Lend-Lease as a percentage. On Lend-Lease and its Significance for the USSR during the Great Patriotic War

LEND-LEASE(eng. lend-lease, from lend - to lend and lease - to lease), a system for the transfer by the United States of America on loan or lease of military equipment and other materiel to allied countries during the Second World War.

The Lend-Lease Act was adopted in the USA in March 1941 and immediately the American government extended its effect to Great Britain. In October 1941 in Moscow, representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain signed a protocol on mutual deliveries. The USSR expressed its readiness to pay for the supplies of the allies with funds from the gold reserve. In November 1941, the United States extended the Lend-Lease Act to the USSR.

In total, during the years of World War II, US Lend-Lease deliveries to the Allies amounted to approx. 50 billion dollars, of which the Sov. Union accounted for 22%. At the end of 1945, deliveries to the USSR under Lend-Lease were expressed in the amount of 11.1 billion dollars. Of these, the USSR accounted for (in million dollars): aircraft - 1189, tanks and self-propelled guns - 618, cars - 1151, ships - 689, artillery - 302, ammunition - 482, machine tools and machines - 1577, metals - 879, food - 1726, etc.

Return deliveries from the USSR to the USA amounted to 2.2 million dollars. Owls. The Union supplied the USA with 300,000 tons of chromium ore, 32,000 tons of manganese ore, a significant amount of platinum, gold, and timber.

In addition to Amer. Lend-lease assistance to the USSR was also provided by Great Britain and (since 1943) Canada, the volume of this assistance is estimated at 1.7 billion dollars, respectively. and 200 million dollars.

The first allied convoy with cargo arrived in Arkhangelsk on 31.8.1941. (cm. Allied convoys in the USSR 1941–45). Initially, Soviet assistance was provided in a relatively small amount and lagged behind the planned deliveries. At the same time, it partly compensated for the sharp drop in owls. military production in connection with the capture by the Nazis of a significant part of the territory of the USSR.

From summer to October 1942, deliveries along the northern route were suspended due to the defeat of the PQ-17 caravan by the Nazis and the Allies' preparations for a landing in North Africa. The main flow of supplies came in 1943-44, when a radical turning point in the war had already been reached. Nevertheless, the deliveries of the allies provided not only material assistance, but also political and moral support for the owls. people in the war with Nazi Germany.

According to American official data, at the end of September 1945, 14,795 aircraft, 7,056 tanks, 8,218 anti-aircraft guns, 131,000 machine guns, 140 submarine hunters, 46 minesweepers, 202 torpedo boats, 30,000 radio stations, etc. were sent from the USA to the USSR. More than 7 thousand aircraft received from Great Britain, St. 4 thousand tanks, 385 anti-aircraft guns, 12 minesweepers, etc.; 1188 tanks delivered from Canada.

In addition to weapons, the USSR received from the United States under Lend-Lease cars (more than 480 thousand trucks and cars), tractors, motorcycles, ships, locomotives, wagons, food and other goods. Aviation squadron, regiment, division, which were consistently commanded by A.I. Pokryshkin, from 1943 until the end of the war, flew American P-39 Airacobra fighters. American Studebaker trucks were used as chassis for rocket artillery combat vehicles (Katyushas).

Unfortunately, some of the Allied supplies did not reach the USSR, because they were destroyed by the Nazi Navy and the Luftwaffe during sea crossings of transports.

Several routes were used for deliveries to the USSR. Almost 4 million cargoes were delivered via the northern route from the UK and Iceland to Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Molotovsk (Severodvinsk), which accounted for 27.7% of the total deliveries. The second route is through the South Atlantic, the Persian Gulf and Iran to the Soviet. Transcaucasia; it was transported to St. 4.2 million cargo (23.8%).

For the assembly and preparation of aircraft for flight from Iran to the USSR, intermediate air bases were used, where British, American and Soviet aircraft worked. specialists. On the Pacific route, ships from the USA to the Far Eastern ports of the USSR went under the owls. flags and with owls. captains (because the US was at war with Japan). Cargoes arrived in Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Nakhodka, Khabarovsk. The Pacific route was the most efficient in terms of volume - 47.1%.

Another route was the air route from Alaska to Eastern Siberia, along which American and owls. pilots delivered 7.9 thousand aircraft to the USSR. The length of the air route reached 14 thousand km.

Since 1945, the route through the Black Sea has also been used.

In total, from June 1941 to Sept. In 1945, 17.5 million tons of various cargoes were sent to the USSR, 16.6 million tons were delivered to their destination (the rest was losses during the sinking of ships). After the surrender of Germany, the United States stopped Lend-Lease deliveries to the European part of the USSR, but continued them for some time to the Soviet Union. Far East in connection with the war against Japan.

Importance of supplies

Your decision, Mr. President, to provide the Soviet Union with an interest-free loan in the amount of $ 1,000,000,000 to ensure the supply of military equipment and raw materials to the Soviet Union was accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude, as vital assistance to the Soviet Union in its huge and difficult struggle against a common enemy - bloody Hitlerism.

original text(English)

Your decision, Mr. President, to grant the Soviet Union an interest-free loan to the value of $1,000,000,000 to meet deliveries of munitions and raw materials to the Soviet Union is accepted by the Soviet Government with heartfelt gratitude as vital aid to the Soviet Union in its tremendously and onerous struggle against our common enemy bloody Hitlerism.

The first official historical assessment of the role of lend-lease was given by Gosplan Chairman Nikolai Voznesensky in his book "The Military Economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War", published in 1948:

... if we compare the size of the deliveries of industrial goods to the USSR by the allies with the size of industrial production at the socialist enterprises of the USSR for the same period, it turns out that the share of these deliveries in relation to domestic production during the period of the war economy will be only about 4%.

