The formation of the White Guard volunteer army began. Formation of a volunteer army

By the time of the October coup of the Bolsheviks, 19 officers and 5 generals remained in the Bykhov prison: L. Kornilov, A. Deni I and Kuban KIN and Lukomsky, I. Romanovsky and S. Markov. Escape from prison did not present any particular difficulties, especially since the troops who sympathized with them guarded the prisoners. Recently appointed instead of M. Alekseev, the new chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General N. Dukhonin, also did not hide his disposition towards Kornilov and his associates. On the morning of November 19, 1917, he ordered the release of those arrested, and on the night of November 20, the future leaders of the white movement headed for the Don by different roads.

Dukhonin himself was well aware that by his decision he had signed his own death warrant. However, having the opportunity to hide, but being faithful to military duty, he remained at Headquarters. The next day, the Bolshevik Commander-in-Chief Ensign N. Krylenko arrived here, announcing his assumption of office. Having handed over his affairs, Dukhonin drove to the station in Krylenko's car, where a crowd of angry sailors tore the general to pieces and brutally abused his corpse.

At that time, officers, cadets, students, high school students - future volunteers - came to the Don from all over Russia in order to raise the banner of struggle against "German-Bolshevism" here, in the Cossack region, for the honor and dignity of the Motherland.

General M. Alekseev, who arrived here from Moscow in early November 1917, was already in Novocherkassk, the capital of the All-Great Don Army.

Mikhail Vasilievich Alekseev (1857-1918) was born in the family of a soldier. He gave over forty years to military service, going from ensign to general from infantry. Behind him were studies at the Moscow Junker School and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, participation in the wars: Russian-Turkish (1877-1878) and Russian-Japanese (1904-1905). During the First World War, he was chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, and on August 18, 1915, he became chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Emperor Nicholas II. During the days of the February coup, General Alekseev was one of the main supporters of the abdication of the tsar from the throne and exerted direct pressure on him for this purpose. Alekseev did not remove the blame and responsibility for this until the end of his life - he died of heart disease in Yekaterinodar in the autumn of 1918. From March 11 to May 22, 1917, Alekseev was the Supreme Commander of the Russian army and had a negative attitude towards her involvement in political life. After the failure of the Kornilov speech, at the request of Kerensky, he again headed the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for several days. By his order, L. Kornilov and his comrades were arrested. After his second resignation, he left for his family in Smolensk and returned to Petrograd only on October 7 to participate in the work of the Pre-Parliament, where he was elected by the Moscow Meeting of Public Figures. Then he headed the military organization, which became known as Alekseevskaya.

M. Alekseev expected to gather at least 30 thousand officers on the Don, who were to form the core of the anti-Bolshevik army. However, by the beginning of the winter of 1917, at least 2,000 people had come to Novocherkassk. Representatives of the Moscow Center, well-known politicians and public figures P. Milyukov, P. Struve, M. Rodzianko, Prince G. Trubetskoy, M. Fedorov also arrived here. Unexpected for many was the visit of the former Socialist-Revolutionary B. Savinkov, who, with his characteristic energy, gave himself up to a new idea of ​​​​creating volunteer squads.

On December 6, having passed through the enemy rear within a few weeks after the escape, L. Kornilov appeared in Novocherkassk. However, his arrival was perceived ambiguously. If ordinary volunteers enthusiastically greeted their idol, then from Alekseev Kornilov was given a very cold reception. The hostile personal relationship between the two leaders of the nascent movement had long roots. Kornilov certainly remembered to whom he owed his arrest after the unsuccessful August speech. In the view of the combat general, the behavior of the former chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was by no means always impeccable, and sometimes even ambiguous, if not treacherous. Alekseev, on the other hand, was clearly annoyed by the swift career of Kornilov, who came to the fore only during the years of war and revolution. He probably felt some kind of feeling for him, close to jealousy for the incredible popularity and loud fame that made his name a symbol of the White Cause.

The conflict between the two generals posed a serious threat to all anti-Bolshevik forces in southern Russia. To resolve it, shortly after the arrival of Kornilov, a conference of generals and public figures was convened, designed to reconcile both sides and outline the basic principles of the army being created. According to A. Denikin, "her fragile body would not have survived the removal of one of them: in the first case (Alekseev's departure), the army would have split, in the second, it would have collapsed." As a result, at the suggestion of Denikin, a compromise was adopted: military power was to be transferred to General L. Kornilov; civil power and foreign relations - to remain under the jurisdiction of General M. Alekseev; management of the Don region - for the ataman A. Kaledin. Thus, the military-political triumvirate of the White movement was formed.

At Christmas, December 25, 1917 Kornilov took command of the Volunteer Army. This day was subsequently celebrated by Russian fighters against Bolshevism as the birthday of this army. The formation of the armed forces of the whites at first proceeded strictly on a voluntary basis. Each volunteer gave a subscription to serve for four months and promised unquestioning obedience to the orders of commanders. In November-December 1917, none of them received a salary. Only from the beginning of 1918 did they begin to issue monetary allowances; officers - 150 rubles. per month, soldiers - 50 rubles. Funding for the new army was extremely uneven. The first contribution to arms, the fight against the Bolsheviks was received in November 1917 and amounted to only 400 rubles. Moscow entrepreneurs donated about 800 thousand rubles. By subscription from the business circles of Rostov and Novocherkassk, they managed to collect another 1 million rubles. Then, by agreement with the Don government, it was decided to divide equally between the Cossack and Volunteer armies about 30 million rubles. - part of the Russian state treasury, kept in local branches of the State Bank. At first, the whites pinned great hopes on their former allies in the world war, but their help at this stage was purely symbolic. So, the French in February 1918 were able to allocate only 300 thousand rubles. From the beginning of 1918, the leaders of the movement decided to issue money on their own, issuing banknotes of their own design, thereby declaring their nationwide claims.

By February 1918, the number of all formations of the Volunteer Army reached 3-4 thousand people. It was headed by L. Kornilov, the post of chief of staff was taken by A. Lukomsky. The core of the army was the 1st Volunteer Division (commander A. Denikin, chief of staff S. Markov) and the Kornilov shock, Georgievsky, Rostov volunteer and 1st officer regiments. By the time they set out on their first military campaign against the Reds, some changes had taken place in the leadership of the army. After Lukovsky's departure for the Kuban, the post of chief of staff of the army was taken by I. Romanovsky. Denikin became an assistant (deputy) commander of the army. S. Markov led the vanguard of the army - the 1st officer regiment.

The goals of the Volunteer Army were set out in two documents: the declaration of December 27, 1917, and in the so-called January (1918) "Kornilov's program". The first of them spoke about the need to create a base in the south of Russia to fight the "German-Bolshevik invasion." It was seen by the whites as a continuation of the Great War. After the victory over the Bolsheviks, it was supposed to hold new free elections to the Constituent Assembly, which would finally decide the fate of the country. The second document was more lengthy. It contained the main provisions of the White movement. In particular, the equality of all citizens before the law, freedom of speech and the press, the restoration of private property were proclaimed, the right of workers to organize in trade unions and strikes and to retain all the political and economic gains of the revolution was declared; on the introduction of universal primary education and the separation of church and state. The solution of the agrarian question remained with the Constituent Assembly, and before the issuance of the relevant laws by it, "all sorts of anarchist actions of citizens" were recognized as "inadmissible." The January program demanded the full fulfillment of all obligations assumed by Russia under international treaties and bringing the war to an end in "close unity with our allies." Wide local autonomy was recognized for the peoples that were part of Russia, "on the condition, however, that state unity be preserved."

Thus, both documents were the ideological basis of the White Cause, they expressed the two main principles of the emerging movement: the preservation of the unity of the Russian state and the “non-prejudice” of its future political fate. The anti-Bolshevik platform was supposed to have, as it seemed to its authors, a national liberation character and the ability to rally various forces in the struggle - from extreme right-wing monarchists to moderate socialists. This created real conditions for a broad unification of all opponents of the communist regime. But this was also the biggest drawback of the Whites - the internal amorphousness and weakness of their organization and the constant threat of a split.

Meanwhile, the situation in southern Russia continued to change. At the beginning of 1918, the Bolsheviks launched an offensive against Rostov and Novocherkassk. The Cossacks refused to fight against the Reds. The workers of Donbass openly opposed the volunteers and declared their support for the Soviet regime. On January 15, the last joint meeting of the "triumvirate" took place in Rostov. Kaledin was in a depressed state of mind, extremely pessimistic about the prospects for further struggle on the Don. Alekseev, trying to dispel the gloomy mood of the chieftain, announced the plans of the Volunteer Army, if necessary, to leave the Volga and gather there with new forces, but this only aggravated the plight of the Cossack general. revolution volunteer army kolchak wrangel

On January 28, 1918, Kornilov, finally convinced of the impossibility of his formations staying on the Don, where they were threatened with death without the help of the Cossacks, decided to leave the region, about which he informed A. Kaledin by telegraph. The next day, Kaledin gathered his government and, after reading a telegram from the leadership of the Volunteer Army, said that only 147 bayonets were found at the front to protect the Don region. Then announcing the resignation of the military ataman, he went up to his office and shot himself.

