New institutionalism. Institutional Theory Institutional Theory

New institutional theory(English) New Institutional Economics; or otherwise "neo-institutionalism") is a modern economic theory belonging to the neoclassical direction, the beginning of which was laid by the book of Ronald Coase « The nature of the firm», published in 1937. However, interest in this area appeared only towards the end of the 1970s in the United States, and then in Europe. The term itself was coined by Oliver Williamson.

In 1997, the "International Society for New Institutional Economics" was founded.

New institutional theory is often confused with institutionalism, to which this theory is not directly related.

Basic Methods

Neo-institutionalism is a vivid manifestation of the tendency for the methods of microeconomic analysis to penetrate into related social disciplines.

Neo-institutionalism proceeds from two general attitudes:

• first, that social institutions matter ( institutions matter);
• second, that they are amenable to analysis using the standard tools of economic theory.

Neo-institutional theory focuses on the analysis of such factors as transaction costs, property rights, contract agency relations.

Neo-institutionalists criticize traditional neoclassical theory for departing from the principle of "methodological individualism".

In comparison with the neoclassical theory, neoinstitutionalism introduces a new class of restrictions due to the institutional structure of society and narrowing the field of individual choice. In addition, behavioral prerequisites are introduced - bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior.

The first premise means that a person with limited information can minimize not only material costs, but also intellectual efforts. The second means "the pursuit of self-interest, reaching treachery" ( self-interest-seeking-with-guile), that is, the possibility of breach of contracts.

The neoclassical school assumes that the market operates under conditions of perfect competition, and characterizes deviations from it as “market failures” and places hopes on the state in such cases. Neo-institutionalists point out that the state also does not have complete information and does not have the theoretical possibility of eliminating transaction costs.

AT Traditional economic theory (mainstream) does not pay enough attention to the institutional environment in which economic agents operate. The desire to avoid this shortcoming led to the emergence of a new school, which came out under the general name of "new institutional theory" (neo-institutional economics). The similarity of the name with the old “Veblenian” institutionalism should not be misleading: the new institutional theory in the field of methodology has common roots with the neoclassical concept. However, it should be noted that there is still a certain relationship with early institutionalism.

H R. Coase's article "The Nature of the Firm" in 1937 laid the foundation for this direction, but the new institutional theory as a special trend in economic thought was recognized only in the 1970s-1980s.

M methodological foundations of the new institutional theory

D For neo-institutionalism, two assumptions are fundamental: first, social institutions matter, and second, they are amenable to analysis using standard neoclassical tools. This is the difference between the new institutionalism and the old one: the early representatives of institutionalism applied to the analysis of the economy the methods used in other sciences (law, psychology, etc.), while the new ones, on the contrary, use the economic apparatus to study such non-market phenomena as racial discrimination , education, marriage, crime, parliamentary elections, etc. This penetration into related social disciplines has been called "economic imperialism"

AT methodologically, neoinstitutionalists adhere to the principle of "methodological individualism", according to which the only really acting "actors" of the social process are individuals. The traditional neoclassical theory, in which both firms and the state act as subjects, is criticized for deviations from the principle of individualism. The methodology of neo-institutionalists assumes that the community does not exist outside of its members. This approach made it possible to deepen the microeconomic analysis and consider the relationships that develop within economic organizations.

AT The second methodological feature of the new institutional theory is the assumption of bounded rationality of subjects. This assumption is based on the fact that when making decisions, a person relies on incomplete, imperfect information, since the latter is an expensive resource. Because of this, agents are forced to settle not on optimal solutions, but on those that seem acceptable to them based on the limited information they have. Their rationality will be expressed in the desire to save not only on material costs, but also on their intellectual efforts.

T The third feature of neo-institutionalism is related to the fact that they allow the existence of opportunistic behavior. O. Williamson, who introduced this concept into scientific circulation, defines opportunistic behavior as "the pursuit of one's own interest, amounting to treachery." We are talking about any form of violation of the obligations assumed, for example, evasion of the terms of the contract. Utility maximizing individuals will behave opportunistically (say, provide less and inferior services) when doing so promises them a profit. In neoclassical theory, there was no place for opportunistic behavior, since the possession of perfect information excludes its possibility.

T Thus, neo-institutionalists abandon the simplifying assumptions of the neoclassical school (complete rationality, availability of perfect information, etc.) by emphasizing that economic agents operate in a world of high transaction costs, ill-defined property rights, and unreliable contracts, a world full of risk and uncertainty. .

H The new institutional theory includes several areas that can be classified as follows (classification by O. Williamson):

1. Directions that study the institutional environment in which the processes of production and exchange take place: a) public choice theory (J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch, M. Olson, etc.) studies the rules governing relations in the public sphere; b) the theory of property rights (R. Coase, A. Alchian, G. Demsets) studies the rules governing relations in the private sphere.

