main dates and events: 1237-1240 p. - Batu campaigns on

Russia; 1380 - Battle of Kulikovo; 1480 - standing on the Ugra River, the liquidation of the Horde domination in Russia.

Basic terms and concepts: yoke; label; baskak.

Historical figures: Batu; Ivan Kalita; Dmitry Donskoy; Mamai; Tokhtamysh; Ivan IP.

Working with the map: show the territories of Russian lands that were part of the Golden Horde or paid tribute to it.

Answer plan: one). the main points of view on the nature of the relationship between Russia and the Horde in the XIlI-XV centuries; 2) features of the economic development of Russian lands under the rule of the Mongol-Tatars; 3) changes in the organization of power in Russia; 4) Russian Orthodox church under the conditions of the Horde dominion; 5) the consequences of the domination of the Golden Horde in the Russian lands.

Reply material: The problems of the Horde dominion caused and continue to cause different assessments and points of view in the domestic historical literature.

Even N. M. Karamzin noted that the Mongol-Tatar domination in Russia had one important positive effect.

vie - it accelerated the unification of the Russian principalities and the revival of a single Russian state. This gave grounds to some later historians to speak of the positive influence of the Mongols.

Another point of view is that the Mongol-Tatar domination had extremely difficult consequences for Russia, as it set back its development by 250 years. This approach allows us to explain all subsequent problems in the history of Russia precisely by the long dominion of the Horde.

The third point of view is presented in the writings of some modern historians, who believe that there was no Mongol-Tatar yoke at all. The interaction of the Russian principalities with the Golden Horde was more like an allied relationship: Russia paid tribute (and its size was not so great), and the Horde in return ensured the security of the borders of the weakened and scattered Russian principalities.

It seems that each of these points of view covers only part of the problem. It is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of "invasion" and "yoke":

In the first case, we are talking about the Batu invasion, which ruined Russia, and about the measures that the Mongol khans took from time to time against the recalcitrant princes; in the second - about the very system of relations between the Russian and Horde authorities and territories.

The Russian lands were considered in the Horde as a part of its own territory that had a certain degree of independence. The principalities were obliged to pay a rather significant tribute to the Horde (even those lands that were not captured by the Horde paid it); in preparation for new campaigns, the khans demanded from the Russian princes not only money, but also soldiers; finally, "F!FOY goods" from the Russian lands were highly valued in the slave markets of the Horde.

Russia was deprived of its former independence. The princes of MOI "do not rule, only having received a label for reigning. The Mongol khans encouraged numerous conflicts and strife between the princes. Therefore, in an effort to obtain labels, the princes were ready to take any steps, which gradually changed the very nature of princely power in Russian lands.

At the same time, the khans did not encroach on the positions of the Russian Orthodox Church - they, unlike the German knights in the Baltic states, did not prevent the population subject to them from believing in their own God. This, despite the most difficult conditions of foreign domination, made it possible to preserve national customs, traditions, and mentality.

The economy of the Russian principalities after a period of complete ruin was restored quite quickly, and from the beginning of the XIV century. began to develop rapidly. Since that time, stone construction has been revived in the cities, and the restoration of temples and fortresses destroyed during the invasion began. An established and fixed tribute was soon no longer considered a heavy burden. And since the time of Ivan Kalita, a significant part of the funds raised has been directed to the internal needs of the Russian lands themselves.

The study in Russian historiography of the problem of Russian-Mongolian relations of the XIII-XV centuries. repeatedly became the subject of consideration by many scientists, mainly of the Soviet period, when a sufficient number of opinions and points of view accumulated both on individual periods and problems, and on the generalizing conclusions of the conceptual plan. Historiographic reviews of different goals and objectives are contained in the works of B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky, A.N. Nasonova, M.G. Safargalieva, L.V. Cherepnina, V.V. Kargalova, N.S. Borisova, G.A. Fedorova-Davydova, I.B. Grekova, D.Yu. Arapova, A.A. Arslanova, P.P. Tolochko, A.A. Gorsky, V.A. Chukaeva. A distinctive feature of these historiographic excursions is that they are mostly devoted to the historiography of the 19th - early 20th centuries, and speak very sparingly of later works. In addition, in this historiographic series there are no works of recent times. Thus, the author sees one of his tasks in supplementing the historiography of the "Mongolian question" with an analysis of the latest literature.

At the same time, we do not aim to list all the works of the past and present years, in which certain conflicts of Russian-Mongolian relations are mentioned and / or an assessment is given to them. Historiographic discrepancies on certain specific issues will, of necessity, be set forth in the relevant chapters. We consider the following as our main task: to trace the most important directions of Russian historical thought on this one of the most significant and defining problems of Russian history, which, in turn, allows (together with source observations and analysis) to develop the basis for the author's study of the topic "Russia and the Mongols ".

1

There are a number of rather highly politicized subjects in Russian historiography. So, in the field of early Russian history, this is the “Norman problem”. This also includes the question of the Mongol-Tatar invasion and yoke. The vast majority of Russian historians have considered and are considering them mainly from the point of view of political content, for example, the subordination of the institute of princely power to the Mongols, as well as the “fall” for the same reason of other ancient Russian power structures. Such a one-sided approach entails a certain modernization of the relationship between the ethno-state structures of the Middle Ages, the interpolation of interstate relations of the new and modern times on them, and ultimately, as we see it, a certain discrepancy in understanding the situation as a whole.

The origins of this kind of perception can already be seen in the reports of the chroniclers, who also added a strong emotional coloring. The latter, of course, is understandable, because the original records were made either by eyewitnesses who survived the tragedy of the invasion, or from their words.

In fact, in Russian historiography, the isolation of the problem of "Tatars and Rus" dates back to the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th century. Its understanding and interpretation must be associated with "the process of self-affirmation of the Russian mentality", "an expression of the intensive growth of national self-consciousness" and "an unprecedentedly high patriotic upsurge." These socio-psychological foundations for the formation of the Russian national culture of modern times directly influenced the formation of Russian national historiography, its initial "romantic" period. Hence the highly emotional and dramatic, even tragic perception of the events of ancient Russian history, especially such as the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the yoke.

N.M. succumbed to the charm of Russian chronicles, tragically vividly depicting the Batu invasion and its consequences. Karamzin. His perception of the events of distant times is no less emotional than contemporaries or eyewitnesses of the events themselves. Russia is "a vast corpse after Batyev's invasion" - this is how he defines the immediate results of the Mongol campaigns. But the state of the country and the people under the yoke: it, “having exhausted the State, having swallowed up its civil well-being, humiliated humanity itself in our ancestors, and left deep, indelible marks for several hundred centuries, irrigated with the blood and tears of many generations.” The stamp of sentimentality is present even when N.M. Karamzin turns to sociological generalizations and conclusions. “The shadow of barbarism,” he writes, “clouding the horizon of Russia, hid Europe from us...”, “Russia, tormented by the Mughals, strained its forces solely to avoid disappearing: we had no time for enlightenment!” The Horde yoke as the reason for Russia's lagging behind the "European states" - this is the first main conclusion of N.M. Karamzin. The second conclusion of the historiographer relates to the internal development of Russia in the "Mongolian centuries". It does not correspond to what was said before, does not follow from it and, moreover, contradicts it, for, it turns out, the Mongols brought to Russia not only “blood and tears”, but also good: thanks to them, internecine strife was eliminated and “autocracy restored”, Moscow itself was "owed its greatness to the khans." "Karamzin was the first historian to single out the influence of the Mongol invasion on the development of Russia as a large independent problem of domestic science."

The views of N.M. Karamzin were widely used among contemporaries, which will be discussed below. For now, we are interested in their ideological origins. We have already pointed out one: it is the elevated socio-psychological and ideological atmosphere in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. But there was another.

When analyzing the literature used by N.M. Karamzin in the III and IV volumes of the "History of the Russian State", a fairly frequent mention of the work of the French Orientalist historian of the 18th century is striking. J. De Guignes "General history of the Huns, Turks, Mongols and other Western Tatars in antiquity and from Jesus Christ to the present", published in 4 volumes in 1756-1758. (volume 5 appeared in 1824). J. De Guignes defines the Mongols and their place in world history as follows: “The people who caused a great upheaval and who then formed an empire, the most extensive of all that we know, were not at all a civilized people, nor did they seek to spread the wisdom of their laws . This was a barbarian people who went to the most distant countries only to seize all the riches, enslave peoples, return them to a barbaric state and make their name awesome.

The work of J. De Guignes was the most significant and popular study of Mongolian history in Europe in the 18th century. As you can see, N.M. Karamzin, not alien to European enlightenment, fully accepted the latest Western European scientific developments in the ancient history of the East.

But Europe influenced the study of Russian history not only from the outside, but also from the inside. We have in mind the activity in the first decades of the 19th century. Russian Academy of Sciences. Historical science in the first quarter of the 19th century. was in the Academy in obvious decline. Scholars of German origin, who were part of the department of history, were mainly engaged in auxiliary historical disciplines (numismatics, genealogy, chronology), and their works on Russian history were published in German. Elected in 1817 by Academician Kh.D. Fren was also a numismatist, a specialist in Oriental (Juchid) coins. But he caught, so to speak, the spirit of the times. The fact is that “it was precisely in the first decades of the 19th century. in France, England, Germany, the first oriental scientific societies arise, special oriental journals begin to be published, etc.” H.D. Fren was able to look more broadly than his predecessors at the problems facing Russian historical science. He became the founder of the Russian school of Oriental studies, and his previous studies of Mongolian problems determined the top priorities of Russian Oriental studies. X. Fren was aware of all the oriental literature of his time and, as the largest historian of the Golden Horde, had firm views on the role of the Mongol conquest in the history of Russia,” noted A.Yu. Yakubovsky. In 1826, the Academy of Sciences announced a competition on the topic “What were the consequences of the domination of the Mongols in Russia and exactly what effect did it have on the political relations of the state, on the form of government and on its internal administration, as well as on the enlightenment and education of the people?” The task was followed by recommendations. “For a proper answer to this question, it is required that it be preceded by a complete description of the external relations and internal situation of Russia before the first invasion of it by the Mongols, and that it should subsequently be shown exactly what changes were made by the rule of the Mongols in the state of the people, and it would be desirable that, in addition to scattered testimonies contained in the Russian chronicles, a comparison of everything that can be gleaned from eastern and western sources regarding the then state of the Mongols and their treatment of the conquered peoples was placed.

Undoubtedly, a grandiose prospect opened up before the researchers. Actually, the very formulation of the problem and explanations to it remain relevant to this day almost without changes. Their scientific literacy is undeniable. But already in this initial task there was a certain predestination: the installation on the "domination" of the Mongols in Russia is determined in advance, although it was precisely the proof or refutation of this that should have become the main task of stimulated research.

This trend became more pronounced later on. The competition of 1826, as is known, did not lead to the desired result and was resumed at the suggestion of H.D. Frena in 1832. The Academy of Sciences again presented the work written by H.D. Fren "Program of the task", more extensive than in the first case. The introduction was also longer. “The dominion of the Mongol dynasty, known to us under the name of the Golden Horde, among the Mohammedans under the name of the Ulus of Jochi, or the Genghis Khanate of Deshtkipchak, and among the Mongols themselves under the name of Togmak, which was once for almost two and a half centuries the horror and scourge of Russia, which held it in bonds of unconditional enslavement and having waywardly disposed of the crown and life of its Princes, this dominion should have more or less influence on the fate, structure, decrees, education, customs and language of our fatherland. The history of this dynasty forms a necessary link in Russian history, and it goes without saying that the closest knowledge of the first not only serves to the most accurate understanding of the latter, in this memorable and ill-fated period, but also contributes a lot to clarifying our concepts of the influence that Mongol rule had on resolutions and folk life in Russia.

