Who is Yakov Kedmi. Kedmi Yakov: biography, career, personal life

Yakov Kazakov (now Kedmi) was born on March 5, 1947. He independently came to the decision to leave for Israel; the first, having no relatives in Israel, applied to leave for Moscow; he was the first to renounce Soviet citizenship and get a publication about it in a leading American newspaper; first left Moscow; was the first to go on a hunger strike near the UN building; actively opposed the policy of "quiet diplomacy" of Israel and Nativ in relation to the USSR, against censorship in relation to emigration from the USSR; in 1978 he joined Nativ, passed all the steps of the hierarchical ladder and in 1992 headed this organization.

This interview was conducted in the summer of 2004. In subsequent years, it was repeatedly supplemented as new questions arose: Kedmi invariably and sympathetically answered the most tricky of them.

- Yasha, on June 13, 1967, you made a statement to renounce Soviet citizenship. This, as far as I know, is the first of its kind in our wave of Zionist revival. It was beautifully formulated and then spread all over the world, was quoted by a number of leading newspapers and became a part of our history. And at that time you were only 20 years old, and you did it, as far as I understood from the sources, on your birthday?

- It was June 11, 1967. I remember this well because on June 11 the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, and on that day I broke off my relations with the Soviet Union. The associative connection was like this. As for my birthday, it's a different day. This day became a holiday of all times and peoples, because on this day - March 5, I then turned 6 years old, the sun set, and Stalin gave Gd ... - I will not say his soul, because he did not have a soul, but that that he had there instead of a soul. By the time I renounced citizenship, I really turned 20 years old. By that time I had been thinking about the letter for two months already. I submitted my travel documents back in February, and since the authorities constantly refused me, I realized that nothing could be achieved by conventional methods, and began to think about alternative ones. What happened during the Six Day War was only a catalyst, but the very idea of ​​abandoning Soviet paradise was born earlier. As far as I know, no one had previously renounced Soviet citizenship on the territory of the Soviet Union. There was a case of the renunciation of Soviet citizenship by diplomat Raskolnikov in Paris in 1936 or 1937, but he was in Paris. He renounced his citizenship when he was asked to return to Moscow, and he realized what would follow.

- You graduated from a Soviet school, was a student at an institute, you were only 20 years old, where does this power, this knowledge, this understanding come from?

- This, as they say, is from Gd.

- Family, home education?

- Uh-uh ... I loved mathematics.

- What institute did you study at?

- I studied in absentia at the Institute of Transport Engineers: the family was large, three children, and I was the eldest and had to work. There was no money for full-time studies.

- You were born in Moscow?

- What about parents?

- Mom was born in Moscow, and father in Smolensk.

- Education?

- Engineering and technical workers.

- An assimilated family?

- Absolutely. My mother did not know Yiddish, my father spoke it with his mother, my grandmother. No tradition, nothing. The first time I brought my father to the synagogue was when I was 19 years old.

- Have you encountered anti-Semitism?

- Nothing but standard situations. The everyday anti-Semitism that was in the air was nothing more.

– Communication environment?

- Purely Russian.

- Then where? Is this a nugget?

- Hmm ... - "geek". The authorities wanted to figure out whether this is a particular phenomenon or a general phenomenon, to understand how a person came to this. The case was discussed at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Komsomol.

- Is it partly the influence of the Russian environment, the patriotism of Soviet culture?

- Perhaps, the transformation of all those principles that the authorities tried to put into us by the system of upbringing and education. Russian patriotism was transformed into Jewish. You rightly pointed out, I have nothing against it. The logic was primitively simple: if I am a Jew, then I must live in a Jewish state. If I don’t want to or I can’t, then I must somehow get rid of my Jewishness or ignore it. It was impossible to get rid of him in the Soviet Union ... in fact, the same reaction to the situation that Herzl and a number of other Jews of his time had.

- And if such an opportunity was provided, would you be ready?

- No, it was not ... When I came to this equation, a natural question arose: why should I get rid of it? How is it worse? This is mine, my ... this is "I". I accept my existence as self-sufficient and I am not going to give it up. This can only be fully realized within the framework of one's own national state. The concept of the National State in the sixties was much deeper, stronger and more unambiguous, more uncompromising than it is today. Each nation should live in its own country. True, there are multinational states such as the United States or the Soviet Union. But in both of these cases, there is a dominant influence of a particular national group. The Anglo-Saxons, although now this is not very evident, - in the United States, and the Slavs on a Russian basis - in Russia.