2. The theory of agency relations studies organizational forms that are created by economic agents on a contract basis (W. Meckling, M. Jensen).

3. Theories considering economic organizations from the point of view of the transactional approach (R. Coase, D. North, O. Williamson). Unlike the theory of agency relations, the emphasis is not on the stage of conclusion, but on the stage of execution of contracts.

AT The emergence of a new institutional theory is associated with the emergence in economics of such concepts as transaction costs, property rights, and contractual relations. Awareness of the importance for the operation of the economic system of the concept of transaction costs is associated with the article by Ronald Coase "The Nature of the Firm" (1937). The traditional neoclassical theory considered the market as a perfect mechanism, where there is no need to take into account the costs of servicing transactions. However, R. Coase showed that in each transaction between economic entities there are costs associated with its conclusion - transaction costs.

With Today, as part of transaction costs, it is customary to single out

1) costs of information search - time and resources spent on obtaining and processing information about prices, about goods and services of interest, about available suppliers and consumers;

2) negotiation costs;

3) the costs of measuring the quantity and quality of goods and services entering into the exchange;

4) costs of specification and protection of property rights;

5) costs of opportunistic behavior: with asymmetry of information, there is both an incentive and the opportunity to work not with full dedication.

T The theory of property rights was developed by A. Alchian and G. Demsetz, they laid the foundation for a systematic analysis of the economic significance of property relations. Under the system of property rights in the new institutional theory is understood the whole set of rules governing access to scarce resources. Such norms can be established and protected not only by the state, but also by other social mechanisms - customs, moral principles, religious precepts. Property rights can be thought of as "rules of the game" that govern relationships between individual agents.

H Neo-institutionalism operates with the concept of a “bundle of property rights”: each such “bundle” can be split, so that one part of the decision-making rights regarding a particular resource begins to belong to one person, the other to another, and so on. The main elements of the bundle of property rights usually include: 1) the right to exclude other agents from access to the resource; 2) the right to use the resource; 3) the right to receive income from it; 4) the right to transfer all previous powers.

H a necessary condition for the efficient operation of the market is the precise definition, or "specification", of property rights. The principal thesis of the new institutional theory is that the specification of property rights is not free, therefore, in a real economy, it cannot be fully defined and protected with absolute reliability.

E Another key term in the new institutional theory is the contract. Any transaction involves the exchange of "bundles of property rights" and this happens through a contract that fixes the powers and the conditions under which they are transferred. Neo-institutionalists study various forms of contracts (explicit and implicit, short-term and long-term, etc.), the mechanism for ensuring the reliability of the fulfillment of obligations assumed (court, arbitration, self-protected contracts).

AT Coase's work "The Problem of Social Costs" (1960) offers a theoretical study of externalities, i.e. external side effects from economic activity (its impact on the environment, on certain objects that are not at all related to this activity, etc.) from a new point of view. According to the views of previous researchers of this problem (A. Pigou), the presence of external effects was characterized as “market failures” and was a sufficient basis for government intervention. Coase, on the other hand, argues that with a clear definition of property rights and the absence of transaction costs, the structure of production remains unchanged and optimal, the problem of externalities does not arise and, therefore, there are no grounds for government action.

T The theorem reveals the economic meaning of property rights. Externalities appear only when property rights are not clearly defined, blurred. It is no coincidence that external effects arise, as a rule, with regard to resources that move from the category of unlimited to the category of rare ones (water, air) and for which there were no property rights in principle before. To solve this problem, it is enough to create new property rights in areas where they are not clearly defined.

P The concept of transaction costs allowed Coase to solve the question of the reasons for the existence of a firm (in neoclassical theory, this problem was not even raised) and to determine the optimal size of a firm. The existence of only the market is accompanied by huge transaction costs. Coase explains the existence of the firm by the desire to avoid the costs of making transactions in the market. Within the firm, resources are distributed administratively (through orders, not on the basis of price signals), search costs are reduced within it, the need for frequent renegotiation of contracts disappears, and business ties become stable. However, with the growth of the size of the firm, the costs associated with the coordination of its activities (loss of control, bureaucratization, etc.) increase. Therefore, the optimal firm size can be calculated at the point where transaction costs equal the firm's coordination costs.

AT In the 1960s, the American scholar James Buchanan (b. 1919) advanced the theory of public choice (COT) in his classic works: The Calculus of Consent, The Limits of Freedom, The Constitution of Economic Policy. TOV studies the political mechanism of formation of macroeconomic decisions or politics as a kind of economic activity. The main research areas of TOV are: constitutional economics, model of political competition, public choice in a representative democracy, the theory of bureaucracy, the theory of political rent, the theory of the fiasco of the state.