Elected as the new ataman, Major General A. Nazarov took drastic measures, introduced a general mobilization of the Cossacks, but could not delay the advance of the Red troops of V. Antonov-Ovseenko to Rostov, where the workers had already raised an uprising. Under such conditions, on the night of February 9-10, 1918, the volunteers hurriedly left the city and went beyond the Don, into the steppe. Thus began the 1st Kuban or "ice" campaign, later sung by its participants as the heroic epic of the White Cause.

On February 12, in the village of Olginskaya, Kornilov convened a military council, at which, after long discussions, a decision was made to advance to the Kuban, to its capital Yekaterinodar, which had not yet been captured by the Bolsheviks. There, in a rich Cossack region, it was supposed to create a new center of struggle against the Soviet regime and strengthen the army.

The first military campaign of the whites lasted three months. During this time, the volunteers traveled about a thousand miles, half the way passed in continuous battles and fierce clashes. More than four hundred people died in them, over one and a half thousand soldiers and officers received various injuries. Among the dead were the commander of the Kornilov regiment, Colonel M. Nezhentsev, and the leader and one of the founders of the movement, General L. Kornilov. He was killed on the morning of March 31, 1918 during the siege of Ekaterinodar, occupied by the Reds. For fear of enemy revenge, the body of the general was secretly buried in the German colony of Gnachbau, and the grave was razed to the ground. The next day, the Bolsheviks, who occupied the village, discovered the remains of the general and brutally abused his corpse. A year later, A. Denikin, speaking in Yekaterinodar, said in his memorial speech: “A Russian grenade, directed by the hand of a Russian person, struck down a great Russian patriot. His corpse was burned, and the ashes were scattered to the wind. A. Denikin became the new commander of the Volunteer Army.

Anton Ivanovich Denikin (1872-1947) was the son of an officer, a native of serfs. He graduated from the Kiev Infantry Junker School and the Nikolaev General Staff Academy (1899). Member of the Russo-Japanese War, for military merit was promoted to colonel. During the First World War - head of the 4th "iron" rifle division, commander of the 8th army corps. In 1917 - Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander and Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front. For supporting General Kornilov during his August speech, he was arrested and imprisoned in the Bykhov prison, from where, together with his associates, he fled to the Don and took part in the organization of the Volunteer Army, which he led after the death of General Kornilov. From December 26, 1918, he was commander-in-chief of the armed forces of southern Russia, which, under his leadership, achieved their most notable victories in the summer of 1919 and survived the acute bitterness of major military failures in the winter of 1920. On March 22, 1920, in Feodosia, he surrendered command to General Wrangel and went abroad, where he retired from active political activity, preferring to her enthusiastic work on "Essays on the Russian Troubles", which became one of the fundamental works on the history of the civil war in Russia. Until the end of his life, he remained a patriot of the Motherland, urging former comrades-in-arms to refuse to cooperate with the Nazis and sincerely wishing the victory of the Red Army in the war against Hitler.

Denikin decided to lift the siege of Ekaterinodar, withdraw his troops and return to the Don, where in April mass actions of the Cossacks, dissatisfied with communist policies, began against the Bolsheviks. On April 30, 1918, Denikin's troops completed their combat path at the villages of Mechetinskaya and Yegorlykskaya, southeast of Rostov.

The 1st Kuban campaign was of great importance in the initial hundred days of the White movement. The total number of volunteers who set out from the Don in February 1918 did not exceed 3.5 thousand people. In the convoy, along with the military, there were about a thousand civilians. The Volunteer Army, which was returning at the end of April, consisted of 5,000 people who had valuable combat experience and firmly believed in the rightness of their cause. Although the main goal was not achieved (the whites did not take Ekaterinodar), the consequences of the campaign for the entire movement were significant. Organizationally and ideologically, the core of the anti-Bolshevik forces in the south of the country, the Volunteer Army, took shape and rallied. In the course of the fighting, a new flexible tactic of conducting a civil war was developed: frontal attacks in the forehead with dense chains with minimal artillery support, combined with unexpected guerrilla sorties and swift maneuvers. Among the volunteers, their leaders emerged, distinguished by courage and courage - colonels Nezhentsev, Kutepov, generals Markov, Bogaevsky, Kazanovich.

At the same time, the disgusting features of the terrible fratricide - incredible cruelty and ruthlessness, executions of prisoners and hostages, violence against the civilian population, rejection of any form of dissent, characteristic of both opposing sides, stood out quite clearly. So, admonishing his soldiers before the battle, Kornilov said: “Do not take prisoner. The more terror, the more victories." A vivid example of the desperate tactics of the whites was the battle on March 15 near the village of Novo-Dimitreevskaya, when General Markov at night, in a snowy cold, passing through a river covered with a thin layer of ice, led the 1st officer regiment in a bayonet attack and, breaking into the village, entered, not leaving no one alive, in hand-to-hand combat with the red units that did not expect a night assault.

The Bolsheviks, in turn, also did not differ in mercy. They shot the captured Don ataman General A. Nazarov and the Cossacks - members of the military circle. The former tsarist general P. Rannenkampf, who lived in Taganrog since 1917, rejected Antonov-Ovseenko's proposal to join the Red Army and was executed (chopped with swords).

The violence of some only multiplied the violence of others, gave rise to extreme forms of atrocities. The civil war passed through families and generations, crippled human destinies, splitting the people. In addition, since the spring of 1918, external forces have become more and more actively involved in the national tragedy of Russia, using internal upheavals in the country for their own purposes.

In the mass consciousness, despite the many films and books about 1917 and the Civil War, and perhaps thanks to them, there is still no single picture of the unfolding confrontation. Or vice versa, it boils down to "a revolution happened, and then the Reds propagandized everyone and kicked the whites in a mob." And you can’t argue - everything was about the same. However, anyone who tries to delve a little deeper into the situation will have a number of fair questions.

Why, in a matter of years, or rather even months, did a single country turn into a battlefield and civil unrest? Why do some people win and others lose? And finally, where did it all begin?

The first alarm bell rang in 1904–1905, with the start of the Russo-Japanese War. A huge, strong world-class empire actually lost its fleet in one day and, with great difficulty, was able not to lose, to smithereens, on land. And to whom? Tiny Japan, despised by all Asians, who from the point of view of "cultural Europeans" were not considered people at all, and half a century before these events, lived under natural feudalism, with swords and bows. This was the first wake-up call, which (as viewed from the future) actually painted the contours of future military operations. But then no one began to heed the formidable warning. The first Russian revolution clearly showed to everyone the vulnerability of the political system of the empire. And the "wishers" drew conclusions.

In fact, fate gave Russia almost a whole decade to prepare for future trials, relying on the Japanese "test of the pen." And it cannot be said that absolutely nothing has been done. It was done, but ... too slowly and fragmentarily, too inconsistently. Too slow.

The shock of the First World War hit everyone, but Russia was especially hard. It turned out that behind the façade of the world empire there is a not so attractive underside - an industry that cannot master the mass production of engines, cars and tanks. Everything was not as bad as categorical opponents of "rotten tsarism" often draw (for example, the needs for three-inch rifles and rifles were more or less met), but in general, the imperial industry was not able to satisfy the needs of the army in most vital positions - light machine guns , heavy artillery, modern aviation, vehicles and so on.

British tanks from World War IMark IVat the Oldbury Carriage Works photosofwar.net

More or less adequate aviation production, on its own industrial base, the Russian Empire could deploy at best by the end of 1917, with the commissioning of new defense plants. The same goes for light machine guns. Copies of French tanks were expected at best in 1918. In France alone, already in December 1914, hundreds of aircraft engines were produced, in January 1916 the monthly output exceeded a thousand - and in Russia in the same year it reached 50 pieces.

A separate problem was the transport collapse. The road network, covering a huge country, was forced to be poor. It turned out to be only half the task to produce or receive strategic cargo from the allies: then it was still necessary to distribute them with epic labors and deliver them to the addressees. The transport system did not cope with this.

Lines for bread - Petrograd, January 1917 http://photochronograph.ru

Thus, Russia turned out to be the weak link of the Entente and the great powers of the world as a whole. She could not rely on a brilliant industry and skilled workers, like Germany, on the resources of the colonies, like Britain, on a powerful industry untouched by war and capable of gigantic growth, like the States.

As a result of all the aforementioned ugliness, and many other reasons that were forced to remain outside the scope of the narrative, Russia suffered disproportionate losses in people. The soldiers simply did not understand what they were fighting and dying for, the government was losing prestige (and then just elementary trust) within the country. The death of most of the trained personnel - and, according to the grenadier captain Popov, by 1917 we had "armed people" instead of the army. Almost all contemporaries, regardless of beliefs, shared this point of view.

And the political "climate" was a real disaster film. The murder of Rasputin (more precisely, his impunity), for all the odiousness of the character, clearly shows the paralysis that has overtaken the entire state system of Russia. And in few places the authorities were so openly, seriously and, most importantly, accused with impunity of treason and helping the enemy.

It cannot be said that these were specifically Russian problems - the same processes were going on in all the warring countries. Britain received the Easter Rising of 1916 in Dublin and another aggravation of the "Irish question", France - mass riots in parts after the failure of the Nivelle offensive in 1917. The Italian front, in the same year, was generally on the verge of a total collapse, and only emergency "infusions" of British and French units saved it. Nevertheless, these states had a margin of safety of the public administration system and some kind of "credibility" among their population. They were able to hold on - or rather hold out - long enough to make it to the end of the war - and win.

A Dublin street after the 1916 uprising.The People's War Book and Pictorial Atlas of the World. USA & Canada, 1920

And in Russia, the year 1917 came, in which two revolutions fell at once.