- You tried to apply for an exit back in February 1967. Before you served in Moscow?

- Until that time, no one applied, without relatives in Israel, such applications for leaving were not accepted. How did the process go? People, those who had direct relatives in Israel, contacted the OVIR through friends or relatives and first found out whether they could apply or not - as they did in the Baltic states, for example. Before me in Moscow, they almost never served. Those who had no relatives in Israel did not apply at all. The logic is simple: they did what had any chance of success. If there is no chance, then why engage in a hopeless and dangerous business? During the years of Soviet power, people were weaned from this.

- Did you have any relatives in Israel?

- No, nobody. It began with the fact that I went, or rather, broke through to the Israeli embassy. I, like all Soviet citizens, was sure that they would not let me into the embassy. But I was 19 years old, I rushed past a security policeman, and he did not have time to grab me. Before that, I passed him several times, looked closely, assessed the situation, calculated how he walks, in what rhythm, at what speed, when he turns. When I entered the gate from the right side, he was just at the end of the next passage to the left side of the gate and had his back to me. I darted through the gate, he turned around, but it was too late.

- Did you know any of the ambassadors?

- When it was?

- And he offered you an invitation to visit the embassy<,>or some kind of office phone in case they won't let you in?

- Nothing. I think he was sure that he would not see me again.

“Perhaps he thought you were a provocateur or an insane?”

- No, he saw me break through. He simply did not understand what this phenomenon was. Boy, 19 years old ... I didn't look older. Several years later, I had the opportunity to read his report. I did not find anything sensible in it. Then he told me: “When you left, I stood by the window and thought that it’s a pity, such a guy left, we’ll hardly ever see him, but could become a good officer of the Israeli army”.

He saw how I was leaving, as “comrades” came up to me at the exit with a swearing-rewind: “What the hell are you here ... hooliganism ... we will go to the police ...” Indescribable, you yourself understand. I tell them: "Here is my passport." "What did you do there?!" I composed a story for them that I was looking for my grandfather, who disappeared during the war, and that I asked the embassy to check if he was in Israel. I had a letter with me that he was missing. They called somewhere, then they told me to get out and no longer catch their eye, otherwise I would not be able to avoid 15 or 30 days, or they might even be expelled from Moscow. I say, "Thank you."

But they told me to come in a week. I come in a week. I am doing the same maneuver. - "Hello, I came." “Well, if you come back in another week, I’m ready to give you a challenge. But this is not a real challenge. This is a document confirming that we are ready to accept you. Does it suit you?" “Good,” I say. I go out, the policeman stops me. I hand him my passport, and he says to me: “You are running here, and I have problems because of you. They begin to disassemble me, clean, and deprive me of progressives. " And then he said to me an amazing phrase: “I have no right not to miss you. If you come humanly and they let you in, I have no right not to let you in. " I remember that. When I came for the third time, another policeman was standing. He says: "What do you want? .. Get out of here." And I told him: “You have no right not to let me in. I have an appointment. Here are my data, here you have a phone number, pass it on. " He calls on the phone ... - "Go." Everything! What turned out to be? Soviet psychology! It turns out that according to the law it was possible. To do this, it was necessary to go a little beyond the bounds and check.

- The ambassadors did not know this?

- The ambassadors did not know anything, because people did not come to them. They feared their own shadow more than they feared the Soviets. What would I do if I were in their place and what would I do later when such a problem arose? I said: "Come tomorrow at 12 o'clock exactly." At five to twelve I left the embassy and watched what would happen. If the policeman intervened, I would tell him: "Sorry, this is my guest." But he would never dare to approach.

- The Americans then escorted us in this way to their embassy.