B Yukenen in public choice theory proceeds from the fact that people in the political sphere also follow self-interest, and, in addition, politics is like a market. The main subjects of political markets are voters, politicians and officials. In a democratic system, voters will give their votes to those politicians whose election programs are most in line with their interests. Therefore, politicians, in order to achieve their goals (entry into power structures, career), should be guided by voters. Thus, politicians adopt certain programs that the voters have expressed, and officials specify and control the implementation of these programs.

AT Within the framework of the theory of public choice, all measures of the state economic policy are understood as endogenous for the economic and political system, since their determination is carried out under the influence of the requests of the subjects of the political market, which are also economic subjects.
The economic behavior of the bureaucracy was considered by U. Niskanen. He believes that the results of the activities of bureaucrats are often "intangible" in nature (decrees, memorandums, etc.) and therefore it is difficult to control their activities. At the same time, it is assumed that the well-being of officials depends on the size of the agency's budget: this opens up opportunities for increasing their remuneration, raising their official status, reputation, and so on. As a result, it turns out that officials manage to significantly inflate the budgets of agencies in comparison with the level actually necessary to perform the functions of the agency. These arguments play a significant role in substantiating the thesis about the relative inefficiency of the provision of public goods by state bodies, which is shared by the vast majority of supporters of public choice theory.

T The theory of the political business cycle considers the activities of political actors as a source of cyclical fluctuations in the economy. The W. Nordhaus model suggests that in order to win the elections, the ruling party, as the election date approaches, seeks to pursue a “popular” course of stimulating economic growth, including through an active monetary and budgetary policy. After the election, the winning party is forced to pursue an "unpopular" course of combating the inflationary consequences of the policy pursued during the election campaign. Thus, a cyclical process occurs in the economy: immediately before the elections, there is an acceleration of economic growth and an increase in inflation, and in the period after the elections, the inflation rate falls, and the economic growth rates also decrease.

D Another model of the political business cycle was proposed by D. Gibbs. Gibbs believes that the nature of economic policy depends on which party is in power. "Left" parties, traditionally focused on supporting employees, are pursuing a policy aimed at increasing employment (even at the expense of rising inflation). The "right" parties - to support big business, pay more attention to preventing inflation (even at the expense of rising unemployment). Thus, according to the simplest model, cyclical fluctuations in the economy are generated by the change of "right" and "left" governments, and the consequences of the policies pursued by the respective governments persist throughout their term of office.

• 2.1. The emergence of a new institutional theory.
• 2.2. Methodology of the new institutional theory.
• 2.3. Modern currents of new institutionalism.

THE RISE OF A NEW INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The emergence of new institutionalism is usually attributed to the 60-70s. 20th century Like traditional institutionalism, this line of research was initiated, originated and developed in America. The term "neo-institutionalism" was originally used by American economist Oliver Williamson (born 1932).

Neo-institutionalism, or new institutional theory, methodologically stems from two currents of modern economic thought. This is, firstly, the old institutionalism and, secondly, neoclassical economic theory. From the old, or early, institutionalism, the new theory perceives the expansion of the subject of research, the intrusion into the spheres of social life that are unusual for classical economic theory. The research method based on the use of limit analysis is borrowed from neoclassical theory.

However, some economists argue that neo-institutionalism as a current of economic thought is closer to neoclassical theory than to traditional or old institutionalism, which was largely built on a critique of neoclassical theory.

To understand the direction of the ideas of the new institutional economics, one should get acquainted with the views of the most famous representatives of this direction. These, we believe, should include: Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Gary Becker, Douglas North and Oliver Williamson.

It is generally accepted that the beginning of this direction of economic research was laid by the work of an American economist of British origin. Ronald Coase(1910, London - 2013, Chicago). He formulated very important methodological provisions of this line of research in two articles: The Nature of the Firm (1937) and The Problem of Social Costs (1960). The ideas presented in the articles were not in demand by economists and practitioners until the mid-1970s. The scientific recognition of the new direction of research took shape in an independent current of economic thought.

The application of the methodology of microeconomic analysis to the most diverse spheres of social life makes it possible to obtain results that fairly reliably explain many phenomena of social life.