Chaos and anarchy

“Everything turned right upside down. The formidable authorities turned into timid - confused, yesterday's monarchists - into orthodox socialists, people who were afraid to say an extra word for fear of badly connecting it with the previous ones, felt the gift of eloquence in themselves, and the deepening and expansion of the revolution in all directions began ... The confusion was complete. The overwhelming majority reacted to the revolution with confidence and joy; for some reason, everyone believed that she would bring with her, along with other benefits, an early end to the war, since the “old regime system” played into the hands of the Germans. And now everyone will decide the public and talents ... and everyone began to feel hidden talents in himself and try them in relation to the orders of the new system. How heavy these first months of our revolution are remembered. Every day, somewhere deep in the heart, something was torn off with pain, what seemed unshakable collapsed, what was considered sacred was desecrated.

Konstantin Sergeevich Popov "Memoirs of a Caucasian grenadier, 1914-1920".

The civil war in Russia began far from immediately and grew out of the flames of general anarchy and chaos. Weak industrialization has already brought a lot of troubles to the country, and continued to bring further. This time - in the form of a predominantly agrarian population, peasants, with their specific view of the world. From the collapsing, ever-memorable Order No. 1 from the Petrosoviet, the army arbitrarily, not obeying anyone, deserted hundreds of thousands of peasant soldiers. Thanks to the "black redistribution" and the multiplication by zero of landowners with fists, the Russian peasant finally, literally, ate, and also managed to satisfy the age-old craving for the "land". And thanks to some kind of military experience, and the weapons brought from the front, he could now defend himself.

Against the background of this boundless sea of ​​peasant life, extremely apolitical and alien to the color of power, political opponents, trying to turn the country in their own direction, were at first lost like pitfalls. They simply had nothing to offer the people.

Demonstration in Petrograd sovetclub.ru

The peasant was indifferent to any power, and only one thing was required of her - just to "do not touch the peasant." They bring kerosene from the city - good. But they don’t bring it - and we’ll live like that, all the same, city people, as soon as they start to starve, they themselves will crawl. The village knew too well what hunger was. And she knew that only she had the main value - bread.

And in the cities a real hell was really going on - only in Petrograd the mortality rate increased more than four times. With the paralysis of the transport system, the task of "simply" bringing already collected bread from the Volga region or Siberia to Moscow and Petrograd was an act worthy of the "feats of Hercules."

In the absence of any single authoritative and strong center capable of bringing everyone to a common denominator, the country was rapidly sliding into a terrible and all-encompassing anarchy. In fact, in the first quarter of the new, industrial XX century, the times of the European Thirty Years' War were revived, when gangs of looters raged amid chaos and general misfortune, changing the faith and color of the banners with the ease of changing socks - if not more.

Two enemies

However, as is known, two main opponents crystallized out of the variety of motley participants in the great turmoil. The two camps that united most of the extremely heterogeneous currents are White and Red.

Psychic attack - frame from the film "Chapaev"

Usually they are presented in the form of a scene from the movie "Chapaev": well-trained monarchist officers dressed to the nines against workers and peasants in tatters. However, one must understand that initially both the "whites" and the "reds" were, in fact, just declarations. Both of them were very amorphous formations, tiny groups that seemed big only against the background of absolutely wild gangs. At first, a couple of hundred people under a red, white or any other banner already represented a significant force capable of capturing a large city or changing the situation on a regional scale. Moreover, all participants actively changed sides. And yet, there was already some kind of organization behind them.

Red Army in 1917 - drawing by Boris Efimov http://www.ageod-forum.com/

Volunteer army

The Volunteer Army is an operational-strategic association of the White Guard troops in the South of Russia in 1917-1920. during the Civil War. It began to form on November 2 (15), 1917 in Novocherkassk of the General Staff by Infantry General M. V. Alekseev under the name "Alekseevskaya Organization". From the beginning of December, Infantry General L. G. Kornilov, who arrived at the Don of the General Staff, joined in the creation of the army. At first, the Volunteer Army was staffed exclusively by volunteers. Up to 50% of those who signed up for the army were chief officers and up to 15% were staff officers, there were also cadets, cadets, students, high school students (more than 10%). Cossacks were about 4%, soldiers - 1%. From the end of 1918 and in 1919 - through the mobilization of peasants, the officer cadre loses its numerical predominance, in 1920 recruitment was carried out at the expense of mobilized, as well as captured Red Army soldiers, who together make up the bulk of the military units of the army.

By the end of December 1917, 3 thousand people signed up for the army as volunteers. December 25, 1917 (January 7, 1918) received the official name "Volunteer Army". The army received this name at the insistence of General L. Kornilov, who was in a state of conflict with Alekseev and dissatisfied with the forced compromise with the head of the former "Alekseevskaya organization": the division of spheres of influence, as a result of which, with Kornilov taking full military power, Alekseev still remained political leadership and finance.

The echelon of the Kornilov regiment arrived in Novocherkassk on December 19, and by January 1, 1918, 50 officers and up to 500 soldiers had gathered. "Officers came to their regiment, and almost everyone took the position of privates in an officer company," when on January 30, 1918, in the Taganrog direction, the officer company of the Kornilovites replaced the combined company of their regiment, there were 120 people in it. As one of them recalled, “there is silence around, only songs about Russia are heard from neighboring cars ... They didn’t go to bed for a long time ... All the officers of the company became close, family in one day. Everyone has one thought, one goal - Russia .. . " Officers of the shock battalions also arrived (who left Headquarters on the eve of its occupation by the Bolsheviks, they fought stubborn battles with the Bolshevik units surrounding them for a week and, having scattered, were able to reach Novocherkassk in groups) and the Tekinsky regiment, which left Bykhov with L. Kornilov. By the end of December, the 1st and 2nd Officer, Junker, Student, St. George battalions, the Kornilov regiment, the cavalry division of Colonel Gershelman and the Engineering Company were formed. A detachment from the consolidated companies of these units was commanded from December 30 in the Taganrog direction by Colonel Kutepov.

The leadership of the army initially focused on Russia's allies in the Entente.

The size of the army, however, remained relatively small, which was due to a number of reasons. First of all, not all officers who lived directly in the area where the Volunteer Army was formed joined it. And this circumstance was the most tragic. In Stavropol, Pyatigorsk and other cities of the North Caucasus and the Don region, not to mention Rostov and Novocherkassk, at the end of 1917, many officers accumulated who were out of work after the collapse of the army, but for various reasons did not join the volunteers. The main reason was the ongoing deep depression that developed after everything suffered at the front and led to the passive behavior of the officers during the October events, disbelief in the possibility of correcting anything, a feeling of despair and hopelessness, and finally, simply cowardice. Others were held back by the uncertainty of the position of the Volunteer Army, and others were simply not sufficiently informed about its goals and objectives. Whatever it was, but they had to become a victim of their own indecision and short-sightedness. At the request of the famous Don Colonel Chernetsov, an order was given to the Novocherkassk garrison to register officers. Before registration, a meeting was held to highlight the situation in the region, where Kaledin, Bogaevsky and Chernetsov spoke:

“Gentlemen officers, if it happens that the Bolsheviks hang me, then I will know what I am dying for. But if it happens that the Bolsheviks hang and kill you, thanks to your inertia, then you will not know what you are dying for ". Of the 800 people present, only 27 signed up, then 115, but the next day 30 arrived for dispatch. And so it happened. Chernetsov valiantly laid down his head, and the officers who remained in Rostov, hiding, caught and shot, did not know why they died. At the beginning of February, the last attempt was made to attract the Rostov officers, but only about 200 people came to the meeting, and most of them did not enter the army ("The visitors looked strange: a few appeared in military uniform, most in civilian clothes, and then obviously dressed" under the proletarians". This was not a meeting of officers, but the worst kind of meeting, which brought together scum, hooligans ... A shameful meeting!"). “The next day, an announcement was placed in the newspapers suggesting that those who did not join the army leave Rostov within three days. Several dozen entered the army. without epaulettes and cockades, with gold buttons torn from their overcoats, in a hurry to leave the danger zone. The picture was disgusting.

Immediately after the creation of the Volunteer Army, numbering about 4 thousand people, entered into hostilities against the Red Army. In early January 1918, she acted on the Don together with units under the command of General A. M. Kaledin. Before the start of the Kuban campaign, the losses of the Dobrarmia amounted to one and a half thousand people, including at least a third of those killed.

The influx of volunteers from Russia was extremely difficult. In the areas occupied by the Bolsheviks, and even in Ukraine, it was impossible to even get any information about the Volunteer Army, and the vast majority of officers simply did not know anything about it. According to the reports that sometimes appeared in the newspapers about the "Kornilov gangs" that were about to be finished off, it was not possible to draw conclusions about the actual state of the White movement in the South. In Kyiv, even in the spring of 1918, almost nothing was known about the Volunteer Army: "information coming from different directions presented the volunteer movement as hopeless attempts, doomed in advance to failure due to lack of funds." “In Moscow, by the end of December, it was reported that General Alekseev had already gathered a large army on the Don. They believed this and were happy about it, but ... they waited ... they began to talk about the ambiguity of the situation on the Don, including even doubts about gathering an army there ". A very important role was played by the attachment of officers to their families, the existence of which had to be somehow ensured, in the conditions of the then anarchy and terror. Very few could ignore these considerations. In the second half of November, the situation on the roads to the Don deteriorated sharply, in January 1918 there were no longer outposts of the Reds, but a solid front of their troops. The only possibility was to go only along the deaf, insignificant country roads, bypassing the settlements. "The few who dared to the end are leaking out. Their number increased again when the demobilization of the armies on the fronts began at the end of January." All this led to the fact that “hundreds, and tens of thousands, made their way through due to various circumstances, including mainly marital status and weakness of character, waited, switched to peaceful pursuits, or went dutifully to the census to the Bolshevik commissars, to torture in Cheka, later - to serve in the Red Army".