- Then, but then no one did it, and even more so the Israelis. So I went through, took the document from them and went to the OVIR. I wrote a statement and attached a document from the embassy in which it was written that if I received permission to leave the Soviet Union, Israel was ready to accept me. This document was really needed. According to international conventions on emigration, the state that gives you the opportunity to leave must be sure that you have somewhere to enter. At first, I submitted documents to the regional OVIR, but they were not accepted there. Then I went to the city OVIR, but they were not accepted there either. They say: "Bring a call from relatives." Then I wrote a complaint, attached a statement, a copy of the Israeli document and submitted it to the city OVIR. I was summoned to the chief, Smirnov. There were two more employees with him. The general conversation, they found out, explained ... Then he says: “There is no general departure to Israel. There is departure only within the framework of family reunification. Therefore, the answer to your request is negative. " But the documents were not returned to me! I say: “Okay,” and I file a complaint with the All-Union OVIR. They summon me to the All-Union OVIR, they start to threaten me, real passions-muzzles. And this continued until I realized that you couldn't get through your comrades and that I would have to look for another way. It was then that I began to think that I might have to renounce my Soviet citizenship. I went to the embassy quite calmly as long as I wanted. When a policeman who did not know me appeared, I quickly explained to him what was what. On the day when they announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, I went to the reception room of the Supreme Council - according to the law, issues of citizenship are decided by this very body.

- Yasha, did anyone renounce citizenship before you?

- Being on the territory of the USSR - no. I went to the reception. A large hall, people are sitting, submitting applications. Most, according to conversations, are relatives of prisoners who are applying for clemency. I wrote a statement addressed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and manually made four copies. I put the main copy in an envelope and handed it through the window, and then went to the Israeli embassy to leave a copy for them.

- Have you consulted with anyone?

- Well, how to do, what to write?

- No, who could know that!

- Have you consulted with the ambassadors either?

- Didn't even consider it necessary to consult?

- No, I already understood from their behavior what kind of advice this could be. June 11 - the Six Day War had just ended, an anti-Israeli demonstration was taking place near the embassy, ​​full of police, people. I approached, and the policeman said to me: "That's it, you can't get through, the relationship is broken, we don't know who will represent Israel." Outside the gates, they rage ... they were furious that the Israeli flag was hung on the flagpole of the embassy as a sign of victory.

- And usually there was no flag?

- We weren't, we are quiet people ... I thought about it and went to the American embassy. It was more difficult there, because in front of the embassy there were lawns eight meters wide, further there was a gate, and a policeman walked in front of them. Those. to get to the gate, I had to slip another eight meters unnoticed by the policeman ... In general, I did the same trick and slipped through. The policeman managed to see me, rushed towards me, but did not have time to grab me.

- Did you understand how it could end for you?

- I understood everything. I slipped through, and he shouts to me: "Well, come here, s-bitch, I'll tear you up." I stopped and told him: "You come here, you bastard, go." He got angry, and I told him: "Well, go, go, freak, what are you?". There he hissed something else, and I turned and calmly walked on. He is not allowed to enter the embassy grounds. Now I have a different problem. I know what and where is on the embassy grounds? No.

- There are the Marines at the entrance.

- Now they are. That was not the case then. I go and ask where the consul is. They explained to me, I went in, explained to him that I had submitted documents to leave for Israel, but they refused me, they do not accept documents. I tried to go to the Israeli embassy, ​​but I was not allowed there - diplomatic relations were severed. I told him that I had applied for renunciation of Soviet citizenship, and asked to forward a copy of the application to the UN ... so that they would know if something happened. I did not know then and did not think that almost all the premises of the embassy were tapped ... I also asked if I could, in principle, ask for political asylum on the territory of the embassy, ​​if necessary. He replied that, unfortunately, they did not have such a practice and they would not be able to go for it. Okay. I leave with a feeling of accomplishment. There is already a whole company standing there, and of course me under the white hands ... You should have seen the face of that policeman! - everything was written on it ... Command: “Take off your clothes”. I undressed. - "Take off your panties?" - "Do not". They searched everything, examined everything. - "What were you at the embassy for?" I said that I was not allowed to enter the Israeli embassy, ​​and I came to find out who represents the interests of Israel. They didn't let me talk to the Israelis, I went to talk to the Americans. They: "Now we will take you to court, you will receive your 30 days, and then we will evict you from Moscow." I told them: “Do what you want. Can I get dressed? " Get dressed. I sat down and began to read the newspaper. As my late grandmother used to say - "zero attention, a pound of contempt." I sat for three hours. Phones, conversations ...

- Was it a police receiver?

