Why did the USSR attack Poland. Polish campaign of the Red Army (RKKA)

On September 17, 1939, the Soviet invasion of Poland took place. The USSR was not alone in this aggression. Earlier, on September 1, by mutual agreement with the USSR, the troops of Nazi Germany invaded Poland and this date marked the beginning of the Second World War.

It would seem that the whole world condemned Hitler's aggression, England and France about " they revealed the war to Germany as a result of allied obligations, but they were in no hurry to enter the war, fearing its growth and hoping for a miracle. We will later find out that the Second World War had already begun, and then ... then the politicians still hoped for something.

So, Hitler attacked Poland and Poland, with the last of its strength, is fighting the troops of the Wehrmacht. England and France condemned the Nazi invasion and declared war on Germany, that is, they sided with Poland. Two weeks later, another country, the USSR, invades Poland, with the last of its strength, repelling the aggression of Nazi Germany, from the east.

War on two fronts!

That is, the USSR, at the very beginning of the world fire, decided to take the side of Germany. Then, after the victory over Poland, the allies (USSR and Germany) will celebrate a joint victory and hold a joint military parade in Brest, spilling trophy champagne from the captured wine cellars of Poland. There are newsreels. And on September 17, Soviet troops moved from their western borders deep into the territory of Poland towards the "fraternal" troops of the Wehrmacht to Warsaw, engulfed in fire. Warsaw will still continue to defend until the end of September, confronting two strong aggressors and will fall in an unequal struggle.

The date of September 17, 1939 was marked by the entry of the USSR into World War II on the side of Nazi Germany. Later, after the victory over Germany, history will be rewritten and the real facts will be hushed up, and the entire population of the USSR will sincerely believe that the "Great Patriotic War" began on June 22, 1941, and then .... then the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition received a severe blow and The global balance of power has been shaken sharply.

September 17, 2010 was the 71st anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland. How did this event go in Poland:

Some history and facts

Heinz Guderian (center) and Semyon Krivoshein (right) watching the passage of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army troops during the transfer of Brest-Litovsk on September 22, 1939 to the Soviet administration

September 1939
Meeting of Soviet and German troops in the Lublin region

They were the first

who met the Nazi war machine with an open face - the Polish military command.The first heroes of World War II:

Commander-in-Chief of the VP Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly

Brigadier General Vaclav Stakhevich, Chief of the General Staff of the VP

Armor General VP Kazimierz Sosnkowski

Divisional General VP Kazimierz Fabricy

Divisional General VP Tadeusz Kutsheba

The entry of the Red Army forces into the territory of Poland

At 5 am on September 17, 1939, the troops of the Belarusian and Ukrainian fronts crossed the Polish-Soviet border along its entire length and attacked the checkpoints of the KOP. Thus, the USSR violated at least four international agreements:

• Riga Peace Treaty of 1921 on Soviet-Polish borders
• The Litvinov Protocol, or the Eastern Pact on the Renunciation of War
• Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact of January 25, 1932, extended in 1934 until the end of 1945
• The London Convention of 1933, containing the definition of aggression, and which the USSR signed on July 3, 1933

The governments of England and France handed in Moscow notes of protest against the undisguised aggression of the USSR against Poland, rejecting all of Molotov's justifying arguments. On September 18, the London Times described the event as "a stab in the back of Poland." At the same time, articles began to appear explaining the actions of the USSR as having an anti-German orientation (!!!)

The advancing units of the Red Army practically did not meet the resistance of the border units. To top it all, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly gave the so-called. "Directive of General Content", which was read out on the radio:

Quote: The Soviets have invaded. I order to carry out a withdrawal to Romania and Hungary by the shortest routes. Do not conduct hostilities with the Soviets, only in the event of an attempt on their part to disarm our units. The task for Warsaw and Modlin, which must defend themselves against the Germans, is unchanged. The units, to which the Soviets have approached, must negotiate with them in order to withdraw the garrisons to Romania, or Hungary ...

The directive of the commander-in-chief led to the disorientation of the majority of the Polish military personnel, and their mass capture. In connection with the Soviet aggression, the President of Poland, Ignacy Mościcki, while in the town of Kosiv, addressed the people. He accused the USSR of violating all legal and moral norms and called on the Poles to maintain firmness of spirit and courage in the fight against soulless barbarians. Mościcki also announced the transfer of the residence of the President of the Republic of Poland and all the highest authorities "to the territory of one of our allies." On the evening of September 17, the President and the Government of the Republic of Poland, headed by Prime Minister Felician Skladkovsky, crossed the Romanian border. And after midnight on September 17 / 18 - Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly. It was also possible to evacuate 30,000 troops to Romania and 40,000 to Hungary. Including a motorized brigade, a battalion of railway sappers and a police battalion "Golędzińw".

Despite the order of the commander-in-chief, many Polish units entered into battle with the advancing units of the Red Army. Particularly stubborn resistance was put up by part of the VP in the defense of Vilna, Grodno, Lvov (which defended itself from the Germans from September 12 to 22, and also from the Red Army from September 18) and near Sarny. On September 29-30, a battle took place near Shatsk between the 52nd Infantry Division and the retreating units of the Polish troops.

War on two fronts

The invasion of the USSR sharply worsened the already catastrophic situation of the Polish army. Under the new conditions, the main burden of resistance to the German troops fell on the Central Front of Tadeusz Piskor. On September 17-26, two battles near Tomaszow-Lubelski took place - the largest in the September campaign after the battle on Bzura. The task was to break through the German barrier in Rawa-Ruska, blocking the way to Lviv (3 infantry and 2 tank divisions of the 7th Army Corps of General Leonard Wecker). During the most difficult battles waged by the 23rd and 55th infantry divisions, as well as the Warsaw tank-motorized brigade of Colonel Stefan Rowiecki, it was not possible to break through the German defenses. Huge losses were also suffered by the 6th Infantry Division and the Krakow Cavalry Brigade. On September 20, 1939, General Tadeusz Piskor announced the surrender of the Central Front. More than 20 thousand Polish soldiers were captured (including Tadeusz Piskor himself).

Now the main forces of the Wehrmacht were concentrated against the Polish Northern Front.

On September 23, a new battle began near Tomaszow-Lubelski. The northern front was in a difficult situation. From the west, the 7th Army Corps of Leonard Vecker pressed on him, and from the east - the troops of the Red Army. Parts of the Southern Front of General Kazimierz Sosnkovsky at that time tried to break through to the encircled Lvov, inflicting a number of defeats on the German troops. However, on the outskirts of Lvov, they were stopped by the Wehrmacht and suffered heavy losses. After the news of the surrender of Lvov on September 22, the troops of the front received an order to split into small groups and make their way to Hungary. However, not all groups managed to reach the Hungarian border. General Kazimierz Sosnkowski himself was cut off from the main parts of the front in the Bzhukhovits area. In civilian clothes, he managed to pass through the territory occupied by Soviet troops. First to Lviv, and then, through the Carpathians, to Hungary. September 23 was one of the last equestrian battles during the Second World War. The 25th regiment of the Wielkopolska Lancers, Lieutenant Colonel Bogdan Stakhlevsky, attacked the German cavalry in Krasnobrud and captured the city.

On September 20, Soviet troops crushed the last pockets of resistance in Vilna. About 10,000 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner. In the morning, the tank units of the Belorussian Front (the 27th tank brigade of the 15th tank corps from the 11th army) launched an offensive on Grodno and crossed the Neman. Despite the fact that at least 50 tanks took part in the assault, they failed to take the city on the move. Some of the tanks were destroyed (the defenders of the city widely used Molotov cocktails), and the rest retreated behind the Neman. Grodno was defended by very small units of the local garrison. All the main forces a few days earlier became part of the 35th Infantry Division and were transferred to the defense of Lvov, besieged by the Germans. Volunteers (including scouts) joined the garrison units.

The troops of the Ukrainian Front began preparations for the assault on Lvov, scheduled for the morning of September 21. Meanwhile, power went out in the besieged city. By evening, the German troops received Hitler's order to move 10 km away from Lvov. Since, under the agreement, the city departed to the USSR. The Germans made one last attempt to change this situation. The command of the Wehrmacht again demanded that the Poles surrender the city no later than 10 hours on September 21: “If you surrender Lviv to us, you will remain in Europe, if you surrender to the Bolsheviks, you will become Asia forever”. On the night of September 21, the German units that besieged the city began to withdraw. After negotiations with the Soviet command, General Vladislav Langner decided to surrender Lvov. He was supported by most of the officers.

The end of September and the beginning of October marked the end of the independent Polish state. Until September 28, Warsaw defended, until September 29 - Modlin. On October 2, the defense of Hel was completed. The defenders of Kock were the last to lay down their arms on October 6, 1939.

This ended the armed resistance of the regular units of the Polish Army in Poland. To further fight against Germany and its allies, armed formations were created, made up of Polish citizens:

• Polish Armed Forces in the West
• Anders Army (2nd Polish Corps)
• Polish armed forces in the USSR (1943 - 1944)

The results of the war

As a result of the aggression of Germany and the USSR, the Polish state ceased to exist. September 28, 1939, immediately after the capitulation of Warsaw, in violation of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907). Germany and the USSR determined the Soviet-German border on the territory of Poland occupied by them. The German plan was to create a puppet "Polish residual state" Reststaat within the borders of the Kingdom of Poland and Western Galicia. However, this plan was not accepted due to Stalin's disagreement. Who was not satisfied with the existence of any kind of Polish state entity.

The new border basically coincided with the "Curzon Line", recommended in 1919 by the Paris Peace Conference as the eastern border of Poland, since it demarcated areas densely populated by Poles, on the one hand, and Ukrainians and Belarusians, on the other.

The territories east of the Western Bug and San rivers were annexed to the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR. This increased the territory of the USSR by 196 thousand km², and the population - by 13 million people.

Germany expanded the borders of East Prussia, moving them close to Warsaw, and included the area up to the city of Lodz, renamed Litzmannstadt, in the Wart region, which occupied the territories of the old Poznanshchina. On October 8, 1939, by Hitler's decree, Poznan, Pomeranian, Silesian, Lodz, part of the Kielce and Warsaw voivodeships, where about 9.5 million people lived, were proclaimed German lands and annexed to Germany.

The small remnant Polish state was declared the "Governorship of the Occupied Polish Regions" under the German authorities, which a year later became known as the "Governorship of the German Empire". Krakow became its capital. Any independent policy of Poland ceased.

On October 6, 1939, speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler publicly announced the termination of the 2nd Commonwealth and the division of its territory between Germany and the USSR. In this regard, he turned to France and England with a proposal for peace. On October 12, this proposal was rejected by Neville Chamberlain at a meeting of the House of Commons.

Side losses

Germany- During the campaign, the Germans, according to various sources, lost 10-17 thousand killed, 27-31 thousand wounded, 300-3500 people missing.

the USSR- Combat losses of the Red Army during the Polish campaign of 1939, according to the Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov, amounted to 1173 people killed, 2002 wounded and 302 missing. As a result of the hostilities, 17 tanks, 6 aircraft, 6 guns and mortars, and 36 vehicles were also lost.

According to Polish historians, the Red Army lost about 2,500 soldiers, 150 armored vehicles and 20 aircraft killed.

Poland- According to post-war studies by the Bureau of Military Losses, more than 66,000 Polish military personnel (including 2,000 officers and 5 generals) died in battles with the Wehrmacht. 133 thousand were wounded, and 420 thousand were captured by the Germans.

Polish losses in battles with the Red Army are not exactly known. Meltyukhov gives figures of 3,500 killed, 20,000 missing and 454,700 captured. According to the Polish Military Encyclopedia, 250,000 servicemen were taken prisoner by the Soviets. Almost the entire officer corps (about 21,000 people) was subsequently shot by the NKVD.

Myths that arose after the Polish campaign

The war of 1939 over the years has acquired myths and legends. This was the result of Nazi and Soviet propaganda, falsification of history and the lack of free access of Polish and foreign historians to archival materials during the time of the PPR. Some works of literature and art also played a decisive role in the creation of enduring myths.

"Polish cavalrymen in desperation rushed to the tanks with sabers"

Perhaps the most popular and tenacious of all myths. It arose immediately after the Battle of Kroyanty, in which the 18th regiment of the Pomeranian Lancers, Colonel Kazimierz Mastalezh, attacked the 2nd motorized battalion of the 76th motorized regiment of the 20th motorized division of the Wehrmacht. Despite the defeat, the regiment completed its task. The attack of the uhlans brought confusion to the general course of the German offensive, slowed down its pace and disorganized the troops. It took the Germans some time to resume their advance. They never managed to get to the crossings that day. In addition, this attack had a certain psychological impact on the enemy, which Heinz Guderian recalled.

The very next day, Italian correspondents who were in the combat area, referring to the testimonies of German soldiers, wrote that "Polish cavalrymen rushed with sabers to tanks." Some "eyewitnesses" claimed that the lancers cut down tanks with sabers, believing that they were made of paper. In 1941, the Germans filmed the propaganda film Kampfgeschwader Lützow on this subject. Even Andrzej Wajda did not escape the propaganda stamp in his “Lotna” of 1958 (the picture was criticized by war veterans).