Comparing the "tasks" of 1826 and 1832, one can note a certain shift in emphasis. Firstly, much more space is now given to the need to study the actual history of the Golden Horde; secondly, only the previously outlined focus on the “dominion” of the Mongols in Russia is now developing into a whole concept. It is said (in the spirit of the “Norman problem”) about the “Mongolian dynasty”, which forms “an essential link in Russian history”. The "horror and scourge" of Russia - the Mongol khans - kept it "in the bonds of unconditional enslavement", and "wilfulness" disposed of the "crown and life" of the princes. In addition, attention is also drawn to the transition, so to speak, to the Karamzin style of presentation (which is worth the same "horror and scourge", etc.).

Thus, the foundation was laid for the future - not only in the 19th, but also in the 20th century. - research on the Russian-Horde problems. The views of N.M. Karamzin, set forth by him in the IV and V volumes of the "History of the Russian State", and the academic competitions of 1826 and 1832 gave a strong impetus to the study of the topic "Russia and the Mongols". Already in the 1920s and 1940s, many works appeared that directly or indirectly developed certain judgments of scientific authorities. In 1822, the first book on this topic was published. Bringing to the point of absurdity the thought of N.M. Karamzin about the slowdown in the course of the historical development of Russia due to the Mongol yoke, the author writes that the influence of the Mongols affected all levels of public life and contributed to the transformation of the Russians into the "Asiatic people". The same topic becomes relevant on the pages of the periodical press (moreover, the most popular magazines), asserting itself, therefore, as a socially significant one.

However, in a number of works of the same time, a different direction is seen than that of N.M. Karamzin and Kh.D. Fren. Thus, denying any benefit from the “Tatar domination”, M. Gastev further writes: “The autocracy itself, recognized by many as the fruit of their dominion, is not the fruit of their dominion, if even in the 15th century the princes divided their possessions. Rather, it can be called the fruit of the specific system, and most likely the fruit of the duration of civil life. Thus, M. Gastev was one of the first to question Karamzin's "concept of slowing down" the natural course of the social development of Russia, due to the intervention of the Mongols. Objections and one's own vision of the Mongol period in Russia can also be seen in the works of N.A. Polevoy and N.G. Ustryalova.

Considerations of a similar nature were put forward by S.M. Solovyov as the basis of his understanding of the time of the Russian Middle Ages. It is difficult to say how much the historiographical situation influenced him. Obviously, he proceeded primarily from his own concept of the historical development of Russia. “Since for us the subject of first importance was the change of the old order of things with a new one, the transition of tribal princely relations into state relations, on which the unity, power of Russia and the change in the internal order depended, and since we notice the beginning of a new order of things in the north before the Tatars, then Mongolian relations should be important to us insofar as they helped or hindered the establishment of this new order of things. We notice, - he continued, - that the influence of the Tatars was not the main and decisive one here. The Tatars remained to live far away, cared only about the collection of tribute, not interfering in any way with internal relations, leaving everything as it was, therefore, leaving those new relations that began in the north before them in complete freedom to operate. Even more clearly, his position as a scientist on the “Mongolian question” was formulated in the following words: “... a historian has no right to interrupt the natural thread of events from the second half of the 13th century - namely, the gradual transition of tribal princely relations into state ones - and insert the Tatar period, to bring to the fore the Tatars, Tatar relations, as a result of which the main phenomena, the main causes of these phenomena, must be closed. In his "History of Russia from Ancient Times" the great historian concretizes and details these general provisions.

With regard to S.M. Solovyov is attracted to the Russian-Mongolian theme by the balanced and conceptual approach. This was expressed accordingly in the absence of emotional assessments, which, as we have seen, the previous historiography was filled with, and in an attentive attitude to the development of precisely internal “original” (as his Slavophil contemporaries would say) processes. A look at the historical development of Mongolian Rus S.M. Solovyov, thus, was a new scientific concept of this period and became an alternative to the previously prevailing point of view of Karamzin-Fren. However, this line did not die either. This is due to the extremely successful development of Russian oriental studies. Moreover, Russia is becoming the only country where Mongolian studies are taking shape as an independent scientific discipline. In the middle - second half of the XIX century. it was represented by such names as N.Ya. Bichurin, V.V. Grigoriev, V.P. Vasiliev, I.N. Berezin, P.I. Kafarov, V.G. Tizenhausen.

V.G. Tizenhausen in 1884 noted that “the study of the Mongol-Tatar period since then (since academic competitions. - Yu.K.) has managed to move forward in many ways ... ". But at the same time, “the absence of a solid, possibly complete and critically processed history of the Golden Horde, or the Jochid ulus ... constitutes one of the most important and sensitive gaps in our everyday life, depriving us of the opportunity not only to get acquainted with the course of affairs and the entire structure of this vast and a kind of semi-steppe power that controlled the fate of Russia for more than 2 centuries, but also to correctly assess the degree of its influence on Russia, determining with certainty what exactly this Mongol-Tatar rule reflected in us and how much it actually slowed down the natural development of Russian people."

How to comment on the presented by V.G. Tiesenhausen the historiographical situation? Of course, firstly, despite the “advancement” of the problem, the awareness of the unsatisfactory scientific level of previous studies (primarily due to the unusedness of the entire known fund of sources), and, secondly, the author clearly has “old prejudices”, because “the ideological platform ” remains basically the same - at the level of Karamzin and Fren.

Actually, the Karamzinskaya line found the most prominent representative in the person of N.I. Kostomarov. Exploring the "Mongolian problem", he approaches it, as it was inherent in him, on a large scale - against the backdrop of the history of all Slavs. “Wherever the Slavs were left to their own devices, there they remained with their primitive qualities and did not develop any stable social system suitable for internal order and external protection. Only a strong conquest or the influence of foreign elements could lead them to this,” he wrote in one of his seminal works. These provisions even A.N. Nasonov called "fantastic theory". But, based on them, N.I. Kostomarov, inheriting N.M. Karamzin, explained the origin of autocratic power in Russia by the Tatar conquest. The legacy of N.M. Karamzin is felt in another passage: under the Mongols, “the sense of freedom, honor, consciousness of personal dignity disappeared; servility to the higher, despotism over the lower became the qualities of the Russian soul”, there was a “fall of the free spirit and the stupefaction of the people”. In general, for N.I. Kostomarov, with the conquest of the Mongols, "the great upheaval of Russian history began."

So, from the middle of the XIX century. The "Mongolian question" becomes one of the most important topics in Oriental and Russian medieval studies. In the second half of the century, two main ways of its study were formed. The first, going back to the traditions laid down by N.M. Karamzin and Kh.D. Fren, and presented by a number of prominent Mongol scholars of that time, proceeds from the significant, and at times decisive and all-encompassing role of the Mongols in medieval Russian history. The second is associated with the name, first of all, S.M. Solovyov, as well as his successors, among whom the names of V.O. Klyuchevsky, S.F. Platonov, and in the first third of the XX century. M.N. Pokrovsky and A.E. Presnyakov. For these scientists, the main thing remains the natural course of the inner life of medieval Russia, which was not subject, at least in a cardinal way, to changes. So S.F. Platonov considered the Mongol yoke only "an accident in our history"; therefore, he wrote, “we can consider the inner life of Russian society in the thirteenth century. not paying attention to the fact of the Tatar yoke.

In a word, there was no unambiguity in the Mongolian question either in general or in specific subjects. This gave rise to one of the Orientalists of the early 20th century. to sum it up like this: "It is hardly possible to point to any other issue in Russian history that has been so little developed as the question of the Tatars."

2

Soviet historiography, thus, found the "Mongolian question" unresolved unambiguously, moreover, solved in a diametrically opposite way. For some time, the Mongolian period did not attract much attention of Soviet historians, and the works published in the late 1920s and early 1930s were mainly based on the widespread (and not yet debunked) theory of M.N. Pokrovsky. The situation began to change by the end of the 1930s, after the most important discussions on a number of problems in the history of Russia had passed, the class-harmful bourgeois concepts of Russian history were thrown off the “steamer of modernity”, and the Marxist doctrine was strengthened. After the approval of the concept of B.D. Grekov about the class feudal nature of ancient Russian society, the turn has come for the next - medieval - period in the history of Russia. It was then that the first Marxist works appeared, devoted to the period of the thirteenth and subsequent centuries. In 1937, a thematically special, but popular science work by B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky "Golden Horde", consisting of two parts: "Golden Horde" and "Golden Horde and Russia".

The book was destined to give an answer to the question - how should one understand, study and present the problem of "Russia and the Mongols" in Soviet historical science. In this regard, the authors followed the path that has already become traditional for Marxist historiography. They turned to the classics of Marxist thought, specifically to the statements of K. Marx, as well as I.V. Stalin. “We have the opportunity to make sure more than once,” writes B.D. Grekov, - how Marx regarded the influence of the Golden Horde authorities on the history of the Russian people. In his remarks, we do not see even a hint of the progressive nature of this phenomenon. On the contrary, Marx sharply emphasizes the deeply negative influence of the Golden Horde power on the history of Russia. Marx also quotes that the yoke “lasted from 1257 to 1462, i.e., more than 2 centuries; this yoke not only crushed, it insulted and withered the very soul of the people who became its victim. I.V. spoke even more clearly and definitely. Stalin (this was done in connection with the Austro-German invasion of Ukraine in 1918): "The imperialists of Austria and Germany ... carry on their bayonets a new, shameful yoke, which is no better than the old, Tatar one ...".

This approach and the assessment by the classics of Marxism-Leninism of medieval Russian-Mongolian relations had a direct impact on all subsequent Soviet historiography. But was there anything fundamentally new in the judgments of the ideologists and politicians of the 19th and 20th centuries? on the problem we are considering? Apparently not. Indeed, with the exception of the "Karamzin" thesis about some positive features of the development of Russian statehood, in general, in the perception of the "Mongolian question" by the classics, the provisions of Karamzin - Kostomarov are repeated. It also speaks of the negative impact of the yoke on the social and spiritual life of medieval Russia, and rather emotionally.

So, Soviet historical science was “offered” an already proven path. However, unlike the previous historiographical period, there was no alternative to this path. The rigid framework of possible interpretations of Russian-Horde relations should not have allowed any radically different understanding of them.

However, returning to the work of B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky, it should be said that they themselves are not inclined to exaggerate the influence of the Mongols on either the economic, political or cultural development of Russia. So, A.Yu. Yakubovsky, criticizing H.D. Fren for his interpretation of the impact of the Golden Horde period on the course of Russian history, writes the following: “For all the merits that Fren has to science, it cannot be overlooked that for his historical consciousness the question was not posed differently ... For Fren, the Golden Horde remains only "ill-fated period", and only from this side is of scientific interest. “No matter how heavy the power of the Golden Horde Mongol khans in feudal Russia,” the scientist continues, “now it is impossible to study the history of the Golden Horde only from the point of view of the extent to which it was a “horror and scourge” for the history of Russia.” However, B.D. Grekov writes: “In the process of the hard struggle of the Russian people against the oppression of the Golden Horde, the Muscovite state was created. It was not the Golden Horde that created it, but it was born against the will of the Tatar Khan, against the interests of his power.” These two theses about the struggle of the Russian people and about the creation of a unified Russian state against the will of the Mongols, in fact, contained a specific program for the upcoming scientific research.

Portion of criticism of "Mongolian views" M.N. Pokrovsky was also in the article by A.N. Nasonov “The Tatar yoke in the coverage of M.N. Pokrovsky” in the well-known collection “Against the anti-Marxist concept of M.N. Pokrovsky. True, the author used this "tribune" to a greater extent to present his own concept of Russian-Horde relations. This was also emphasized by A.N. Nasonov. “Turning to the criticism of the views of M.N. Pokrovsky,” he wrote, “let us note that our task will be not so much to evaluate the works of Pokrovsky in order to determine the place he occupies in our historiography, but to test his views on concrete historical material.”

A little later, the concept of A.N. Nasonov will be issued already in the form of the book "Mongols and Russia". The work of A.N. Nasonov will become a milestone for the Soviet historiography of the "Mongolian question".