- No, they had a neighborhood there, in the corner. All their superiors ran there. After all, their heads were torn off for this, and rightly so - after all, they were allowed to pass. “You screwed up, and who duped you? This "shpendrik", this little baby? Oh you, your mother ... We, your mother ... we taught you, we, your mother ... brought up, where is the vigilance? "

- By that time did they have a dossier on you?

- Of course.

- They studied him for three hours?

- No. They called the service that guards the American embassy, ​​then the second and fifth directorates of the KGB.

- What was the second department doing?

- Counterintelligence, and the fifth by dissidents. The fifth department was created anew in 1967. They put Philip Bobkov at the head. The fifth was engaged in all types of internal anti-state activities on an ideological, political and national basis. There was a Jewish department, a German department ... There was a department that dealt with the Chinese.

- Balts, Ukrainian nationalists?

- Yes, too, but it was already a different direction. The Jews have a state abroad. The Germans and the Chinese, too. Then there were the religious: Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, Muslims, the white church, the gray church, but they did not deal with Jews. Then came internal problems - nationalists of all stripes who do not have a state abroad. Then the ideological problems: Trotskyists, anarchists, dissidents, liberals. The first and second directorates were the main ones. The fifth department was not the main one, i.e. it was one rank lower.

- Was the structuring effective from your point of view?

- She was correct and effective with them. Then Bobkov, who by that time was already retired, he left in 1991 with the rank of army general and deputy chairman of the KGB, he told me ...

- Sorry, but what was your position as head of Nativ in the military hierarchy?

- In the Israeli military hierarchy, this is parallel to "aluf" - the second rank of general, that is, in Soviet terms, it corresponds to a lieutenant general. So, what was the problem of the Soviet Union? They did not have an effective apparatus for assessing the situation in relation to various anti-state, political or national movements within the country. When they created this department, they received the first analysis tool to create an effective system to control, prevent and combat these movements. Bobkov told me that he analyzed the situation and gave an analysis of the Jews, but the Central Committee did not accept his proposal. He, of course, analyzed everything else, but the situation with the Jews was more urgent. He said: "If this department had been created earlier, it would have been possible to identify the mistakes made in advance and give recommendations on how to prevent the development of the situation that began to take shape in 1967." One of the first things they put on his table was my business. When I started talking to him, he was surprised: - "Do you speak Russian?" - "Yes". “You can't tell by your last name, Kedmi.” - "You know me under a different name." - "Which?". I told him, well, here he is ... - “Yes, ah ... I remember your case. It was one of the first things they put on my table. So it's you! "

What happened? If I were just off the street, if there was nothing behind me and there was no case in the KGB, then the decision would be simple - the police, sit for 15 days. The reaction would be purely police. But it turned out that there was a KGB thing on me, a big deal. How do I know it was a big deal? When I left, I was returned to the Israeli entry permit, which I attached at one time to the application for exit. On it in the corner was the serial number of the page under which it was filed into the file - number 104. before that there were 103 more pages. Since there was a case, the police could not do anything until the curator of the case at the KGB told me what to do. Secondly, since this was a breakthrough into the embassy, ​​the second department had to react somehow as well - maybe I was a spy or an agent.

- Did they admit that spies break into the embassies like this in a hooligan way, or is it just some kind of routine?

- First, it happens. Pollard is still sitting. Three departments had to deal with my case: those who are engaged in the physical protection of foreign missions - to find out who it was and what happened; counterintelligence - check according to your criteria; the fifth control is to check on your own. Each of these three departments had to coordinate with the others, to receive from them the attitude and absence of objections, but for now sit. Well, I was sitting.

- And who concentrated all this information?

- The one whose client I was. Collectively, I was a client of the fifth department. The second checked - it does not appear, not ours. My actions were in the field of vision of the fifth department. They kept me for about five hours and released me, did nothing.

- You were lucky, maybe because you were the first such case?

- I think not. There were several circumstances. In parallel with this whole game, I met with Pavlik Litvinov, Petya Yakir. I was at Petya's house three or four times, I saw his mother, and, as usual, we drank vodka and ate cutlets, which he loved very much. I didn't think that we had to somehow coordinate our actions. “For you, what is happening to us,” I told them, “is part of the problem of the state structure and the legislative base of your country. That is, you must be aware of ... this is your concern. But your problems are not mine. I do not want and have no right to interfere with what is happening in your country. "

- Do you think that contacts with the Democrats were good for you?