On February 22, 1918, under the onslaught of the Red troops, the Dobrarmia units left Rostov and moved to the Kuban. The famous "Ice March" (1st Kuban) of the Volunteer Army (3200 bayonets and sabers) began from Rostov-on-Don to Yekaterinodar, with heavy fighting surrounded by a 20,000-strong group of red troops under the command of Sorokin.

In the village of Shenzhiy, on March 26, 1918, a 3,000-strong detachment of the Kuban Rada under the command of General V. L. Pokrovsky joined the Volunteer Army. The total strength of the Volunteer Army increased to 6,000 soldiers. On March 27-31 (April 9-13), the Volunteer Army made an unsuccessful attempt to take the capital of the Kuban - Yekaterinodar, during which the Commander-in-Chief General L. Kornilov was killed by a random grenade on March 31 (April 13), and the command of the army units in the most difficult conditions of complete encirclement, many times superior enemy forces, was received by General Denikin, who was able, in the conditions of incessant fighting on all sides, to withdraw the army from flank attacks and safely exit the encirclement on the Don. This was possible, largely due to energetic actions, who distinguished himself in battle on the night of 2 (15) to 3 (16) April 1918 when crossing the Tsaritsyn-Tikhoretskaya railway, the commander of the Officer Regiment of the General Staff, Lieutenant General S. L. Markov.

According to the memoirs of contemporaries, events developed as follows:

"... At about 4 o'clock in the morning, Markov's units began to cross the railway. Markov, having captured the railway gatehouse at the crossing, deployed infantry units, sent scouts to the village to attack the enemy, hastily began crossing the wounded, convoy and artillery. Suddenly, an armored train separated from the station Reds and went to the crossing, where the headquarters was already located, together with Generals Alekseev and Denikin.A few meters remained before the crossing - and then Markov, showering the armored train with merciless words, remaining true to himself: "Stop! Such-rasta! Bastard! You will crush your own!", rushed on the way. When he really stopped, Markov jumped back (according to other sources, he immediately threw a grenade), and immediately two three-inch guns fired grenades at point blank range into the cylinders and wheels of the locomotive. A heated battle ensued with the crew of the armored train, which in as a result, it was killed, and the armored train itself was burned."

One of the future volunteers, who was in Kyiv, recalled: "I went to the Aero-photo-grammometric courses, where, I knew, there were about 80 aviation officers. They were sitting, smoking and discussing the latest political events. I told them about the information received from the Don, and began to persuade him to go there with us. Alas! My many hours of eloquence was in vain ... none of the gentlemen of the officers wanted to move to join the emerging anti-Bolshevik army. " "First of all, many did not know about the existence of the White Struggle cell on the Don. Many could not. Many did not want to. Everyone was surrounded by the influence of enemy forces, often feared for his life or was under the influence of his relatives, who thought only about the safety of their loved one." There were, of course, other examples as well. One of the eyewitnesses of the Kuban campaign, telling about the death of one of its participants, remarks: “When we returned to the Don, his elder brother, the last of the three brothers who survived, came to us in the Olginskaya village. He left his young wife and little daughter and came to replace his brother. His mother told him: “It is easier for me to see you killed in the ranks of the Volunteer Army than alive under the rule of the Bolsheviks.” But such self-denial could not be massive.

In May 1918, after completing his campaign from the Romanian front to the Don, a 3,000-strong detachment of the General Staff of Colonel M. G. Drozdovsky joined the Volunteer Army. About 3000 volunteer fighters came with Drozdovsky, perfectly armed, equipped and uniformed, with significant artillery (six light guns, four mountain guns, two 48-line guns, one 6-inch and 14 charging boxes), machine guns (about 70 pieces of various systems) , two armored cars ("Verny" and "Volunteer"), airplanes, cars, with a telegraph, an orchestra, significant stocks of artillery shells (about 800), rifle and machine-gun cartridges (200 thousand), spare rifles (more than a thousand). The detachment had an equipped sanitary unit and a convoy in excellent condition. The detachment consisted of 70% front-line officers. On the night of June 22-23, 1918, the Volunteer Army (numbering 8-9 thousand), with the assistance of the Don Army under the command of Ataman P.N. Ekaterinodar. The basis of the Volunteer Army was made up of "colored" units - the Kornilov, Markovsky, Drozdovsky and Alekseevsky regiments, subsequently deployed during the attack on Moscow in the summer and autumn of 1919 in the division.

On August 15, 1918, the first mobilization was announced in the Volunteer Army, which was the first step towards turning it into a regular army. According to the Kornilov officer Alexander Trushnovich, the first mobilized - the Stavropol peasants, were poured into the Kornilov shock regiment in June 1918 during the fighting near the village of Medvezhye.

Markov artillery officer E. N. Giatsintov testified to the state of the material part of the Army during this period:

"... It's funny for me to watch films that depict the White Army - having fun, ladies in ball gowns, officers in uniforms with epaulettes, with aiguillettes, brilliant! In fact, the Volunteer Army at that time was a rather sad, but heroic phenomenon. We were dressed in any way. For example, I was in trousers, in boots, instead of an overcoat I was wearing a jacket of a railway engineer, which was presented to me in view of the late autumn by the owner of the house where my mother lived, Mr. Lanko. He was in the past head of the section between Ekaterinodar and some other station. That's how we flaunted. Soon the sole of my boot on my right foot fell off, and I had to tie it with a rope. These are the "balls" and what "epaulettes" we were at that time We had time! Instead of balls, there were constant battles. All the time the Red Army, very numerous, was pressing on us. I think that we were one against a hundred! And we somehow fired back, fought back and even at times went on the offensive and pushed back took the enemy."

By September 1918, the number of the Volunteer Army had increased to 30-35 thousand, mainly due to the influx of the Kuban Cossacks into the army, and opponents of Bolshevism who fled to the North Caucasus.

A very significant factor that had an extremely negative impact on the strength of the Volunteer Army was its virtually illegal existence. Ataman Kaledin had to reckon with the selfish position of a part of the Don circles, who hoped to "pay off" the Bolsheviks by expelling volunteers from the region, and the little help that was provided to them was provided on his personal initiative. “Don policy deprived the nascent army of another very significant organizational factor. “Whoever knows officer psychology understands the meaning of the order. Generals Alekseev and Kornilov, under other conditions, could have given the order to gather all the officers of the Russian army on the Don. Such an order would be legally contestable, but morally obligatory for the vast majority of the officers, serving as an incentive for many weak in spirit. Instead, anonymous appeals and "prospects" of the Volunteer Army were circulated. True, in the second half of December, in the press published on the territory of Soviet Russia, fairly accurate information about the army and its leaders appeared. But there was no authoritative order, and the morally weakened officers were already making deals with their own consciences... and cafes in Rostov and Novocherkassk were full of young, healthy officers who had not entered the army. After the capture of Rostov by the Bolsheviks, the Soviet commandant Kalyuzhny complained about the terrible burden of work: thousands of officers came to his office with statements "that they were not in the Volunteer Army" ... It was the same in Novocherkassk.

After the end of the First World War, in November 1918, the governments of Great Britain and France increased the material and technical assistance to the Volunteer Army. Believing that this is in the interests of Russia, on June 12, 1919, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia, General A.I. Denikin, announced his submission to Admiral A.V. Kolchak, as the Supreme Ruler of the Russian State and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies. On January 8, 1919, the Volunteer Army became part of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (VSYUR), becoming their main striking force, and its commander, General A. Denikin, headed the VSYUR.

There was another reason, about which one of the volunteers said this: "An ancient Greek proverb says:" Whom the gods want to destroy, they deprive of reason "... Yes, since March 1917, a significant part of the Russian people and officers have lost their mind. We heard : “There is no Emperor - there is no point in serving.” At the request of our division chief, General B. Kazanovich, to Count Keller, not to dissuade officers from entering the Volunteer Army, the answer was: “No, I will dissuade! Let them wait until the time comes to proclaim the Tsar, then we will all enter. "Forgotten was everything that was so clearly explained to us and clearly perceived in excellent military schools: the command at the abdication of the Emperor, the oath taken, the German and international boots trampling on their native land ... ".
Finally, those who nevertheless decided to make their way to the Don faced many dangers. It was extremely difficult for an officer to get to Rostov and Novocherkassk from central Russia. The probability of being suspected by neighbors in the car and becoming a victim of reprisal was very high. At the stations bordering the Don region, since December, the Bolsheviks have established careful control in order to detain volunteers traveling to the Don. Forged documents did not always save the officers. "They were often betrayed by their silent concentration and appearance. If there were sailors or Red Guards in the car, then the identified officers were often thrown out of the car at full speed of the train." Hundreds and thousands of officers died in this way before they could join the army. Truly, "how much courage, patience and faith in their cause those" madmen "who went to the army, despite all the difficult conditions of its origin and existence, must have had!" Here is one of the episodes. At the end of December, a detachment led by Colonel Tolstov left Kyiv with a Cossack echelon. At st. The Volnovakha train was surrounded by a crowd, and the Cossacks decided to hand over the "foreign" officers. Two officers shot themselves. The voice of Colonel Tolstov was heard: "What these young people have done is a crime. They are not worthy of the title of Russian officer. An officer must fight to the end." Our first officers jump out with bayonets at the ready. We lined up in front of the carriage and quite calmly passed through the crowd of many thousands parting before us. "On January 1, 1918, these 154 officers met with volunteers.