R. Coase turns to the study of transactions almost simultaneously (a little later) with J. Command. He uses the concept of "transaction". In the article "The Nature of the Firm" R. Coase introduces the concept of transaction costs, implying by them the costs (or losses) of economic agents during transactions. The concepts of transactions and transaction costs are interpreted by him extremely broadly. In this article, R. Coase tries to give answers to some questions that are vital for economic theory, to which classical economic theory does not give definite answers. These questions include the following. First, what is a firm? Second, why do firms exist? Third, what factors determine firm size? Fourth, why can't the entire set of firms in the national economy be replaced by one large firm? R. Coase gives answers to these questions using the concept of transaction costs, which are systematized, according to J. Commons, with the allocation of transaction transactions, management transactions and rationing transactions. The economist's methodology consists in comparing the value of transaction costs of management and rationing within the firm and the value of transaction costs of transactions outside the firm. The optimal size of the firm is considered to be the one at which the sum of internal and external transaction costs of the firm is minimized.

As another merit of the economist, the study at a new methodological level is recognized for a rather long time and well-known in economic theory, the problem of externalities or “externalities”. One of the first to describe the problem of externalities and propose its solution was an English economist, a representative of the Cambridge School, Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877-1959). In his opinion, the internalization of externalities can be ensured through the introduction of a special tax (the Pigou tax).

In his work "The Problem of Social Costs" R. Coase offers a different solution. He argues that under the condition of zero transaction costs and a sufficiently clear specification of property rights, the producer of the product and the owner of the resource affected by the production process are able to come to an agreement. This ensures the sharing of additional costs between them, turning the individual costs of the producer into "social costs". In this case, the distribution of resources between producers ensures the efficiency of production. George Stigler formulated these conclusions and called them "the Coase theorem." It is believed that two currently significant areas of research stem from these articles by R. Coase - the theory of organizations and the theory of property rights.

Further development of neo-institutional economic theory is associated with the identification of several main areas of research. A number of the most significant of them should be named: the theory of transaction costs, the theory of public choice, the modern economic theory of property, the theory of contracts, as well as a set of research areas within the framework of the so-called economic imperialism.

Among the economists representing the new institutional current of economic theory, it should be noted, in addition to those mentioned, several of the most famous names. These are James Buchanan, Gordon Tulloch, Gary Stanley Becker, Douglas North, Oliver Williamson, Elinor Ostrom, Harold Demsets, Armen Albert Alchian, Mansour Olson, Jan Tinbergen, Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Gunnar Myrdal, Herbert Simon.

James McGill Buchanan(1919-2013) taught at the University of Virginia (Virginia School), winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics (1986) "for his study of the contractual and constitutional foundations of the theory of economic and political decision making."

James McGill Buchanan

He is considered to be one of the founders of the direction in economic theory (political economy), called "public choice theory". This direction was developed in his works “Calculation of consent. Logistic Foundations of Constitutional Democracy” (1964, co-authored with G. Tullock) and “The Limits of Freedom. Between Anarchy and Leviathan" (1975).

The main idea of ​​J. Buchanan was to try to apply the methods of neoclassical economic theory to create models of behavior of subjects in the political sphere. The model of the political market assumes that the subjects of the political market act in a rational way, pursuing their own interests. Based on this assumption, J. Buchanan considered the behavior of subjects in the sphere of politics in the same way as the behavior of subjects in the commodity market is analyzed. From these positions, taxation is one side of the transaction or exchange between the taxpayer and the state. The second part of this transaction consists in the provision of services by the state to ensure security and other public benefits to the subjects staying on the territory of the country.

In the political market, as well as in the goods market, there is competition between the subjects of this market for the production and provision of certain public goods, the provision of resources for the production of these goods. There is a competitive struggle between state departments and officials for the allocation of resources and a place in the state hierarchy.

The political market, according to J. Buchanan, serves to make decisions on the production and exchange of public goods. He divides the decision-making process in the political sphere into two parts. Initially, the choice of rules for making decisions on the production of public goods is implemented - the constitutional stage. This stage is studied by constitutional economics. The second stage is the decision-making in accordance with the previously adopted rules for the production of public goods of a certain quality and in the right quantity.

Gary Stanley Becker

Within the framework of new ideas, united by the common name "economic imperialism", in the second half of the 20th century. initiated several areas of modern research. Gary Stanley Becker(born in 1930), a representative of the Chicago School of Institutional Economics, initiated such studies as the economics of discrimination, the economics of the family, the economic choice of education, and the economic analysis of crime.

The Nobel Prize "For extending the scope of microeconomic analysis to a number of aspects of human behavior and interaction, including non-market behavior" was awarded to G. Becker in 1992. In one of his first works "Human Capital" (1964), he develops some of the ideas of his colleague in University of Chicago T. Schultz. The original purpose of writing the work was to evaluate the economic efficiency of investments in secondary and higher education in the United States.

G. Becker applies a methodology based on the concept of human behavior in the social sphere as rational and expedient. He applies the methodological apparatus of neoclassical economic theory, forming optimization models both in this case and for the study of other areas of social life.