- I think yes.

- The link between the Zionists and dissidents is a double threat to the authorities. What's good for a Zionist?

- Why was it good? They saw that I did not participate in any of their actions. Only once I was present in the courthouse (but not at the trial itself) in the Galanskov case, and there they photographed me. I think they understood that I just wanted to show that they knew me ... That is, it is impossible to arrest me without becoming aware of this. And if it was known, the question arose of who would react to this and how. That is, an additional element appeared, which, of course, did not cancel the use of force, but complicated its application. After I submitted my application for renunciation of citizenship, I began to expand contacts.

On June 11, after visiting the American embassy, ​​I was released. A week or two later, when it became known that the Dutch were representing Israel's interests, I went to the Dutch embassy. The first time I broke through - it was easy there, but later it was already normal. At the Dutch embassy, ​​I met with the consul and asked him to convey my appeal to the Israeli Knesset. I explained to him that since I renounced Soviet citizenship and now I have no citizenship, I am asking to be granted Israeli citizenship. I thought that if the Supreme Council deals with citizenship issues in the Union, then in Israel, by analogy, the parliament should deal with this. A month later, I was informed that my request could not be granted because Israel does not grant citizenship to Jews abroad.

- Ordinary things. I continued to study and work. They called me again ... the conversation took place at the OVIR. Interviewed by the same comrades in civilian clothes. They repeated that I was denied leave, and then began to threaten. They said that normal people do not renounce their citizenship and that I can be taken either to an insane asylum or to another equally pleasant place. I tell them: “Your strength. If you think you can do it, do it. You will try this remedy, I will try my remedies. " They say: "What will happen if we take you into the army?" “What do I have to do with your army? - I say. - I renounced citizenship. There is only one army in the world that I am willing to serve, and that is the Israeli army. " "What if there is a war with China tomorrow?" - At this time, the tension was just beginning on Damanskoye, on the border with China. "I really sympathize with you," I say, "but these are your problems, what have I to do with it?" - "You won't go to the army?" - "To fight the Chinese for you - no."

- You studied by correspondence. They could easily shave you ...

- Then there was a law that exempted from service even in evening and correspondence courses. True, according to this law, the exemption from the army was in effect until the moment a student moved from his institute to another institute. I didn’t know that then. At one time, I wrote a statement asking to leave the Komsomol in connection with the renunciation of citizenship and departure to Israel. I was expelled at a general meeting and reported about it at the place of work and study. When they informed the institute, I had just passed the exam in the first part of political economy. They explained to me that I would not be able to pass the second part of political economy. They said bluntly: "Either you leave yourself, or we will fail you in the exams." The Soviet government was very concerned about making everything look fair and cultural. Then I applied to the Polytechnic Institute for the correspondence department. I was accepted, everything is fine. I did not know that from that moment I could be summoned. When they sent me a summons from the military registration and enlistment office, I told them: "Why are you, I'm studying," and they told me: "This is the law." I said, "Okay," and I didn't go. One time I didn't go, the second time I didn't go ...

- Did you have a feeling that you will break through?

- I had a feeling that what will be will be. We started the game - it's on. Here a completely unexpected thing played along with me. August 1968. The Union sent troops to Czechoslovakia. How did this affect my destiny? They delayed the demobilization, but began another mobilization. And they had more people in the army than the army was ready to accept. As a result, in September, after I received the third summons, the recruitment was canceled.

- And you stubbornly did not follow the summons?

- No. I warned at home - I won't go. Do not take, do not sign, nothing ...

- Did your parents try to influence you?

- We tried, but it's useless.

- Did you try to put pressure on your parents? They know how ...

- No. Then my dad told me that they talked to him. He told them: “This is your school, your upbringing. I don’t want to, I’m not going anywhere, I’m working ”... The call was canceled, all things to one side.

- Well, if the KGB decided to hide you in the army, no cancellation of the draft would help you ...

- But this is bureaucracy. These think the machine is working. There is no curator there who only deals with my business every day. Agreed - that's it! Does the army take? Beret. Sends a summons to him? Sends. He will come, we will settle accounts with him. All of a sudden they postpone the autumn recruitment to the spring of 1969, and in December they publish my letter to the Washington Post. This, too, was not easy. There they said - “this cannot be!”. Nehemiah Levanon, a former Nativ representative in the United States, talked to them and persuaded them. He said: “We checked, we know ...” It took him 2-3 months to convince the newspaper, and in December this letter was printed.