The Polish cavalry fought on horseback but used infantry tactics. It was armed with machine guns and 75 and 35 mm carbines, Bofors anti-tank guns, a small number of Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as a small number of UR 1935 anti-tank rifles. Of course, the cavalrymen carried sabers and lances, but these weapons were used only in mounted battles. Throughout the September campaign, there was not a single case of an attack by the Polish cavalry on German tanks. It should, however, be noted that there were moments when the cavalry rushed at a fast gallop in the direction of the tanks attacking it. With one single purpose - to pass them as quickly as possible.

"Polish aviation was destroyed on the ground in the first days of the war"

In fact, just before the start of the war, almost all aviation was relocated to small camouflaged airfields. The Germans managed to destroy only training and auxiliary aircraft on the ground. For two whole weeks, inferior to the Luftwaffe in numbers and quality of vehicles, Polish aviation inflicted significant losses on them. After the end of the fighting, many Polish pilots moved to France and England, where they joined the flight crew of the Allied Air Force and continued the war (having already shot down a lot of German aircraft during the Battle of England)

"Poland did not put up proper resistance to the enemy and quickly surrendered"

In fact, the Wehrmacht, surpassing the Polish Army in all major military indicators, received a strong and completely unplanned OKW rebuff. The German army lost about 1,000 tanks and armored vehicles (almost 30% of the total), 370 guns, and over 10,000 military vehicles (about 6,000 vehicles and 5,500 motorcycles). The Luftwaffe lost over 700 aircraft (about 32% of the entire composition participating in the campaign).

Losses in manpower amounted to 45,000 killed and wounded. According to Hitler's personal confession, the Wehrmacht infantry "... did not live up to the hopes placed on it."

A significant number of German weapons received such damage that they needed major repairs. And the intensity of the hostilities was such that ammunition and other ammunition was enough for only two weeks.

In terms of time, the Polish campaign turned out to be only a week shorter than the French one. Although the forces of the Anglo-French coalition significantly outnumbered the Polish Army both in numbers and weapons. Moreover, the unforeseen delay of the Wehrmacht in Poland allowed the Allies to more seriously prepare for the German attack.

Read also about the heroic, which the Poles were the first to take on.

Quote: Immediately after the invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939, "" ... the Red Army committed a series of violence, murders, robberies and other lawlessness, both in relation to the captured units and in relation to the civilian population" "[http://www .krotov.info/libr_min/m/mackiew.html Józef Mackiewicz. "Katyn", Ed. Zarya, Canada, 1988] In total, according to general estimates, about 2,500 military and police personnel were killed, as well as several hundred civilians. Andrzej Frischke. "Poland. The fate of the country and the people 1939 - 1989, Warsaw, published by Iskra, 2003, p. 25, ISBN 83-207-1711-6] At the same time, the commanders of the Red Army called on the people to "beat the officers and generals" (from the appeal of Commander Semyon Timoshenko) [http://www.krotov.info/libr_min/m/mackiew.html] Polish servicemen who managed to find themselves in the West testified to British military counterintelligence officers, which were carefully recorded and now constitute a huge archive.

“When we were taken prisoner, we were ordered to put our hands up and so they drove us at a run of two kilometers. During the search, they stripped us naked, grabbing everything that was of any value ... after which they drove for 30 km, without rest and water. Who was weaker and did not keep up, he was hit with a butt, fell to the ground, and if he could not get up, they pinned him with a bayonet. I saw four such cases. I remember exactly that Captain Ksheminsky from Warsaw was shoved several times with a bayonet, and when he fell, another Soviet a soldier shot him twice in the head…" (from the testimony of a KOP soldier) [http://www.krotov.info/libr_min/m/mackiew.html Yuzef Matskevich. "Katyn", Ed. "Dawn", Canada, 1988] ]

The most serious war crimes of the Red Army took place in Rogatin, where prisoners of war along with the civilian population were brutally murdered (the so-called "Rogatin massacre") Vladislav Pobug-Malinovsky. "The Recent Political History of Poland. 1939 - 1945", ed. "Platan", Krakow, 2004, volume 3, p. 107, ISBN 83-89711-10-9] Katyn crime in documents. London, 1975, pp. 9-11]] Wojciech Roszkowski. "Modern history of Poland 1914 - 1945". Warsaw, "Mir Knigi", 2003, pp. 344-354, 397-410 (vol. 1) ISBN 83-7311-991-4] Vladislav Pobug-Malinovsky. "The Recent Political History of Poland. 1939 - 1945", ed. "Platan", Krakow, 2004, volume 3, p. 107, ISBN 83-89711-10-9] "...Terror and murders took on enormous proportions in Grodno, where 130 schoolchildren and cadets were killed, wounded defencists fought on the spot 12-year-old Tadzik Yasinsky was tied to a tank and dragged along the pavement. After the occupation of Grodno, repressions began; those arrested were shot on Dog Mountain and in the Secret Grove. A wall of corpses lay on the square near Fara ... Yulian Sedletsky. "The fate of the Poles in the USSR in 1939 - 1986", London, 1988, pp. 32-34] Karol Liszewski. "Polish-Soviet War 1939", London, Polish Cultural Foundation, 1986, ISBN 0-85065-170-0 (The monograph contains a detailed description of the battles on the entire Polish-Soviet front and the testimony of witnesses about the war crimes of the USSR in September 1939)] Institute of the National Memory of Poland. Investigation into the fact of the massacre of civilians and military defenders of Grodno by the Red Army soldiers, NKVD officers and saboteurs 22.09.39]

“At the end of September 1939, a part of the Polish army entered into battle with a Soviet unit in the vicinity of Vilna. The Bolsheviks sent truce with a proposal to lay down their arms, guaranteeing freedom and return home in return. The commander of the Polish unit believed these assurances and ordered to lay down their arms. The entire detachment immediately surrounded, and the liquidation of officers began ... "(from the testimony of the Polish soldier J.L. dated April 24, 1943) [http://www.krotov.info/libr_min/m/mackiew.html Józef Mackiewicz. "Katyn", Ed. "Dawn", Canada, 1988] ]

“I myself witnessed the capture of Ternopil. I saw how Soviet soldiers hunted Polish officers. For example, one of the two soldiers passing by me, leaving his comrade, rushed in the opposite direction, and when asked where he was in a hurry, he answered: “I’ll be right back , I’ll just kill that bourgeois,” and pointed to a man in an officer’s overcoat without insignia ...” (from the testimony of a Polish soldier on the crimes of the Red Army in Ternopil) [http://www.krotov.info/libr_min/m/mackiew.html Jozef Matskevich. "Katyn", Ed. "Dawn", Canada, 1988] ]

"Soviet troops entered at about four o'clock in the afternoon and immediately began a brutal massacre and brutal abuse of the victims. They killed not only the police and the military, but also the so-called "bourgeois", including women and children. Those military who escaped death and whom only disarmed, it was ordered to lie down in a wet meadow outside the city. There were about 800 people. Machine guns were installed in such a way that they could shoot low above the ground. Those who raised their heads perished. They kept them like that all night. The next day they were driven to Stanislavov , and from there into the depths of Soviet Russia ... "(from the testimony on the "Rohatyn massacre") [http://www.krotov.info/libr_min/m/mackiew.html Yuzef Matskevich. "Katyn", Ed. "Dawn", Canada, 1988] ]

"On September 22, during the battles for Grodno, at about 10 o'clock, the commander of the communications platoon, junior lieutenant Dubovik, received an order to escort 80-90 prisoners to the rear. Having moved 1.5-2 km from the city, Dubovik interrogated the prisoners in order to identify the officers and persons who took participation in the murder of the Bolsheviks.Promising to release the prisoners, he sought confessions and shot 29 people.The rest of the prisoners were returned to Grodno.This was known to the command of the 101st Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division, but no action was taken against Dubovik. Moreover, the commander of the 3rd battalion, Senior Lieutenant Tolochko, gave a direct order to shoot the officers ... "Meltyukhov M.I. [http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov2/index.html Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939] M., 2001.] end of quote

Often, Polish units surrendered, succumbing to the promises of freedom, which they were guaranteed by the commanders of the Red Army. In fact, these promises were never kept. As, for example, in Polissya, where some of the 120 officers were shot, and the rest were sent deep into the USSR [http://www.krotov.info/libr_min/m/mackiew.html Yuzef Matskevich. "Katyn", Ed. Zarya, Canada, 1988]] On September 22, 1939, the commander of the defense of Lvov, General Vladislav Langner, signed an act of surrender, providing for the unhindered passage of military and police units to the Romanian border immediately after they lay down their arms. This agreement was violated by the Soviet side. All Polish servicemen and policemen were arrested and taken to the USSR. Wojciech Roszkowski. "Modern history of Poland 1914 - 1945". Warsaw, "The World of the Book", 2003, pp. 344-354, 397-410 (vol. 1) ISBN 83-7311-991-4]

The command of the Red Army did the same with the defenders of Brest. Moreover, all the captured border guards of the 135th KOP regiment were shot on the spot by Wojciech Roszkowski. "Modern history of Poland 1914 - 1945". Warsaw, "The World of the Book", 2003, pp. 344-354, 397-410 (vol. 1) ISBN 83-7311-991-4]

One of the most serious war crimes of the Red Army was committed in the Great Bridges on the territory of the School of sub-officers of the state police. At that time, there were about 1,000 cadets in this largest and most modern police school in Poland. The commandant of the School, Inspector Vitold Dunin-Vonsovich, gathered the cadets and teachers on the parade ground and gave a report to the arriving NKVD officer. After that, the latter ordered to open fire from machine guns. Everyone died, including the commandant

Massacre of General Olshina-Vilchinsky

On September 11, 2002, the Institute of National Remembrance launched an investigation into the circumstances of the tragic death of General Jozef Olszyna-Wilczynski and Captain Mieczysław Strzemeski (Act S 6/02/Zk). During inquiries in Polish and Soviet archives, the following was established:

"On September 22, 1939, the former commander of the Grodno task force, General Jozef Olshina-Vilchinsky, his wife Alfreda, adjutant artillery captain Mechislav Strzemesky, the driver and his assistant ended up in the town of Sopotskin near Grodno. Here they were stopped by the crews of two tanks of the Red Army. The tankers ordered everyone to leave the car. The general's wife was taken to a nearby shed, where there were already more than a dozen other people. After which both Polish officers were shot on the spot. From the photocopies of Soviet archival materials in the Central Military Archive in Warsaw, it follows that on September 22, 1939, in near Sopotskin, a motorized detachment of the 2nd tank brigade of the 15th tank corps entered into battle with the Polish troops. The corps was part of the Dzerzhinsky cavalry-mechanized group of the Belorussian Front, commanded by commander Ivan Boldin ... "[http://www.pl.indymedia .org/pl/2005/07/15086.shtml

The investigation identified the persons directly responsible for this crime. This is the commander of a motorized detachment, Major Fedor Chuvakin and Commissar Polikarp Grigorenko. There are also testimonies of witnesses to the murder of Polish officers - the wife of General Alfreda Staniszewska, the driver of the car and his assistant, as well as local residents. On September 26, 2003, a request was submitted to the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation for assistance in the investigation into the murder of General Olszyna-Wilchinsky and Captain Mieczysław Strzemeski (as a crime that does not have a statute of limitations in accordance with the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907). In the response of the Military Prosecutor's Office to the Polish side, it was stated that in this case it was not a war crime, but a common law crime, the statute of limitations of which had already expired. The arguments of the prosecutor's office were rejected as having the sole purpose of stopping the Polish investigation. However, the refusal of the Military Prosecutor's Office to cooperate made further investigation pointless. On May 18, 2004, it was terminated. [http://www.pl.indymedia.org/pl/2005/07/15086.shtml Act S6/02/Zk - investigation into the assassination of General Olszyna-Wilczynski and Captain Mieczysław Strzemeski, Institute of National Remembrance of Poland]]

Why did Lech Kaczynski die?... The Polish Law and Justice Party, led by President Lech Kaczynski, is preparing a response to Vladimir Putin. The first step against "Russian propaganda praising Stalin" should be a resolution equating the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 with fascist aggression.

Officially, the Polish conservatives from the Law and Justice Party (PiS) proposed to equate the invasion of Soviet troops in Poland in 1939 with fascist aggression. The most representative party in the Sejm, to which Polish President Lech Kaczynski also belongs, submitted a draft resolution on Thursday.

According to Polish conservatives, every day of glorifying Stalin in the spirit of Soviet propaganda is an insult to the Polish state, the victims of World War II in Poland and around the world. To prevent this, they call on the leadership of the Sejm "to call on the Polish government to take steps to counter the falsification of history."

“We insist on revealing the truth,” Rzeczpospolita quotes the statement of the official representative of the faction, Mariusz Blaszczak. “Fascism and communism are the two great totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, and their leaders are responsible for the outbreak of World War II and its aftermath. The Red Army brought death and ruin to Polish territory. Its plans included genocide, murder, rape, looting and other forms of persecution,” the proposed PiS resolution says.

Blaszczak is sure that the date of September 17, 1939, when the Soviet troops entered Poland, until that time was not as well known as September 1, 1939 - the day of the invasion of the Nazi troops: “Thanks to the efforts of Russian propaganda, falsifying history, it remains so to this day”.

When asked whether the adoption of this document would harm Polish-Russian relations, Blashak spoke in the spirit that there would be nothing to harm. In Russia, "slander campaigns" are being waged against Poland, in which government agencies, including the FSB, take part, and official Warsaw "should put an end to this."