The 4% figure was published without further comment and raised many questions. In particular, it was not clear how Voznesensky and his staff calculated these percentages. Estimating Soviet GDP in monetary terms was difficult due to the lack of convertibility of the ruble. If the bill went to units of production, then it is not clear how tanks were compared with aircraft, and food - with aluminum.

Voznesensky himself was soon arrested in the Leningrad case and shot in 1950, so he could not comment. Nevertheless, the figure of 4% was subsequently widely quoted in the USSR as reflecting the official point of view on the significance of Lend-Lease.

He highly appreciated the role of lend-lease and A. I. Mikoyan, who during the war was responsible for the work of seven allied people's commissariats (trade, procurement, food, fish and meat and dairy industries, maritime transport and the river fleet) and, as the people's commissar for foreign trade of the country, with 1942, who led the reception of allied Lend-Lease supplies:

- ... when we began to receive American stew, combined fat, egg powder, flour, and other products, what significant additional calories our soldiers immediately received! And not only the soldiers: something also fell to the rear.

Or take car deliveries. After all, we received, as far as I remember, taking into account the losses along the way, about 400,000 first-class cars of the Studebaker, Ford, Jeeps and amphibians type for that time. Our entire army actually turned out to be on wheels and what wheels! As a result, its maneuverability increased and the pace of the offensive increased noticeably.

Yes…” Mikoyan drawled thoughtfully. - Without lend-lease, we would probably have fought for another year and a half extra.

The lend-lease program was mutually beneficial both for the USSR (and other recipient countries) and for the United States. In particular, the United States won the necessary time to mobilize its own military-industrial complex.

Lend-Lease debts and their payment

Immediately after the war, the United States sent a proposal to the countries receiving lend-lease assistance to return the surviving military equipment and pay off the debt in order to obtain new loans. Since the Lend-Lease law provided for the write-off of used military equipment and materials, the Americans insisted on paying only for civilian supplies: rail transport, power plants, steamships, trucks and other equipment that was in the recipient countries as of September 2, 1945. The United States did not demand compensation for the military equipment destroyed during the battles.

United Kingdom

The volume of UK debt to the US amounted to $4.33 billion, to Canada - $1.19 billion. The last payment in the amount of $83.25 million (in favor of the USA) and $22.7 million (Canada) was made on December 29.

China

China's debt to the United States for lend-lease deliveries amounted to $187 million. Since 1979, the United States has recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, and therefore the heir to all previous agreements (including lend-lease deliveries). Nevertheless, in 1989, the US demanded that Taiwan (not the PRC) repay its Lend-Lease debt. The further fate of Chinese debt is not clear.

USSR (Russia)

The volume of American lend-lease deliveries amounted to about 11 billion US dollars. According to the Lend-Lease law, only equipment that survived during the war was subject to payment; to agree on the final amount, immediately after the end of the war, Soviet-American negotiations began. At the 1948 negotiations, the Soviet representatives agreed to pay only a small amount and were met with a predictable refusal from the American side. The 1949 negotiations also came to nothing. In 1951, the Americans twice reduced the amount of the payment, which became equal to $800 million, but the Soviet side agreed to pay only $300 million. According to the Soviet government, the calculation should have been carried out not in accordance with the real debt, but on the basis of a precedent. This precedent was supposed to be the proportions in determining the debt between the United States and Great Britain, which were fixed as early as March 1946.

An agreement with the USSR on the procedure for repaying lend-lease debts was concluded only in 1972. Under this agreement, the USSR undertook to pay $722 million by 2001, including interest. By July 1973, three payments were made for a total of $48 million, after which the payments were terminated due to the introduction by the American side of discriminatory measures in trade with the USSR (Jackson-Vanik Amendment). In June 1990, during the talks between the presidents of the USA and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing the debt. A new deadline for the final repayment of the debt was set - 2030, and the amount - $674 million.

Thus, out of the total volume of US lend-lease deliveries of $11 billion, the USSR, and then Russia, paid $722 million, or about 7%.

However, it should be noted that, taking into account the inflationary depreciation of the dollar, this figure will be significantly (many times) less. So, by 1972, when the amount of debt for lend-lease in the amount of $722 million was agreed with the United States, the dollar had depreciated 2.3 times since 1945. However, in 1972, only $48 million was paid to the USSR, and an agreement to pay the remaining $674 million was reached in June 1990, when the purchasing power of the dollar was already 7.7 times lower than at the end of 1945. Given the payment of $674 million in 1990, the total amount of Soviet payments in 1945 prices amounted to about 110 million US dollars, i.e. about 1% of the total cost of lend-lease supplies. But most of what was delivered was either destroyed by the war, or, like shells, was spent on the needs of the war, or, at the end of the war, in accordance with the lend-lease law, returned to the United States.

France

On May 28, 1946, France signed a package of agreements with the United States (the so-called Blum-Byrnes accords) that settled the French debt for Lend-Lease supplies in exchange for a number of trade concessions from France. In particular, France has significantly increased the quotas for showing foreign (primarily American) films on the French film market.