- It became your permission ?!

- On December 31, I had an attack of appendicitis, I was operated on. The next morning my mother came and said that the father of our friend's boyfriend had listened to the Voice of Israel in Yiddish, and they mentioned my name and a letter. "What does it mean?" - asks. I say: "This means that I will go to the East ... to the Near or Far."

“It was published in Israel as a reprint from the Washington Post. I returned from the hospital, go downstairs for a newspaper, and there is an envelope with an invitation to the OVIR. I went, of course. The conversation was interesting. "Where is parents? Come back in a week with dad and mom. We give you permission to leave, sit down, fill out the form. " Before that, I did not fill out a single questionnaire. I looked surprised. The captain smiled and replied, “Okay. Do not. We have everything".

- Why parents?

- A young guy ... A week later I came with my parents. "Sign that you agree." They signed, of course. To me: "Come back in two days, you will receive a visa." They give me only two weeks to get ready, mom and dad are shocked: in two weeks they won't see their son again. Two days later, I receive a visa, and an employee of the OVIR says to me: "You will never come to the Soviet Union again." - "I will survive." He: “I warn you so that you behave normally and not make anti-Soviet statements. We apologize for taking so long to consider your request. Understand, this is an extraordinary case, you have not finished your studies yet, you are going to a capitalist country, we weighed all this only out of concern for your future. We believe that your decision is wrong, but if you insist on it, then please. " I say, “Okay, thanks. I am not interested in this country. But if there are any actions against my parents ... "

- Did you mention only this topic?

- Yes. When I came to the Dutch embassy for an entry visa, they told me: "This is the first time we have issued a visa to a resident of Moscow."

Why did they think Israel was a capitalist country? Israel was very socialist at the time.

- By their standards, it was a capitalist country, since it belonged to the capitalist camp, supported the United States since the Korean War, and for the Soviets everything was clear.

- Did you leave earlier than Slovina and Sperling?

- No, they left several months earlier than me. They left Riga. They had direct relatives in Israel. On one of the OVIR visits in August 1968<,>The head of the Moscow OVIR told me: “Don’t think, but only now it has been decided that all those who received permission and did not leave in connection with the Six Day War will be able to leave. It really doesn’t apply to you ”. I realized that changes were coming. I went to the Dutch embassy and said: "Tell Israel that a decision has been made and people who have received permission will come to you." - "Can not be". - "Pass." And the ice was broken. Those who were stopped in June 67th, in accordance with the decision adopted in August 68th, in September have already begun to receive summons to the OVIR.

- You're absolutely right. In a book on Jewish emigration, Boris Morozov cites Andropov and Gromyko's secret appeal to the Central Committee with a proposal to resume Jewish emigration within 1,500 people a year. This document is dated June 10, 1968. The proposal was accepted.

- Why Andropova and Gromyko? This was Bobkov's recommendation. Andropov accepted it and voiced it. Many of Bobkov's recommendations were not accepted. Dov Sperling and Lea Slovina arrived in October and November. They were given permission because they had direct relatives. When I came to the embassy for a visa, I was asked: "Do you need a hotel?" I say, "No, just a plane ticket." - "Why is there no need for a hotel?" - "I live at home." - "So you are a Muscovite?" - "Yes". - “This is the first time you have received permission to leave Moscow.”

- You then paid for leaving and renouncing citizenship?

- With citizenship, they granted my request. At that time, no money was taken for the satisfaction of such requests. They said that I have to pay 20 or 30 rubles for a visa. I quit my job, got a settlement. At that time I worked as a concrete reinforcement worker at a plant, and I received three times more than at a research institute. I had enough money to pay and, in addition, I gave them 90 rubles and received 130 dollars.

- I don’t really understand how it was possible to work at the plant, study at the correspondence department of the institute and still have time to do everything that you did to travel?

- Why not? The work is shiftable.

- Did you somehow prepare for the departure, did you study Hebrew?