However, the passage of the document through the Sejm is unlikely.

The deputy head of the PiS faction, Gregory Dolnyak, generally opposed the draft resolution being made public until his group managed to agree on the text of the statement with the rest of the factions. “We must first try to agree on any resolution of historical content among us, and then make it public,” Rzeczpospolita quotes him.

His fears are justified. The ruling coalition, led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk's Civic Platform party, is frankly skeptical.

Deputy Speaker of the Parliament Stefan Nesiolowski, representing the Civic Platform, called the resolution "stupid, untruthful and detrimental to Poland's interests." “It does not correspond to the truth that the Soviet occupation was the same as the German one, it was softer. It also does not correspond to the truth that the Soviets carried out ethnic cleansing, the Germans did it,” he said in an interview with Gazeta Wyborcza.

In the socialist camp, they also categorically oppose the resolution. As Tadeusz Iwinski, deputy of the Left Forces and Democrats bloc, noted to the same publication, the LSD considers the draft resolution “anti-historical and provocative.” Poland and Russia have recently managed to bring their positions closer on the issue of the role of the USSR in the death of the Polish state in 1939. In an article in Gazeta Wyborcza, timed to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the start of the war, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact "morally unacceptable" and had "no prospects from the point of view of practical implementation", not forgetting to reproach the historians who write for the sake of "momentary political conjuncture". The idyllic picture was blurred when, at the memorial celebrations at Westerplatte near Gdansk, Prime Minister Putin compared trying to figure out the causes of World War II to "picking in a moldy bun." At the same time, Polish President Kaczynski announced that in 1939 “Bolshevik Russia” had stabbed his country in the back, and unequivocally accused the Red Army, which occupied the eastern Polish lands, of persecuting the Poles on ethnic grounds.

The Nuremberg military tribunal sentenced: Goering, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, Streicher, Sauckel, Jodl, Seyss-Inquart, Bormann (in absentia) - to death by hanging.

Hess, Funk, Reder - to life imprisonment.

Schirach, Speer - to 20, Neurath - to 15, Doenitz - to 10 years in prison.

Fritsche, Papen, Schacht were acquitted. Handed over to the court, Ley hanged himself in prison shortly before the start of the trial, Krup (the industrialist) was declared terminally ill, and the case was dismissed.

After the Control Council for Germany rejected the petitions of the convicts for clemency, those sentenced to death on the night of October 16, 1946 were hanged in Nuremberg prison (2 hours before that, G. Goering committed suicide). The Tribunal also declared the SS, SD, Gestapo, the leadership of the National Socialist Party (NDSAP) to be criminal organizations, but did not recognize the SA, the German government, the General Staff and the Wehrmacht high command as such. But a member of the tribunal from the USSR, R. A. Rudenko, declared in a “dissenting opinion” that he disagreed with the acquittal of the three defendants, spoke in favor of the death penalty against R. Hess.

The International Military Tribunal recognized aggression as the gravest crime of an international character, punished statesmen guilty of preparing, unleashing and waging aggressive wars as criminals, justly punished the organizers and executors of criminal plans to exterminate millions of people and subdue entire nations. And its principles, contained in the Charter of the Tribunal and expressed in the verdict, were confirmed by the resolution of the UN General Assembly of December 11, 1946, as universally recognized norms of international law and entered the minds of most people.

So, don't say that someone is rewriting history. It is beyond the power of man to change past history, to change what has already happened.

But it is possible to change the brains of the population by implanting political and historical hallucinations in them.

As for the accusations of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, don't you think that the list of the accused is not complete? Many have evaded responsibility and continue to go unpunished to this day. But it's not even about them themselves - their crimes, which are presented as valor, are not condemned, thereby distorting historical logic and distorting memory, replacing it with propaganda lies.

"You can't trust anyone's word, comrades.... (Stormy applause)." (I.V. Stalin. From speeches.)

September 1, 1939. This is the day of the beginning of the greatest catastrophe that claimed tens of millions of human lives, destroyed thousands of cities and villages, and eventually led to a new redivision of the world. It was on this day that the troops of Nazi Germany crossed the western border of Poland. The Second World War began.

And on September 17, 1939, Soviet troops hit the back of defending Poland from the east. Thus began the last partition of Poland, which was the result of a criminal collusion between the two greatest totalitarian regimes of the 20th century - the Nazi and the Communist. The joint parade of Soviet and Nazi troops on the streets of the occupied Polish Brest in 1939 became a shameful symbol of this collusion.

Before the storm

The end of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles created even more contradictions and points of tension in Europe than before. And if we add to this the rapid strengthening of the communist Soviet Union, which, in fact, was turned into a giant weapons factory, it becomes clear that a new war on the European continent was almost inevitable.

After the First World War, Germany was crushed and humiliated: it was forbidden to have a normal army and navy, it lost significant territories, huge reparations caused economic collapse and poverty. Such a policy of the victorious states was extremely short-sighted: it was clear that the Germans, a talented, hardworking and energetic nation, would not tolerate such humiliation and would strive for revenge. And so it happened: in 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany.

Poland and Germany

After the end of the Great War, Poland again received its statehood. In addition, the Polish state is still seriously "grown up" with new lands. Part of Poznan and the Pomeranian lands, which had previously been part of Prussia, went to Poland. Danzig received the status of a "free city". Part of Silesia became part of Poland, the Poles seized part of Lithuania by force along with Vilnius.

Poland, together with Germany, took part in the annexation of Czechoslovakia, which in no way can be attributed to deeds that should be proud of. In 1938, the Teszyn region was annexed under the pretext of protecting the Polish population.

In 1934, a ten-year non-aggression pact was signed between the countries, and a year later, an agreement on economic cooperation. In general, it should be noted that with the advent of Hitler to power, German-Polish relations improved significantly. But it didn't last long.

In March 1939, Germany demanded that Poland return Danzig to it, join the Anti-Comintern Pact and provide a land corridor for Germany to the Baltic coast. Poland did not accept this ultimatum and early in the morning on September 1, German troops crossed the Polish border, Operation Weiss began.

Poland and the USSR

Relations between Russia and Poland have traditionally been difficult. After the end of the First World War, Poland gained independence and almost immediately the Soviet-Polish war began. Fortune was changeable: first, the Poles reached Kyiv and Minsk, and then the Soviet troops reached Warsaw. But then there was the "miracle on the Vistula" and the complete defeat of the Red Army.

According to the Riga Peace Treaty, the western parts of Belarus and Ukraine were part of the Polish state. The new eastern border of the country passed along the so-called Curzon Line. In the early 1930s, a treaty of friendship and cooperation and a non-aggression agreement were signed. But, despite this, Soviet propaganda painted Poland as one of the main enemies of the USSR.

Germany and USSR

Relations between the USSR and Germany in the period between the two world wars were contradictory. Already in 1922, an agreement was signed on cooperation between the Red Army and the Reichswehr. Germany had serious restrictions under the Treaty of Versailles. Therefore, part of the development of new weapons systems and the training of personnel was carried out by the Germans on the territory of the USSR. A flight school and a tank school were opened, among the graduates of which were the best German tank crews and pilots of the Second World War.

After Hitler came to power, relations between the two countries deteriorated, military-technical cooperation was curtailed. Germany again began to be portrayed by official Soviet propaganda as an enemy of the USSR.

On August 23, 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR was signed in Moscow. In fact, in this document, the two dictators Hitler and Stalin divided Eastern Europe between themselves. According to the secret protocol of this document, the territories of the Baltic countries, as well as Finland, parts of Romania were included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. Eastern Poland belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence, and its western part was to go to Germany.

Attack

On September 1, 1939, German aircraft began bombing Polish cities, and ground forces crossed the border. The invasion was preceded by several provocations on the border. The invasion force consisted of five army groups and a reserve. Already on September 9, the Germans reached Warsaw, and the battle for the Polish capital began, which lasted until September 20.

On September 17, practically without resistance, Soviet troops entered Poland from the east. This immediately made the position of the Polish troops almost hopeless. On September 18, the Polish high command crossed the Romanian border. Separate pockets of Polish resistance remained until the beginning of October, but it was already agony.

Part of the Polish territories, which were previously part of Prussia, went to Germany, and the rest was divided into governor-generals. Polish territories occupied by the USSR became part of Ukraine and Belarus.

Poland suffered huge losses during World War II. The invaders banned the Polish language, all national educational and cultural institutions, newspapers were closed. Representatives of the Polish intelligentsia and Jews were massively exterminated. In the territories occupied by the USSR, Soviet punitive bodies worked tirelessly. Tens of thousands of captured Polish officers were destroyed in Katyn and other similar places. Poland lost about 6 million people during the war.

On September 1, 1939, at 4:00 am, German troops invaded Poland. So World War II started.

The reason for the German attack on Poland was the refusal of the Polish government to transfer the free city of Danzig to Germany and give it the right to build highways to East Prussia, which would pass through the territory of Poland. Danzig with the adjacent territory formed the so-called "Danzig Corridor". This corridor was created by the Treaty of Versailles in order for Poland to have access to the sea. The Danzig region cut off German territory from East Prussia. But not only the passage between the territory of Germany and East Prussia (part of Germany) was the goal of the attack on Poland. For Nazi Germany, this was the next stage in the implementation of the program to expand the "living space". In Austria and Czechoslovakia, Hitler managed to achieve his goals through diplomatic moves, threats and blackmail. Now the power phase of the implementation of predatory goals has frowned.

"I have completed the political preparations, now the road is open to the soldier," Hitler declared before the start of the invasion. Of course, by "political preparations" he meant, in particular, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939, which relieved Hitler of the need to wage war on two fronts. Historians will later call this pact the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact". We will discuss this document and its secret appendices in detail in the next chapter.

Wehrmacht soldiers break the barrier at the border checkpoint in Sopot
(border of Poland and the Free City of Danzig), September 1, 1939.
German Federal Archives.

In the early morning of September 1, German troops moved deep into the territory of Poland, having up to 40 divisions in the first echelon, including all the mechanized and motorized formations that Germany then had, followed by another 13 reserve divisions. The massive use of tank and motorized forces with the active support of aviation allowed the German troops to carry out a blitzkrieg operation in Poland (Blitzkrieg - lightning war). The million-strong Polish army was dispersed along the borders, which did not have strong defensive lines, which made it possible for the Germans to create significant superiority in forces in certain areas. The flat terrain contributed to the high rate of advance of the German troops. Attacking the line of the Polish border from the north and west, using superiority in tanks and aircraft, the German command carried out a major operation to encircle and destroy the Polish troops. Despite the powerful onslaught of the enemy, a significant part of the Polish troops managed at the first stage to break out of the encirclement and retreat to the east.

From the first days of the war, miscalculations of the Polish military leadership were revealed. The Polish main headquarters proceeded from the fact that the allies would strike at Germany from the west, and the Polish army would carry out an offensive in the direction of Berlin. The offensive doctrine of the Polish armed forces did not provide for the creation of a reliable line of defense. Therefore, the Germans, with relatively small losses in people and equipment from September 1 to 6, 1939, achieved the following results: the 3rd Wehrmacht Army (along with the 4th Army was part of the Northern Army Group under the command of General von Bock), breaking through the Polish defenses on the border with East Prussia, went to the Narew River and crossed it at Ruzhan. The 4th Army, with a blow from Pomerania, passed the "Danzig corridor" and began to move south along both banks of the Vistula. The 8th and 10th armies advancing in the center (Southern Army Group under the command of General von Rundstedt) advanced - the first to Lodz, the second to Warsaw. Three Polish armies ("Torun", "Poznan" and "Lodz") made their way to the southeast or to the capital (at first unsuccessfully). This was the first stage of the encirclement operation.

Already the first days of the campaign in Poland showed that the era of a new war was beginning. Gone are the positional sitting in the trenches with painfully long breakthroughs. The era of engines, the massive use of tanks and aircraft has come. French military experts believed that Poland should hold out until the spring of 1940. But five days was enough for the Germans to defeat the main backbone of the Polish army, which turned out to be unprepared for modern warfare. The Poles could not oppose anything to the six German tank divisions, especially since the territory of Poland was best suited for the blitzkrieg.

The main forces of the Polish army were located along the borders, where there were no fortifications that represented any serious obstacles for tank formations. Under such conditions, the courage and perseverance that the Polish wars everywhere showed could not bring them victory.

Polish troops that managed to break out of the encirclement, as well as the garrisons of cities located beyond the Narew and Bug rivers, tried to create a new defensive line on the southern banks of these rivers. But the created line turned out to be weak, the units that returned after the battles suffered heavy losses, and the newly arriving fresh formations did not have time to fully concentrate. The 3rd Army, which was part of the German group "North", reinforced by Guderian's tank corps, broke through the defenses of the Polish troops on the Narew River on September 9 and moved to the southeast. On September 10, units of the 3rd Army crossed the Bug and reached the Warsaw-Brest railway. Meanwhile, the German 4th Army was moving forward in the direction of Modlin-Warsaw.

Army Group "South" defeated the Polish troops in the interfluve of the San and Vistula and advanced on the connection with the troops of Army Group "North". At the same time, the 14th Army crossed the San River and launched an offensive against Lvov. The 10th Army continued its offensive against Warsaw from the south. The 8th Army was advancing on Warsaw in the central direction, through Lodz. Thus, in the second stage, the Polish troops retreated in almost all areas.