Although the Don was a "small, unflooded island, among the raging elements" - only here the officers continued to wear golden shoulder straps, only here military honor was given and the rank of officer was respected, but even here the atmosphere was extremely unfavorable for "volunteers". Even in Novocherkassk, in November, several officers were killed in the back of the head, from around the corner. The Cossacks, who did not know the power of the Bolsheviks, remained indifferent then, and "the workers and every street rabble looked with hatred at the volunteers, and only waited for the arrival of the Bolsheviks in order to deal with the hated" Cadets ". Little understandable anger against them ... was so great that sometimes It poured out in terrible, brutal forms. It was far from safe to walk the streets of the city in the dark, and especially in Temernik. There were cases of attacks and murders. Once in Bataysk, the workers themselves called the officers of one of the volunteer units standing here to a political interview, and by their word of honor guaranteed them complete safety. Several officers trusted the promise and even went to this meeting without weapons. Near the gate of the shed where it was to take place, the crowd surrounded the unfortunate officers, started an argument with them, at first in a rather calm tone , and then, at someone's signal, the workers rushed at them and literally tore four officers to pieces ... On the other day I was at the funeral of two of them in one of the Rostov churches. Despite clean clothes, flowers and fleur - their appearance was terrible. They were quite young men, children of local Rostov residents. Over one of them, in inconsolable despair, the mother was crying, judging by the clothes, a very simple woman. "Only 5 people together and well armed had to be released into the city.

In combat terms, some units and formations of the Volunteer Army had high fighting qualities, since it included a large number of officers who had considerable combat experience and were sincerely devoted to the idea of ​​the White movement, but since the summer of 1919 its combat effectiveness has decreased due to heavy losses, and the inclusion of mobilized peasants and captured Red Army soldiers in its composition.

The small number of volunteers was compensated by the fact that they were people who were selflessly devoted to their idea, who had military training and combat experience, who had nothing to lose, except for a life deliberately put at stake in saving the motherland. General Lukomsky, characterizing the moral qualities of the first volunteers, recalled how the officer he had chosen for the post of adjutant refused to take this position: “According to him, he would not want to take the safe place of an adjutant at a time when his comrades are exposed to the hardships and dangers of military life "Shortly after that, he was killed, saving a wounded officer in battle. Upon learning of his death, his brother went into the ranks of the Volunteer Army, seriously shell-shocked during the European War and unconditionally subject to release from service. He was also killed. Their third brother was killed during the European War. From such honest and valiant fighters, a small army of General Kornilov was formed. " The leaders of the army - Generals L.G. Kornilov, M.V. Alekseev, A.I. Denikin, S.L. Markov, I.G. Erdeli and others, were the color of the Russian generals. Many of the volunteers have already lost loved ones, some took part in the battles in Petrograd and Moscow. Here is one of the typical fates: "Then I was told his story. The Bolsheviks killed his father, a decrepit retired general, mother, sister and sister's husband - a complete invalid of the last war. The lieutenant himself, being a cadet, took part in the October days in the battles on the streets of Petrograd , was captured, severely beaten, received severe injuries to the skull and barely escaped... And there were many such people, mangled, broken by life, who lost loved ones or left their family without a piece of bread there, somewhere far away, to the mercy of the raging red madness. and the ranks were a variety of people: "In the ranks were gray-haired military colonels next to the cadets of the 5th class."

On June 23, 1918, the Volunteer Army began the Second Kuban Campaign (June-September), during which it defeated the troops of the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic and took Ekaterinodar (August 15-16), Novorossiysk (August 26) and Maykop (September 20), established control over the main part of the Kuban and the north of the Black Sea province. By the end of September, it already numbered 35-40 thousand bayonets and sabers. On October 28, the volunteers took control of Armavir and ousted the Bolsheviks from the left bank of the Kuban; in mid-November, they took Stavropol and inflicted a heavy defeat on the 11th Red Army, led by I.F. Fedko. Since the end of November, they began to receive large deliveries of weapons from the Entente through Novorossiysk. Due to the growth in numbers, the Volunteer Army was reorganized into three army corps (1st General A. Kutepov, 2nd Borovsky, 3rd General V. Lyakhov) and one cavalry corps (General P. Wrangel). At the end of December, she repelled the offensive of the 11th Red Army in the Yekaterinodar-Novorossiysk and Rostov-Tikhoretsk directions, and in early January 1919, inflicting a strong counterattack on her, cut her into two parts and threw her back to Astrakhan and beyond Manych. By February, the entire North Caucasus was occupied by volunteers. This made it possible to transfer the grouping of General V. Mai-Maevsky, formed from selected regiments, to the Donbass to help the Don Army retreating under the onslaught of the Bolsheviks, and the 2nd Army Corps to the Crimea to support the Crimean regional government.

On January 8, 1919, the Volunteer Army became part of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia; General P. Wrangel was appointed its commander. On January 23, it was renamed the Caucasian Volunteer Army. In March, it included the 1st and 2nd Kuban cavalry corps. Deployed in April in the Donbass and Manych, the army went on the offensive in the Voronezh and Tsaritsyno directions and forced the Reds to leave the Don region, Donbass, Kharkov and Belgorod. On May 21, the units operating in the Tsaritsyno direction were separated into a separate Caucasian army, and the name Volunteer Army was returned to the left-flank (Voronezh) group; May-Maevsky became its commander. It included the 1st (Kutepov) and 2nd (General M. Promtov) army, 5th cavalry (General Ya. Yuzefovich), 3rd Kuban cavalry (Shkuro) corps.

In late 1918 - early 1919, Denikin's units defeated the 11th Soviet Army and occupied the North Caucasus. On January 23, 1919, the army was renamed the Caucasian Volunteer Army. On May 22, 1919, the Caucasian Volunteer Army was divided into 2 armies: the Caucasian, advancing on Tsaritsyn-Saratov, and the Volunteer Army itself, advancing on Kursk-Orel. In the summer - autumn of 1919, the Volunteer Army (40 thousand people) under the command of General V. Mai-Maevsky became the main force in Denikin's campaign against Moscow.

In the offensive of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia against Moscow, which began on July 3, 1919, the Volunteer Army was assigned the role of the main striking force - it was supposed to capture Kursk, Orel and Tula and capture the Soviet capital; by this time, more than 50 thousand bayonets and sabers were in its ranks. In July-October 1919, volunteers occupied Central Ukraine (Kyiv fell on August 31), Kursk and Voronezh provinces and repelled the August counteroffensive of the Bolsheviks. The peak of their success was the capture of Orel on October 13. However, due to heavy losses and forced mobilization, the combat effectiveness of the army in the fall of 1919 decreased significantly.

After an unsuccessful attack on Moscow, in the summer and autumn of 1919, the main forces of the volunteers were defeated. On November 27, Denikin deposed Mai-Maevsky; On December 5, P. Wrangel again headed the Volunteer Army. At the end of December, the troops of the Soviet Southern Front cut it into two parts; the first had to retreat beyond the Don, the second - to Northern Tavria. On January 3, 1920, it actually ceased to exist. However, the Volunteer Corps, as a combat unit, was preserved and was not destroyed. With continuous fighting, the corps retreated in March 1920, to the port of Novorossiysk. There, the Volunteer Corps, as a priority, thanks to the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the All-Union Socialist Republic, Lieutenant General A. Denikin, and the iron restraint of his commander, Lieutenant General A. Kutepov, embarked on ships, and arrived in the Crimea, which remained white, thanks to the successfully organized defense of its isthmuses, by the troops of General -Major Ya. Slashchev. The volunteer corps in the Crimea formed the powerful backbone of the Russian Army, for General Denikin's successor as white commander-in-chief, General P. Wrangel ...

Rutych N.N. Biographical directory of the highest ranks of the Volunteer Army. M., 1997
Butakov Ya.A. Volunteer army and armed forces of the South of Russia: concepts and practice of state building. Abstract M., 1998
Tsvetkov V.Zh. White armies of the South of Russia. M., 2000, v. 1
Karpenko S.V. homeless army(December 1917 - April 1918) - New Historical Bulletin, 2000, No. 1
Fedyuk V.P. Kuban and the Volunteer Army: the origins and essence of the conflict. - In book. Civil War in Russia: Events, opinions, assessments. M., 2002

Dear kamradessa posted for review a link to one of the chapters of A. Bushkov's book "The Red Monarch", dedicated to the turmoil that was in Russia in 1918.

The material is very interesting and informative. I leave it in my bookmarks and recommend it for reading to everyone who is trying to understand that difficult and confusing period of our history...