Anticipating his own formulation of the question, he not only criticizes, but, based on the socio-political conditions of his time, explains the reasons for the "general assessment of the significance of the Tatar yoke in Russia" of his predecessors. “Apparently,” he believes, “in the pre-revolutionary situation, the idea of ​​the active policy of the Russian princes in the Horde was more easily perceived than the idea of ​​the active policy of the Tatars in Russia, even by those historians who attached great importance to the Tatar yoke. Modern historians XIX - early XX century. Russia was a state with the class of the Great Russian center dominating over other peoples of the East European Plain. To a certain extent, they unwittingly transferred the idea of ​​contemporary Russia to the old days. They willingly discussed the results of the policy of the Russian princes in the Horde, but the question of the Tatars in Russia was not studied or touched upon in passing. In most cases, they were of the opinion that the passive behavior of the Mongols contributed to the process of the state unification of Russia.

His reasoning about the influence of social conditions on the formation of "pre-revolutionary" concepts of Russian-Horde relations can be fully applied to the ideological origin of his own concept. Firstly, despite the fact that “the problem of studying the history of the Tatar policy in Russia is posed” by him “for the first time”, “the formulation of such a problem follows from the indications of the “traditional policy of the Tatars”” given by K. Marx in the book “The Secret History of Diplomacy XVIII century." This is the first impetus for subsequent constructions. Secondly, the ideological essence of A.N. Nasonov is explained by the social conditions of the time, of which he was a contemporary. “We prove,” he says, “that the Mongols pursued an active policy and the main line of this policy was expressed not in the desire to create a single state from a politically fragmented society, but in the desire to prevent consolidation in every possible way, to support the mutual strife of individual political groups and principalities. Such a conclusion suggests that a single "Great Russian" state, as we see it in the 17th century, was formed in the process of fighting the Tatars, that is, in the 15th-16th centuries, partly in the second half of the 16th century, when the struggle was possible according to the state of the Golden Horde itself. Consequently, “the formation of a centralized state was, therefore, by no means as a result of the peaceful activities of the Mongols-conquerors, but as a result of the struggle against the Mongols, when the struggle became possible, when the Golden Horde began to weaken and decay, and a popular movement arose in the Russian Northeast for the unification of Russia and for the overthrow of the Tatar rule.

After analyzing a large number of Russian (mainly annals) and eastern (in translation) sources, A.N. Nasonov came to the following concrete conclusions: 1) the internal political life of Russia in the second half of the 13th - early 15th centuries. decisively depended on the state of affairs in the Horde; the changes that took place in the Horde certainly entailed a new situation in Russia; 2) the Mongol khans constantly manipulated the Russian princes; 3) popular uprisings took place against the Mongols, but they were suppressed.

Book by A.N. Nasonova became the first monograph in Russian historiography entirely devoted to the topic "Russia and the Mongols", and most of her conclusions became the basis for the subsequent development of the problem. Moreover, it can be said that it still remains in this “role”: many (if not most) of its provisions are accepted as axioms in modern historiography. Therefore, thanks to the work of B.D. Grekov and A.Yu. Yakubovsky and the monograph by A.N. Nasonov, first of all, "Soviet historiography of the 30s - early 40s developed ... a unified scientifically based view of the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion as a terrible disaster for the Russian people, which for a long time delayed the economic, political and cultural development of Russia" ; this was also due to the fact that for many decades a regime of “systematic terror” was established in Russia, wrote A.A. Zimin, fully accepting the scheme of A.N. Nasonov. Thus, as A.A. Zimin, "the study of the struggle of the Russian people against the Tatar-Mongolian enslavers is one of the important tasks of Soviet historical science."

An example of solving this problem is the fundamental work of L.V. Tcherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State. In the chapters on the socio-political history of medieval Russia, its history is closely intertwined with the Horde theme. Peru L.V. Cherepnin also wrote an article about the initial period (XIII century) of Mongol dependence in Russia.

“Having suppressed the courageous and stubborn resistance of the peoples, the Mongol-Tatar invaders established their dominance over the Russian land, which had a detrimental effect on its future destinies.” In general, the researcher formulates the question of this “perniciousness” as follows: “the Mongol invasion of Russia is not a single fact, but a continuous long process that led the country to exhaustion, causing it to lag behind a number of other European countries that developed in more favorable conditions.” Already in the XIII century. the "Russian" policy of the Mongol khans is revealed, "aimed at inciting inter-princely strife, strife, internal wars." Although the Horde did not break (“could not break”) the “political order” that existed in Russia, it sought to put them “at its service, using in its own interests the Russian princes, who seemed to them reliable, exterminating the unreliable and all the time pushing the princes against each other to prevent anyone from gaining strength and to keep everyone in fear.

However, “the Horde khans acted not only in intimidation. They tried to rely on certain social forces; gifts, benefits, privileges to attract a part of the princes, boyars, clergy. This, according to L.V. Cherepnin, played a certain role: “some representatives of the ruling class went over to the service of the conquerors, helping to strengthen their dominion. But not everyone did so. And among the feudal elite - princes, boyars, clerics - there were enough people who resisted the foreign yoke. But they did not determine the "mode" of the fight against the enemy. “The active force in the fight against the Mongol-Tatar oppression was the masses. Throughout the thirteenth century there was a people's liberation movement, anti-Tatar uprisings broke out, ”representing, however, not“ organized armed resistance ”(which will happen only by the end of the 14th century), but“ separate spontaneous disparate performances ”.

This is how an authoritative researcher of the 13th century sees it. How much has changed in the XIV century.? The events of the century in relation to Russian-Mongolian relations are presented (and rightly so!) by L.V. Cherepnin is ambiguous. Before us is a detailed picture of that complex and dramatic era.

However, the first decades of the XIV century. not much different from the last 13th century. The scientist writes: “In the first quarter of the XIV century. the Tatar-Mongolian yoke weighed heavily on Russia. Fighting for political primacy in Russia, individual Russian princes did not oppose the Golden Horde, but acted as executors of the Khan's will. As soon as they stopped doing this, the Horde dealt with them. The struggle against the Horde was waged by the people themselves in the form of spontaneous uprisings, which arose mainly in the cities. The princes had not yet tried to lead the liberation movement of the townspeople. For this, they did not yet have the proper material prerequisites and forces. But the support of the cities to a large extent determined the success of certain princes in the political struggle with each other.

The same processes remained dominant during the time of Ivan Kalita. So, the uprising in Tver in 1327 was raised "by the people themselves, contrary to the instructions of the prince of Tver ...". In general, “under Kalita, the Russian feudal lords not only made no attempt to overthrow the Tatar-Mongol yoke (the time had not yet come for this), but this prince brutally suppressed those spontaneous popular movements that undermined the foundations of the Horde’s rule over Russia.”

Some changes are observed in the following decades. In the 1940s and 1950s, while still recognizing the supreme power and regularly paying the “exit”, the princes achieved “non-interference of the Horde Khan in the internal affairs of their possessions”. Thanks to this, these years become a time of "a certain strengthening of the independence of a number of Russian lands." This, as well as the internal struggle in the Golden Horde itself, lead to the fact that in the 60-70s of the XIV century. there is a "gradual weakening of the power of the Golden Horde over Russia." However, since the turn of the 60-70s of the XIV century. in connection with the intensified Tatar raids, “the resistance of the Russian people to the Horde invaders also intensified”, and the “Nizhny Novgorod Principality” becomes the “center of the national liberation struggle”. Ultimately, this "rise" led to "a decisive battle" on the Kulikovo field. Assessing the reign of Dmitry Donskoy L.V. Cherepnin writes about "a significant intensification of the foreign policy of Russia": if earlier the Russian princes ensured the security of their possessions by paying tribute to the khans, then "now they are already organizing a military rebuff to the Horde force." Dmitry Donskoy "tried to achieve" silence "for Russia, not only with the people's ruble, but also with the sword." Having “elevated” this prince in this way, L.V. Cherepnin hurries to make a reservation right there: “However, before Dm. Donskoy raised this sword, the Russian people have already risen to fight the Tatar yoke. And yet, "Prince Dmitry more consistently than his predecessors supported an alliance with the townspeople", which was due to the growth of their importance, primarily in socio-economic development. Dmitry Donskoy "objectively", thus, contributed to the rise of the people's liberation movement.

In the studies of L.V. Cherepnin devoted to the period of Horde dependence, a number of thoughts are clearly visible that develop the views of his predecessors. The first is princely-khan relations, mainly dependent on the khan's will and, in general, on the events taking place in the Horde. The second is an emphasis in relation to the Mongols of a deep class abyss between the princes (and other feudal lords) and the people. At the same time, certain successes in the inter-princely struggle depended on the latter, mainly on the townspeople. Of course, specific situations in one way or another changed the alignment of the noted parties, but always, according to L.V. Cherepnin, their original opposition was preserved: the prince - the khans, the feudal lords - the people (townspeople) and, of course, Russia - the Horde. At the same time, it is necessary to note a certain research flexibility, which allows the scientist in his conceptual scheme of events to take into account data that, at first glance, contradict the main trend of research (which, however, remains unchanged).

This distinguishes the works of L.V. Cherepnin from the somewhat straightforward conclusions of other Russian historians, whose works were contemporary with them or were published in subsequent years. So, I.U. Budovnits wrote the following very emotionally: “... In the most terrible decades of the Tatar yoke, which came after the bloody pogrom of Batu, the preaching of servitude, servility and groveling before the carriers of foreign oppression emanating from the clergy and the ruling feudal class, the people managed to oppose their fighting ideology based on intransigence towards the invaders, on contempt for death, on the readiness to sacrifice one's life in order to free the country from the foreign yoke.

Having considered the historiographical situation in the “Mongolian question” that had developed by the mid-1960s, V.V. Kargalov came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create a "special study" specifically about the period of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russia. These were the chapters of thematically and chronologically more general of his work.

The main goal of V.V. Kargalov is to maximize the "field" of the problem within the 13th century: chronologically, territorially, and finally, socially. As for the first task, “the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russia are considered not as the result of only Batu’s campaign, but as a consequence of a whole series of Tatar invasions that lasted several decades (starting with the Batu pogrom).” In general, it seems that it is true and justified: the Mongol detachments still repeatedly appear in Russia. But V.V. Kargalov is a priori interested in only one aspect: "This formulation of the question makes it possible to more fully imagine the devastating consequences of the Mongol-Tatar conquest."

Expanding the "territorial field", V.V. Kargalov also contributes. If “the question of the consequences of the invasion for the Russian city,” he believes, “is well developed by Soviet historians,” then “the situation is somewhat worse with the study of the consequences of the invasion for the rural areas of feudal Russia. Having studied the written and archaeological data, V.V. Kargalov came to the conclusion that both the cities and the "productive forces of the Russian feudal village" were "dealt a terrible blow" by the Mongol invasion.

How did the population of the Russian lands react to these disasters: the nobility and the people? V.V. Kargalov continues the practice of their "bifurcation", outlined in previous works. The “policy of agreement” of the Tatars with the “local feudal lords”, “cooperation of the Tatar feudal lords”, their “alliance” among themselves, at best, “a certain compromise” - such is the picture of Russian-Mongolian relations in the second half of the 13th century. at the level of "feudalism" of two ethnic groups.

But unlike his predecessors, V.V. Kargalov proposes to consider this “compromising policy” of the Russian princes not locally (both in relation to individual princes and other “feudal lords” of certain Russian lands), but extends such conclusions to “Russian spiritual and secular feudal lords” as a whole. “The Russian feudal lords,” he concludes, “quickly came to an agreement with the Horde khans and, recognizing the supreme power of the khan, retained their “tables” and power over the oppressed classes.”