Although the bulk of the Polish troops were forced to retreat to the east, stubborn battles still continued in the west. The Polish troops succeeded here in preparing and inflicting a surprise counterattack from the Kutno region against the rear of the 8th German Army. This counterattack was the first tactical success of the Polish army, but, of course, it had no effect on the outcome of the battle. The Polish grouping of three divisions, which carried out a counterattack from the Kutno region, was surrounded by German troops in one day and ultimately defeated.

On September 10, formations of the 3rd German Army came to the northern suburbs of Warsaw. Guderian's tank corps advanced east of Warsaw in a southerly direction and on September 15 reached Brest. On September 13, the encircled Polish grouping in the Radom area was defeated. On September 15, German troops operating beyond the Vistula took Lublin. On September 16, the formations of the 3rd Army, advancing from the north, connected in the Vlodawa region with units of the 10th Army, that is, the troops of the Army Group North and South joined behind the Vistula, and the encirclement ring of Polish troops east of Warsaw closed. German troops reached the line Lvov - Vladimir-Volynsky - Brest - Bialystok. Thus ended the second stage of hostilities in Poland. The organized resistance of the Polish army at this stage actually ceased.

Poland's allies - Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, but for the entire Polish campaign they did not provide any practical assistance to Poland.

The third and last stage of hostilities in Poland consisted in the suppression by German troops of individual pockets of resistance and in the battles for Warsaw. These battles ended on 28 September. The desperate resistance of the defenders of Warsaw stopped only when the ammunition ran out. Prior to this, Warsaw had been subjected to artillery shelling and aerial bombardment for six days. The death toll from the barbarian bombardment of Warsaw was five times greater than the death toll during its defense.

The Government of Poland, in the most difficult hour of trials for its people, on September 16 shamefully fled to Romania. The army and the entire Polish people were left to the mercy of fate, or rather, to the mercy of the fascist aggressors. The last battles were fought by one of the Polish divisions near the city of Kotsk. Here, on October 5, 1939, the remnants of the division laid down their arms and surrendered.

Shortly after the invasion of Poland, the Germans offered the Soviet Union to intervene in the course of hostilities in order to immediately occupy those areas of Poland that, according to the secret annex to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, were to be annexed by the Soviet Union. But the Soviet leadership gave its troops, concentrated at the western border of the USSR, an order to occupy the eastern regions of Poland only after it became clear that the Polish army was defeated, and help from Poland's allies would no longer come, since the Polish government left the country. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish border. The liberation campaign of the Red Army began, as it was called then and many years later. The Soviet leadership motivated the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Poland by the need to protect the Ukrainian and Belarusian population of the eastern regions of Poland in the conditions of the outbreak of war and the complete defeat of the Polish armed forces. It should be noted that the Soviet Union repeatedly offered Poland military assistance in repelling German aggression, but these proposals were actually rejected by the Polish government, which was more afraid of Soviet assistance than German attacks.

The number of Soviet troops participating in the campaign against Poland was about 620 thousand people. The Polish armed forces did not expect the offensive of the Red Army at all. In most areas occupied by Soviet troops, the Poles did not put up armed resistance. Only in certain places in the Ternopil and Pinsk regions, as well as in the city of Grodno, did the Soviet units meet stubborn resistance, which was quickly crushed. Resistance was provided, as a rule, not by regular Polish troops, but by units of the gendarmerie and military settlers. The Polish troops, completely demoralized by the defeat from the German troops, surrendered en masse to the Soviet troops. In total, more than 450 thousand people surrendered. For comparison: about 420 thousand Polish soldiers and officers surrendered to the German troops operating on the vast territory of Poland. One of the possible reasons for this was also the order of the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, General Rydz-Smigly, to refrain from hostilities with the Soviet troops.

One of the main goals of the Polish campaign of the Red Army in September 1939 was the return of the territories of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, captured by Poland during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. Here we would like to briefly remind our readers of the background of the issue. The eastern borders of Poland were established at the suggestion of the Supreme Council of the Entente in December 1919 along the line: Grodno - Brest - the Bug River - Przemysl - Carpathians (the so-called "Curzon Line"). But the then Polish government, headed by Marshal Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935), unleashed a war for the lands lying much to the east of this border. During the undeclared war with Soviet Russia, Polish troops, together with the military formations of the Ukrainian People's Republic, transferred to the Polish command by Semyon Petliura, seized the lands of Ukraine and Belarus, lying much to the east of the Curzon Line. So, in Belarus, by the end of 1919, Polish troops reached the Berezena line, and in Ukraine they went to areas east of Kyiv, Fastov, Lvov. The Red Army as a whole unsuccessfully conducted the largest operations of the Soviet-Polish war and was ultimately defeated. The Polish campaign of the Red Army, which began on September 17, 1939, was supposed to restore the western lands of Belarus and Ukraine as part of the USSR.

The Soviet media were silent for a long time about the war with Poland in 1920. In fact, Soviet Russia was at war with Poland throughout 1919 (the first clashes between the Red Army and Polish troops took place in the western part of Belarus in December 1918) and until October 12, 1920, when a truce was concluded between Poland and Soviet Russia in Riga. Long peace negotiations began, and the Riga Peace Treaty was concluded only on March 18, 1921. Soviet Russia failed to push the Soviet-Polish border to the "Curzon Line". Under the terms of the Riga Peace Treaty, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus withdrew to Poland.

The Soviet leadership preferred not to talk about the Soviet-Polish war for obvious reasons: who is interested in talking about their defeat? In addition, the Soviet troops in that war were commanded by two marshals - M.N. Tukhachevsky and A.I. Egorov, who were slandered and in 1937 were shot on Stalin's orders as "enemies of the people."

No more than the Soviet official organs spread about the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 and about the "liberation campaign" of the Red Army in September 1939. Whatever they say about the “liberation mission” of the Red Army, but the black shadow of the secret protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, relentlessly followed this noble mission.

The campaign of the Red Army, which began on September 17, continued as follows. On September 19-20, 1939, advanced Soviet units met with German troops on the line Lvov - Vladimir-Volynsky - Brest - Bialystok. On September 20, negotiations began between Germany and the USSR on establishing a demarcation line.

As a result of these negotiations, on September 28, 1939, the Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany was signed in Moscow. The new Soviet border now differed little from the so-called Curzon Line. Stalin, during negotiations in Moscow, abandoned the initial claims to the ethnic Polish lands between the Vistula and the Bug and suggested that the German side abandon its claims to Lithuania. The German side agreed with this, and Lithuania was assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR. We also agreed that the Lubelskie and partially Warsaw Voivodeships would pass into the zone of German interests.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and the Border, economic relations between the Soviet Union and Germany became noticeably more active. The USSR supplied Germany with food and strategic materials, such as cotton, oil, chromium, copper, platinum, manganese ore, and others. The deliveries of raw materials and materials from the Soviet Union made almost imperceptible for Germany the economic blockade imposed against it by Western countries with the outbreak of the war. From Germany, the USSR received rolled steel, machinery and equipment in exchange for the supply of its goods. The confidence of the top leadership of the USSR in the Non-Aggression Treaty of August 23, 1939 and in the Treaty of Friendship and Border of September 28 of the same year was quite high, although not unlimited. This, of course, influenced the increase in the share of Germany in the foreign trade of the USSR. This proportion rose from 7.4% to 40.4% between 1939 and 1940.

The Polish campaign of the Red Army actually meant the entry of the USSR into World War II. The losses of the Soviet troops during the Polish campaign amounted to 715 people killed and 1876 people wounded. The Poles lost in combat clashes with the Red Army 3.5 thousand people killed, 20 thousand wounded and over 450 thousand people captured. Most of the prisoners were Ukrainians and Belarusians. Almost all of them (primarily the rank and file) were sent home.

The total losses of the Germans during the hostilities in Poland in 1939 amounted to 44 thousand people, of which 10.5 thousand were killed. The Poles lost in battles with the German army 66.3 thousand people killed and missing, 133.7 thousand wounded and 420 thousand prisoners.

Hitler, especially in the first weeks of fighting in Poland, personally controlled the actions of the German troops. According to the memoirs of Heinz Guderian, on September 5, Adolf Hitler unexpectedly arrived in his tank corps in the Plevno region. Seeing the destroyed Polish artillery, he was surprised to learn from Guderian that this was done not by dive bombers, but by tanks. Hitler asked about casualties. Learning that in five days of fighting in four divisions there were 150 killed and 700 wounded, he was very surprised at such insignificant losses. By way of comparison, Hitler cited the loss of his regiment during World War I after the first day of operations as about 2,000 killed and wounded in the regiment alone. Guderian pointed out that the slight losses of his corps in battle were due mainly to the effectiveness of the tanks. At the same time, he described his opponent as brave and stubborn.

The results of the German aggression against Poland were as follows: the western regions of Poland were annexed to Germany, and on the common territory of the Warsaw, Lublin and Krakow voivodships, a general government was created, occupied by the Wehrmacht troops. The state of Poland, having gained independence in November 1918, practically ceased to exist after twenty years, until the spring of 1945, when Poland was liberated by the Soviet Army with the participation of the Polish Army.

The result of the Polish campaign of the Red Army in 1939 was the reunification of the divided peoples - Belarusians and Ukrainians. The territories inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and Belarusians became part of the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR in November 1939. The territory of the USSR increased by 196 thousand square kilometers, and the population - by 13 million people. Soviet borders moved 300-400 km to the west. Of course, it was a good territorial and demographic result. But the Polish campaign also had a certain negative result. We mean that the ease with which the goals of this campaign were achieved could create illusions in the military-political leadership of the USSR about the invincible power of the Red Army. Here the praise of the victories of the Red Army over the Japanese in the area of ​​​​Lake Khasan (1938) and the Khalkhin-Gol River (1939) also played a role, which, by the way, did not come easily to the Soviet troops. Soviet propaganda kept saying that the results of the Polish campaign were proof of the "invincibility" of the Red Army. But it was clear to every normal person that the “ease” of the actions of the Red Army was ensured by the defeat of Poland by the troops of the German Wehrmacht. How dangerous self-confidence, overestimated self-esteem and simultaneous underestimation of the enemy's forces are, the Soviet military leadership was convinced very soon in the war with Finland, which began on November 30, 1939.

Occupation of Poland. The struggle of the Polish people against the Nazi invaders.

The occupation of Poland by the Nazi troops, which began on September 1, 1939, continued until May 1945. All this time, the Polish people put up courageous resistance to the invaders. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were the first to enter the territory of occupied Poland on July 17, 1944, and on July 20, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and the 1st Polish Army.

On July 22, in the city of Chelm, liberated by the Soviet Army (then the Red Army) and parts of the Polish Army, the Polish Committee of National Liberation was established, which took over the functions of the government of Poland.

On July 31, 1944, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution on the tasks of the Soviet Army in connection with the entry into the territory of Poland. The resolution emphasized that the Soviet Army, having entered the territory of Poland, was carrying out a liberation mission against the Polish people.

This mission was not easy. Let us give just one figure: almost 600 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers died in the battles for the liberation of Poland. All of Poland is covered with mass graves of Soviet soldiers.

Soviet-Polish relations were not easy, starting from the first years of the existence of Soviet Russia. The Soviet-Polish war of 1920 and the entry of Soviet troops on September 17, 1939 into the territory of Poland showed the complexity of these relations. It is known that the ruling circles of Western countries constantly pushed Poland to aggravate relations with the USSR. Great Britain was especially successful in this ignoble business.

The entry of Soviet troops on September 17, 1939 into the eastern regions of Poland, populated mainly by Belarusians and Ukrainians, was agreed with the leadership of Nazi Germany. The non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, concluded between the USSR and Germany, called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, provided for the division of Poland into zones of interests of the Soviet Union and Germany.

On September 28, 1939, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed a new German-Soviet “Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany”. This treaty officially and legally fixed the division of the territory of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Two additional secret protocols were attached to this treaty. In one of them, the borders of the division of Poland were specified: the Lublin Voivodeship and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship went into the sphere of influence of Germany, and the entire Lithuanian territory was given to the Soviet Union as an additional sphere of influence. In another secret protocol, both sides undertook the obligation not to allow any Polish agitation on "their territories" and even to "eliminate the germs" of such agitation. In other words, the USSR and Nazi Germany agreed on joint actions against agitation and propaganda for the revival of Poland. The meaning is clear, but we will not expand on the moral and ethical side of such a collusion.

In the years that have passed since then, nothing has been written or said about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its appendices, as well as about the Treaty of Friendship and Borders. For objective historians, it has long been clear that these documents recorded a conspiracy between the leaders of the two largest states: the USSR and Germany, and the conspiracy was forced for both one and the other side. The intentions of each side were determined by the current situation. Germany, with the help of these documents, tried to convince (at least for a while) the Soviet leadership of the supposedly peaceful intentions of the Nazi regime in order to guarantee itself from the need to wage a war on two fronts (in the west and in the east). The Soviet leadership, realizing the inevitability of war with Germany, hoped to win at least a little time before the start of the war in order to prepare the country and the armed forces for the upcoming trials. This was vital for the USSR in that tense situation.