Notes

1. Using the USSR as an example, Lend-Lease received materials worth $11.3 billion, of which less than 1% was paid. The remaining 99% were actually received free of charge - for more details, see the section Lend-Lease Debts and Their Payment
2. Mutual Aid Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: June 11, 1942
3. For example, by denying the USSR the supply of such scarce raw materials as duralumin and tungsten, the United States supplied them to the Third Reich.
4. The recalculation was made on the basis of official data on inflation in the United States for 1913-2008 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (USA)
5. "The Big "L"--American Logistics in World War II", Alan Gropman, 1997, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC
6. Leo T. Crowley, "Lend Lease" in Walter Yust, ed. 10 Eventful Years (1947) 2: 858-60; 1:520
7. “The USSR has repeatedly recognized the enormous importance of the equipment and materials necessary for the conduct of hostilities that came from the United States with the participation of England to the Soviet Union. But in 1942, the agreed plans for these deliveries were only 55 percent fulfilled. In the most difficult time of preparation for the Kursk operation (in Washington and London they knew about this work), deliveries were interrupted for 9 months and resumed only in September 1943. Such a long break is not a technical issue, but a political one!” (O. B. Rakhmanin,). See also .
8. Vishnevsky A. G. Sickle and ruble. Conservative modernization in the USSR. Moscow, 1998, ch. ten
9. The First Lend-Lease Protocol was signed between the USSR and the USA, in the amount of $ 1 billion, valid until 06/30/1942.
10. The Reichstag speech of December 11, 1941: Hitler's declaration of war against the United States
11. http://publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/K/KUMANEV_Georgiy_Aleksandrovich/Govoryat_stalinskie_narkomy.(2005).%5Bdoc%5D.zip
12. Paperno A.L. Lend-Lease. Pacific Ocean. M., 1998. S. 10
13. Zaostrovtsev G. A. "Northern Convoys: Research, memories, documents", Arkhangelsk 1991. part 27
14. V. Zimonin "Lend-Lease: how it was", 10/26/2006, the newspaper "Red Star"
15. Leo T. Crowley, "Lend Lease" in Walter Yust, ed. 10 Eventful Years (1947) 2: 858-60; 1:520
16. Correspondence of Roosevelt and Truman with Stalin on Lend Lease and Other Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945
17. Voznesensky N. Military economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War. - M.: Gospolitizdat, 1948
18. Artem Krechetnikov, "Garden Hose" by Franklin Roosevelt, June 29, 2007, BBCRussian.com
19. From the report of the chairman of the KGB V. Semichastny - N. S. Khrushchev; stamp "top secret" // Zenkovich N. Ya. Marshals and general secretaries. M., 1997. S. 161-162
20. G. Kumanev "Stalin's people's commissars are talking", p. 70 - Smolensk: Rusich, 2005
21. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
22. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
23. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6248000/6248720.stm
24. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
25. Federal Agency for State Reserves, "Reserves during the Great Patriotic War"
26. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6248000/6248720.stm
27. http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/04.html
28. V. Gakov "The Green Price of Victory", "Money" Magazine No. 23, 06/2002

It’s worth starting with the “deciphering” of the very term “lend-lease”, although for this it is enough to look into the English-Russian dictionary. So, lend - "to lend", lease - "to lease". It was under such conditions that the United States during the Second World War transferred military equipment, weapons, ammunition, equipment, strategic raw materials, food, various goods and services to the allies in the Anti-Hitler coalition. These conditions will still have to be remembered at the end of the article.

The Lend-Lease Act was passed by the U.S. Congress on March 11, 1941, and authorized the President to grant the above species to countries whose "defence against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States." The calculation is clear: to protect yourself with the hands of others and to preserve your strength as much as possible.

Lend-Lease deliveries in 1939-45. received 42 countries, US spending on them amounted to more than 46 billion dollars (13% of all military spending of the country during the Second World War). The main volume of supplies (about 60%) fell on the British Empire; Against this background, the share of the USSR, whose share fell the brunt of the war, is more than indicative: slightly more than 1/3 of the British supplies. The largest part of the remaining deliveries came from France and China.

Even in the Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, it was said about the desire "to supply the USSR with the maximum amount of those materials that it needs most of all." Although the United States officially signed the supply agreement with the USSR on July 11, 1942, the effect of the Lend-Lease Law was extended to the USSR by a presidential decree on November 7, 1941 (obviously "for the holiday"). Even earlier, on 10/01/41, an agreement was signed in Moscow between England, the USA and the USSR on mutual deliveries for a period up to 06/30/42. Subsequently, such agreements (they were called "Protocols") were renewed annually.

But again, even earlier, on August 31, 1941, the first caravan under the code name "Dervish" arrived in Arkhangelsk, and more or less systematic Lend-Lease deliveries began in November 1941. At first, sea convoys arriving in Arkhangelsk, Murmansk were the main delivery method. and Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk). In total, 1530 transports followed this route, consisting of 78 convoys (42 - to the USSR, 36 - back). By the actions of submarines and aviation of Nazi Germany, 85 transports (including 11 Soviet ships) were sunk, and 41 transports were forced to return to their original base.

Our country highly appreciates and honors the courageous feat of the sailors of Britain and other allied countries who participated in the escort and protection of convoys along the Northern route.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEND-LEASE FOR THE USSR

For the Soviet Union, which fought against an exceptionally strong aggressor, the supply of military equipment, weapons and ammunition was primarily important, especially considering their huge losses in 1941. It is believed that according to this nomenclature, the USSR received: 18,300 aircraft, 11,900 tanks, 13,000 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, 427,000 vehicles, a large amount of ammunition, explosives and gunpowder. (However, the figures given may vary considerably from source to source.)

But we did not always get exactly what we especially needed, and within the agreed time frame (besides inevitable combat losses, there were other reasons for this). So, in the most difficult period for us (October - December 1941), the USSR was underdelivered: aircraft - 131, tanks - 513, wedges - 270 and a whole range of cargoes. For the period from October 1941 to the end of June 1942 (the terms of the 1st Protocol), the United States fulfilled its obligations for: bombers - by less than 30%, fighters - by 31%, medium tanks - by 32%, light tanks - by 37%, trucks - by 19.4% (16,502 instead of 85,000).

SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT UNDER LEND-LEASE

This type of supply, of course, was of paramount importance. Lend-lease aircraft came mainly from the United States, although a certain part (and a lot) also came from the UK. The figures indicated in the table may not coincide with other sources, but they very clearly illustrate the dynamics and range of aircraft deliveries.

In terms of their flight performance, the Lend-Lease aircraft were far from equivalent.

So. the American Kittyhawk fighter and the English Hurricane, as A.I. Shakhurin in September 1941, "are not the latest examples of American and British technology"; in fact, they were significantly inferior to the German fighters in terms of speed and armament. "Harry-Kane", moreover, had an unreliable engine: due to its failure in battle, the famous pilot from the North Sea, twice Hero of the Soviet Union B.F. Safonov. Soviet pilots frankly called this fighter a "flying coffin."

The American fighter Airacobra, on which the Hero of the Soviet Union A.I. Pokryshkin fought three times, was practically not inferior to the German Me-109 and FV-190 in speed and had powerful weapons (37-mm air cannon and 4 machine guns 12.7 mm), which, according to Pokryshkin, "broke the German planes to smithereens." But due to miscalculations in the design of the "Aircobra", with complex evolutions during the battle, it often fell into a hard-to-remove "flat" tailspin, deformation of the fuselage "Aerocob-Of course, such an ace as Pokryshkin brilliantly coped with a capricious aircraft, but among ordinary pilots There were many accidents and disasters.

The Soviet government was forced to present a claim to the manufacturer ("Bell"), but she rejected it. Only when our test pilot A. Kochetkov was sent to the USA, who over the airfield of the company and in front of its management demonstrated the deformation of the Aerocobra fuselage in the tail area (he himself managed to jump out with a parachute), the company had to redesign the design of his car. The improved model of the fighter, which received the designation P-63 "Kingcobra", began to arrive at the final stage of the war, in 1944-45, when our industry mass-produced excellent Yak-3, La-5, La-7 fighters, which surpassed the American ones in terms of characteristics.

A comparison of the characteristics shows that American vehicles were not inferior to the German ones of the same type in terms of basic indicators: the bombers also had an important advantage - night vision bomb sights, which the German Yu-88 and Xe-111 did not have. Yes, and the defensive weapons of the American bombers were machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber (for the German ones - 7.92), and their number was large.

The combat use and technical operation of American and British aircraft, of course, brought a lot of worries, but our technicians relatively quickly learned not only to prepare "foreigners" for combat missions, but also to repair them. Moreover, on the part of British aircraft, Soviet specialists managed to replace their rather weak machine guns of 7.71 mm caliber with more powerful domestic weapons.

Speaking of aviation, one cannot fail to mention the provision of fuel. As you know, the shortage of aviation gasoline was an acute problem for our Air Force even in peacetime, holding back the intensity of combat training in combat units and training in flight schools. During the war years, the USSR received under Lend-Lease 630 thousand tons of aviation gasoline from the USA, and more than 570 thousand more from Great Britain and Canada. 1941 - 1945. Thus, one has to agree with the statement of the historian B. Sokolov that without fuel imports, Soviet aviation would not have been able to operate effectively in the operations of the Great Patriotic War. Unprecedented was the difficulty of ferrying aircraft from the United States "under its own power" to the Soviet Union. Particularly long - 14,000 km) was the ALSIB air route (Alaska-Siberia), laid in 1942 from Fairbanks (USA) to Krasnoyarsk and beyond. The uninhabited expanses of the Far North and taiga Siberia, frosts up to 60 and even 70 degrees, unpredictable weather with unexpected fogs and snow loads made ALSIB the most difficult haul route. The ferry air division of the Soviet Air Force operated here, and, probably, more than one of our pilots laid down his young head not in battle with the aces of the Luftwaffe, but on the ALSIBA track, but his feat is as glorious as that of the front. 43% of all aircraft received from the United States passed through this air route.

Already in October 1942, the first group of American A-20 Boston bombers was overtaken by ALSIB near Stalingrad. Aircraft made in the USA could not withstand the severe Siberian frosts - rubber products burst. The Soviet government urgently provided the Americans with a recipe for frost-resistant rubber - only this saved the situation ...

With the organization of the delivery of goods by sea across the South Atlantic to the Persian Gulf and the creation of aircraft assembly workshops there, aircraft began to be ferried from the airfields of Iran and Iraq to the North Caucasus. The southern air route was also difficult: mountainous terrain, unbearable heat, sandstorms. 31% of the aircraft received from the United States was transported through it.

In general, it must be admitted that the supply of aircraft under Lend-Lease to the USSR undoubtedly played a positive role in intensifying the combat operations of the Soviet Air Force. It is also worth considering that although on average foreign aircraft accounted for no more than 15% of their domestic production, for certain types of aircraft this percentage was significantly higher: for front-line bombers - 20%, for front-line fighters - from 16 to 23%, and for naval aircraft aviation - 29% (especially the sailors noted the Catalina flying boat), which looks very significant.

ARMORED VEHICLES

In terms of importance for military operations, in terms of the number and level of vehicles, tanks, of course, took second place in Lend-Lease deliveries. We are talking specifically about tanks, since the supply of self-propelled guns was not very significant. And again, it must be noted that the corresponding figures fluctuate quite significantly in different sources.

"Soviet Military Encyclopedia" gives the following data on tanks (pieces): USA - about 7000; Great Britain - 4292; Canada - 1188; total - 12480.

The reference dictionary "The Great Patriotic War 1941 - 45" gives the total number of tanks received under Lend-Lease - 10800 units.

The latest edition of Russia and the USSR in Wars and Conflicts of the 20th Century (M, 2001) gives the figure of 11,900 tanks, as does the latest edition of The Great Patriotic War 1941-45 (M, 1999).

So, the number of Lend-Lease tanks amounted to about 12% of the total number of tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the Red Army during the war (109.1 thousand units).