The attitude towards the Horde people was different. “The policy of cooperation with the Mongol-Tatar conquerors, which was pursued by a significant part of the Russian feudal lords, was opposed by the masses with an irreconcilable attitude towards the rapists. Despite the terrible consequences of the "Batu pogrom" and the policy of their own feudal lords, who conspired with the Horde khans, the Russian people continued to fight against the foreign yoke.

This alignment of social forces has led to at least two consequences. The first was that "anti-Tatar and anti-feudal motives were closely intertwined in the speeches of the lower classes." The second is that it is precisely “the struggle of the Russian people against the foreign yoke ... North-Eastern Russia owes its special position in relation to the Horde Khan. Not the "wise policy" of the Russian princes, but the struggle of the masses against the Mongol conquerors led to the elimination of "bessermenstvo" and "Basqueism", to the expulsion of numerous "tsarist ambassadors" from Russian cities, to the fact that Russia did not turn into a simple "ulus" of Golden Hordes. Under the oppressive foreign yoke, the Russian people managed to preserve the conditions for their independent national development. This is one main conclusion of the work of V.V. Kargalov. Another sums up the invasion. “The study of the history of Russia after the Mongol-Tatar invasion inevitably leads to the conclusion about the negative, deeply regressive influence of foreign conquest on the economic, political and cultural development of the country. The consequences of the Mongol-Tatar yoke were felt for several centuries. It was this that was the main reason for Russia's lagging behind the developed European countries, the elimination of which required the titanic efforts of the industrious and talented Russian people.

The work of V.V. Kargalov is a new milestone in the development of the national historiography of the "Mongolian question". She very clearly pointed out the main plots of Russian-Horde relations in the 13th century. and their perspective. Between Russia and the Horde there was an armed tough confrontation, between the princes (and other "feudal lords") and the people - irreconcilable class contradictions. At the same time, another aspect of the problem is the preservation of a certain (within the framework of feudal development) political independence of the Russian lands.

We see the development of this kind of research trends in the monograph by V.L. Egorova. Its main task is to study the historical geography of the Golden Horde in the XIII-XIV centuries. - is closely linked, in particular, with the military-political relations of Russia and the Horde. Along with the confirmation of a number of provisions already established in Russian historiography, for example, about “the undivided power of the Mongols and the absence of active resistance from the Russian princes” in the period before 1312 or that the period of 1359-1380. "characterized by a steady increase in the military and economic power of the Russian lands", the author puts some questions in a new way or emphasizes well-known ones more.

First, we see a clear division of "the main stages of the Mongolian policy in Russia." Secondly, it seems important to us the assertion that this policy "was not connected with the seizure and exclusion of new land territories." The Russian lands, therefore, according to the reasonable opinion of the researcher, were not included in the actual territory of the Golden Horde. And in the same connection is the concept of "buffer zones" introduced by him into scientific circulation, "limiting the Russian borders from the south." Finally, thirdly, emphasizing that the main goal of the Horde's policy "was to obtain the greatest possible tribute", and the Russian lands were "in the position of semi-dependent territories subject to tribute." At the same time, this status not only did not interfere, but, on the contrary, stimulated the military dictate of the Mongol khans over Russia. Therefore, "throughout the entire existence of the Golden Horde, the Russian principalities were forcibly drawn into the orbit of the political and economic interests of the Mongols."

The results of the consideration in the latest domestic historiography of the "Mongolian question" were summed up in the article by A.L. Khoroshkevich and A.I. Pliguzov, anticipating the book of J. Fennel about Russia 1200-1304. “The question of the impact of the Mongol invasion on the development of Russian society is one of the most difficult in the history of Russia. The extreme lack of sources makes it difficult to answer it, so the appearance of such works becomes quite possible, in which any impact of the invasion on the development of Russia is denied. Most historians, however, are of the opinion that the foreign yoke delayed the economic, social and political development of Russia, the completion of the formation of feudalism, reviving the archaic forms of exploitation.

Along with such a conclusion, which, however, does not contain any innovations, the authors propose the formulation of some relevant problems that they consider to be relevant. Without a doubt, they are such and are both for solving private and general issues of Russian-Horde relations. But at the same time, we note that the “Mongolian question” as a whole is far from being resolved in principle. By no means do not seem frivolous and unscientific concepts, which before, having criticized, it was possible, simply speaking, to brush aside, citing their scientific inconsistency. In our historiography in such an unenviable role for a long time was the concept of L.N. Gumilyov.

The relationship between Russia and the Mongols is considered by L.N. Gumilyov against a broad background of foreign policy, largely based on the ethnic and confessional relations of that time. The invasion of Batu's troops for the scientist is not some kind of turning point in the history of Russia. It was a "Mongol raid", or "a big raid, and not a planned conquest, for which the entire Mongol Empire would not have had enough people"; it "in terms of the scale of the destruction produced is comparable to the internecine war, common for that turbulent time." “The Grand Duchy of Vladimir, which let the Tatar army through its lands, retained its military potential,” and “the destruction caused by the war” is “exaggerated.”

Subsequently, "in Great Russia they agreed that the Russian land became the land of "Kanovi and Batyeva", that is, they recognized the suzerainty of the Mongol Khan." This situation suited both the Mongols and the Russians, since "it was justified by the foreign political situation." What was "suzerainty" for Russia? “... The Mongols, neither in Russia, nor in Poland, nor in Hungary, did not leave garrisons, did not impose a constant tax on the population, did not conclude unequal treaties with the princes. Therefore, the expression "a conquered but not conquered country" is completely wrong. The conquest did not take place, because it was not planned”; "Russia was neither subjugated nor conquered by the Mongols", and "Russian land became part of the Dzhuchiev ulus, without losing autonomy ...". “This system of Russian-Tatar relations that existed before 1312 should be called a symbiosis. And then everything changed ... ". The changes occurred as a result of the adoption of Islam by the Golden Horde, which L.N. Gumilyov calls "the victory of the neighboring Muslim super-ethnos, which in 1312 took possession of the Volga and Black Sea regions." “Great Russia, in order not to perish, was forced to become a military camp, and the former symbiosis with the Tatars turned into a military alliance with the Horde, which lasted more than half a century - from Uzbek to Mamai.” Its political essence was that the Russian princes “demanded and received military assistance against the West (Lithuania and the Germans. - for the tribute they paid) against the West (Lithuania and the Germans. - Yu.K.) and had a strong barrier that protected them from impending strikes from the East.

The subsequent confluence of circumstances (internal and external) has already made it possible to lay the "foundation of the future greatness of Russia."

The concept of "Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe" L.N. Gumilyov in many ways goes back to the idea of ​​"Eurasianism" and its specific historical development, primarily in the works of G.V. Vernadsky. (L.N. Gumilyov, as is well known, called himself “the last Eurasian”.) “Eurasianism” now, unlike in the past decades, is actively present in Russian social and scientific thought. He is "opposed" by the concept of Russian-Mongolian relations, formed by our historical science in the late 30s - 60s-70s. How significant are the differences between these concepts? If you pay attention to the details, then, of course, there will be a lot of inconsistencies and disagreements. And if you look more broadly and voluminously?

Both concepts recognize, to one degree or another, the dependence of Russia on the Mongols, which is obvious. But the "Eurasian" view assumes the status of Russian lands as a "Russian ulus", i.e. their entry into the main territory of the Golden Horde. However, no "stagnation" in the internal life of Russia came from this. Moreover, she was enriched by many acquisitions in various spheres of social, political, cultural and even ethnic life.

Most domestic historians believed and still believe that Russia, as a territory and society, did not become the territory of the "Juchi ulus". As noted by V.L. Egorov, between the "indigenous" lands of North-Eastern Russia and the Golden Horde, there were so-called "buffer zones", in fact delimiting the Russian and Mongolian areas. But at the same time, this did not alleviate the situation of Russia. Russia found itself under the heavy Horde "yoke", which lasted almost two and a half centuries. The "yoke" threw the country, which was in line with the all-European development, for several centuries, causing its backwardness and specificity in the future. These are the positions of the currently opposing historiographic parties in the "Mongolian question".

It seems to us that, despite the external antagonism, there are no insurmountable obstacles between them. But for this it is necessary to somewhat soften their provisions regarding the internal state and development of Russia "under the yoke". There is no doubt that assessments of relations as “friendly” or “benevolent” did not correspond to reality. There was a confrontation between two ethno-social systems (although, perhaps, they were close in their basis), and the confrontation was tough. On the other hand, we believe that the view of Russian-Horde relations as a "total" subordination of Russia to the Horde, expressed in the form of constant "terror" in relation to the population and the prince, is at least somewhat exaggerated.

This is not about defending the Mongol-Tatar policy in Russia, we are not striving for any kind of apologetics for the Mongol-Tatars. (It seems that the history of any ethnic group does not need protection and patronage, because in the history of all peoples there is positive and negative, "black" and "white", if the question can be put that way at all.) We are talking about creating the most complete picture of Russian - Horde relations, complete and balanced, without ideological and other distortions in one direction or another. We are also talking about an attempt to explain some (all, apparently, fail) elements of relations (their origins, causes), which do not always fit into the rationalistic schemes that are familiar to us. Religious ideas, norms of customary law, everyday life, rituals - all this (along with "classical" economic and political relations, of course) must be taken into account when studying Russian-Horde relations.

Not only economic, social and political systems came into contact, not only the nomadic and sedentary worlds, but also worldview systems: ideological and mental. Without taking into account the latter, our perception of the events and phenomena of that time becomes impoverished and becomes inadequate to medieval realities.

Raids, assaults, violence clearly simplify Russian-Horde relations, as they generally simplify the internal development of Russia itself, in many respects reducing it only to the imposed influence of the Mongol-Tatar orders.

The essays proposed below are intended to show the common and the different, what connected or separated the two large social systems of the Eurasian Middle Ages. Ultimately, an attempt to move from the interpretation of Russian-Horde relations as a continuous struggle to an interpretation that involves multilateral and multi-level interaction.

Notes

. Grekov B.D., Yakubovsky A.Yu. 1) The Golden Horde (Essay on the history of the Ulus Ju-chi during the period of formation and flourishing in the XIII-XIV centuries). L., 1937. S. 3-10, 193-202; 2) The Golden Horde and its fall. M.; L., 1950. S. 5-12; Nasonov A.N. The Tatar yoke in the coverage of M.N. Pokrovsky // Against the anti-Marxist concept of M.N. Pokrovsky. Part 2. M.; L., 1940; Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols in Russia // Essays on the history of Russian oriental studies. M., 1953. S. 31-95; Safargaliev M.G. The collapse of the Golden Horde. Saransk, 1960. S. 3-18; Cherepnin L.V. Formation of the Russian centralized state in the XIV-XV centuries. Essays on the socio-economic and political history of Russia. M., 1960 (Chapter 1. Historiography of the issue of the formation of the Russian centralized state); Kargalov V.V. Foreign policy factors in the development of feudal Russia: Feudal Russia and nomads. M., 1967. S. 218-255; Fedorov-Davydov G.A. Social structure of the Golden Horde. M., 1973. S. 18-25; Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography on the impact of the Tatar-Mongol invasion on Russian culture // Problems of the history of the USSR. Issue. V. M., 1976. S. 129-148; Grekov I.B. Place of the Battle of Kulikovo in the political life of Eastern Europe at the end of the 14th century. // Battle of Kulikovo. M., 1980. S. 113-118; Arapov D.Yu. Russian Oriental Studies and the Study of the History of the Golden Horde // Battle of Kulikovo in the history and culture of our Motherland. M., 1983. S. 70-77; Arslanova A.A. From the history of the study of the Golden Horde according to Persian sources of the 13th - first half of the 15th centuries. in Russian historiography // Problems of socio-economic development of the village of the Middle Volga region during the period of feudalism. Kazan, 1986, pp. 11-130; Tolochko P.P. Ancient Russia. Essays on socio-political history. Kyiv, 1987. S. 165-167; Gorsky A.A. Russian lands in the XIII-XV centuries. Ways of political development. M., 1996. S. 56-57, 107-108; Chukaeea V.A. Russian principalities and the Golden Horde. 1243-1350 Dnepropetrovsk, 1998. S. 4-19.