The concept of "human capital" has entered the scientific circulation. The results of research in this area are widely used in the practice of government programs and firms. Improvement of education, accumulation of professional knowledge, measures to improve health protection are considered as investments in human capital.

The main works of G. Becker include the following: "Economic Theory of Discrimination" (1957), "The Theory of Time Distribution" (1965), "Treatise on the Family" (1981).

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Douglas Cecil North

A significant contribution to the development of economic theory was made by Douglas North(born in 1920) is an American economist who taught at the University of Washington. The Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to D. North in 1993 with the wording "For the revival of research in the field of economic history, thanks to the application of economic theory and quantitative methods to explain economic and institutional changes." D. North was one of the first to try to apply quantitative methods in historical research. This direction is called "cliometry".

The main work of the economist was published in 1990 under the title "Institutions, institutional changes and the functioning of the economy."

The idea of ​​the work is to show the importance of institutions in the life of society. According to D. North, the main role of institutions is to establish interaction between people. The development of in-statutes, "from traditional conventions, codes and norms of behavior to written law, customary law and contracts between individuals" results in a change in the economy and the whole society.

D. North pays special attention to the institution of property, finding in it the reasons for the transformation of "pure" knowledge into "applied" and the onset of periods of rapid technological development. “Strengthening incentives through the development of patent law, trade secret laws, and other regulations increased the profitability of innovation, and also led to the creation of an “invention industry” and its integration into the economic development of the modern Western world, which in turn led to the Second Industrial Revolution” .

D. North pays considerable attention to the problems of the theory of public choice and voting procedures, including in the historical aspect.

One of the most famous representatives of neo-institutionalism, who has undeniable merits in the development of this area of ​​economic thought, is an American economist. Oliver Eaton Williamson(b. 1932), professor at the University of California. For his work in the field of institutional economics in 2009, he was awarded the Nobel Prize with the wording "For research in the field of economic organization."

Oliver Eaton Williamson

Several of his major works in the field of institutional economics are known, one of his last works “The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, markets, “relational” contracting” (1996).

O. Williamson is considered one of the founders of the neo-institutional theory of the firm. The theory of contracts as presented by O. Williamson also became famous. The basis of his logical constructions is the theory of transaction costs. An attempt is made to give as precise a definition of the contract as possible - to define the "inner world of the contract". For this, the main characteristics of the contract as a certain process - contracting are considered. This is done from the standpoint of various approaches to identifying the inner world of the contract: the contract as a planning process, the contract as a “promise” (apparently, it should be understood as an obligation), the contract as a process of competition and the contract as a management mechanism. The behavioral characteristic of an organization, according to O. Williamson, is determined by the properties of "limited rationality" (decision-making in conditions of incomplete information) or "opportunism", as well as the "specificity of assets" exchanged in a transaction. From these properties of organizations and contracts flow the characteristics of contracting processes. Based on this methodology, a classification of contracts is built. By analogy with the concepts of "economic man", "working man", "political man", "hierarchical man", O. Williamson introduces the concept of "contract man". To analyze contracts, he uses the concept of "behavioral uncertainty".

An important characteristic of the company's actions and contracts is the "transaction frequency". The concept of transaction costs remains the main one in the model built by O. Williamson.

Author of The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and Group Theory, American economist Mansour Olson(1932-1998) develops the theory of groups, organizations in their relation to public goods, uses and modifies the concept of public goods.

Mansour Olson

In his opinion, coherence or agreement in joint activities ensures the achievement of the set goals and, thus, the realization of the common or collective interests of groups.

The use of similar methodological provisions makes it possible to explain the achievement of coherence between groups, which makes it possible to transfer the practice of collective action to the relationship between groups. Collective inter-group action makes it possible to ensure the achievement of goals common to different groups and to satisfy the needs that are shared by these groups.

Research currently being carried out within the framework of neo-institutional theory is directed to the institutional environment in which acts of market exchange are carried out. The merit of the economists discussed above was that they determined the main directions of development of modern institutional economic theory and economic theory in general.

Characteristics of the new institutional economic theory. 60–70s of the 20th century marked by the revival of institutionalism (mainly in the United States), expressed both in the growth in the number of supporters of the trend, and in a meaningful change in institutional views. As noted earlier, the old institutionalism could not give a generally valid research program, and this prompted the development of a direction in the microeconomic part of economic theory that is focused not on a radical revision, but on the modification of the research program. The emergence of this theory is associated with the name of the Nobel Prize winner in economics R. Coase (b. 1910). The key ideas of the new direction are set forth in the articles by R. Coase "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) and "The Problem of Social Costs" (1960). The works of R. Coase significantly corrected the ideas about the subject of economic theory and included the analysis of institutions in the study of the problem of economic choice. This approach was developed in the works of another Nobel laureate, D. North. His approach is focused on explaining the structure and change of economies in a historical perspective based on the study of the interrelations of institutions, organizations, technologies that affect the level of transaction costs and depend on the latter.