VOLUNTEER ARMY, one of the first armed formations of the White movement during the Civil War of 1917-22 in Russia. It began to form in November 1917 in Novocherkassk from volunteers (officers, cadets, senior cadets, students, etc.) by General of Infantry M. V. Alekseev (originally called "Alekseevskaya Organization"). Created on December 25, 1917 (January 7, 1918), headed by the supreme leader Alekseev, commander - infantry general L. G. Kornilov, chief of staff - lieutenant general A. S. Lukomsky. At the beginning of 1918, the Volunteer Army (about 2 thousand people), together with the Cossacks of the cavalry general A. M. Kaledin, fought with the Soviet troops in the Novocherkassk region, at the end of January it was transferred to Rostov-on-Don.

After the defeat of Kaledin, the performances of 1917-1918 by the Volunteer Army (about 3.7 thousand people) on February 22, 1918, set out in the 1st Kuban (“Ice”) campaign (see Kuban campaigns of the Volunteer Army) to the Kuban, where its leaders expected to create a bridgehead for the fight with the Soviet government. At the beginning of the campaign in the village of Olginskaya, the Volunteer Army, which consisted of 25 separate units, was reduced to 3 infantry regiments [Consolidated Officer (1st Officer; commander - Lieutenant General S. L. Markov), Kornilov shock (Colonel M. O Nezhentsev), Partisan (Major General A.P. Bogaevsky)] and 2 battalions [Special Junker (Major General A.A. Borovsky) and Czechoslovak Engineering (Captain I.F. Nemchek)], artillery battalion (Colonel S M. Ikishev) and 3 cavalry detachments under the command of Colonels V. S. Gerschelman, P. V. Glazenap and Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Kornilov. At the end of March, a detachment of the Kuban Rada under the command of Major General V. L. Pokrovsky (about 3 thousand people) joined the Volunteer Army, but the bulk of the Kuban Cossacks did not support the "volunteers".

When trying to capture Yekaterinodar (now Krasnodar) on April 9-13, L. G. Kornilov was killed, Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin took command of the army, who led parts of the Volunteer Army to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe villages of Mechetinskaya and Yegorlytskaya Regions of the Don Army. Having replenished with personnel (including a 2,000-strong detachment of Colonel M. G. Drozdovsky), weapons and ammunition from the Don military ataman P. N. Krasnov, at the end of June, the Volunteer Army (10-12 thousand people), the core of which was 4 nominal regiment (Kornilovsky, Alekseevsky, Markovsky and Drozdovsky; later deployed in divisions), began the so-called 2nd Kuban campaign. Replenished at the expense of the Kuban Cossacks to 30-35 thousand people (September 1918), by the end of 1918 it occupied almost the entire North Caucasus. To assert the power of the Volunteer Army in the occupied territory, a Special Conference was created under the supreme leader of the Volunteer Army as the highest legislative body and body of civil administration. From the end of 1918, it began to be partially completed through mobilizations. The Entente countries provided material and technical assistance to the Volunteer Army. In January 1919, the Volunteer Army became part of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia and was renamed the Caucasian Volunteer Army (from May 22 again the Volunteer Army). In Denikin's Moscow campaign of 1919, the Volunteer Army (commander - Lieutenant General V.Z. Mai-Maevsky; over 50 thousand bayonets and sabers) dealt the main blow in the Kursk-Oryol direction and, having occupied Oryol (October 13), created a threat to Tula and Moscow . However, during the counter-offensive of the Southern Front in 1919, selected units of the “volunteers” were destroyed in fierce battles. Replenishment from the mobilized significantly reduced the combat capability of the Volunteer Army, and during the offensive of the Southern and Southeastern Fronts of 1919-20, Soviet troops cut it into 2 parts: the southeastern group (about 10 thousand people) retreated beyond the Don and in January 1920 in the Rostov region -on-Don was reduced to the Volunteer Corps (commander - Lieutenant General A.P. Kutepov; 5 thousand people), and the southwestern group (over 30 thousand people) withdrew to Northern Tavria and the Southern Bug River. After the defeat of Denikin's troops in the North Caucasus, the Volunteer Corps was evacuated to the Crimea at the end of March 1920, where it became part of the "Russian Army".

Lit .: Lukomsky A.S. The origin of the volunteer army //From the first person. M. 1990; Don and the Volunteer Army. M., 1992; Kuban and the Volunteer Army. M., 1992; Guide to the funds of the White Army. M., 1998; Ippolitov G. M. On the rise of the "white cause" // Armageddon. M., 2003.

VOLUNTEER ARMY, the main military force of the White movement in southern Russia in 1918–1920.

It arose on December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918) from the Alekseevskaya organization - a military detachment formed on November 2 (15), 1917 on the Don by General M.V. Alekseev to fight the Bolsheviks. Its creation pursued both a military-strategic and political goal: on the one hand, the Volunteer Army, in alliance with the Cossacks, was supposed to prevent the establishment of Soviet power in southern Russia, on the other hand, to ensure free elections to the Constituent Assembly, which was to determine the future state structure of the country . It was recruited on a voluntary basis from officers, cadets, students, high school students who fled to the Don. The supreme leader is Alekseev, the commander is General L.G. Kornilov. Center of deployment - Novocherkassk. Initially, there were about two thousand people, by the end of January 1918 it had grown to three and a half thousand. It consisted of the Kornilov shock regiment (commanded by lieutenant colonel M.O. Nezhentsev), officer, cadet and St. George battalions, four artillery batteries, an officer squadron, an engineering company and a company of guards officers. Later, the Rostov Volunteer Regiment (Major General A.A. Borovsky), a naval company, a Czechoslovak battalion and a death division of the Caucasian division were formed. It was planned to increase the size of the army to ten thousand bayonets and sabers, and only then begin major military operations. But the successful offensive of the Red troops in January-February 1918 forced the command to suspend the formation of the army and send several units to defend Taganrog, Bataysk and Novocherkassk. However, a few detachments of volunteers, not having received serious support from the local Cossacks, could not stop the onslaught of the enemy and were forced to leave the Don region. At the end of February 1918, the Volunteer Army moved to Yekaterinodar to make the Kuban its main base (the First Kuban Campaign). On February 25, it was reorganized into three infantry regiments - Consolidated Officer (General S.L. Markov), Kornilov shock (M.O. Nezhentsev) and Partizansky (General A.P. Bogaevsky), on March 17, after connecting with units of the Kuban the regional government - into three brigades: 1st (Markov), 2nd (Bogaevsky) and Horse (General I.G. Erdeli). On April 10–13, the Volunteer Army, which had increased to six thousand people, made several unsuccessful attempts to take Yekaterinodar. After the death of Kornilov on April 13, General A.I. Denikin, who replaced him as commander, led the thinned detachments to the south of the Don region in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe villages of Mechetinskaya and Egorlykskaya.

In May-June 1918, the position of the Volunteer Army was strengthened due to the liquidation of Soviet power on the Don and the emergence of a new ally - the Don army, ataman P.N. Krasnov, who transferred to it a significant part of the weapons and ammunition he received from the Germans. The number of the Volunteer Army increased to eleven thousand people due to the influx of Kuban Cossacks and the addition of a three thousandth detachment of Colonel M.G. Drozdovsky to it. In June, it was reorganized into five infantry and eight cavalry regiments, which made up the 1st (Markov), 2nd (Borovsky), 3rd (M.G. Drozdovsky) infantry divisions, 1st cavalry division (Erdeli) and the 1st Kuban Cossack Division (General V.L. Pokrovsky); in July, the 2nd Kuban Cossack Division (General S.G. Ulagai) and the Kuban Cossack Brigade (General A.G. Shkuro) were also formed.

On June 23, 1918, the Volunteer Army began the Second Kuban Campaign (June-September), during which it defeated the troops of the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic and took Ekaterinodar (August 15-16), Novorossiysk (August 26) and Maykop (September 20), established control over the main part of the Kuban and the north of the Black Sea province. By the end of September, it already numbered 35-40 thousand bayonets and sabers. After the death of Alekseev on October 8, 1918, the post of commander-in-chief passed to A.I. Denikin. On October 28, the volunteers took control of Armavir and ousted the Bolsheviks from the left bank of the Kuban; in mid-November, they took Stavropol and inflicted a heavy defeat on the 11th Red Army, led by I.F. Fedko. Since the end of November, they began to receive large deliveries of weapons from the Entente through Novorossiysk. In connection with the increase in the number of Volunteer Army was reorganized into three army corps (1st General A.P. Kutepov, 2nd Borovsky, 3rd General V.N. Lyakhov) and one cavalry corps (General P.N. Wrangel ). At the end of December, she repelled the offensive of the 11th Red Army in the Yekaterinodar-Novorossiysk and Rostov-Tikhoretsk directions, and in early January 1919, inflicting a strong counterattack on her, cut her into two parts and threw her back to Astrakhan and beyond Manych. By February, the entire North Caucasus was occupied by volunteers. This made it possible to transfer the grouping of General V.Z. Mai-Maevsky, formed from selected regiments, to the Donbass to help the Don Army retreating under the onslaught of the Bolsheviks, and the 2nd Army Corps to the Crimea to support the Crimean regional government.

On January 8, 1919, the Volunteer Army became part of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia; Wrangel was appointed its commander. On January 23, it was renamed the Caucasian Volunteer Army. In March, it included the 1st and 2nd Kuban cavalry corps. Deployed in April in the Donbass and Manych, the army went on the offensive in the Voronezh and Tsaritsyno directions and forced the Reds to leave the Don region, Donbass, Kharkov and Belgorod. On May 21, the units operating in the Tsaritsyno direction were separated into a separate Caucasian army, and the name Volunteer Army was returned to the left-flank (Voronezh) group; May-Maevsky became its commander. It included the 1st (Kutepov) and 2nd (General M.N. Promtov) army, 5th cavalry (General Ya.D. Yuzefovich), 3rd Kuban cavalry (Shkuro) corps.