Cm.: Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography ... S. 140-143; Kargalov V.V. Foreign Policy Factors... S. 253-255.

Cm.: Rudakov V.N. Perception of the Mongol-Tatars in the annalistic stories about the invasion of Batu // Hermeneutics of Old Russian Literature. Sat. 10. M., 2000, etc. Of course, it is necessary to take into account the later editorial processing of the “scribes” ( Prokhorov G.M. 1) Codicological analysis of the Laurentian Chronicle // VID. L., 1972; 2) The story of the Batu invasion in the Laurentian Chronicle // TODRL. T. 28. 1974).

. Stennik Yu.V. On the Origins of Slavophilism in Russian Literature of the 18th Century // Slavophilism and Modernity. SPb., 1994. S. 17, 19, 20; Poznansky V.V. Essay on the formation of Russian national culture: The first half of the 19th century. M., 1975. S. 8 and others.

. Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 12 volumes. T. V. M., 1992. S. 205.

There. T. II-III. M., 1991. S. 462.

There. T. V. C. 201, 202, 208. See also: Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography ... S. 130-132.

There. S. 132.

. Karamzin N.M. History of the Russian State in 12 volumes. T. II-III. S. 751; T. IV. M., 1992. S. 423.

Cit. on: Golman M.I. Study of the history of Mongolia in the West (XIII - mid-XX centuries). M., 1988. S. 40.

There. - Another prominent French Orientalist of the early 19th century became his successor. D "Osson, who published in 1824 in 4 volumes "The History of the Mongols from Genghis Khan to Timur Bek." M.I. Golman believes that he "managed to recreate a broad picture of the Mongol conquests and, most importantly, correctly assess them devastating consequences for the peoples of Asia and Eastern Europe "; as de Guigne's work for the 18th century, the work of D" Osson was "the most significant in Western European historiography on the history of Mongolia in the 19th century. and has not lost its scientific significance in the 20th century. (Ibid., pp. 42-43). A look at the Mongols of the 13th century. as conquerors who caused enormous destruction in the countries they conquered, was accepted by bourgeois science when this science was on the rise "( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... S. 33). Compare: "After D" Osson, historians, so to speak, vulgarized a negative attitude towards the Mongols and Genghisides "( Kozmin N.N. Preface // D "Osson K. History of the Mongols. T. 1. Genghis Khan. Irkutsk, 1937. C.XXVII-XXVIII).

History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. T. 2. 1803-1917. M.; L., 1964. S. 189.

About H.D. Frenet see: Saveliev P. On the life and scientific works of Fren. SPb., 1855.

. Golman M.I. Studying the history of Mongolia ... S. 143, approx. 57. - D.Yu. Arapov ( Arapov D.Yu. Russian oriental studies and the study of the history of the Golden Horde. S. 70). See also: Gumilyov L.N. Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe. M., 1989. S. 602-604; Kozhinov V.V. Mysterious pages of the history of the XX century. M., 1995. S. 229, 231-232.

. Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... S. 39.

Collection of acts of the solemn meeting of the Academy of Sciences, which was on the occasion of its 100th anniversary of its existence on December 29, 1826. St. Petersburg, 1827. S. 52-53. - About the prehistory of setting the task and the results of the competition, see: Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials relating to the history of the Golden Horde. SPb., 1884. T. 1. S. V-VI; Safargaliev M.G. The collapse of the Golden Horde. pp. 3-6.

. Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials relating to the history of the Golden Horde. T. 1. S. 555-563.

There. S. 555.

There. pp. 556-557.

. "The views of H. Fren were then dominant in historical science" ( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... S. 39). - It is hardly appropriate to say that in the "Program" compiled by H.D. Fren, "the problem of classes and the class struggle was not taken into account, no priority was given to the study of the socio-economic foundations of the Golden Horde state" ( Arapov D.Yu. Russian Oriental Studies ... S. 72).

. Richter A. Something about the influence of the Mongols and Tatars on Russia. SPb., 1822. See also: Naumov P. On the relationship of Russian princes to the Mongol and Tatar khans from 1224 to 1480. St. Petersburg, 1823; Bernhof A. Russia under the yoke of the Tatars. Riga, 1830; Kartamyshev A. On the significance of the Mongolian period in Russian history. Odessa, 1847.

. A.R. Research on the influence of the Mongol-Tatars on Russia // Otechestvennye zapiski. 1825, June; Prandunas G. The reasons for the fall of Russia under the yoke of the Tatars and the gradual restoration of autocracy in it // Bulletin of Europe. 1827. Ch. 155. No. 14; [N. W.] On the state of Russia before the invasion of the Mongols (excerpt) // Son of the Fatherland. 1831. V. 22. No. 33-34; [M.P.] Reasoning about the reasons that slowed down civil education in the Russian state to Peter the Great, essay by M. Gastev. M., 1832 // Telescope. 1832. No. 12; Fisher A. Speech delivered at the solemn meeting of St. Petersburg University by Ordinary Professor of Philosophy A. Fisher, September 20, 1834 // ZhMNP. 1835.4.5. No. 1.

. Gastev M. Reasoning about the reasons that slowed down civil education in the Russian state. M., 1832. S. 131.

. Polevoy N.A. History of the Russian people. SPb., 1833. T. 4. S. 9; T. 5. S. 22-23 and others; Ustryalov N.G. Russian history. Part 1. St. Petersburg, 1855. S. 185, 187-193.

Although it is possible to assume that his view was “a reaction to the exaggeration of the role of the Tatar yoke in Russian history” (Russian history in essays and articles / Edited by M.V. Dovnar-Zapolsky. T. I. B. m., 6. g. S. 589).

. Soloviev S.M. Op. in 18 books. Book. I. History of Russia since ancient times. T. 1-2.M., 1988. S. 53.

There. S. 54.

The concept of the "Mongolian question" S.M. Solovyov was not accepted by Soviet historical science and was sharply criticized. So, N.S. Borisov wrote that in his works “the significance of the Tatar invasion is extremely underestimated, even the very term “Mongolian period” is discarded. In his multi-volume "History of Russia" Batu's invasion occupies only four pages, and about the same - a description of the customs of the Tatars "( Borisov N.S. Domestic historiography ... S. 135).

. Kononov A.N. Some questions of studying the history of domestic oriental studies. M., 1960. S. 3; Golman M.I. The study of the history of Mongolia ... S. 54. - On the subsequent development of Mongolian studies in Russia, see p. 108-118.

. Tizengauzen V.G. Collection of materials relating to the history of the Golden Horde. T. 1. S. IX.

There. S. V. Compare: “The merits of that generation of Orientalists to which Berezin belongs are determined not so much by the fulfillment as by the setting of scientific tasks, and in this regard, a scientist who understood that “Russian Orientalists have the duty of explaining” the Mongolian period of Russian history, and not only in word, but also in deed, he who has proved the consciousness of this duty ... has the full right to the gratitude of posterity ”( Bartold V.V. Op. T. IX. M., 1977. S. 756).

. Kostomarov N.I. The beginning of autocracy in ancient Russia // Kostomarov N.I. Sobr. op. Historical monographs and researches. Book. 5. T. XII-XIV. SPb., 1905. S. 5.

. Nasonov A.N. The Tatar yoke in the coverage of M.N. Pokrovsky. S. 61.

. Kostomarov N.I. The beginning of autocracy in ancient Russia. S. 47.

There. S. 43.

. Platonov S.F. Op. in 2 vols. T. 1. St. Petersburg, 1993. S. 135-139. - A brief description of other points of view of Russian historiography of the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. see: Russian history in essays and articles. pp. 589-590. - Reassessment of the "Mongolian heritage" at the end of the 19th century. took place in Western historiography. “In bourgeois historical science, at that time, a revision of views on the past began, including the question of the role of the Mongol conquest. More and more voices began to be heard that previous historians had incorrectly assessed the role of the Mongols and the Mongol conquest in the history of mankind, that it was high time to reassess the previous views in this area, that the Mongols were not at all such destroyers as they thought before, and that, on the contrary, , they brought a lot of positive things into the life of the conquered peoples and countries. This change of progressive views in the field of evaluating the Mongol conquests with reactionary ones captured even the most serious representatives of bourgeois historiography of the late 19th and 20th centuries, ”described from the standpoint of the early 50s of the 20th century. a revolution in the views on the "Mongolian problem" A.Yu. Yakubovsky ( Yakubovsky A.Yu. From the history of the study of the Mongols ... S. 64. See also: Golman M.I. The study of the history of Mongolia ... S. 44, 52).

The invasion of the Mongol hordes and the subsequent domination, which stretched for almost two and a half centuries, became a terrible shock for medieval Russia. The Mongol cavalry swept away everything in its path, and if any city tried to resist, its population was ruthlessly massacred, leaving only ashes in place of houses. From 1258 to 1476, Russia was obliged to pay tribute to the Mongol rulers and provide recruits for the Mongol armies. The Russian princes, whom the Mongols eventually entrusted with the direct management of their lands and the collection of tribute, could begin to fulfill their duties only after receiving official permission from the Mongol rulers. Starting from the 17th century, the phrase “Tatar-Mongolian yoke” began to be used in the Russian language to designate this historical period.

The destructiveness of this invasion does not raise the slightest doubt, but the question of how exactly it influenced the historical fate of Russia still remains open. On this issue, two extreme opinions oppose each other, between which there is a whole range of intermediate positions. Supporters of the first point of view generally deny any significant historical consequences of the Mongol conquest and domination. Among them, for example, Sergei Platonov (1860-1933), who proclaimed the yoke only an accidental episode of national history and reduced its influence to a minimum. According to him, "we can consider the life of Russian society in the XIII century, not paying attention to the fact of the Tatar yoke." Followers of a different point of view, in particular, the theorist of Eurasianism Pyotr Savitsky (1895-1968), on the contrary, argued that “without the “Tatars” there would be no Russia.” Between these extremes, one can find many intermediate positions, the defenders of which attributed to the Mongols a greater or lesser degree of influence, ranging from theses about a limited impact solely on the organization of the army and diplomatic practice, and ending with a recognition of exceptional importance in predetermining, among other things, the political structure of the country.

This dispute is of key importance for Russian self-consciousness. After all, if the Mongols did not have any influence on Russia at all, or if such an influence was negligible, then today's Russia can be considered as a European power, which, despite all its national characteristics, still belongs to the West. In addition, from this state of affairs follows the conclusion that the Russian attachment to autocracy has developed under the influence of some genetic factors and, as such, is not subject to change. But if Russia was formed directly under the Mongol influence, then this state turns out to be part of Asia or a “Eurasian” power that instinctively rejects the values ​​of the Western world. As will be shown below, the opposing schools argued not only about the significance of the Mongol invasion of Russia, but also about where Russian culture originated.

Thus, the purpose of this work is to study the mentioned extreme positions, as well as to analyze the arguments used by their supporters.

The dispute originated at the beginning of the 19th century, when the first systematized history of Russia was published, penned by Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826). Karamzin, who was the official historian of the Russian autocracy and an ardent conservative, called his work "History of the Russian State" (1816-1829), thereby emphasizing the political background of his work.

For the first time, the Tatar problem was identified by Karamzin in the “Note on Ancient and New Russia”, prepared for Emperor Alexander I in 1811. The Russian princes, the historian argued, who received “labels” for ruling from the Mongols, were much more cruel rulers than the princes of the pre-Mongol period, and the people under their rule cared only about saving life and property, but not about exercising their civil rights. One of the Mongol innovations was the use of the death penalty for traitors. Taking advantage of the current situation, the Moscow princes gradually approved an autocratic form of government, and this became a boon for the nation: “The autocracy founded and resurrected Russia: with the change of the State Charter, it perished and had to perish ...”.