Unlike traditional institutionalism, this direction is first called neo-institutionalism, and then - the new institutional economic theory (NIE). The new institutionalism appears as a doctrine focused on the individual, his freedom, opening the way to an economically efficient, sustainable society based on internal incentives. This doctrine substantiates the idea of ​​weakening the influence of the state on the market economy with the help of the state itself, which is strong enough to establish the rules of the game in society and monitor their observance.

If we take orthodox neoclassical theory as a starting point, then the new institutional economics is a modification of the neoclassical research program, and traditional institutionalism is a new research program (at least in the project) in terms of a set of principles such as methodological individualism, rationality, economic equilibrium .

The new institutionalism accepts the model of rational choice as the basic one, but frees it from a number of auxiliary prerequisites and enriches it with new content 17 .

1. Consistently use the principle methodological individualism. According to this principle, not groups or organizations, but individuals are recognized as really acting "actors" of the social process. The state, society, firm, as well as the family or trade union cannot be considered as collective entities whose behavior is similar to individual, although they are explained on the basis of individual behavior. The utilitarian approach, which involves interpersonal comparisons of utilities and, accordingly, the construction of a social welfare function, is also inapplicable. As a result, institutions are secondary to individuals. The focus of the new institutional theory is the relationship that develops within economic organizations, while in neoclassical theory the firm and other organizations were considered simply as a "black box" into which researchers did not look. In this sense, the approach of the new institutional economic theory can be characterized as nanoeconomic or microeconomic.

2. Neoclassical theory knew two types of constraints: physical, generated by the scarcity of resources, and technological, reflecting the level of knowledge and practical skill of economic agents (that is, the degree of skill with which they turn input resources into finished products). At the same time, it disregarded the institutional environment and transaction costs, believing that all resources are distributed and privately owned, that the rights of owners are clearly defined and reliably protected, that there is perfect information and absolute mobility of resources, etc. New institutionalists enter another class of restrictions due to the institutional structure of society also narrowing the economic choice. They emphasize that economic agents operate in a world of positive transaction costs, ill-defined or poorly defined property rights, a world of institutional realities full of risk and uncertainty.

3. In accordance with the neoclassical approach, the rationality of economic agents is complete, independent and objective (hyperrationality), which is equivalent to considering an economic agent as an ordered set of stable preferences. The meaning of economic action in the model is to reconcile preferences with constraints in the form of a set of prices for goods and services. The new institutional theory is more realistic, which finds expression in two important behavioral assumptions - bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior. The first reflects the fact that the human intellect is limited. The knowledge and information that a person has are always incomplete, he cannot completely process the information and interpret it in relation to all situations of choice. In other words, information is an expensive resource. As a result, the maximum task turns, according to G. Simon, into the task of finding a satisfactory solution in accordance with a certain level of requirements, when the object of choice is not a specific set of benefits, but the procedure for determining it. The rationality of agents will be expressed in the desire to save not only on material costs, but also on their intellectual efforts. O. Williamson introduced the concept of "opportunistic behavior", which is defined as "the pursuit of one's own interest using deceit" 18 or following one's own interests, which is not related to moral considerations. We are talking about any form of violation of the obligations assumed. Utility maximizing individuals will behave opportunistically (say, provide less and less service) when the other side is unable to detect it. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

4. In neoclassical theory, when evaluating really operating economic mechanisms, the model of perfect competition was taken as a starting point. Deviations from the optimal properties of this model were regarded as “market failures”, and hopes for their elimination were pinned on the state. It was implicitly assumed that the state possesses all the completeness of information and, unlike individual agents, acts without costs. The new institutional theory rejected this approach. H. Demsetz called the habit of comparing real, but imperfect institutions with a perfect, but unattainable ideal image "the economy of nirvana." Regulatory analysis should be carried out in comparative institutional perspective, i.e. assessments of existing institutions should be based on comparisons not with ideal models, but with alternatives that are feasible in practice. For example, we are talking about the comparative efficiency of various forms of ownership, possible options for internalizing external effects (due to the need for government intervention), etc.

Classification and main directions of new institutionalism. Due to the enormous complexity, several approaches to the classification of modern trends in institutional theory are proposed.