In the offensive of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia against Moscow, which began on July 3, 1919, the Volunteer Army was assigned the role of the main striking force - it was supposed to capture Kursk, Orel and Tula and capture the Soviet capital; by this time, more than 50 thousand bayonets and sabers were in its ranks. In July-October 1919, volunteers occupied Central Ukraine (Kyiv fell on August 31), Kursk and Voronezh provinces and repelled the August counteroffensive of the Bolsheviks. The peak of their success was the capture of Orel on October 13. However, due to heavy losses and forced mobilization, the combat effectiveness of the army in the autumn of 1919 decreased significantly.

During the offensive of the red units in October-December 1919, the main forces of the volunteers were defeated. On November 27, Denikin deposed Mai-Maevsky; On December 5, Wrangel again led the Volunteer Army. At the end of December, the troops of the Soviet Southern Front cut it into two parts; the first had to retreat beyond the Don, the second - to Northern Tavria. On January 3, 1920, it actually ceased to exist: the southeastern grouping (10 thousand) was reduced to a separate Volunteer Corps under the command of Kutepov, and from the southwestern (32 thousand) the army of General N.N. Schilling was formed. In February-March 1920, after the crushing defeat of the Whites in the Odessa region and in the North Caucasus, the remnants of volunteer formations were evacuated to the Crimea, where they became part of the Russian Army, organized by Wrangel in May 1920 from the surviving units of the Armed Forces of southern Russia.

Ivan Krivushin

100 years ago, on January 7, 1918, the Volunteer Army was created in Novocherkassk to fight the Bolsheviks. Trouble in Russia was gaining momentum. Reds, whites, nationalists formed their troops, with might and main they were in charge of various gangs. The West was preparing for the dismemberment of the murdered Russian Empire.

The army received the official name of the Volunteer. This decision was made at the suggestion of General Lavr Kornilov, who became its first commander in chief. Political and financial leadership was entrusted to General Mikhail Alekseev. The army headquarters was headed by General Alexander Lukomsky. The official appeal of the headquarters, published two days later, stated: “The first immediate goal of the Volunteer Army is to resist an armed attack on the south and southeast of Russia. Hand in hand with the valiant Cossacks, at the first call of his Circle, his government and the military ataman, in alliance with the regions and peoples of Russia who rebelled against the German-Bolshevik yoke - all Russian people gathered in the south from all over our Motherland will defend to the last drop of blood, the independence of the regions that gave them shelter and are the last stronghold of Russian independence. At the first stage, about 3 thousand people signed up for the Volunteer Army, more than half of them were officers.

In the conditions of the complete disintegration of the old army, General Mikhail Alekseev decided to try to form new units outside the composition of the former army on a voluntary basis. Alekseev was the largest military figure in Russia: during the Russo-Japanese War - Quartermaster General of the 3rd Manchurian Army; during the First World War - Chief of Staff of the armies of the Southwestern Front, Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the North-Western Front, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. During the February Revolution of 1917, he advocated the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne and by his actions largely contributed to the fall of the autocracy. That is, he was a prominent February revolutionary, and was responsible for the subsequent collapse of the army, the country and the beginning of unrest and civil war.

The right wing of the Februaryists-Westerners, having destroyed the "old Russia" - hoped to create a "new Russia"- the creation of a "democratic", bourgeois-liberal Russia with the dominance of the class of owners, capitalists, the bourgeoisie and large landowners - that is, development according to the Western matrix. They wanted to make Russia a part of an "enlightened Europe", similar to Holland, France or England. However, hopes for this quickly collapsed. The Februaryists themselves opened Pandora's box, destroying all the bonds (the autocracy, the army, the police, the old legislative, judicial and punitive system) that held back the contradictions and faults that had been building up in Russia for a long time. Events begin to develop according to a poorly predictable scenario of spontaneous rebellion, Russian unrest, with the strengthening of radical left forces demanding a new development project and fundamental changes. Then the Februaryists relied on a "firm hand" - a military dictatorship. However, the rebellion of General Kornilov failed. And the Kerensky regime finally buried all hopes for stabilization, in fact, doing everything so that the Bolsheviks simply took power, almost without resistance. However, the class of owners, the bourgeoisie, the capitalists, their political parties - the Cadets, the Octobrists, were not going to give up. They are began to create their own armed forces in order to return power by force and "calm down" Russia. At the same time, they hoped for the help of the Entente - France, England, the USA, Japan, etc.

Part of the generals, who had previously strongly opposed the regime of Nicholas II and the autocracy (Alekseev, Kornilov, Kolchak, etc.), and hoped to take leading positions in the "new Russia", was used to create the so-called. The White Army, which was supposed to return power to the former "masters of life." As a result, whites, separatist nationalists and interventionists ignited a terrible civil war in Russia that claimed millions of lives. Owners, the bourgeoisie, capitalists, landowners, their political superstructure - liberal-democratic, bourgeois parties and movements (only a few percent, together with the entourage and servants of the population of Russia) became "white". It is clear that the well-groomed rich, industrialists, bankers, lawyers and politicians themselves did not know how to fight and did not want to. They wanted to return "old Russia", without a tsar, but with their power - a rich and contented caste ("crunch of French rolls") over the poor and illiterate masses of the people. Professional military officers signed up to fight - officers who, after the collapse of the old army, wandered around the cities in masses doing nothing, Cossacks, simple-minded young men - cadets, cadets, students. After the expansion of the scale of the war, the forcible mobilization of former soldiers, workers, townspeople, and peasants has already begun.

There were also high hopes that "the West would help." And the masters of the West really "helped" - to kindle a terrible and bloody civil war in which Russians killed Russians. They actively threw “firewood” into the fire of a fratricidal war - made promises to the leaders of the white armies and governments, supplied ammunition and ammunition, provided advisers, etc. They themselves had already divided the skin of the “Russian bear” into spheres of influence and colonies and soon began to divide Russia, simultaneously carrying out its total plunder.

On December 10 (23), 1917, Georges Clemenceau, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of War of France, and Robert Cecil, Deputy Foreign Minister of Great Britain, at a meeting in Paris, concluded a secret agreement on the division of Russia into spheres of influence. London and Paris agreed that from now on they would consider Russia not as an ally in the Entente, but as a territory for the implementation of their expansionist plans. The areas of alleged military operations were named. The English sphere of influence included the Caucasus, the Cossack regions of the Don and Kuban, and the French - Ukraine, Bessarabia and Crimea. Representatives of the United States did not formally participate in the meeting, but they were kept informed of the negotiations, while in the administration of President Woodrow Wilson at the same time a plan was ripe for expansion to the Far East and Eastern Siberia.

The leaders of the West rejoiced - Russia was lost, the "Russian question" was resolved once and for all! The West has got rid of a thousand-year-old enemy that prevents it from establishing full control over the planet. True, our enemies will once again miscalculate, Russia will survive and be able to recover. Russian communists will win and eventually create a new Russian empire - the USSR. They are implementing an alternative globalization project - the Soviet (Russian), again challenging the West and giving hope to humanity for a just world order.

Alekseevskaya organization

The right wing of the Western-Febralists (future Whites) and part of the generals decided to create a new army. It was supposed to create such an organization that, as an "organized military force ... could resist the impending anarchy and the German-Bolshevik invasion." Initially, they tried to create the core of such an organization in the capital. General Alekseev arrived in Petrograd on October 7, 1917 and began to prepare the creation of an organization in which it was supposed to unite officers of the spare parts, military schools and those who simply found themselves in the capital. At the right moment, the general planned to organize combat units from them.

According to V. V. Shulgin, who happened to be in Petrograd in October, he attended the meeting that took place at the apartment of Prince V. M. Volkonsky. In addition to the host and Shulgin, M. V. Rodzianko, P. B. Struve, D. N. Likhachev, N. N. Lvov, V. N. Kokovtsev, and V. M. Purishkevich were present. That is, prominent Februaryists who previously participated in the overthrow of Nicholas II and the destruction of the autocracy. The main issue in the business started rested on the complete lack of funds. Alekseev was “morally supported”, they sympathized with his cause, but they were in no hurry to share the money. By the time of the October Revolution, Alekseev's organization was supported by several thousand officers who either lived in Petrograd or ended up in the capital for one reason or another. But almost no one dared to give battle to the Bolsheviks in Petrograd.

Seeing that things were not going well in the capital and that the Bolsheviks could soon cover the organization, Alekseev on October 30 (November 12) ordered the transfer to the Don of “those who wanted to continue the fight”, supplying them with fake documents and money for travel. The general appealed to all officers and junkers with a call to stand up for the fight in Novocherkassk, where he arrived on November 2 (15), 1917. Alekseev (and the forces behind him) planned to create statehood and an army on part of the territory of Russia that would be able to resist Soviet power .