The agreement of August 23, 1939 did not provide for the seizure of Polish territories by the Soviet Union. It was only supposed to reunite the western lands that historically belonged to Ukraine and Belarus, but passed to Poland after the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. Therefore, the campaign of the Red Army on the territory of Poland, which began on September 17, 1939, was not an act of aggression against Poland, as was represented by Polish nationalist circles and many Western politicians.

In anticipation of the complete defeat of Poland from the Nazi troops, the Polish government left the country and emigrated to London. On July 30, 1941, an agreement was signed in London between the USSR and Poland on the restoration of diplomatic relations, on mutual assistance in the war against Nazi Germany and on the creation of a Polish army on the territory of the USSR.

On December 3-4, 1941, Soviet-Polish negotiations were held in Moscow and a declaration of the governments of the USSR and Poland on friendship and mutual assistance was signed. But on April 25, 1943, the Soviet government sent a note to the Polish government in exile in London about breaking off relations with it. The reason for this step was the criticism of the policy of the Soviet leadership by the Polish government, perceived by Moscow as a slanderous campaign.

The Union of Polish Patriots, organized in the USSR, turned to the Soviet government with a request to form Polish military units on the territory of the USSR. This request was granted, and in May 1943, the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko began to form on the territory of the USSR. This Polish division for the first time entered into battle with the Nazi invaders on October 12, 1943 near the village of Lenino (Goretsky district of the Mogilev region) as part of the 33rd Army of the Soviet Western Front. October 12 was previously considered the Day of the Polish Army. We do not know what this day is considered in Poland now.

We only know that modern-day Poland is a member of NATO, and the Polish leaders, clearly confusing day with night, are talking about some kind of danger coming from Russia, the country that once saved the Polish people from destruction. Having lost orientation in space, the Polish government clung to the maternal breast of NATO, seeking protection from this military-political organization. NATO instructors, mentors and other military experts have already arrived in Poland. It is likely that more militarily tangible NATO forces and assets will appear here soon. Then the Polish leaders will breathe freely: Polska has not yet perished ...

The nationalistic aspirations of the leading circles of Poland, on the one hand, and the inexorable desire of the Soviet leadership to keep Poland in their sphere of influence, on the other, were the reason that in the struggle against the Nazi invaders in Poland, national forces of different goals, organized in Home Army and People's Army.

Let us briefly recall what these two military organizations were. The Home Army (Armia Krajowa - Polish. Fatherland Army) is an underground military organization created in 1942 by the Polish government in exile in the territory of Poland occupied by Nazi Germany. It operated until January 1945. In 1943-1944. its number ranged from 250 to 350 thousand people.

With the help of the Home Army, the emigrant government hoped to retain its power after the liberation of Poland, prevent the loss of Poland's independence and avoid its dependence on the Soviet Union.

The Army of Ludowa (Armia Ludowa - Polish. People's Army) is a military organization created by the Polish Workers' Party by decision of the Home Rada of the People on January 1, 1944 on the basis of the Guards of the People - an underground military organization of the Polish Workers' Party and operating since January 1942. The Army of Lyudov and the Guards of Lyudov, which preceded it, waged a rather active struggle against the Nazi occupiers. Geographically, Ludov's Army was divided into six districts. Organizationally, it consisted of 16 partisan brigades and 20 separate battalions and detachments. Ludov's army fought 120 major battles, destroyed more than 19 thousand Nazi soldiers and officers, and collaborated with Soviet partisan detachments operating in Poland. The Soviet Union helped the Human Army with weapons and other materiel. In July 1944, the Ludov Army (about 60 thousand people) merged with the 1st Polish Army into a single Polish Army.

Ordinary people always suffer from political confrontation within any country, as well as from international political disagreements and conflicts. A great drama for the inhabitants of Warsaw and the entire Polish people was the Warsaw armed uprising of 1944. Short-sighted, to put it mildly, acted the leadership of the Home Army, which prepared this uprising against the Nazi invaders without establishing contact with the Soviet command and the leadership of the People's Army. Yes, the leadership of the Home Army could not do otherwise, following the instructions of the Polish government in exile. The victory of the uprising would enable this government to establish its power in Warsaw, and then in the whole camp.

The uprising, prepared in a hurry and militarily weak, began on August 1, 1944. It quickly took on a mass character, and then the rebels were supported by detachments of the People's Army, not notified in advance of the impending uprising. However, the forces were not equal. The fascist German garrison of Warsaw rushed at the insurgents with all its might. The weakness of the preparations for the uprising was already evident in the first clashes between the rebels and the Germans. The rebels turned to the Soviet Army for help. The Soviet leadership, of course, did not want such a turn of affairs that, as a result of the victory of the Warsaw Uprising, the former bourgeois-landowner power was established in Poland. Therefore, Stalin did not immediately respond to the appeal of the Poles for help. But in order to create the appearance of helping the rebels, he ordered them to drop weapons, ammunition and other necessary equipment on airplanes. The order was carried out, but, unfortunately, a significant part of the dropped weapons fell into the hands of the Germans. It was impossible to do more, since the Soviet troops could not yet take Warsaw by storm. Warsaw was liberated from the Nazi occupation by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front with the participation of the 1st Army of the Polish Army only on January 17, 1945.

After fierce fighting, the rebels were defeated. The leadership of the Home Army withdrew the remnants of the troops and signed the surrender on the terms dictated by the Nazi command. This event took place on October 2, 1944. As a result of hostilities on the part of the rebels, about 200 thousand people died, and Warsaw received severe destruction.

© A.I. Kalanov, V.A. Kalanov,
"Knowledge is power"

The Polish campaign of the Red Army in 1939 was overgrown with an incredible amount of interpretations and gossip. The invasion of Poland was announced both as the start of a world war jointly with Germany, and as a stab in the back of Poland. Meanwhile, if we consider the events of September 1939 without anger and passion, quite a clear logic is found in the actions of the Soviet state.

Relations between the Soviet state and Poland were not cloudless from the very beginning. During the Civil War, Poland, which gained independence, claimed not only its own territories, but at the same time Ukraine and Belarus. The fragile peace in the 1930s did not bring friendly relations. On the one hand, the USSR was preparing for a world revolution, on the other hand, Poland had huge ambitions in the international arena. Warsaw had far-reaching plans to expand its own territory, and besides, it feared both the USSR and Germany. Polish underground organizations fought against the German Freikorps in Silesia and Poznan, Pilsudski recaptured Vilna from Lithuania with armed force.

The coldness in relations between the USSR and Poland grew into open hostility after the Nazis came to power in Germany. Warsaw reacted surprisingly calmly to the changes in its neighbor, believing that Hitler did not pose a real threat. On the contrary, they planned to use the Reich to implement their own geopolitical projects.

The year 1938 was decisive for Europe's turn to a big war. The history of the Munich Agreement is well known and does not do honor to its participants. Hitler delivered an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, demanding that the Sudetenland on the German-Polish border be handed over to Germany. The USSR was ready to defend Czechoslovakia even alone, but did not have a common border with Germany. A corridor was required along which Soviet troops could enter Czechoslovakia. However, Poland flatly refused to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory.

During the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis, Warsaw successfully made its own acquisition by annexing a small Teszyn region (805 sq. Km, 227 thousand inhabitants). Now, however, clouds were gathering over Poland itself.

Hitler created a state that was very dangerous for its neighbors, but it was precisely in his power that his weakness consisted. The fact is that the exceptionally rapid growth of the German military machine threatened to undermine its own economy. The Reich needed to continuously absorb other states and cover the costs of its military development at someone else's expense, otherwise it would be in danger of complete collapse. The Third Reich, despite all its external monumentality, was a cyclopean financial pyramid needed to service its own army. Only war could save the Nazi regime.

We clear the battlefield

In the case of Poland, the Polish corridor, which separated Germany proper from East Prussia, became the reason for the claims. Communication with the exclave was maintained only by sea. In addition, the Germans wanted to reconsider in their favor the status of the city and the Baltic port of Danzig with its German population and the status of a "free city" under the patronage of the League of Nations.

Such a rapid collapse of the existing tandem, of course, did not please Warsaw. However, the Polish government counted on a successful diplomatic resolution of the conflict, and if it failed, then on a military victory. At the same time, Poland confidently torpedoed Britain's attempt to form a united front against the Nazis, including England itself, France, Poland and the USSR. The Polish Foreign Ministry stated that they refused to sign any document jointly with the USSR, and from the Kremlin, on the contrary, they announced that they would not enter into any alliances aimed at protecting Poland without its consent. During a conversation with People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, the Polish ambassador announced that Poland would turn to the USSR for help "when needed."

However, the Soviet Union intended to secure its interests in Eastern Europe. There was no doubt in Moscow that a big war was being planned. However, the USSR in this conflict had a very vulnerable position. The key centers of the Soviet state were too close to the border. Leningrad was under attack from two sides at once: from Finland and Estonia, Minsk and Kyiv were dangerously close to the Polish borders. Of course, we were not talking about fears directly from Estonia or Poland. However, in the Soviet Union it was believed that they could be successfully used as a springboard for an attack on the USSR by a third force (and by 1939 it was quite obvious what kind of force it was). Stalin and his entourage were well aware that the country would have to fight Germany, and would like to get the most advantageous positions before the inevitable clash.

Of course, a much better choice would have been a joint action against Hitler with the Western powers. This option, however, was firmly blocked by Poland's resolute rejection of any contact. True, there was one more obvious option: an agreement with France and Britain, bypassing Poland. An Anglo-French delegation flew to the Soviet Union for negotiations...

... and it quickly became clear that the Allies had nothing to offer Moscow. Stalin and Molotov were primarily interested in the question of what kind of joint action plan could be proposed by the British and French, both regarding joint actions and regarding the Polish question. Stalin feared (and rightly so) that the USSR might be left alone before the Nazis. Therefore, the Soviet Union went on a controversial move - an agreement with Hitler. On August 23, a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany, which determined the spheres of interest in Europe.

As part of the famous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the USSR planned to win time and secure a foreground in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the Soviets spoke out an essential condition - the transition to the sphere of interests of the USSR of the eastern part of Poland, which is also western Ukraine and Belarus.

The dismemberment of Russia is at the heart of Polish policy in the East... The main goal is the weakening and defeat of Russia."

Meanwhile, the reality was radically different from the plans of the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, Marshal Rydz-Smigly. The Germans left only weak barriers against England and France, while they themselves attacked Poland with their main forces from several sides. The Wehrmacht was indeed the advanced army of its time, the Germans also outnumbered the Poles, so that for a short time the main forces of the Polish army were surrounded west of Warsaw. Already after the first week of the war, the Polish army began to retreat chaotically in all areas, part of the forces were surrounded. On September 5, the government left Warsaw towards the border. The main command left for Brest and lost contact with most of the troops. After the 10th, there was simply no centralized control of the Polish army. On September 16, the Germans reached Bialystok, Brest and Lvov.

At that moment, the Red Army entered Poland. The thesis about a stab in the back against fighting Poland does not stand up to the slightest criticism: there was no longer any "back". Actually, only the fact of advancing towards the Red Army stopped the German maneuvers. At the same time, the parties did not have any plans for joint actions, no joint operations were conducted. The Red Army soldiers occupied the territory, disarming the Polish units that came across. On the night of September 17, the Ambassador of Poland in Moscow was handed a note of approximately the same content. Leaving aside the rhetoric, it remains to recognize the fact: the only alternative to the invasion of the Red Army was the seizure of the eastern territories of Poland by Hitler. The Polish army did not offer organized resistance. Accordingly, the only party whose interests were actually infringed is the Third Reich. The modern public, worried about the perfidy of the Soviets, should not forget that in fact Poland could no longer act as a separate party, it did not have the strength to do so.

It should be noted that the entry of the Red Army into Poland was accompanied by great disorder. The resistance of the Poles was episodic. However, confusion and a large number of non-combat losses accompanied this march. During the assault on Grodno, 57 Red Army soldiers were killed. In total, the Red Army lost, according to various sources, from 737 to 1475 people dead and took 240 thousand prisoners.

The German government immediately stopped the advance of its troops. A few days later, the demarcation line was determined. At the same time, a crisis arose in the Lviv region. Soviet troops clashed with German ones, and on both sides there were wrecked equipment and human casualties.

On September 22, the 29th tank brigade of the Red Army entered Brest, occupied by the Germans. Those at that time, without much success, stormed the fortress, which had not yet become "the one". The piquancy of the moment was that the Germans transferred Brest and the fortress to the Red Army right along with the Polish garrison that had settled inside.

Interestingly, the USSR could have pushed even deeper into Poland, but Stalin and Molotov chose not to.

Ultimately, the Soviet Union acquired a territory of 196 thousand square meters. km. (half of the territory of Poland) with a population of up to 13 million people. On September 29, the Polish campaign of the Red Army actually ended.

Then the question arose about the fate of the prisoners. In total, counting both the military and civilians, the Red Army and the NKVD detained up to 400 thousand people. Some part (mainly officers and policemen) were subsequently executed. Most of those captured were either sent home or sent through third countries to the west, after which they formed the "Army of Anders" as part of the Western coalition. Soviet power was established on the territory of western Belarus and Ukraine.

The Western allies reacted to the events in Poland without any enthusiasm. However, no one cursed the USSR and branded it an aggressor. Winston Churchill, with his characteristic rationalism, said:

- Russia is pursuing a cold policy of self-interest. We would have preferred the Russian armies to stand in their present positions as friends and allies of Poland rather than as invaders. But in order to protect Russia from the Nazi threat, it was clearly necessary that the Russian armies stand on this line.