Karamzin continued the study of the topic in the fourth chapter of the fifth volume of "History ...", the publication of which began in 1816. In his opinion, Russia lagged behind Europe not only because of the Mongols (whom he called “Moguls” for some reason), although they played their negative role here. The historian believed that the lag began during the period of princely civil strife of Kievan Rus, and continued under the Mongols: “At the same time, Russia, tormented by the Moghuls, strained its forces solely in order not to disappear: we had no time for enlightenment!” Under the rule of the Mongols, the Russians lost their civic virtues; in order to survive, they did not shy away from deception, love of money, cruelty: “Perhaps the very present character of the Russians still shows the stains placed on it by the barbarity of the Mughals,” wrote Karamzin. If any moral values ​​were preserved in them at that time, then this happened solely thanks to Orthodoxy.

In political terms, according to Karamzin, the Mongol yoke led to the complete disappearance of free-thinking: "Princes, humbly groveling in the Horde, returned from there as formidable rulers." The boyar aristocracy lost power and influence. "In a word, autocracy was born." All these changes were a heavy burden on the population, but in the long run their effect was positive. They brought an end to the civil strife that destroyed the Kievan state, and helped Russia get back on its feet when the Mongol empire fell.

But Russia's gain was not limited to this. Orthodoxy and trade flourished under the Mongols. Karamzin was also one of the first to draw attention to how widely the Mongols enriched the Russian language.

Under the clear influence of Karamzin, the young Russian scientist Alexander Richter (1794-1826) published in 1822 the first scientific work devoted exclusively to the Mongol influence on Russia - "Studies on the influence of the Mongol-Tatars on Russia." Unfortunately, this book is not in any of the American libraries, and I had to form an idea of ​​its content based on an article by the same author, which was published in June 1825 in the journal Otechestvennye Zapiski.

Richter draws attention to the Russian adoption of Mongol diplomatic etiquette, as well as such evidence of influence as the isolation of women and their clothing, the spread of inns and taverns, food preferences (tea and bread), methods of warfare, the practice of punishment (beating with a whip), the use of extrajudicial decisions, the introduction of money and a system of measures, ways of processing silver and steel, numerous language innovations.

“Under the rule of the Mongols and Tatars, the Russians almost degenerated into Asians, and although they hated their oppressors, they imitated them in everything and entered into kinship with them when they converted to Christianity.”

Richter's book prompted a public discussion, which in 1826 prompted the Imperial Academy of Sciences to announce a competition for the best work on “what were the consequences of the domination of the Mongols in Russia and exactly what effect it had on the political relations of the state, on the form of government and on the internal administration of Onago, as well as the enlightenment and education of the people.” Interestingly, this competition received a single application from a certain German scientist, whose manuscript was ultimately considered unworthy of the award.

The competition was continued in 1832 at the initiative of the Russified German orientalist Christian-Martin von Frehn (1782–1851). This time, the topic was expanded in such a way as to cover the entire history of the Golden Horde - in the perspective of the influence that "Mongol rule had on the decrees and the people's life in Russia." Again, only one application was received. The famous Austrian orientalist Joseph von Hammer-Purgstahl (1774–1856) became its author. The jury, consisting of three members of the Academy, chaired by Fren, refused to accept the work for consideration, calling it "superficial". The author published it on his own initiative in 1840. In this edition, he briefly covers the background of his research and provides feedback from members of the Russian academic jury.

In 1832, Mikhail Gastev published a book in which he accused the Mongols of slowing down the development of Russia. Their influence on the state was proclaimed purely negative, and even the formation of autocracy was excluded from their merits. This work was one of the first in a long line of historical works, the authors of which insisted that the Mongol invasion did not bring Russia anything good.

In 1851, the first of twenty-nine volumes of a history of Russia was published, written by Sergei Solovyov (1820–1879), professor at Moscow University and leader of the so-called “state” historical school. A staunch Westerner and admirer of Peter I, Solovyov generally abandoned the use of the concept of “Mongolian period”, replacing it with the term “specific period”. For him, the Mongol rule was just an accidental episode in Russian history, which did not have significant consequences for the further evolution of the country. Solovyov's views had a direct impact on his student Vasily Klyuchevsky (1841-1911), who also denied the significance of the Mongol invasion for Russia.

A significant contribution to the development of this discussion in 1868 was made by the legal historian Alexander Gradovsky (1841–1889). In his opinion, it was from the Mongol khans that the Moscow princes adopted the attitude towards the state as their personal property. In pre-Mongol Russia, Gradovsky argued, the prince was only a sovereign ruler, but not the owner of the state:

“The private property of the prince existed along with the private property of the boyars and did not in the least constrain the latter. Only in the Mongol period does the concept of a prince appear not only as a sovereign, but also as the owner of all the land. The Grand Dukes gradually became to their subjects in such an attitude in which the Mongol khans stood in relation to themselves. “According to the principles of Mongolian state law,” says Nevolin, “all the land in general, which was within the dominion of the khan, was his property; the subjects of the khan could only be simple landowners.” In all regions of Russia, except for Novgorod and Western Russia, these principles were to be reflected in the principles of Russian law. The princes, as rulers of their regions, as representatives of the khan, naturally enjoyed the same rights in their destinies as he did in his entire state. With the fall of the Mongol dominion, the princes became the heirs of the khan's power, and, consequently, of those rights that were connected with it.

Gradovsky's remarks became the earliest mention in the historical literature of the merging of political power and property in the Muscovite kingdom. Later, under the influence of Max Weber, this convergence would be called "patrimonialism."

Gradovsky's ideas were taken up by the Ukrainian historian Mykola Kostomarov (1817–1885) in his work The Beginning of Autocracy in Ancient Russia, published in 1872. Kostomarov was not an adherent of the “state” school, emphasizing the special role of the people in the historical process and opposing the people and the authorities. He was born in Ukraine, and in 1859 he moved to St. Petersburg, where for some time he was a professor of Russian history at the university. In his writings, Kostomarov emphasized the difference between the democratic structure of Kievan Rus and the autocracy of Muscovy.

According to this scholar, the ancient Slavs were a freedom-loving people who lived in small communities and did not know autocratic rule. But after the Mongol conquest, the situation changed. The khans were not only absolute rulers, but also the owners of their subjects, whom they treated as slaves. If in the pre-Mongolian period the Russian princes demarcated state power and possession, then under the Mongols the principalities became patrimonies, that is, property.

“Now the earth has ceased to be an independent unit; […] it descended to the value of a real belonging. […] The feeling of freedom, honor, consciousness of personal dignity disappeared; servility to the higher, despotism over the lower have become qualities of the Russian soul.

These conclusions were not taken into account in the eclectic in spirit "Russian History" by St. Petersburg professor Konstantin Bestuzhev-Ryumin (1829-1897), first published in 1872. He was of the opinion that both Karamzin and Solovyov were too harsh in their judgments, and the influence exerted by the Mongols on the organization of the army, the financial system and the deterioration of morals cannot be denied. At the same time, however, he did not believe that the Russians adopted corporal punishment from the Mongols, since they were also known in Byzantium, and especially did not agree that the royal power in Russia was a semblance of the power of the Mongol Khan.

Perhaps the sharpest position on the issue of Mongol influence was taken by Fyodor Leontovich (1833–1911), a professor of law, first at Odessa and then at Warsaw Universities. His specialization was natural law among the Kalmyks, as well as among the Caucasian highlanders. In 1879, he published a study on a prominent Kalmyk legal document, at the end of which he offered his view on the influence of the Mongols in Russia. Recognizing a certain degree of continuity between Kievan Rus and Muscovy, Leontovich still believed that the Mongols "broke" the former Rus. In his opinion, the Russians adopted from the Mongols the institution of orders, the enslavement of peasants, the practice of parochialism, various military and fiscal orders, as well as criminal law with its inherent torture and executions. Most importantly, the Mongols predetermined the absolute character of the Muscovite monarchy:

“The Mongols introduced into the minds of their tributaries - the Russians - the idea of ​​the rights of their leader (khan) as the supreme owner (patrimony) of all the land they occupied. Arising from here dispossession(in a legal sense) population, the concentration of land rights in a few hands, is inextricably linked with the strengthening of service and hard-working people who retained the “ownership” of land in their hands only under the condition of proper service and duties. Then, after the overthrow of the yoke [...] the princes could transfer the supreme power of the khan to themselves; why all the land began to be considered the property of the princes.

Orientalist Nikolai Veselovsky (1848-1918) studied in detail the practice of Russian-Mongolian diplomatic relations and came to the following conclusion:

“... The embassy ceremonial in the Moscow period of Russian history bore in full, one might say, the volume of the Tatar, or rather, Asian, character; deviations with us were insignificant and were caused mainly by religious views.

How, according to the supporters of such views, did the Mongols ensure their influence, given that they ruled Russia indirectly, entrusting this task to the Russian princes? For this purpose, two means were used. The first was the endless stream of Russian princes and merchants who traveled to the Mongol capital Saray, where some of them had to spend whole years absorbing the Mongol way of life. So, Ivan Kalita (1304-1340), as is commonly believed, made five trips to Sarai and spent almost half of his reign with the Tatars or on the way to Sarai and back. In addition, Russian princes were often forced to send their sons to the Tatars as hostages, thereby proving loyalty to the Mongol rulers.

The second source of influence was the Mongols, who were in the Russian service. This phenomenon appeared in the 14th century, when the Mongols were at the peak of their power, but it acquired a truly massive character after the Mongol empire broke up into several states at the end of the 15th century. As a result, the Mongols who left their homeland brought with them the knowledge of the Mongolian way of life, which they taught the Russians.

So, the arguments of scholars who insisted on the significance of the Mongol influence can be summarized as follows. First of all, the influence of the Mongols is clearly visible in the fact that the Muscovite state formed after the fall of the yoke at the end of the 15th century was fundamentally different from the old Kievan Rus. The following differences can be distinguished between them:

1. The Moscow tsars, unlike their Kievan predecessors, were absolute rulers, not bound by the decisions of the people's assemblies (veche), and in this respect resembled the Mongol khans.

2. Like the Mongol khans, they literally owned their kingdom: their subjects disposed of the land only temporarily, subject to lifelong service to the ruler.

3. The entire population was considered the servants of the king, as in the Horde, where the statute of bound service was the basis of the khan's omnipotence.

In addition, the Mongols significantly influenced the organization of the army, the judicial system (for example, the introduction of the death penalty as a criminal punishment, which in Kievan Rus was applied only to slaves), diplomatic customs and postal practices. According to some scholars, the Russians also adopted from the Mongols the institution of parochialism and a large array of trading customs.

If we turn to scholars and publicists who did not recognize the Mongol influence or minimized its significance, the fact that they never considered it necessary to respond to the arguments of their opponents immediately attracts attention. They could at least be expected to solve two problems: either to demonstrate that their opponents misrepresented the political and social organization of the Muscovite kingdom, or to prove that the customs and institutions attributed to the Mongol innovations actually existed in Kievan Rus. But neither was done. This camp simply ignored the arguments of its opponents, which significantly weakened its position.

This is equally true of the views advocated by the three leading historians of the late empire—Solov'ev, Klyuchevsky, and Platonov.

Solovyov, who divided the historical past of Russia into three chronological periods, did not in any way separate the time period associated with Mongol domination. He did not see "the slightest trace of the Tatar-Mongolian influence on the internal administration of Russia" and in fact did not mention the Mongol conquest. Klyuchevsky in his famous "Course of Russian History" also almost ignores the Mongols, not noticing either a separate Mongol period or the Mongol influence on Russia. Surprisingly, in the detailed table of contents of the first volume devoted to Russian history in the Middle Ages, there is no mention of the Mongols or the Golden Horde at all. This striking but deliberate omission can be explained by the fact that, for Klyuchevsky, colonization was the central factor in Russian history. For this reason, he considered the mass movement of the Russian population from the southwest to the northeast to be the key event of the 13th-15th centuries. The Mongols, even having caused this migration, seemed to Klyuchevsky an insignificant factor. As for Platonov, he devoted only four pages to the Mongols in his popular course, stating that this subject was not studied in such depth that its impact on Russia could be accurately determined. According to this historian, since the Mongols did not occupy Russia, but ruled it through intermediaries, they could not influence its development at all. Like Klyuchevsky, Platonov considered the division of Russia into southwestern and northeastern parts as the only significant result of the Mongol invasion.