ENGLISH TANKS

They made up most of the first lots of Lend-Lease armored vehicles (together with two types of American tanks of the M3 series). These were combat vehicles designed to escort infantry.

"Valentine" Mk 111

It was considered infantry, weighing 16.5 -18 tons; armor - 60 mm, gun 40 mm (on parts of tanks -57 mm), speed 32 - 40 km / h (different engines). On the fronts, it proved to be positive: having a low silhouette, it had good reliability, comparative simplicity of device and maintenance. True, our repairmen had to weld “spurs” onto the Valentine’s tracks to increase cross-country ability (tea, not Europe). They were delivered from England - 2400 pieces, from Canada - 1400 (according to other sources - 1180).

"Matilda" Mk IIA

By class, it was a medium tank weighing 25 tons, with good armor (80 mm), but a weak 40 mm caliber gun; speed - no more than 25 km / h. Disadvantages - the possibility of loss of mobility in the event of freezing of dirt that has fallen into the closed undercarriage, which is unacceptable in combat conditions. A total of 1,084 Matildas were delivered to the Soviet Union.

"Churchill" Mk III

Although it was considered infantry, by weight (40-45 tons) it belonged to the heavy class. It had a clearly unsatisfactory layout - the caterpillar bypass covered the hull, which sharply worsened the visibility of the driver in battle. With strong armor (board - 95 mm, forehead of the hull - up to 150), it did not have powerful weapons (the guns were installed mainly 40 - 57 mm, only for some vehicles - 75 mm). Low speed (20-25 km / h), poor maneuverability, limited visibility reduced the effect of strong armor, although Soviet tankers noted the good combat survivability of the Churchills. There were 150 of them delivered. (according to other sources - 310 pieces).

Diesel engines were installed on the Valentines and Matildas, and carburetors on the Churchills.

AMERICAN TANKS

For some reason, the M3 index denoted two American tanks at once: the light M3 - "General Stuart" and the medium M3 - "General Lee", aka "General Grant" (in everyday life - "Lee / Grant").

MZ "Stuart"

Weight - 12.7 tons, armor 38-45 mm, speed - 48 km / h, armament - 37 mm caliber gun, carburetor engine. With good armor for a light tank and speed, one has to note reduced maneuverability due to the characteristics of the transmission and poor maneuverability due to insufficient adhesion of the tracks to the ground. Delivered to the USSR - 1600 pcs.

M3 "Lee / Grant"

Weight - 27.5 tons, armor - 57 mm, speed - 31 km / h, armament: 75 mm cannon in the sponson of the hull and 37 mm cannon in the turret, 4 machine guns. The layout of the tank (high silhouette) and the location of the weapons were extremely unfortunate. The bulkiness of the design and the placement of weapons in three tiers (which forced the crew to be brought up to 7 people) made the Grant a fairly easy prey for enemy artillery. Aviation gasoline engine exacerbated the situation of the crew. We called it "a mass grave for seven." Nevertheless, in late 1941 - early 1942, 1400 of them were delivered; in that difficult period, when Stalin personally distributed the tanks individually, and the "Grants" were at least some kind of help. Since 1943, the Soviet Union has abandoned them.

The most effective (and, accordingly, popular) American tank of the period 1942 - 1945. the medium tank M4 "Sherman" appeared. In terms of production during the war (a total of 49324 were produced in the USA), it ranks second after our T-34. It was produced in several modifications (from M4 to M4A6) with different engines, both diesel and carburetor, including twin engines and even blocks of 5 engines. Under Lend-Lease, we were supplied mainly with M4A2 Shsrmams with two 210 hp diesel engines, which had different cannon armament: 1990 tanks - with a 75-mm gun, which turned out to be insufficiently effective, and 2673 - with a 76.2 mm caliber gun, capable of hitting armor 100 mm thick at ranges up to 500 m.

"Sherman" М4А2

Weight - 32 tons, armor: hull forehead - 76 mm, turret forehead - 100 mm, side - 58 mm, speed - 45 km / h, gun - indicated above. 2 machine guns caliber 7.62 mm and anti-aircraft 12.7 mm; crew - 5 people (like our modernized T-34-85).

A characteristic feature of the Sherman was a removable (bolted) cast front (lower) part of the body, which served as a cover for the transmission compartment. An important advantage was given by a device for stabilizing the gun in a vertical plane for more accurate shooting on the move (it was introduced on Soviet tanks only in the early 1950s - on the T-54A). The electro-hydraulic turret traverse mechanism was duplicated for the gunner and commander. A large-caliber anti-aircraft machine gun made it possible to deal with low-flying enemy aircraft (a similar machine gun appeared on the Soviet heavy tank IS-2 only in 1944.

For its time, the Sherman had sufficient mobility, satisfactory armament and armor. The disadvantages of the car were: poor roll stability, insufficient reliability of the power plant (which was an advantage of our T-34) and relatively poor cross-country ability on slippery and frozen soils, until during the war the Americans replaced the Sherman caterpillars with wider ones, with spurs - lugs. Nevertheless, in general, according to tankers, it was a completely reliable combat vehicle, easy to set up and maintain, very maintainable, since it made the most use of automotive units and components well mastered by American industry. Together with the famous "thirty-fours", although somewhat inferior to them in certain characteristics, the American "Shermans" with Soviet crews actively participated in all major operations of the Red Army in 1943-1945, reaching the coast of the Baltic, to the Danube, Vistula, Spree and Elba.

The sphere of Lend-Lease armored vehicles should also include 5,000 American armored personnel carriers (half-tracked and wheeled), which were used in the Red Army, including as carriers of various weapons, especially anti-aircraft for air defense of rifle units (their armored personnel carriers during the Patriotic War in the USSR not produced, only reconnaissance armored cars BA-64K were made).

AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT

Automotive equipment supplied to the USSR in quantity exceeded all military equipment not at times, but by an order of magnitude: in total, 477,785 vehicles of fifty models were received, manufactured by 26 automobile firms in the USA, England and Canals.

In total, 152,000 Studebaker trucks of the US 6x4 and US 6x6 brands, as well as 50,501 command vehicles ("jeeps") of the Willys MP and Ford GPW models were delivered; it is also necessary to mention the powerful Dodge-3/4 all-terrain vehicles with a carrying capacity of 3/4 tons (hence the number in the marking). These models were real army models, most adapted to front-line operation (as you know, we did not produce army vehicles until the early 1950s, the Red Army used ordinary national economic vehicles GAZ-AA and ZIS-5).

Deliveries of Lend-Lease vehicles, which exceeded their own production in the USSR by more than 1.5 times during the war years (265 thousand units), were certainly of decisive importance for a sharp increase in the mobility of the Red Army during large-scale operations in 1943-1945 . After all, for 1941-1942. The Red Army lost 225,000 vehicles, which were halfway missing even in peacetime.

The American Studebakers, with strong metal bodies that had folding benches and removable canvas awnings, were equally suitable for transporting personnel and various cargoes. Possessing high-speed qualities on the highway and high off-road maneuverability, the US 6x6 Studebakers also worked well as tractors for various artillery systems.

When deliveries of the Studebakers began, the BM-13-N Katyushas began to be mounted only on their all-terrain chassis, and from 1944 - the BM-31-12 for heavy M31 rockets.

It is impossible not to mention the tires, of which 3606 thousand were delivered - more than 30% of the domestic tire production. To this we must add 103 thousand tons of natural rubber from the "bins" of the British Empire, and again recall the supply of light fraction gasoline, which was added to ours, "native" (which was required by Studebaker engines).

OTHER EQUIPMENT, RAW MATERIALS

Deliveries from the United States of rolling stock and rails helped in many ways to solve our transport problems during the war years. Almost 1,900 steam locomotives were delivered (we ourselves built 92 (!) steam locomotives in 1942-1945) and 66 diesel-electric locomotives, as well as 11,075 wagons (with our own production of 1087). The supply of rails (if you count only broad gauge rails) accounted for more than 80% of their domestic production during this period - the metal was needed for defense purposes. Taking into account the extremely hard work of the railway transport of the USSR in 1941 - 1945, the importance of these deliveries can hardly be overestimated.

As for communication equipment, 35,800 radio stations, 5,839 receivers and 348 locators, 422,000 telephone sets and about a million kilometers of field telephone cable were delivered from the USA, which basically satisfied the needs of the Red Army during the war.

Of certain importance for providing the USSR with food (of course, primarily for the army in the field) were also deliveries of a number of high-calorie foods (4.3 million tons in total). In particular, the supply of sugar accounted for 42% of its own production in those years, and canned meat - 108%. Even though our soldiers nicknamed the American stew mockingly “the second front”, they ate it with pleasure (although their own beef was still tastier!). To equip the fighters, 15 million pairs of shoes and 69 million square meters of woolen fabrics became very useful.

In the work of the Soviet defense industry in those years, the supply of raw materials, materials and equipment under Lend-Lease also meant a lot - after all, in 1941, large production facilities for smelting iron, steel, aluminum, the production of explosives and gunpowder remained in the occupied areas. Therefore, the supply of 328 thousand tons of aluminum from the USA (which exceeded its own production), the supply of copper (80% of its smelting) and 822 thousand tons of chemical products were, of course, of great importance "as well as the supply of steel sheet (our" one and a half and “three-tons” were made in the war with wooden cabins precisely because of the shortage of sheet steel) and artillery gunpowder (used as an additive to domestic ones). Deliveries of high-performance equipment had a tangible impact on raising the technical level of domestic mechanical engineering: 38,000 machine tools from the USA and 6,500 from Great Britain worked for a long time after the war.

ARTILLERY GUNS

The smallest number of Lend-Lease deliveries turned out to be the classic types of weapons - artillery and small arms. It is believed that the share of artillery pieces (according to various sources - 8000, 9800 or 13000 pieces) was only 1.8% of the number produced in the USSR, but if we consider that most of them were anti-aircraft guns, then their share in similar domestic production for war time (38000) will rise to a quarter. Anti-aircraft guns from the United States were supplied in two types: 40-mm automatic guns "Bofors" (Swedish design) and 37-mm automatic "Colt-Browning" (actually American). The Bofors were the most effective - they had hydraulic drives and therefore were induced by the entire battery at the same time using the AZO launcher (artillery anti-aircraft fire control device); but these tools (in the complex) were very complex and expensive to manufacture, which was only possible for the developed US industry.

SUPPLY OF SMALL ARMS

In terms of small arms, the deliveries were simply meager (151,700 units, which amounted to about 0.8% of our production) and did not play any role in the armament of the Red Army.

Among the samples supplied to the USSR: the American Colt M1911A1 pistol, Thompson and Reising submachine guns, as well as Browning machine guns: easel M1919A4 and large-caliber M2 HB; English light machine gun "Bran", anti-tank guns "Boys" and "Piat" (English tanks were also equipped with machine guns "Beza" - an English modification of the Czechoslovak ZB-53).

At the fronts, samples of Lend-Lease small arms were very rare and not very popular. American "Thompsons" and "Raising" our soldiers sought to quickly replace the familiar PPSh-41. The Boys PTR turned out to be clearly weaker than the domestic PTRD and PTRS - they could only fight German armored personnel carriers and light tanks (there was no information about the effectiveness of the Piat PTR in parts of the Red Army).