What did the Soviet Union really gain? The Reich was not the most honored negotiating partner, but the war would have started anyway - with or without a pact. As a result of the intervention in Poland, the USSR received an extensive background for a future war. In 1941, the Germans passed it quickly - but what would have happened if they had started 200-250 kilometers to the east? Then, probably, Moscow would have remained with the Germans in the rear.

Background of the Soviet-Polish war of 1939

Russian-Polish relations over the centuries have developed very difficult. No fundamental change took place after the October Revolution, when Soviet Russia welcomed the declaration of Poland's independence. In the 20-30s. these relations did not have a stable character, old prejudices and stereotypes affected.

In 1932, a non-aggression pact was signed between the USSR and Poland, which recognized that the peace treaty of 1921 still remains the basis of their mutual relations and obligations. The parties renounced war as an instrument of national policy, pledged to refrain from aggressive actions or attacks on each other separately or jointly with other powers. Such actions recognized "any act of violence that violates the integrity and inviolability of the territory or political independence" of the other side. At the end of 1938, both governments reaffirmed that the non-aggression pact of 1932, extended in 1934 until 1945, is the basis of peaceful relations between countries.

However, the outwardly peaceful nature of Soviet policy actually covered up the notorious confrontational nature of the Soviet policy of the Soviet leadership in the 1920s–1930s. regarding Poland. Significantly exacerbated mutual distrust in these years and the failed attempt to establish a Soviet regime in Poland during the Soviet-Polish war, and the results of the Riga Peace Treaty, and the activities of the Comintern aimed at destabilizing the internal political situation in Poland and preparing a pro-communist coup. It is impossible not to take into account the presence of insurmountable ideological contradictions.

Until 1939, the Soviet leadership considered Poland a springboard used by European states for subversive activities against the USSR and a possible military attack. The development of Polish-English, and then Polish-German relations was seen as a potential threat to the security of the USSR. However, Poland itself was perceived as an adversary. The Polish secret services, sometimes in cooperation with the British, carried out active intelligence activities to identify military potential, both in the border regions and in the deep regions of the Soviet Union. The understandable desire of the leadership of Poland, which had recently experienced a massive invasion of the Red Army, to have reliable information about possible Soviet military preparations, was perceived in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks as Yu. Pilsudsky's preparation of aggressive actions against the USSR.

In our opinion, during that period, those special reports of Soviet intelligence residents from Poland were not always correctly perceived, in which the real situation was most adequately reflected. So, for example, at the beginning of 1937, S. Shpigelglas, deputy head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, drew the following conclusion from the report of the Othello source: “The report is undoubtedly interesting. It is replete with facts that are confirmed by other documents. The main idea of ​​the report: Poland is not an aggressor, she is eager to maintain neutrality with the help of England - maneuvering between the USSR, Germany, France - may turn out to be disinformation. This is the danger of the report.” As you can see, the Polish state was clearly seen as a potential adversary. Obviously, this is one of the main reasons for the fact that among the victims of mass repressions of the era of the Great Terror, a very significant proportion were Poles and people accused of having links with Poland.

In 1934-1935. a number of factors led to the intensification of repressions against persons of Polish nationality, and, above all, against representatives of the KPP and its autonomous organizations - the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) and the Communist Party of Western Belarus (KPZB). The repressive policy was reflected in the general change in the attitude of the USSR towards the communist movement: it was in 1935 that the 7th Congress of the Comintern staked on the creation of a united workers' front, thereby recognizing that the policy of relying only on the Communist Parties of the countries of the world, including Poland, had failed. The attitude of the Soviet leadership towards Poland and the Poles was also hardened by the successful actions of the Polish secret services to curb the subversive activities of the Comintern. The Polish-German agreement of 1934 and G. Goering's visit to Poland caused particular irritation of the Soviet leadership.

From the first months of 1936, purges began among political emigrants. In the process of preparing a special resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on political emigrants, special attention was paid to the Polish communists. Preparation for mass repressions against people of Polish nationality was manifested not only in the registration of political emigrants. In the period preceding the Great Terror, about 35% of those arrested throughout the country allegedly for espionage were accused of belonging to Polish intelligence agencies: in 1935 out of 6409 arrested - 2253, and in 1936 out of 3669 - 1275.

The change at the beginning of 1936 in the attitude towards immigrants from other countries, primarily from Poland, was reflected in the “purge” not only of the Comintern apparatus, one of the instruments of the USSR’s foreign policy, but also of the NKVD apparatus, the most important instrument for implementing domestic policy. In organizing the campaign against the Poles (in particular, employees of the NKVD bodies), the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, chairman of the Party Control Commission N. I. Yezhov, who skillfully aroused Stalin's manic suspicion, played a huge role. Yezhov, who in September 1936 replaced Yagoda as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, sharply intensified the campaign against Polish espionage.

On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded, on September 28, 1939, an agreement on friendship and borders, and secret protocols to them. These documents were directly related to the fate of the Polish state.

The entry of Soviet troops into the eastern provinces of Poland and their advance to the line of the Narew-Vistula-San rivers were, in principle, predetermined by the content of the secret protocol of August 23. But the German side was naturally interested in joint operations with the Red Army from the very beginning of the war against Poland.

The high command of the German army admitted the possibility of Soviet troops entering Poland, but did not know its timing. As for the commanders in the army in the field, and especially the commanders of the advanced units, they were completely unoriented in the general situation and planned their actions to the depth of the border with the Soviet Union.

Using the delay in the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Poland, the German command from September 1 (the date of the attack of fascist Germany on Poland) to September 16 advanced its troops up to 200 km east of the agreed Narew-Vistula-San line. The movement of German troops to the twice-changing line of "state interests" on the territory of Poland was completed only on October 14, 1939.

There was a real danger of interference in the events of the Western powers. Chamberlain and Halifax publicly announced on 24 August that Britain would fight for Poland. This position became known to the Soviet government the very next day, when the British Foreign Secretary and the Polish ambassador in London signed a pact establishing that the parties would assist each other in the event of an attack by a third country. Stalin and Molotov could not but understand the consequences if the Soviet Union intervened from the very beginning and the German-Polish conflict on the side of Germany. To Ribbentrop's inquiry, Molotov replied through Schulenburg that the Soviet Union would begin concrete actions at the appropriate time, but “we believe, however, that this time has not yet come. We may be mistaken, but it seems to us that excessive haste can harm us and help unite our enemies.

The Soviet leadership had to wait until the final clarification of the situation in Poland. Only on September 17, 1939 at 05:40 did the Soviet troops cross the Soviet-Polish border.

Military campaign of Soviet troops against Poland

A fairly large grouping of Soviet troops was created for the Polish operation.

By the evening of September 16, the troops of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts were deployed in the initial areas for the offensive. The Soviet group united 8 rifle, 5 cavalry and 2 tank corps, 21 rifle and 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank, 2 motorized brigades and the Dnieper military flotilla (DVF). The air forces of the fronts, taking into account the 1st, 2nd and 3rd special-purpose aviation armies relocated to their territory on September 9-10, totaled 3,298 aircraft. In addition, about 16.5 thousand border guards of the Belarusian and Kiev border districts served on the border.

On the eastern border of Poland, apart from 25 battalions and 7 squadrons of the border guard (about 12 thousand people, or 8 soldiers per 1 km of the border), there were practically no other troops, which was well known to Soviet intelligence. So, according to intelligence data of the 4th Army, “the border strip to the river. Shara is not busy with field wars, and the KOP battalions are weak in their combat training and combat effectiveness ... Serious resistance from the Polish army to the river. It is unlikely to expect a shchar from the Poles.” At 05:00 on September 17, the forward and assault detachments of the Soviet armies and border troops crossed the border and defeated the Polish border guard. Crossing the border confirmed the data of Soviet intelligence about the absence of significant groupings of Polish troops, which made it possible to accelerate the offensive.

For the Polish leadership, the intervention of the USSR was completely unexpected. Polish intelligence did not record any threatening movements of the Red Army, and the information received on September 1-5 was perceived as an understandable reaction to the outbreak of war in Europe. And although on September 12 information was received from Paris about a possible action by the USSR against Poland, they were not taken seriously.

The behavior of the Soviet troops also seemed strange - as a rule, they did not shoot first, they treated the Polish troops with demonstrative goodwill, treated them to cigarettes and said that they had come to the aid against the Germans. On the ground, they waited for the instructions of the commander-in-chief. At first, the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, Rydz-Smigly, was inclined to give the order to repel the Soviet invasion. However, a closer examination of the situation showed that there are no forces, except for the KOP battalions and a certain number of rear and spare parts of the army, in Eastern Poland. These weakly armed troops had no chance in battle with the Red Army. As a result, on September 17, the Polish leadership was faced with a fait accompli and, based on the statements of the Soviet government and its note, believed that the Red Army was introduced in order to limit the zone of German occupation. Therefore, at about 23.40 on September 17, the order of Rydz-Smigly was transmitted by radio: “The Soviets have invaded. I order to carry out a withdrawal to Romania and Hungary by the shortest routes. Do not conduct hostilities with the Soviets, only in the event of an attempt on their part to disarm our units. The task for Warsaw and Modlin, which must defend themselves against the Germans, is unchanged. The units to which the Soviets have approached must negotiate with them in order to withdraw the garrisons to Romania or Hungary. Only units of the KOP, retreating from Zbruch to the Dniester, and units covering the "Romanian suburb" were ordered to continue resistance.

Of course, the Polish command had a plan for the deployment of troops on the eastern border - "Vskhud", which was developed from 1935-1936. On the eastern border, it was planned to deploy all available forces of the Polish Army. Of course, in the real situation of the second half of September 1939, when Poland spent all the available defense potential on attempts to continue resisting Nazi Germany, which was superior to the Poles in manpower and equipment and had already practically won the war, this whole plan remained on paper.

On the right flank of the Belorussian Front of the Red Army, from the Latvian border to Begoml, the 3rd Army was deployed, which had the task of reaching the Sharkovshchina-Dunilovichi-Lake Lake by the end of the first day of the offensive. Blyada - Yablontsy, and the next day to the front, Sventsyany, Mikhalishki and then move on to Vilna. The main blow was dealt by the right wing of the army, where the troops of the 4th Rifle Corps and the mobile group of the 24th Cavalry Division and the 22nd Tank Brigade were concentrated under the command of the divisional commander of the 24th brigade commander P. Akhlyustin.

To the south of the 3rd Army, on the front from Begoml to Ivanets, the troops of the 11th Army were deployed, which had the task of taking Molodechno, Volozhin by the end of September 17, the next day - Oshmyany, Ivye and moving further to Grodno. Having crossed the border at 5 o'clock on September 17, the 6th tank brigade occupied Volozhin at 12 o'clock, formations of the 16th rifle corps at the same time entered Krasnoe, and by 19 o'clock they reached Molodechno, Benzovets. The formations of the 3rd Cavalry Corps had already reached the area of ​​​​Rachinety, Poryche, Marshalka by 15 o'clock, and on the morning of September 18 they moved further towards Lida, reaching the front of Rynoviche, Constanta, Voishtoviche by 10 o'clock. At this time, the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 6th Tank Brigade were tasked with advancing on Vilna, which they were ordered to occupy.

At that time, only insignificant Polish units were in Vilna: about 16 infantry battalions (about 7 thousand soldiers and 14 thousand militia) with 14 light guns. However, the Polish command in Vilna did not have a general attitude towards the Bolshevik invasion. At 9 o'clock on September 18, the commander of the garrison, Colonel Ya. Okulich-Kozarin, gave the order: “We are not at war with the Bolsheviks, units, by additional order, will leave Vilna and cross the Lithuanian border; non-combat units can start leaving the city, combat units remain in position, but cannot fire without an order. However, since some of the officers took this order as treason, and rumors spread in the city about a coup in Germany and a declaration of war by Romania and Hungary, Colonel Okulich-Kozarin around 16.30 decided to refrain from issuing an order to retreat until 20 hours.

Around 19.10, the commander of the 2nd battalion, deployed on the southern and southwestern outskirts of the city, Lieutenant Colonel S. Shileiko reported on the appearance of Soviet tanks and asked if he could open fire. While Okulich-Kozarin gave the order to open fire, while this order was transmitted to the troops, 8 tanks had already passed the first line of defense and reserve units were sent to fight them. At about 20 o'clock Okulich-Kozarin ordered the troops to withdraw from the city and sent Lieutenant Colonel T. Podvysotsky to the location of the Soviet troops in order to notify them that the Polish side did not want to fight them and demand that they leave the city. After that, Okulich-Kozarin himself left Vilna, and Podvysotsky, who returned at about 21:00, decided to defend the city and at about 21:45 issued an order to suspend the withdrawal of troops. At that time, uncoordinated battles were going on in the city, in which the Vilna Polish youth played an important role. The teacher G. Osinskiy organized volunteer teams of gymnasium students who took up positions on the hills. The oldest ones fired, the rest delivered ammunition, organized communications, etc.

Approaching at about 19.30 on September 18 to Vilna, the 8th and 7th tank regiments started a battle for the southern part of the city. The 8th tank regiment broke into the southern part of the city at 20.30. The 7th Panzer Regiment, which ran into a stubborn defense, was able to enter the southwestern part of the city only at dawn. Due to the stubborn defense, the city was taken only the next day.