General of Infantry M. V. Alekseev

Alekseev went to the Ataman Palace to the hero of Brusilovsky, General A. M. Kaledin. In the summer of 1917, the Large military circle of the Don Cossack army, Alexei Kaledin, was elected Don military ataman. Kaledin became the first elected chieftain of the Don Cossacks after Peter I abolished the election in 1709. Kaledin was in conflict with the Provisional Government, as he opposed the collapse of the army. On September 1, Minister of War Verkhovsky even ordered the arrest of Kaledin, but the Military Government refused to comply with the order. On September 4, Kerensky canceled it on the condition that the Military Government would "guarantee" Kaledin.

The situation on the Don during this period was extremely difficult. The main cities were dominated by the “alien” population, alien to the indigenous Cossack population of the Don, both in terms of their composition, features of life, and political preferences. In Rostov and Taganrog, socialist parties, hostile to the Cossack authorities, dominated. The working population of the Taganrog district supported the Bolsheviks. In the northern part of the Taganrog district there were coal mines and mines of the southern ledge of Donbass. Rostov became the center of resistance to "Cossack dominance". At the same time, the left could count on the support of spare military units. The "out-of-town" peasantry was not satisfied with the concessions made to it (wide admission to the Cossacks, participation in stanitsa self-government, transfer of part of the landowners' lands), demanding a radical land reform. The Cossack front-line soldiers themselves were tired of the war and hated the "old regime". As a result, the Don regiments, which were returning from the front, did not want to go to a new war and defend the Don region from the Bolsheviks. The Cossacks went home. Many regiments handed over their weapons without resistance at the request of small red detachments, which stood as barriers on the railway lines leading to the Don region. Masses of ordinary Cossacks supported the first decrees of the Soviet government. Among the Cossacks-front-line soldiers, the idea of ​​\u200b\u200b"neutrality" in relation to the Soviet government was widely spread. In turn, the Bolsheviks sought to win the "labor Cossacks" over to their side.

Kaledin called the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks criminal and declared that until the restoration of legitimate power in Russia, the military government assumes full power in the Don region. Kaledin from Novocherkassk introduced martial law in the coal-mining region of the region, deployed troops in a number of places, began the defeat of the Soviets and established contacts with the Cossacks of Orenburg, Kuban, Astrakhan and Terek. On October 27 (November 9), 1917, Kaledin declared martial law throughout the Region and invited members of the Provisional Government and the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic to Novocherkassk to organize the fight against the Bolsheviks. On October 31 (November 13), the delegates of the Don, who were returning from the Second Congress of Soviets, were arrested. During the following month, the Soviets in the cities of the Don region were liquidated.

Thus, Kaledin opposed the Soviet regime. The Don region became one of the centers of resistance. However, Kaledin, in conditions when the masses of ordinary Cossacks did not want to fight, wanted peace, and at first sympathized with the ideas of the Bolsheviks, could not decisively oppose the Soviet government. Therefore, he warmly received Alekseev as an old comrade-in-arms, but refused the request to “give shelter to the Russian officers”, that is, to take the future anti-Bolshevik army for the maintenance of the Don military government. He even asked Alekseev to remain incognito, “not to stay in Novocherkassk for more than a week” and to transfer the Alekseev formation outside the Don region.

Despite such a cold reception, Alekseev immediately began to take practical steps. Already on November 2 (15), he published an appeal to the officers, urging them to "save the Motherland." On November 4 (17), a whole party of 45 people arrived, headed by staff captain V. D. Parfenov. On this day, General Alekseev laid the foundation for the first military unit - the Consolidated Officer Company. Staff Captain Parfenov became the commander. On November 15 (28), it was deployed to an officer company of 150-200 people under the command of Staff Captain Nekrashevich.

Alekseev, using his old connections with the Stavka generals, contacted the Stavka in Mogilev. He gave M.K. Dieterikhs an order to send officers and loyal units to the Don under the guise of their redeployment for further staffing, with the issuance of money for the officers to travel. He also asked to remove the decomposed "Sovietized" military units from the Don region by disbanding or sending them to the front without weapons. The question was raised about negotiations with the Czechoslovak corps, which, according to Alekseev, should have willingly joined the struggle for the "salvation of Russia." In addition, he asked to send batches of weapons and uniforms to the Don under the guise of creating army stores here, to give orders to the main artillery department to send up to 30 thousand rifles to the Novocherkassk artillery depot, and in general to use every opportunity to transfer military equipment to the Don. However, the imminent fall of the Stavka and the general collapse of the railway transport prevented all these plans. As a result, weapons, ammunition and ammunition were bad at the beginning.

When the organization already had 600 volunteers, there were about a hundred rifles for everyone, and there were no machine guns at all. The military depots on the territory of the Don Army were full of weapons, but the Don authorities refused to issue them to volunteers, fearing the wrath of the front-line Cossacks. Weapons had to be obtained both by cunning and by force. Thus, on the outskirts of Novocherkassk, Khotunok, the 272nd and 373rd reserve regiments were quartered, which had already completely decomposed and were hostile to the Don authorities. Alekseev suggested using the forces of volunteers to disarm them. On the night of November 22, volunteers surrounded the regiments and disarmed them without firing a shot. The selected weapons went to volunteers. Artillery was also mined, as it turned out - one cannon was "borrowed" in the Donskoy reserve artillery division for the solemn funeral of one of the dead junker volunteers, and they "forgot" to return it after the funeral. Two more guns were taken away: completely decomposed units of the 39th Infantry Division arrived in the neighboring Stavropol province from the Caucasian front. Volunteers became aware that an artillery battery was located near the village of Lezhanka. It was decided to capture her guns. Under the command of naval officer E. N. Gerasimov, a detachment of 25 officers and cadets set off for Lezhanka. During the night, the detachment disarmed the sentries and stole two guns and four ammunition boxes. Four more guns and a supply of shells were bought for 5 thousand rubles from Don artillery units that returned from the front. All this shows the highest degree of decomposition of the then Russia, weapons, up to machine guns and guns, can be obtained or “acquired” in one way or another.

By November 15 (28), the Junker company was formed, which included cadets, cadets and students under the command of staff captain V. D. Parfenov. The 1st platoon consisted of cadets from infantry schools (mainly Pavlovsky), the 2nd from artillery, the 3rd from naval schools, and the 4th from cadets and students. By mid-November, the entire senior year of the Konstantinovsky Artillery School and several dozen cadets of Mikhailovsky, led by staff captain N. A. Shokoli, were able to get through from Petrograd in small groups. On November 19, after the arrival of the first 100 cadets, the 2nd platoon of the Junker company was deployed into a separate unit - the Consolidated Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (which served as the core of the future Markov battery and artillery brigade). The Junker Company itself turned into a battalion (two Junker and "Cadet" companies).

Thus, in the second half of November, the Alekseevskaya organization consisted of three formations: 1) a consolidated officer company (up to 200 people); 2) Junker battalion (over 150 people); 3) Consolidated Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (up to 250 people) under the command of Captain N. A. Shokoli). The Georgievsky company (50-60 people) was in the formation stage, and there was an entry into the student squad. The officers made up a third of the organization and 50% of the cadets (that is, the same element). Cadets, students of secular and religious schools made up 10%.

In November, Kaledin nevertheless decided to give the officers arriving to Alekseev a roof over their heads: in one of the infirmaries of the Don branch of the All-Russian Union of Cities, under the fictitious pretext that a "weak team, recovering, requiring care" would be placed here, volunteers were placed. As a result, a small infirmary No. 2 in house No. 36 on the outskirts of Barochnaya Street, which was a disguised hostel, became the cradle of the future Volunteer Army. Immediately after finding shelter, Alekseev sent conditional telegrams to loyal officers, meaning that the formation on the Don had begun and it was necessary to start sending volunteers here without delay. On November 15 (28), volunteer officers arrived from Mogilev, sent by the Headquarters. In the last days of November, the number of generals, officers, cadets and cadets who entered the Alekseevsky organization exceeded 500 people, and the "infirmary" on Barochnaya Street was overcrowded. Volunteers again, with the approval of Kaledin, was rescued by the Union of Cities by transferring Alekseev infirmary No. 23 on Grushevskaya Street. On December 6 (19), General L. G. Kornilov also reached Novocherkassk.

The big problem was the collection of funds for the core of the future army. One of the sources was the personal contribution of the participants in the movement. In particular, the first contribution to the "army cash desk" was 10 thousand rubles, brought by Alekseev with him from Petrograd. Kaledin allocated personal funds. Alekseev counted on the financial assistance of Moscow industrialists and bankers, who promised him support at one time, but they were very reluctant to respond to the requests of the general's couriers, and for all the time 360 ​​thousand rubles were received from Moscow. By agreement with the Don government, in December, a subscription was held in Rostov and Novocherkassk, the funds from which were supposed to be divided equally between the Don and Volunteer armies (DA). About 8.5 million rubles were collected, but, contrary to the agreements, 2 million were transferred to YES. Some volunteers were quite wealthy people. Under their personal guarantees, loans totaling 350 thousand rubles were received in the Rostov branch of the Russian-Asian Bank. An informal agreement was concluded with the bank's management that the debt would not be collected, and the loan would be counted as a gratuitous donation to the army (the bankers would later try to return the money). Alekseev hoped for the support of the Entente countries. But during this period, they still had doubts. Only at the beginning of 1918, after the truce concluded by the Bolsheviks on the Eastern Front, 305 thousand rubles were received from the military representative of France in Kyiv in three steps. In December, the Don government decided to leave 25% of the state fees collected in the region for the needs of the region. Half of the money collected in this way, about 12 million rubles, was placed at the disposal of the newly created DA.