The most effective in their class were, of course, the American Brownings: the M1919A4 were mounted on American armored personnel carriers, and the large-caliber M2 HBs were mainly used as part of anti-aircraft installations, quad (4 machine guns M2 HB) and built-in (37-mm anti-aircraft gun "Colt -Browning" and two M2 HB). These installations, mounted on Lend-Lease armored personnel carriers, were very effective means of air defense for rifle units; they were also used for anti-aircraft defense of some objects.

We will not touch on the naval nomenclature of Lend-Lease deliveries, although these were large quantities in terms of volume: in total, the USSR received 596 ships and vessels (not counting captured ships received after the war).

In total, 17.5 million tons of Lend-Lease cargo were delivered along ocean routes, of which 1.3 million tons were lost from the actions of Hitler's submarines and aviation; the number of heroes-sailors of many countries who died at the same time has more than one thousand people. Deliveries were distributed along the following delivery routes: the Far East - 47.1%, the Persian Gulf - 23.8%, Northern Russia - 22.7%, the Black Sea - 3.9%, along the Northern Sea Route) - 2.5%.

RESULTS AND ASSESSMENTS OF LEND-LISA

For a long time, Soviet historians only pointed out that Lend-Lease deliveries amounted to only 4% of the output of domestic industry and agriculture during the war years. True, from the data presented above it is clear that in many cases it is important to take into account the specific range of equipment samples, their quality indicators, the timeliness of delivery to the front, their significance, etc.

As repayment for Lend-Lease supplies, the United States received various goods and services worth $7.3 billion from allied countries. The USSR, in particular, sent 300 thousand tons of chromium and 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, and in addition, platinum, gold, furs and other goods for a total of $ 2.2 million. The USSR also provided the Americans with a number of services, in particular , opened its northern ports, took over the partial provision of the Allied troops in Iran.

08/21/45 The United States of America stopped Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR. The Soviet government turned to the United States with a request to continue part of the supplies on the terms of a loan to the USSR, but was refused. A new era was coming... If most of the other countries' debts on supplies were written off, then negotiations on these issues with the Soviet Union were conducted in 1947-1948, 1951-1952 and in 1960.

The total amount of lend-lease deliveries to the USSR is estimated at $11.3 billion. At the same time, according to the law on lend-lease, only goods and equipment that have survived after the end of hostilities are subject to payment. Such Americans were estimated at 2.6 billion dollars, although a year later they reduced this amount by half. Thus, initially the US demanded compensation in the amount of $1.3 billion, paid over 30 years with an accrual of 2.3% per annum. But Stalin rejected these demands, saying, "The USSR paid off its Lend-Lease debts in full with blood." The fact is that many models of equipment supplied to the USSR immediately after the war turned out to be morally obsolete and no longer represented any combat value. That is, American assistance to the allies in some way turned out to be a “pushing” of equipment that the Americans themselves did not need and became morally obsolete, for which, nevertheless, it was necessary to pay off as something useful.

To understand what Stalin meant when he spoke of "payment in blood" , should be quoted excerpt from an article by a professor at the University of Kansas Wilson: “What America experienced during the war is fundamentally different from the trials that befell its main allies. Only Americans could name World War II "good war", since it helped to significantly raise living standards and demanded too few victims from the overwhelming majority of the population ... ”And Stalin was not going to take away resources from his already war-ravaged country in order to give them to a potential enemy in World War III.

Negotiations on the repayment of Lend-Lease debts resumed in 1972, and on 10/18/72 an agreement was signed on the payment by the Soviet Union of 722 million dollars, until 07/01/01. $48 million was paid, but after the Americans introduced the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the USSR suspended further Lend-Lease payments.

In 1990, at new negotiations between the presidents of the USSR and the USA, the final maturity of the debt was agreed upon - 2030. However, a year later the USSR collapsed, and the debt was "reissued" to Russia. By 2003, it was about $100 million. Adjusted for inflation, the US is unlikely to receive more than 1% of its original cost for its supplies.

(The material was prepared for the site "Wars of the XX century" © http: //site under article H. Aksenova, magazine "Arms". When copying an article, please do not forget to link to the source page of the Wars of the XX Century website).

“Few people know that military supplies under Lend-Lease (lend-lease) were not at all free for rent - Russia, as the assignee of the USSR, paid the last debts on them already in 2006,” writes historian and publicist Yevgeny Spitsyn.

In the issue of lend-lease (from English lend - to lend and lease - to rent, hire - ed.) For the USSR, there are many subtleties that it would be nice to understand - on the basis of historical documents.

Part I

Not exactly free

The Lend-Lease Act or the "Law for the Defense of the United States", which was passed by the US Congress on March 11, 1941, gave the President of the United States "the right to lend or lease to other states various goods and materials necessary for the conduct of hostilities", if these actions, by definition of the President, were vital to the defense of the United States. Various goods and materials were understood as weapons, military equipment, ammunition, strategic raw materials, ammunition, food, civilian goods for the army and rear, as well as any information of great military importance.

The lend-lease scheme itself provided for the fulfillment by the recipient country of a number of conditions:1) materials destroyed, lost or lost during the hostilities were not subject to payment, and the property that survived and was suitable for civilian purposes had to be paid in whole or in part in order to repay a long-term loan issued by the United States itself; 2) the surviving military materials could remain with the recipient country until the United States requests them back; 3) in turn, the tenant undertook to help the United States with all the resources and information he had.

With the help of lend-lease, the administration of President F.D. Roosevelt was going to solve a number of urgent tasks, both foreign policy and domestic. Firstly, such a scheme made it possible to create new jobs in the United States itself, which had not yet fully recovered from the severe economic crisis of 1929-1933. Secondly, lend-lease allowed the US government to exert some influence on the recipient country of lend-lease assistance. Finally, thirdly, by sending his allies only weapons, materials and raw materials, but not manpower, President F.D. Roosevelt fulfilled his campaign promise: "Our guys will never participate in other people's wars."