While all these turbulent events were taking place in the Vilna region, the troops of the 16th Rifle Corps of the 11th Army were turned to the northwest and moved towards Lida.

While the troops of the 3rd and 11th armies occupied the northeastern part of Western Belarus, to the south, on the front from Fanipol to Nesvizh, units of the KMG went on the offensive, with the task of reaching Lyubcha and Kirin on the first day of the offensive, and the next day to force the river. Keep quiet and move to Volkovysk. The 15th Panzer Corps, advancing on the southern flank of the group, crossed the border at 0500 and, breaking the slight resistance of the Polish border guards, moved west. By the evening of September 17, the 27th tank brigade crossed the river. Servech, 2nd tank brigade - r. Usha, and the 20th Motorized Brigade was pulling up to the border. At about 4 p.m. on September 18, the 2nd Tank Brigade entered Slonim.

In Grodno there were insignificant forces of Polish troops: 2 improvised battalions and an assault company of the reserve center of the 29th Infantry Division, the 31st guard battalion, 5 platoons of positional artillery (5 guns), 2 anti-aircraft machine gun companies, a two-battalion detachment of Colonel Zh. Blumsky, the national defense battalion "Poctavy", the dismounted 32nd division of the Podlasie cavalry brigade, there were a lot of gendarmerie and police in the city. The commander of the "Grodno" district, Colonel B. Adamovich, was determined to evacuate units to Lithuania. On September 18, riots took place in the city in connection with the release of prisoners from the city prison and the anti-Polish speech of local "red" activists. Soviet troops were expected from the east, but they approached the city from the south, which was beneficial for the defenders, since the right bank of the Neman was steep.

Only as fuel arrived, units of the 15th Panzer Corps began to move towards Grodno in peculiar waves from 07:00 on September 20. At 1300, 50 tanks of the 27th Tank Brigade approached the southern outskirts of Grodno. The tankers attacked the enemy on the move and by the evening occupied the southern part of the city, reaching the banks of the Neman. Several tanks managed to break through the bridge to the north bank in the city center. However, without infantry support, the tanks were attacked by soldiers, policemen and youths, who used a few guns and Molotov cocktails. As a result, some of the tanks were destroyed, and some were taken back beyond the Neman. The 27th Tank Brigade, with the support of the 119th Rifle Regiment of the 13th Rifle Division, which arrived at 18:00, occupied the southern part of the city. A group of junior lieutenant Shaikhuddinov, with the help of local workers, crossed in boats to the right bank of the Neman, 2 km east of the city. On the other side, battles began for cemeteries, where machine-gun nests were equipped. During the night battle, the 119th regiment managed to gain a foothold on the right bank and reach the approaches to the eastern outskirts of the city.

By the morning of September 21, the 101st Rifle Regiment approached, which also crossed to the right bank and deployed north of the 119th Regiment. From 6 o'clock on September 21, the regiments, reinforced by 4 guns and 2 tanks, attacked the city and by 12 o'clock, despite the counterattacks of the Poles, they reached the railway line, and by 14 o'clock they reached the center of Grodno, but by evening they were again withdrawn to the outskirts. In these battles, the regiments were supported by a motorized group of the 16th Rifle Corps, which, after spending the night on the highway a few kilometers from Skidel, moved towards Grodno at dawn on September 21. Approaching the city, the tanks suppressed firing points on its eastern outskirts, which provided support to the 119th and 101st rifle regiments. The attack of the city from the east was successful, but after crossing the railway line, the main forces of the rifle units again retreated to the outskirts. As a result, the tanks were forced to fight alone.

In the second echelon behind KM G, the troops of the 10th Army advanced, which on September 19 crossed the border with the task of reaching the front of Novogrudok, Gorodishche and moving further to the Palace. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 10th Army reached the line of the river. Neman and Usha. Continuing the slow advance in the second echelon of the Belorussian Front, by the end of September 20, the army troops reached the Naliboki, Derevna, Mir line, where they received the task of advancing to the Sokulka front. Bolshaya Berestovitsa, Svisloch, Novy Dvor, Pruzhany. In the evening, by order of the commander of the Belorussian Front No. 04 of the army, the troops of the 5th rifle, 6th cavalry and 15th tank corps were subordinated. However, during the negotiations between the commanders of the 10th Army, KMG and the Belorussian Front on September 21, it was decided to leave the 6th Cavalry and 15th Tank Corps as part of the KMR.

On the front of the 4th Army, which had the task of advancing on Baranovichi with access to the line of Snov, Zhilichi by the end of the first day of the operation, the offensive began at 5 o'clock in the morning on September 17. At 22:00, the 29th Tank Brigade occupied Baranovichi and the fortified area located here, which was not occupied by Polish troops. The tank battalion under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky was the first to enter the city. Up to 5 thousand Polish soldiers were captured in the Baranovichi region, 4 anti-tank guns and 2 food echelons became Soviet trophies.

The 29th tank brigade, which remained on the outskirts of Pruzhany, on September 20 was engaged in a technical inspection of tanks and conducted reconnaissance in the direction of Brest. Vidomlya had contact with the German units. As the brigade commander S. M. Krivoshey later recalled, “the intelligence sent forward under the command of Vladimir Yulianovich Borovitsky, secretary of the party commission of the brigade, soon returned with a dozen soldiers and officers of the German motorized corps of General Guderian, who managed to occupy the city of Brest. Not having precise instructions on how to deal with the Germans, I asked the chief of staff to contact the commander [Chuikov], and I myself engaged in a non-committal conversation with the commissar. The conversation took place in Lenin's tent, where, along with indicators of combat training and the growth of the industrial power of our country, posters were hanging on folding portable stands calling for the destruction of fascism. Many Germans had cameras. After looking around, they asked permission to photograph the tent and those present in it. One of them took a picture of us with the commissar in a group of German officers against the background of an anti-fascist poster.

Having fed the Germans with rich Russian borscht and kara shish kebab (the guests ate all this with enviable zeal), we sent them home, instructing them to convey “warm greetings” to General Guderian. The brigade commander forgot to mention that during dinner the brigade band played several marches.

Troops of the 23rd Rifle Corps were deployed in Polesie, who were forbidden to cross the border until further notice. The appeal of the corps commander to the Military Council of the Belorussian Front with a request to go on the offensive along with the rest of the troops of the front was rejected. As a result, the corps crossed the border at 16.25 on September 18. At 11 a.m. on September 19, the advance detachment of the 52nd Infantry Division occupied Lakhva. Moving on, the Soviet troops in Kozhan-Gorodok were fired upon by a detachment of the 16th battalion of the KOP. Having turned around, the units entered the battle and soon pushed the Poles into the forest north of Kozhan-Gorodok. During the battle, the Soviet units lost 3 people killed and 4 wounded. 85 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner, 3 of them were wounded and 4 were killed. At about 5 p.m., the 205th Infantry Regiment with the 1st Battalion of the 158th Artillery Regiment occupied David-Gorodok after a small battle. At 19.30, units of the 52nd Infantry Division occupied Luninets. In the meantime, the ships of the Soviet Dnieper flotilla reached the mouth of the Goryn River, where they were forced to stop due to shallows and flooded Polish ships.

The troops of the Ukrainian Front also crossed the Polish border on September 17 and began to move deep into Poland. On the northern flank, on the front from Olevsk to Yampol, the troops of the 5th Army deployed, which was tasked with "delivering a powerful and lightning strike against the Polish troops, resolutely and quickly advancing in the direction of Rovno." The 60th Infantry Division, which had the task of advancing on Sarny, concentrated in the Olevsk area. In the area of ​​​​Gorodnitsa - Korets, the troops of the 15th rifle corps deployed, which had the immediate task of reaching the river. Goryn, and by the end of September 17, take Rovno. The 8th Rifle Corps, deployed in the Ostrog-Slavuta region, was supposed to take Dubno by the end of the day. On September 18, both corps were to occupy Lutsk and move towards Vladimir-Volynsky.

By the end of September 22, the troops of the 5th Army reached the line Kovel - Rozhitsa - Vladimir-Volynsky - Ivanichi. To the south, on the Teofipol-Voytovtsy front, the troops of the 6th Army deployed, with the task of advancing on Tarnopol, Ezerna and Kozova, later reaching the Buek-Przemyshlyany front and further on to Lvov.

At 04:00 on September 17, an assault group of border guards and Red Army soldiers captured the Volochinsky border bridge. At 04:30, the troops of the 17th Rifle Corps launched an artillery strike on enemy firing points and strongholds, and at 05:00 they began to force the river. Zbruch, using the captured bridge and established crossings. Forcing the river practically without any resistance from the enemy, units of the 17th Rifle Corps around 8.00 turned into marching columns and moved towards Tarnopol. Mobile formations quickly overtook the infantry and after 1800 on September 17, the 10th tank brigade entered Tarnopol. The 24th tank brigade advancing north of the city with the 136th rifle regiment of the 97th rifle division passed Dobrovody already at 12 o'clock and, bypassing Tarnopol from the north-west, reached its western outskirts at about 22 o'clock and began to clear it from Polish units . At 7 pm, 11 tanks of the 5th Cavalry Division of the 2nd Cavalry Corps entered the city from the north, however, not knowing the situation, the tankers decided to wait until the morning to attack. Having entered Tarnopol, the 5th division had to clean up the city from scattered groups of Polish officers, gendarmes and just the local population. During skirmishes in the city between 10.20 and 14.00 on September 18, the division lost 3 people killed and 37 wounded. At the same time at 10.30 rifle divisions of the 17th rifle corps entered the city. Up to 600 Polish soldiers were taken prisoner.

The formations of the 2nd Cavalry Corps advancing north from the morning of September 18 crossed the river. Seret and at 10.00 received an order from the command of the Ukrainian Front to move to Lvov with a forced march and capture the city.

The consolidated motorized detachment of the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the 24th Tank Brigade with 35 bales approached Lvov at about 02:00 on September 19. After stubborn fighting, the city was taken.

On September 20, the troops of the 12th Army advanced to the Nikolaev-Stryi line. In the Stryi region, at about 1700, contact was made with German troops, who on September 22 handed over the city to the Red Army. On September 23, the 26th tank brigade approached the same place. As a result of the negotiations, the Soviet troops were stopped on the reached line.

At 10.30 on September 21, the headquarters of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts received an order from the People's Commissar of Defense No. 16693, demanding to stop the troops on the line reached by advanced units by 20.00 on September 20. The troops were tasked with bringing up lagging units and rear areas, establishing stable communications, being in a state of full combat readiness, being vigilant and taking measures to protect the rear areas and headquarters. In addition, the command of the Belorussian Front was allowed to continue the offensive in the Suwalki salient. At 22.15 on September 21, the headquarters of the Belorussian and Ukrainian fronts received order No. 156 of the People's Commissar of Defense, which outlined the contents of the Soviet-German protocol and was allowed to start moving west at dawn on September 23. The next day, the Military Council of the Belorussian Front issued the corresponding order No. 05. On September 25, the troops received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 011 and the order of the Military Council of the Belorussian Front No. 06, warning that "when the army moves from the reached line of Augustow - Bialystok - Brest-Litovsk to the west in the territory left by the German army, it is possible that the Poles will crumble collect units into detachments and gangs, which, together with the Polish troops operating near Warsaw, can offer us stubborn resistance and in places deliver counterattacks.

On September 21, the 2nd tank brigade in Sokulka formed a detachment for operations in the Augustow-Suwalki area under the command of Major F.P. Chuvakin, in which there were 470 people, 252 rifles, 74 machine guns, 46 guns, 34 BT tanks - 7, 6 armored vehicles and 34 cars. Moving north, at about 5 o'clock on September 22, at Sopotskin, the detachment caught up with the Poles retreating from Grodno, who hoped to gain a foothold in. old forts of the Grodno fortress, where there were military depots. In the ensuing battle, which lasted up to 10 hours, 11 Red Army soldiers were killed and 14 wounded, 4 tanks and 5 vehicles were hit. The enemy made extensive use of Molotov cocktails, which created significant problems in the conditions of tank operations without infantry cover.

Meanwhile, a detachment of the 27th Tank Brigade of 20 BT-7 tanks and 1 armored vehicle under the command of Major Bogdanov was combing the border line with Lithuania and arrived in Suwalki at 24:00 on September 24.

The troops of the 3rd Army continued to guard the Latvian and Lithuanian borders from Drissa to Druskininkai. The 11th Army began redeployment along the Lithuanian border to Grodno. Formations of the 16th Rifle Corps continued to advance towards Grodno and on September 21 occupied Eishishki. By September 24, the troops of the corps deployed on the Lithuanian and German borders north and northwest of Grodno.

By September 26-28, the troops of the 3rd and 11th armies entrenched themselves on the border with Lithuania and East Prussia from Druskininkai to Shchuchin. Meanwhile, on September 21, at negotiations in Vaukavysk, representatives of the German command and the 6th Cavalry Corps agreed on a procedure for withdrawing the Wehrmacht from Bialystok.