Three explanations can be offered as to why leading Russian historians have been so dismissive of Mongol influence in Russia.

First of all, they were not familiar with the history of the Mongols in particular and Oriental studies in general. Although Western scientists of that time had already begun to deal with these issues, their work was not well known in Russia.

As another explanatory circumstance, one can point to unconscious nationalism and even racism, expressed in unwillingness to admit that the Slavs could learn anything from the Asians.

But, probably, the most weighty explanation is found in the peculiarities of those sources that medieval historians then used. For the most part, these were chronicles compiled by monks and therefore reflecting the church's point of view. The Mongols, starting with Genghis Khan, pursued a policy of religious tolerance, respecting all faiths. They freed the Orthodox Church from taxes and protected its interests. As a result, monasteries under the Mongols prospered, owning about a third of all arable land - a wealth that, in the early 16th century, when Russia got rid of Mongol domination, gave rise to a discussion about monastic property. With that said, it is easy to see why the church viewed Mongol rule quite favorably. The American historian comes to a surprising conclusion:

“There are no fragments in the annals containing anti-Mongol attacks that would have appeared between 1252 and 1448. All records of this kind are made either before 1252 or after 1448.”

According to the observation of another American, in the Russian chronicles there is no mention at all that the Mongols ruled Russia, their reading forms the following impression:

“[It seems that] the Mongols influenced Russian history and society no more than the earlier steppe peoples, and many historians shared a similar view.”

This opinion was certainly supported by the fact that the Mongols ruled Russia indirectly, through the mediation of Russian princes, and in connection with this, their presence within its borders was not very tangible.

Among historical writings that try to minimize Mongol influence while neglecting specific issues, the work of Horace Dewey of the University of Michigan is a rare exception. This specialist thoroughly investigated the problem of exposure Mongols to the folding in the Moscow kingdom and then in the Russian Empire of a system of collective responsibility, forcing the communities to answer for the obligations of their members to the state. A vivid example of this practice was the responsibility of the village community for the payment of taxes by the peasants included in it. The very term "guarantee" in the texts of Kievan Rus was used quite rarely, but Dewey nevertheless argued that this institution was already known at that time, and therefore it cannot be attributed to the acquisitions of the Mongol era. At the same time, however, the historian admits that its most widespread use occurred in the period after the Mongol conquest, when other Mongol practices were actively assimilated.

In the first fifteen years of Soviet power, those sections of historical science that did not deal with the revolution and its consequences were relatively free from state control. For the study of the Middle Ages, this was a particularly favorable period. Mikhail Pokrovsky (1868–1932), the leading Soviet historian of the day, minimized the perniciousness of Mongol influence and downplayed the resistance offered by Rus to invaders. In his opinion, the Mongols even contributed to the progress of the conquered territory by introducing key financial institutions in Russia: the Mongolian land cadastre - “sosh letter” - was used in Russia until the middle of the 17th century.

In the 1920s, it was still possible to disagree with the fact that the Mongol masters of Russia acted as carriers of only savagery and barbarism. In 1919-1921, in the harsh conditions of the civil war and the cholera epidemic, archaeologist Franz Ballod carried out large-scale excavations in the Lower Volga region. The finds made convinced him that the ideas of Russian scientists about the Horde were largely erroneous, and in the book “Volga Pompeii” published in 1923, he wrote:

“[The studies carried out show that] in the Golden Horde of the second half of the XIII-XIV centuries, it was not savages at all, but civilized people who were engaged in manufacturing and trade and maintained diplomatic relations with the peoples of the East and West. […] The military successes of the Tatars are explained not only by their inherent fighting spirit and the perfection of the organization of the army, but also by their obviously high level of cultural development.”

The famous Russian orientalist Vasily Bartold (1896–1930) also emphasized the positive aspects of the Mongol conquest, insisting, contrary to the prevailing belief, that the Mongols contributed to the Westernization of Russia:

“Despite the devastation caused by the Mongol troops, despite all the extortions of the Baskaks, during the period of Mongol rule, not only the political revival of Russia, but also the further successes of the Russian culture. Contrary to often expressed opinion, even the influence of the European culture Russia in the Muscovite period was subjected to a much greater extent than in Kyiv.

However, the opinion of Ballod and Barthold, as well as the Oriental community as a whole, was largely ignored by the Soviet historical establishment. Beginning in the 1930s, Soviet historical literature became firmly convinced that the Mongols did not bring anything positive to the development of Russia. Equally obligatory were indications that it was the fierce resistance of the Russians that turned out to be the reason that forced the Mongols not to occupy Russia, but to rule it indirectly and from afar. In reality, the Mongols preferred the model of indirect control for the following reasons:

“... Unlike Khazaria, Bulgaria or the Crimean Khanate in Russia, it [the model of direct control] was uneconomical, and not because the resistance offered by the Russians was allegedly stronger than anywhere else. […] The indirect nature of the government not only did not reduce the strength of the Mongol influence on Russia, but also eliminated the very possibility of a reverse influence of the Russians on the Mongols, who adopted the Chinese order in China and the Persian order in Persia, but at the same time underwent Turkization and Islamization in the Golden Horde itself” .

While pre-revolutionary historians for the most part agreed that the Mongols, albeit unintentionally, nevertheless contributed to the unification of Russia by entrusting the management of it to the Moscow princes, Soviet science placed the accents differently. The unification, she believed, took place not as a result of the Mongol conquest, but in spite of it, becoming the result of a nationwide struggle against the invaders. The official communist position on this issue is set out in an article in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia:

“The Mongol-Tatar yoke had negative, deeply regressive consequences for the economic, political and cultural development of the Russian lands, was a brake on the growth of the productive forces of Russia, which were at a higher socio-economic level compared to the productive forces of the Mongol-Tatars. It artificially preserved for a long time the purely feudal natural character of the economy. Politically, the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar yoke were manifested in the violation of the process of state consolidation of Russian lands, in the artificial maintenance of feudal fragmentation. The Mongol-Tatar yoke led to the intensification of the feudal exploitation of the Russian people, who found themselves under the double yoke of their own and the Mongol-Tatar feudal lords. The Mongol-Tatar yoke, which lasted 240 years, was one of the main reasons for Russia's lagging behind some Western European countries.

Interestingly, attributing the collapse of the Mongol Empire to purely hypothetical Russian resistance completely ignores the painful blows inflicted on it by Timur (Tamerlane) in the second half of the 14th century.

The position of party scholars was so rigid and unreasoned to such an extent that it was not easy for serious historians to come to terms with it. An example of such rejection is the monograph on the Golden Horde, published in 1937 by two leading Soviet orientalists. One of its authors, Boris Grekov (1882–1953), cites in the book many words used in Russian that are of Mongolian origin. Among them: bazaar, shop, attic, chamber, altyn, chest, tariff, container, caliber, lute, zenith. However, this list, perhaps due to censorship, lacks other important borrowings: for example, money, treasury, pits or tarkhan. It is these words that show what a significant role the Mongols played in the formation of the financial system of Russia, the formation of trade relations and the foundations of the transport system. But, having given this list, Grekov refuses to develop his thought further and declares that the question of the influence of the Mongols on Russia still remains unclear to him.

No one defended the ideas about the positive influence of the Mongols on Russia more consistently than the circle of émigré publicists who acted in the 1920s and called themselves “Eurasians”. Their leader was Prince Nikolai Trubetskoy (1890-1938), a descendant of an old noble family, who received a philological education and taught after emigrating at the universities of Sofia and Vienna.

History as such was not the primary concern of the Eurasians. Although Trubetskoy gave his main work, The Legacy of Genghis Khan, the subtitle “A look at Russian history not from the West, but from the East,” he wrote to one of his associates that “the treatment of history in it is deliberately unceremonious and tendentious.” The circle of Eurasians was made up of intellectuals who specialized in various fields, who experienced the strongest shock from what happened in 1917, but did not leave attempts to understand the new communist Russia. In their opinion, the explanation should be sought in geographical and cultural determinism, based on the fact that Russia cannot be attributed to either East or West, since it was a mixture of both, acting as the heir to the empire of Genghis Khan. According to the Eurasianists, the Mongol conquest not only had a strong influence on the evolution of the Muscovite kingdom and the Russian Empire, but also laid the very foundations of Russian statehood.

The date of birth of the Eurasian movement is considered to be August 1921, when the work Exodus to the East: Premonitions and Accomplishments was published in Bulgaria, written by Trubetskoy in collaboration with the economist and diplomat Petr Savitsky (1895–1968), the music theorist Petr Suvchinsky (1892–1985) and theologian Georgy Florovsky (1893–1979). The group founded its own publishing business with offices in Paris, Berlin, Prague, Belgrade and Harbin, which published not only books, but also periodicals - "Eurasian Time" in Berlin and "Eurasian Chronicle" in Paris.

Trubetskoy abandoned the traditional idea of ​​Muscovy as the heir of Kievan Rus. The fragmented and warring Kiev principalities could not unite into a single and strong state: “In the existence of pre-Tatar Rus there was an element instability prone to degradation which could not lead to anything other than a foreign yoke. Muscovite Rus, like its successors in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, were the successors of the Mongolian empire of Genghis Khan. The territory occupied by them has always remained a closed space: Eurasia was a geographical and climatic unity, which doomed it to political integration. Although this territory was inhabited by different nationalities, a smooth ethnic transition from the Slavs to the Mongols made it possible to treat them as a single entity. The main part of its population belonged to the "Turanian" race, formed by the Finno-Ugric tribes, Samoyeds, Turks, Mongols and Manchus. On the influence of the Mongols on Russia, Trubetskoy spoke as follows:

“If in such important branches of state life as the organization of the financial economy, posts and communications, there was an indisputable continuity between Russian and Mongolian statehood, then it is natural to assume such a connection in other sectors, in the details of the construction of the administrative apparatus, in the organization of military affairs, and so on. ".

The Russians also adopted Mongolian political habits; having combined them with Orthodoxy and Byzantine ideology, they simply appropriated them for themselves. According to the Eurasianists, the most significant thing that the Mongols brought to the development of Russian history concerned not so much the political structure of the country as the spiritual sphere.

“Great is the happiness of Russia that at the moment when, due to internal decay, it had to fall, it went to the Tatars and no one else. Tatars - a "neutral" cultural environment that accepted "all kinds of gods" and tolerated "any cults" - fell on Russia as a punishment from God, but did not muddy the purity of national creativity. If Russia had gone to the Turks, infected with "Iranian fanaticism and exaltation", its test would have been many times more difficult and the fate would have been bitter. If the West had taken her, he would have taken her soul out of her. […] The Tatars did not change the spiritual being of Russia; but in their capacity as creators of states, as a military-organizing force, which was distinctive for them in this era, they undoubtedly influenced Russia.

“An important historical moment was not the “overthrow of the yoke”, not the isolation of Russia from the power of the Horde, but the expansion of Moscow’s power over a significant part of the territory that was once subject to the Horde, in other words, replacement of the Horde khan by the Russian tsar with the transfer of the khan's headquarters to Moscow”.

As the historian Alexander Kizevetter (1866–1933), who taught in Prague at the time, noted in 1925, the Eurasian movement suffered from irreconcilable internal contradictions. He described Eurasianism as a "feeling that resulted in a system." The contradictions manifested themselves most clearly in the attitude of the Eurasians towards Bolshevism in particular and towards Europe as a whole. On the one hand, they rejected Bolshevism because of its European roots, but, on the other hand, they approved of it, since it turned out to be unacceptable for Europeans. They considered Russian culture as a synthesis of the cultures of Europe and Asia, at the same time criticizing Europe on the grounds that the basis of its being was the economy, while the religious and ethical element prevailed in Russian culture.