O. Williamson proposed the following classification of new institutionalism 19 (Fig. 1.1).

Rice. 1.1. Basic approaches to the analysis of economic organizations

("tree of institutionalism")

Neoclassical doctrine, according to Williamson, is predominantly technologically oriented. It is assumed that the exchange takes place instantly and without cost, that the contracts concluded are strictly enforced, and that the boundaries of economic organizations (firms) are predetermined by the nature of the technology used. In contrast, the new institutional theory proceeds from a contractual perspective - the costs that accompany the interaction of economic agents come to the fore. In some concepts related to this area, the subject of study is the institutional environment, i.e. fundamental political, social and legal rules within which the processes of production and exchange take place (for example, constitutional law, property law, contract law, etc.). The rules governing relations in the public sphere are studied by the theory of public choice (J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch, M. Olson, and others); rules governing relations in the private sphere - the theory of property rights (R. Coase, A. Alchian, H. Demsetz, R. Posner, etc.). These concepts differ not only in the subject of research, but also in theoretical settings. If in the first one the emphasis is on the losses that are generated by the activities of political institutions, then in the second - on the gain in welfare, which is provided by the institutions of law (primarily the judicial system).

Other concepts study organizational structures, which (subject to the rules in force) are created by economic agents on a contract basis. The interaction between the principal and the agent is considered by the theory of agency relations. One version of it, known as incentive mechanism theory, explores which organizational arrangements can provide the optimal distribution of risk between principal and agent. Another, so-called "positive" theory of agency relations addresses the problem of "separation of ownership and control", formulated by A. Burley and G. Minz back in the 1930s. Among the leading representatives of this concept are W. Meckling, M. Jensen, Yu. Fama. The central question for it is: what contracts are necessary so that the behavior of agents (hired managers) deviates to the least extent from the interests of the principals (owners)? Acting rationally, the principals will ex ante take into account the risk of avoiding behavior when concluding contracts, stipulating protection measures.

The transactional approach to the study of economic organizations is based on the ideas of R. Coase. In terms of this approach, organizations serve the purpose of reducing transaction costs. Unlike the theory of agency relations, the emphasis is not on the stage of conclusion, but on the stage of execution of contracts (ex post). In one of the branches of the transactional approach, the main explanatory category is the cost of measuring the quantity and quality of goods and services provided in a transaction. Here it is necessary to highlight the works of S. Chen, J. Barzel and D. North. The leader of the other school is O. Williamson. The concept of “management structure” became central for her. We are talking about special mechanisms that are created to assess the behavior of the participants in the transaction, resolve disputes that arise, adapt to unexpected changes, and apply sanctions to violators. In other words, there is a need for governance structures that would regulate relations between the participants in the transaction at the stage of its execution (ex post).

Based on the scheme of O. Williamson, R.M. Nureyev proposed a detailed classification of modern institutional concepts 20 (Fig. 1.2), which distinguishes neo-institutional economics and new institutional economics.

Rice. 1.2. Classification of institutional concepts

In it, neo-institutionalism is understood as NIE, and the new institutional economics is represented by the French economy of agreements and "other theories" in the terminology of O. Williamson. It should be noted that the proposed scheme does not reflect the institutional-evolutionary direction of modern theory, or evolutionary economic theory.

Developing directions within the new institutional economics (new political economy, economics of property rights, new organization of industrial markets, new economic history, transaction cost economics, constitutional economics, contract economics, law and economics, etc. ) differ in the degree of modification of the rigid neoclassical core. The existing differences do not allow the use of the above names as perfect substitutes.

At the same time, almost all researchers within the NIE use several fundamental research principles: (1) methodological individualism; (2) utility maximization; (3) bounded rationality of economic agents; (4) their opportunistic behavior 21 . Therefore, we can only speak of a modification of the neoclassical research program.

The Icelandic economist T. Eggertsson proposes to distinguish between neo-institutional and new institutional economic theory, which is determined by the depth of modification of the neoclassical approach 22 . The very term "new institutional economics" was introduced by O. Williamson in his work "Markets and Hierarchies" (1975). However, in terms of content, the new institutional economic theory turned out to be significantly broader than the approach he proposed, since this theory includes concepts that fundamentally do not accept elements of a rigid core, as well as updated neoclassical models that allow selective use of the principle of bounded rationality.

The new institutional economic theory is a continuation of neoclassical, traditional microeconomic theory and does not affect its rigid core to the extent that one could speak of the emergence of a fundamentally new research program, since the premise of utility maximization is used in various forms, which has transformed into the idea of ​​minimizing transaction costs. or the sum of transaction and transformation costs, the principle of methodological individualism, economic equilibrium. At the same time, according to T. Eggertsson, the new institutional economic theory is based on a significant change in the elements of the hard core. So, O. Williamson turned out to be a representative of a new institutional economic theory, which is primarily due to his interpretation of rationality, on the basis of which the hypothesis of maximizing expected utility by an economic agent cannot be accepted.