To the north, the 20th motorized brigade operated, transferred to the 10th Army, which on September 25 at 15 o'clock took Osovets from the Germans, on September 26, moving along the bank of the river. Biebrzha, entered the Falcons, and by the evening of September 29 reached Zambruv. On September 27, the forward detachments of the 5th Rifle Corps occupied Nur and Chizhev, and in the area of ​​Gainuyka, parts of the corps again stumbled upon a Polish warehouse, where about 14 thousand shells, 5 million rounds of ammunition, 1 tankette, 2 armored vehicles, 2 vehicles and 2 barrels of fuel.

On the southern sector of the front, the troops of the 4th Army moved to the west. At 3 p.m. on September 22, the 29th Tank Brigade entered Brest, which was occupied by the troops of the 19th Motorized Corps of the Wehrmacht. As Krivoshey later recalled, in negotiations with General G. Guderian, he proposed the following parade procedure: “At 4 p.m., parts of your corps in a marching column, with standards in front, leave the city, my units, also in a marching column, enter the city, stop at streets where the German regiments pass, and salute the passing units with their banners. Bands perform military marches. In the end, Guderian, who insisted on holding a full-fledged parade with preliminary formation, agreed to the proposed option, "having stipulated, however, that he would stand with me on the podium and greet the passing units."

By September 29, the troops of the Belorussian Front advanced to the line Shchuchin - Staviski - Lomza - Zambruv - Tsekhanovets - Kosuv-Latski - Sokoluv-Podlaski - Siedlce - Lukow - Vohyn. On October 1, the commander of the 4th Army, Divisional Commander Chuikov, issued an order, which demanded that “with the forward detachments, there should be one commander of the headquarters and political department for negotiating with the German troops.”

By the end of September 29, the troops of the Ukrainian Front were on the line Pugachev - Piaski - Piotrkuv - Krzemen - Bilgoraj - Przemysl - the upper reaches of the river. San.

Here we should dwell on another side of the Polish campaign of the Red Army, associated with various military crimes of Soviet military personnel. Lynching, looting and robbery as manifestations of the class struggle were not only not persecuted, but even encouraged. Here are some very illustrative examples.

On September 21, having disarmed the Polish troops, units of the 14th Cavalry Division let the soldiers go home, while the officers and gendarmes were left until further notice on the scale in Sasuva. At 7 pm, the prisoners entered the basement of the school, killed a worker who was guarding weapons, and opened fire from the windows. The battalion commissar Ponomarev with the Red Army men suppressed the uprising of the officers and, having arrived at the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division, told about what had happened. At the same time, he expressed the idea that all officers and gendarmes are bastards that need to be destroyed. Impressed by what they heard, on September 22, in the village of Boshevitsy, 4 Red Army soldiers, under various pretexts, took 4 captured officers from the custody of the people's militia and shot them.

On September 22, during the battles for Grodno, at about 10 o'clock, the commander of the communications platoon, junior lieutenant Dubovik, received an order to escort 80-90 prisoners to the rear. Having moved 1.5-2 km from the city, Dubovik interrogated the prisoners in order to identify the officers and persons who took part in the murder of the Bolsheviks. Promising to release the prisoners, he sought confessions and shot 29 people. The rest of the prisoners were returned to Grodno. This was known to the command of the 101st Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division, but no action was taken against Dubovik. Moreover, the commander of the 3rd battalion, senior lieutenant Tolochko, gave a direct order to shoot the officers.

On September 21, the Military Council of the 6th Army, represented by Commander Commander Golikov and a member of the Military Council, Brigadier Commissar Zakharychev, while in parts of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, issued an obviously criminal decision on the production and procedure for lynching - the execution of 10 people (surnames are not indicated in the decision). On this basis, the head of the special department of the 2nd cavalry corps, Koberniuk, went to the city of Zlochow, arrested various employees of the Polish prison, police, etc., such as Klimetsky V.V., according to the position of head. prison, Kuchmirovsky K. B., pom. early prison, Lukashevsky M.S., vice city prosecutor. Plakht I. - an official of the beaten headman and others in the amount of 10 people, and all these persons, at the expense of the limit established by the Military Council of the 6th Army, was shot in the prison building. This lynching was attended by ordinary employees of the prison. This criminal decision of the Military Council on lynching was quickly passed on to the leading circles of commanders and commissars of formations and units of the 2nd cavalry corps, and this led to grave consequences when a number of commanders, military commissars and even Red Army soldiers, following the example of their leaders, began to lynch prisoners, suspicious detainees and etc.

Noteworthy is the question of what tasks were assigned to the troops during the action in Poland. For example, the commander of the troops of the Ukrainian Front, Army Commander 1st Rank Semyon Timoshenko, in an order noted that "the Polish government of landowners and generals dragged the peoples of Poland into an adventurous war." Approximately the same was said in the order of the commander of the troops of the Belorussian Front, commander of the 2nd rank Kovalev. They contained an appeal to the population to turn "their weapons against the landowners and capitalists", but said nothing about the fate of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. This was apparently due to the fact that after the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, the Soviet government never raised the question of reuniting the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. But in subsequent documents, such a task of the troops as saving the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples from the threat of "ruin and beating" from enemies was noted, it was emphasized that Soviet troops were going to Poland not as conquerors, but as liberators of Belarusians, Ukrainians and working people of Poland.

The actions of the Red Army on the territory of Poland lasted 12 days. During this time, the troops advanced 250-300 km and occupied a territory with a total area of ​​​​over 190 thousand square meters. km with a population of more than 12 million people, including more than 6 million Ukrainians and about 3 million Belarusians.

Partition of the Polish territories by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany

After the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Poland, relations between England and France with the Soviet Union sharply escalated. On September 19, an Anglo-French note was received in Moscow, which demanded to stop the advance and withdraw Soviet troops from Poland. Otherwise, the note said, in accordance with the Polish-French alliance treaty, the declaration of war on the Soviet Union could happen automatically.

Stalin and his entourage could not fail to understand that the nature of Soviet-German relations and the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland could make an extremely negative impression on world public opinion. Therefore, in a joint German-Soviet communiqué, adopted at the suggestion of Ribbentrop on September 18, 1939, but published only on September 20, it was said that the goal of the German and Soviet troops was “to restore order and tranquility in Poland, disturbed by the collapse of the Polish state, and to help the population Poland to reorganize the conditions of its state existence.

The Soviet leadership went even further with regard to the “Polish question” during the negotiations and the conclusion of the friendship and border treaty of September 28, 1939. These negotiations, dedicated to clarifying the border of the “state interests” of the USSR and Germany on the territory of Poland, began at the initiative of the Soviet side. On September 20, Schulenburg informed Ribbentrop that, in Molotov's opinion, the time had come to jointly decide the fate of Poland and that Stalin was inclined to divide it along the Tissa-Narew-Vistula-San line: "The Soviet government wishes to immediately resolve this issue at negotiations in Moscow with the participation of the highest statesmen of both countries. In a reply telegram to Molotov on September 23, Ribbentrop said that "the Russian point of view on the passage of the future border along four rivers is acceptable." The atmosphere in which the negotiations took place in Moscow is testified by Ribbentrop himself, who said that in the Kremlin he "felt like he was among the old party genosses."

The adopted document established the border of the "state interests" of both states on the territory of Poland, although in the German-Soviet communique of September 22, 1939 it was also called the "demarcation line between the German and Soviet armies" and was supposed to run much east of the line agreed on August 23 1939

It is interesting to note that both texts of the treaty - in German and Russian - were recognized as authentic. But at the same time, it becomes incomprehensible why in the title of the treaty in German the word "friendship" is placed after the word "border", and in the text in Russian - on the contrary. Is this really due to the difference in style between the two languages, or is there a political implication here: that Stalin was more interested in the “friendship” he offered than Hitler?

In one confidential and two secret protocols attached to the September 28 treaty, some territorial changes were specified in the strip from the Baltic to the Black Seas. In particular, the territory of Lithuania was included in the sphere of "state interests" of the USSR, and the territory of Lublin and part of the Warsaw voivodeships fell into the sphere of "state interests" of Germany. The parties also agreed that they would stop the actions of the Polish population directed against the other side.

In the treaty of September 28 there is not a word about the right of the Polish people to state existence; the "reorganization" of Poland announced in it is considered only from the point of view of the "further development of friendly relations" between the USSR and Germany.

Some Soviet studies claim that the Soviet leadership decisively prevented the advance of German troops east of the agreed border line with the Soviet Union. However, in the light of the German documents, a different picture emerges. So, as early as September 5, 1939, Molotov informed Ribbentrop that the Soviet leadership understood that “in the course of operations, one of the parties or both parties may be forced to temporarily cross the demarcation line between their spheres of influence, but such cases should not interfere with the direct implementation of the planned plan. ". On September 15, Ribbentrop informed Molotov for the second time that Germany was bound by demarcation spheres of influence in Poland and therefore would welcome the early action of the Red Army, which "will free us from the need to destroy the remnants of the Polish army, pursuing them all the way to the Russian border."

In Berlin, at the beginning of hostilities, the idea arose of the possibility of creating, as a buffer, somewhere in the zone between the lines of interests of Germany and the USSR, a "residual Polish state." On this issue, General Halder wrote in his diary on September 7: “The Poles propose to start negotiations. We are ready for them on the following terms: Poland's break with England and France; the remainder of Poland will be kept; areas from Narew to Warsaw - Poland; industrial area - to us; Krakow - Poland; the northern outskirts of the Beskydy - to us; regions of Western Ukraine are independent”. As is clear from the entry dated September 10, the German leadership prepared a special appeal to the population of Western Ukraine, in which they promised them an "independent state" under the auspices of Germany.

Ribbentrop also spoke about the options for dismembering Poland on September 12. With reference to Hitler, he stated that with this version of the “solution of the Polish question”, it would be possible, if necessary, to negotiate the conclusion of an “Eastern peace”. At the same time, Ribbentrop did not rule out the option that would provide for the dismemberment of Poland into separate constituent parts, including Western Ukraine.

But Hitler did not yet know what would be the position of Stalin and Molotov on this issue. Schulenburg found this out only the next day and informed the Führer that Stalin was resolutely against the preservation of the "Polish residual state" and for the partition of Poland. On September 28, Stalin announced that the dismemberment of areas with a purely Polish population would inevitably cause his desire for national unity, which could lead to friction between the USSR and Germany.

The decision of the German and Soviet governments on September 28 to divide the territory of Poland caused serious concern among the Polish people and officials. Thus, the Polish ambassador in Paris, according to the Havas agency, protested to the French government, calling the Soviet-German treaty a violation of the rights of a sovereign state and people, international obligations and human morality.

The position of the Polish patriots was aggravated by the fact that there was a Soviet-German agreement on cooperation in the fight against Polish agitation. It was not a formal declaration; such cooperation between the military authorities of Germany and the USSR in the Polish campaign, as the German military attache in Moscow, General Kestring, declared, was a reality and proceeded flawlessly at all levels. To establish cooperation between the Gestapo and the NKVD in December 1939 in the city of Zakopane, i.e. in the Polish territory occupied by Germany, a joint training center was established.

After the delegations of the USSR and Germany delimited the border between the "spheres of interest", by mid-October 1939 it was demarcated. Thus, if earlier the border of the USSR with Poland was 1446 km long, then the border with Germany was 1952 km, i.e. 506 km more - from the village of Marinovo (the southern point of the USSR border with Latvia) to the village of Kazachuvka (the northern point on the Soviet-Romanian border). Retaining the oil-bearing region of Lvov-Drogobych, which was occupied by German troops in the first half of September, Stalin undertook to supply Germany from this region with 300,000 tons of oil annually.

On September 21, a secret protocol was signed, according to which, in particular, the German command was obliged to ensure the safety and transfer of all abandoned objects to the Soviet troops. It was also agreed that "to destroy the Polish gangs along the way, Soviet and German troops will act together."

A clear example of the interaction between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army at that time can be an agreement on the use of the Minsk radio station to guide German bombers to Polish cities. It is worth recalling that Goering, as a token of gratitude for military cooperation in the fight against a common enemy, presented the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Voroshilov with an airplane.

In the course of hostilities, the commanders of the forward units of the German and Soviet armies exchanged liaison officers. Cooperation was also established with the command of the German Navy in the Baltic. Joint parades were held in Grodno, Brest, Pinsk and a number of other cities even before the capitulation of Warsaw. For example, in Grodno, along with the German general, commander Chuikov took over the parade, in Brest - General Guderian and brigade commander Krivoshein.

The statements of high-ranking Soviet political and military leaders indicate that the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland, and later in the Baltic states and against Finland were considered mainly from the point of view of expanding the territory, increasing the population of the USSR and other military-strategic advantages. It was precisely this concept that Mekhlis formulated at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b), referring to the opinion of Stalin: “If the second imperialist war turns its edge against the first socialist state in the world, then military operations must be transferred to enemy territory, fulfill our international duties and multiply the number of Soviet republics.

At a solemn meeting on the occasion of the anniversary of October on November 6, 1939, Molotov emphasized that after the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the population of the USSR had grown from 170 to 183 million people. In June 1941, the draft directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda “On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future” stated: “The entire personnel of the Red Army must be imbued with the consciousness that the increased political, economic and military power of the Soviet Union allows us to carry out offensive foreign policy, resolutely eliminating the hotbeds of war at their borders, expanding their territories ... ". When discussing the project at the Main Military Council, Zhdanov said: “We have become stronger, we can set more active tasks. The war with Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already embarked on the path of offensive policy.