The Eurasianist movement was popular in the 1920s, but by the end of the decade it collapsed due to the lack of a common position towards the Soviet Union. However, as we will see below, after the collapse of communism, it was to experience a stormy revival in Russia.

The question of the influence of the Mongols on the history of Russia did not arouse much interest in Europe, but in the United States two scientists were seriously carried away by it. The publication in 1985 by Charles Galperin of the work “Russia and the Golden Horde” opened the discussion. Thirteen years later, Donald Ostrovsky took up the theme in his study Muscovy and the Mongols. In general, they took a unified position on the issue under study: Ostrovsky noted that he was completely unanimous with Galperin on the main points of Mongol influence on Muscovy.

However, even the existing unprincipled and small disagreements were quite enough to provoke a lively discussion. Both scholars believed that the Mongol influence took place, and it was very tangible. Galperin attributed Moscow military and diplomatic practices, as well as “some” administrative and fiscal procedures, to Mongolian borrowings. But he did not agree that Russia learned politics and government only thanks to the Mongols: "They did not give rise to the Muscovite autocracy, but only accelerated its arrival." In his opinion, the Mongol invasion could not predetermine the formation of the Russian autocracy, which had local roots and "drawn ideological and symbolic habits rather from Byzantium than from Saray." In this respect, Ostrovsky's opinion diverges from that of his opponent:

“Throughout the first half of the 14th century, the Moscow princes used a model of state power based on the Golden Horde. The civil and military institutions that existed in Muscovy at that time were predominantly Mongolian.”

Moreover, Ostrovsky included several more institutions that played a key role in the life of the Muscovite kingdom among the Mongol borrowings. Mentioned among them was the Chinese principle that all land in a state belonged to the ruler; parochialism, which allowed the Russian nobility not to serve those representatives of their class, whose ancestors themselves were once in the service of their ancestors; feeding, suggesting that local officials lived at the expense of the population accountable to them; an estate, or land allotment, given on the condition of performing conscientious service to the sovereign. Ostrovsky built a relatively coherent theory, which, however, he himself undermined by the statement that Muscovy was not a despotism, but something like a constitutional monarchy:

“Although there was no written constitution in the Muscovy, its internal functioning was in many ways reminiscent of a constitutional monarchy, that is, a system in which decisions are made by consensus between various institutions of the political system. […] Muscovy at that time was a state of law.”

Allowing himself such statements, Ostrovsky ignored the fact that in the 16th-17th centuries there was nothing resembling a constitution in any country in the world, that the Muscovite tsars, according to the testimony of both their own subjects and foreigners, were absolute rulers, and the political the structure of Moscow did not contain any institutions capable of restraining tsarist power.

In a lengthy debate that unfolded on the pages of the magazine "Kritika", Galperin challenged Ostrovsky's inclusion of the estate and locality in the Mongolian inheritance. He also disputed Ostrovsky's thesis about the Mongol roots of the boyar duma, which served as an advisory body under the Russian tsar.

Worthy of attention are the little-known views of Polish historians and publicists regarding the relationship between Mongols and Russians. The Poles, who remained for a millennium the neighbors of Russia and lived under its rule for more than a hundred years, have always shown a keen interest in this country, and their knowledge of it was often much more complete than the unsystematic and random information of other peoples. Of course, the opinions of Polish scientists cannot be called absolutely objective, given that the Poles throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries dreamed of restoring the independence of their state. The main obstacle to this was precisely Russia, which ruled over four-fifths of all the lands that made up Polish territory before its partitions.

Polish nationalists were interested in portraying Russia as a non-European country that threatened other states of the continent. One of the first supporters of this view was Franciszek Dushinsky (1817–1893), who emigrated to Western Europe and published a number of works there, the main idea of ​​which was the division of all human races into two main groups - “Aryan” and “Turanian”. To the Aryans, he attributed the Romanesque and Germanic peoples, as well as the Slavs. The Russians were included in the second group, where they were related to the Mongols, Chinese, Jews, Africans and the like. Unlike the “Aryans”, the “Turanians” had a predisposition to a nomadic way of life, did not respect property and legality, and were prone to despotism.

In the 20th century, this theory was developed by Felix Konechny (1862–1949), a specialist in the comparative study of civilizations. In the book “Polish Logos and Ethos”, he discusses the “Turanian civilization”, the defining features of which, among other things, include the militarization of public life, as well as statehood, which is based on private rather than public law. He considered the Russians the heirs of the Mongols and therefore “Turanians”. By this he also explained the establishment of the communist regime in Russia.

As soon as the communist censorship, which demanded unambiguity on the issue of Mongolian influence, ceased to exist, the discussion on this issue resumed. For the most part, its participants rejected the Soviet approach, showing a willingness to recognize the significant nature of the influence of the Mongols on all spheres of Russian life, and especially on the political regime.

The dispute has now lost its scientific character, acquiring an undeniably political coloring. The collapse of the Soviet state left many of its citizens at a loss: they could not figure out which part of the world their new state belonged to - Europe, Asia, both at the same time, or neither. This means that by that time most Russians agreed that it was largely because of the Mongol yoke that Russia became a unique civilization, the difference from the Western one being rooted in the distant past.

Let's refer to a few examples. Medieval historian Igor Froyanov emphasized in his works the dramatic changes that took place in the political life of Russia as a result of the Mongol conquest:

“As for princely power, it receives completely different grounds than before, when ancient Russian society developed on social and veche principles, characterized by direct democracy, or democracy. If before the arrival of the Tatars, the Rurikovichs occupied the princely tables, as a rule, at the invitation of the city council, dressing up on it about the conditions of their reign and taking an oath, secured by kissing the cross, they promised to keep the contract inviolable, now they sat on the reigns at the pleasure of the khan, sealed with the corresponding khan's label . The princes in a string reached out to the khan's headquarters for labels. So, the khan's will becomes the highest source of princely power in Russia, and the veche people's assembly loses the right to dispose of the princely table. This immediately made the prince independent in relation to the veche, creating favorable conditions for the realization of his monarchical potentialities.

Vadim Trepalov also sees the most direct connection between the Mongol yoke and the rise of autocracy in Russia through the downplaying of representative institutions like the veche. This point of view is shared by Igor Knyazkiy:

“The Horde yoke radically changed the political system of Russia. Dynastically descending from the Kievan princes, the power of the Muscovite tsars essentially goes to the omnipotence of the Mongol khans of the Golden Horde. And the great prince of Moscow becomes tsar in the wake of the fallen power of the Golden Horde lords. It is from them that the formidable sovereigns of Muscovy inherit the unconditional right to execute any of their subjects at their own will, regardless of his real guilt. Arguing that to execute and pardon the Moscow tsars “are free”, Ivan the Terrible acts not as the heir of Monomakh, but as the successor of Batu, for here neither wine nor the virtue of the subject is important for him - they are determined by the royal will itself. The most important circumstance noted by Klyuchevsky, that the subjects of the Tsar of Moscow have no rights, but only obligations, is a direct legacy of the Horde tradition, which even the zemstvo of the 17th century did not essentially change in Muscovy, because during the time of the zemstvo councils, the rights of the Russian people did not increase, and even their own. The councils never gained votes.”

Another manifestation of the revived interest in the Mongolian heritage in post-Soviet Russia was the revival of Eurasianism. According to the French specialist Marlene Laruelle, “neo-Eurasianism became one of the most developed conservative ideologies that appeared in Russia in the 1990s.” The bibliography of one of her books lists dozens of papers published on this topic in Russia since 1989. The most prominent theorists of the revived movement were Lev Gumilyov (1912–1992), Alexander Panarin (1940–2003), professor of philosophy at Moscow University, and Alexander Dugin (b. 1963).

Post-Soviet Eurasianism has a pronounced political character: it calls on Russians to turn their backs on the West and choose Asia as their home. According to Gumilyov, the Mongolian "scourge" is nothing but a myth created by the West to hide the true enemy of Russia - the Romano-Germanic world. The movement is characterized by nationalism and imperialism, and sometimes also anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. Some of its principles were outlined in President Vladimir Putin's November 2001 speech:

“Russia has always felt like a Eurasian country. We never forgot that the bulk of Russian territory is in Asia. True, we must honestly say that they did not always use this advantage. I think the time has come for us, together with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, to move from words to deeds and build up economic, political and other ties. […] After all, Russia is a kind of integration hub that connects Asia, Europe and America.”

This anti-European position is shared by a significant part of Russian society. Answering the question “Do you feel like a European?”, 56% of Russians choose the answer “practically never”.

Modern supporters of Eurasianism pay even less attention to history than their predecessors; First of all, they are interested in the future and Russia's place in it. But when it comes to talking about history, they stick to the manner characteristic of the first Eurasians:

“[Panarin] pays almost no attention to Kievan Rus, since he considers it to be a European rather than a Eurasian entity (and therefore doomed to perish), focusing on the Mongol period. He writes about the "yoke" as a boon that allowed Russia to become an empire and conquer the steppe. Genuine Russia, he declares, appeared in the Muscovite period from the union of Orthodoxy with the Mongolian statehood, Russians with Tatars.

The totality of the facts presented makes it clear that in the dispute about Mongol influence, those who spoke in favor of its importance were right. At the center of the discussion, which stretched over two and a half centuries, was the fundamentally important question of the nature of the Russian political regime and its origin. If the Mongols did not influence Russia in any way, or if this influence did not affect the political sphere, then the Russian commitment to autocratic power, and in the most extreme, patrimonial, form, will have to be declared something innate and eternal. In this case, it must be rooted in the Russian soul, religion, or some other source that cannot be changed. But if Russia, on the contrary, borrowed its political system from foreign invaders, then there is still a chance for internal change, because the Mongol influence may eventually be replaced by Western influence.

In addition, the question of the role of the Mongols in Russian history is of key importance for Russian geopolitics - this circumstance was overlooked by historians of the 19th century. After all, the perception of Russia as the direct heir to the Mongol empire, or even simply as a country that has survived their strong influence, makes it possible to justify the legitimacy of the assertion of Russian power over a vast territory from the Baltic and Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean and over many peoples inhabiting it. This argument is of critical importance to contemporary Russian imperialists.

Such a conclusion makes it possible to understand why the issue of Mongol influence continues to cause such heated controversy in Russian historical literature. Apparently, the search for an answer to it will stop very soon.

Scientists have long disagreed in the interpretation of the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke on the history of Ancient Russia. Some scientists sincerely believe that there really was no invasion, and the Russian princes simply turned to the nomads for protection. At that time, the country was weak and not ready for serious wars with Lithuania or Sweden. The Tatar-Mongol yoke carried out the protection and patronage of Russian lands, preventing the invasion of other nomads and the development of wars.

One way or another, but in 1480 the Tatar-Mongol rule in Russia came to an end. It is necessary to characterize the role of the yoke in the history of the state in the most detailed way, paying attention to both positive and negative aspects.

The positive and negative impact of the Tatar-Mongol yoke

Conclusions on the topic

Of course, it was impossible to deny the impact of the Tatar-Mongol yoke. The Mongols were feared and hated by the people, largely due to the fact that the representatives of the Tatar-Mongol yoke tried to change the state according to their own model. At that time, the Mongols even dreamed of imposing their religious system on the inhabitants of Ancient Russia, but they actively resisted this, preferring only Orthodoxy.

In addition, the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke also affected the establishment of the future system of power. Gradually, power in the country became centralized, and the beginnings of democracy were completely destroyed. Thus, the despotic, eastern model of government flourished on the territory of Russia.

After liberation from the yoke in 1480, the country found itself in a deep economic crisis, from which it got out only decades later. Ahead of the state were the Troubles, imposture, a change in the ruling dynasty and the flowering of autocracy.