Immediately after the signing of this program by President Roosevelt, his adviser and special representative Averell Harriman flew to London, and from there to Moscow, where on October 1, 1941, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Presidential Special Representative A. Harriman signed the First (Moscow) protocol, which marked the beginning of the spread of the Lend-Lease program to the Soviet Union.

It is not customary to talk much about the help of the allies of the USSR during the Second World War. However, it was, and was considerable. And not only within the framework of Lend-Lease. Food, medicines, military equipment were delivered to the Soviet troops.

As you know, there is only one step from love to hate. Especially in politics, where it is quite permissible to smile at those who were vilified yesterday as fiends. Here we are, if we open the Pravda newspaper for 1941 (until June 22), we will immediately find out which Americans and British were bad. They starved their own population and unleashed a war in Europe, while the chancellor of the German people, Adolf Hitler, was only defending himself ...

Well, even earlier in Pravda one could even find the words that “fascism helps the growth of the class self-consciousness of the working class” ...

And then they got really good...

But then came June 22, 1941, and literally the next day Pravda came out with reports that Winston Churchill had promised the USSR military assistance, and the US President had unfrozen Soviet deposits in American banks frozen after the war with Finland. And that's it! Articles about starvation among British workers disappeared in an instant, and Hitler turned from "Chancellor of the German people" into a cannibal.

Convoy "Dervish" and others

Of course, we don't know about all the behind-the-scenes negotiations that took place at the time; even the declassified correspondence between Stalin and Churchill does not reveal all the nuances of this difficult period of our common history. But there are facts showing that the Anglo-American allies of the USSR began to provide assistance, if not immediately, then quite timely. Already on August 12, 1941, a caravan of Dervish ships left Loch Ewe (Great Britain).

On August 31, 1941, the first transports of the Dervish convoy delivered ten thousand tons of rubber, about four thousand depth charges and magnetic mines, fifteen Hurricane-type fighters, as well as 524 military pilots from the 151st air wing of two squadrons of the royal military British Air Force.

Later, pilots even from Australia arrived on the territory of the USSR. In total, between August 1941 and May 1945, there were 78 convoys (although there were no convoys between July and September 1942 and March and November 1943). In total, about 1,400 merchant ships delivered important military materials to the USSR as part of the Lend-Lease program.

85 merchant ships and 16 warships of the Royal Navy (2 cruisers, 6 destroyers and 8 other escorts) were lost. And this is only the northern route, because the cargo flow also went through Iran, through Vladivostok, and planes from the United States were directly ferried to Siberia from Alaska. Well, and then the same Pravda reported that in honor of the victories of the Red Army and the conclusion of agreements between the USSR and Great Britain, the British were organizing festivities.

Not only and not so much convoys!

The Soviet Union received assistance from the allies not only under Lend-Lease. In the United States, the Committee for Assistance to Russians in the War (Russia War Relief) was organized.

“With the money raised, the committee purchased and sent medicines, medical preparations and equipment, food, clothing to the Red Army, the Soviet people. In total, during the war, the Soviet Union received assistance in the amount of more than one and a half billion dollars. A similar committee under the leadership of Churchill's wife operated in England, and he also bought medicines and food to help the USSR.

When Pravda wrote the truth!

On June 11, 1944, the Pravda newspaper placed a significant material on the entire page: “On the supply of weapons, strategic raw materials, industrial equipment and food to the Soviet Union by the United States of America, Great Britain and Canada”, and it was immediately reprinted by all Soviet newspapers, including local and even newspapers of individual tank armies.

It reported in detail how much was sent to us and how much cargo in tons was sailing by sea at the time the newspaper was published! Not only tanks, guns and planes were listed, but also rubber, copper, zinc, rails, flour, electric motors and presses, portal cranes and industrial diamonds!

Army shoes - 15 million pairs, 6491 metal-cutting machines and much more. It is interesting that the message made a precise division of how much was bought for cash, that is, before the adoption of the Lend-Lease program, and how much was sent after. By the way, it was precisely the fact that at the beginning of the war a lot was bought for money that gave rise to the still prevailing opinion that all Lend-Lease came to us for money, and for gold at that. No, much was paid for by "reverse lend-lease" - raw materials, but the calculation was postponed until the end of the war, since everything that was destroyed during hostilities was not subject to payment! Well, why such information was needed at this particular time is understandable. Good PR is always a useful thing! On the one hand, the citizens of the USSR found out how much they supply us with, on the other hand, the Germans found out the same thing, and those well, they simply could not help but be overcome with despondency.

How reliable are these numbers? It is obvious that it is possible. After all, if they contained incorrect data, then as soon as German intelligence would have found out, although according to some indicators, how could they declare everything else to be propaganda and, of course, Stalin, giving permission for the publication of this information, could not help but understand this!

Both quantity and quality!

In Soviet times, it was customary to scold equipment supplied under Lend-Lease. But ... it’s worth reading the same Pravda and, in particular, articles by the famous pilot Gromov about American and British aircraft, articles about the same British Matilda tanks, to make sure that during the war years all this was assessed in a completely different way than after it ended!

And how can one evaluate the powerful presses on which turrets for T-34 tanks, American drills with corundum tips or technical diamonds, which the Soviet industry did not produce at all, were stamped?! So the quantity and quality of supplies, as well as the participation of foreign technical specialists, military sailors and pilots, was very noticeable. Well, then politics intervened in this matter, the post-war conjuncture, and everything that was good during the war years immediately became bad with just a stroke of the guiding pen!