A. E. Shastitko characterizes in detail the features of the NIE based on a comparison with neoclassical theory and old institutionalism in the work “New Institutional Economic Theory: Features of the Subject and Method” (2003), and also draws the following conclusions regarding the NIE 23 . NIE's founding thesis is (1) institutions matter and (2) institutions are researchable. The subject-methodological features of the new institutional economic theory are expressed in the fact that institutions are important both for the efficiency of resource allocation, economic development, and for the distribution of limited resources (wealth) among decision-making economic agents. In other words, a realistic analysis of the interaction between self-interested people within and about institutions is related to the solution of both distributive conflicts and the problem of coordination (plans, expectations, actions), provided that the actors are boundedly rational and at least some of them behaves opportunistically according to the circumstances. Thus, the current state of the NIE allows us to speak of the new institutionalism as an independent, emerging research program.

Problem analysis in terms of new institutional economics is widely presented in the journals "Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics", "Journal of Law and Economics", "Journal of Corporate Finance", "Economic Inquiry" and many others, as well as in the materials of six annual conferences of the International Society of New Institutional Economics (www.isnie.org).

Difficulties of NIE. Here are some expressions of disagreement with which the new institutional economic theory is confronted 24 . Critics point out that the emphasis on transaction costs (the concept of which remains vague) often turns into an ignorance of production costs, which is unacceptable in economic analysis. According to evolutionary economists, since representatives of the NIE derive organizations, law, and other socioeconomic phenomena from the processes of direct interaction between individuals, they skip the intermediate level - habits and stereotypes, which are central to the old institutionalism. J. Hodgson believes that all variants of the new institutionalism, despite differences in approaches, are united by the common idea of ​​defining individual preferences as exogenous and ignoring the processes that govern their formation. Traditionally, property relations were associated with the concept of power. In the studies of the new institutionalists, this aspect remains in the background. Hence the tendency to present hierarchy as a special kind of contract, vertical social ties as horizontal, relations of domination and subordination as relations of equal partnership. According to left-wing radical critics of NIE, this is one of its most vulnerable positions.

However, the final assessment of the new institutional economic theory is determined by its strengths and the real results obtained at the present stage of the development of the theory.

INSTITUTIONAL THEORY The branch of organization theory is sometimes referred to as "new" institutional theory; developed in the 1970s and 1980s. It is based on the position that the actions of an organization are determined not only by the logic of economic and technological factors, but also by the institutions that make up its social environment, for example, the state, professions, other organizations, as well as the values ​​and culture of society as a whole. This kind of institutional influence affects both the goals of the organization and the means used by it. It follows from this that organizations located in the same institutional environment have similarities. For example, in Germany, one of the features of the industrial democracy system is the legal requirement that representatives of employees in large firms should occupy a certain percentage of seats on the board of directors of the company, and managers should regularly discuss issues related to their work with employees through workers' councils. . This state-introduced practice is a reflection of a broader culture that emphasizes and supports participatory governance. Thus, it is assumed that organizations in Germany should be similar in structure and management methods and at the same time different from organizations in the US or Britain. Institutionalists argue that organizations choose institutionalized practices that are appropriate for their social environment. The concept of isomorphism refers to the fact that organizations usually copy each other: when new organizational practices arise, and a certain minimum of organizations begin to follow them, they become common property. Isomorphism is explained by a number of reasons: coercive factors, the need to strive for social legitimacy and the desire to reduce the degree of uncertainty. This theory also emphasizes the importance of the process of institutionalization, during which the repetition and recognizability of organizational structures and activities lead over time to their rooting and legitimization within the culture of the members of the organization. Thus, the structure and activities of the organization are also influenced by the internal social environment. In the process of institutionalization, those innovations that are introduced from outside or come from the organization itself can be modified in accordance with existing social norms and practices of the members of the organization. The term “path dependence” used in this connection denotes the fact of the influence of initial conditions, which in this case are understood as institutional, on the direction of innovation development. For example, the same new technology can be used in different ways by different firms: in one case, it can contribute to the growth of the professional skills of the staff, and in the other, it can de-skill. This state of affairs can be explained by cultural differences between firms and societies, suggesting appropriate forms of work organization and grounds for satisfaction from it. Institutionalization also means that certain practices can persist even when they no longer serve the purposes of those who control the organization. Institutional theory has some value in correcting the notion that there is a simple relationship between economic and technological variables and how an organization operates. Such notions are supported by the contingency approach within organization theory and by neoclassical economists, based on rational profit maximization assumptions. However, in general, institutional theory should be viewed as a general direction rather than a detailed theory, since even among its adherents there is no agreement on the exact formulation of its main provisions. See also: Economic sociology. Lit.: Scott, W.R. (1995)