- I learned Hebrew on my own using the Mori textbook. When I arrived, I could explain myself, I spoke at the airport, on the street. The admission procedure was as follows - everyone leaves the plane and goes to passport control. There they are met by a representative of the Sokhnut or the Ministry of Absorption, they are taken to a house outside the airport, and there they issue a "teudat ole" (certificate of a new repatriate) and everything else.

- Even then, there was such a practice that there were representatives of the Sokhnut and representatives of the Ministry of Absorption?

- I do not know exactly who was there, but the representatives of the ministry were for sure, because the ministry of absorption was already created. What happened there? Everyone gets up, new immigrants don't know where to go, huddle together. I go with all the Israelis, I go to the passport control, there is a policeman, I give him a certificate, the whole conversation is in Hebrew, he lets me through, I go to Israel. Nobody here. I ask, where are the "representatives"? And they are not. In the end, I had to go back and it took half an hour. The “representatives” had a panic because they lost me. In those days, everything was decided by the comrades from the office. They decided to send me to Kibbutz Revivim. I got into a taxi - then we were taken by taxi, we are going to Revivim. We drove through almost all of Israel, Beer Sheva, we come to Revivim, to the secretariat of the kibbutz. There they tell me: "They called from Tel Aviv, they are sending you to another ulpan - to Karmiel." It's in the north. We sit in a taxi, go back, arrive in Tel Aviv, they tell me - "Karmiel". They let me spend the night in Tel Aviv, and in the morning I left for Karmiel. There I spent three months in an ulpan, then went to the Technion to finish my education.

- Lishka tried to discuss any issues with you?

- We tried. Yaka Yanai called me, I had a conversation with Shaul Avigur, who was then the head of Nativ. Nehemiah later came, talked to him too ... talked to everyone. I told them everything I knew and what I thought. I was warned not to give interviews to anyone, because it is forbidden to disclose that there is aliyah from the Soviet Union. This is a state secret. I asked: “From whom? Because the Soviet Union knows. " "It is impossible for the Arabs to know, otherwise they will put pressure on the Soviet Union, and the aliyah will stop." That was the point of view then.

- Were there sufficient grounds for such secrecy?

- Did not have. Then I looked at all these documents. The Arabs discussed this issue and sometimes raised it before the Soviets. Not 1969, later. But the Soviet Union had good reasoning for the Arabs. Firstly, there were an insignificant number of those leaving: humanitarian cases, close relatives, most of them not liable for military service, elderly and without higher education. Secondly, the Arab countries could not present claims to the Soviet Union, since several hundred thousand people came to Israel from the Arab countries themselves, who by that time made up the bulk of the country's population. I remember just arriving, and a journalist from the newspaper "Aarets" rolled over to me ...

- Despite Lishka's ban *?

- I didn't really tell him anything. He wrote that the interview was taken with a guy who had recently arrived from Moscow, that permission was given after the initial refusal was given. No more details. The entire interview was about what was happening in the Soviet Union. Whether the Jews want to go or not, what are the moods in general and what are the moods of young people. But I didn't give them any details about myself. They called from Lishka: "You have no right to give interviews, you were warned!" Lishka did not allow this interview to be published.

- Did they find out that you gave the interview even before it went to print?

- Of course. The native was one of the few organizations with the right to censor. Later, while working in Nativa, I was also responsible for censorship. I could demand to prohibit the publication of any article, to give an indication of the reproduction of any mail, to any person.

- Before submitting an article to print, journalists were obliged to submit it to Lishka for censorship?

- According to Israeli law and by special order, everything related to aliyah from the countries of the socialist camp and the Soviet Union had to undergo censorship. When the censor received an article on this topic, he immediately passed it on to Nativ. She broke the strict censorship of Shulamit Aloni. Rather, she added the last drop. There was a question about some refuseniks, and we wanted to give a message to the newspaper. Shula voiced this from the Knesset rostrum. She spoke out against censorship. Golda got angry with her and then moved her from the real place on the party list in the elections to sixty. Shula spat, went out and organized her party.

- What happened next?

- Rumors leaked, and they began to invite me to perform in kibbutzim. I was introduced to Geula Cohen, then a journalist at Maariva. By that time, fermentation had begun among those who had arrived. They were mostly guys from Riga. On the one hand, they were of a beitarist orientation, on the other hand, like everyone else who came, they faced the socialist manifestations of the insanity of the authorities. Meetings began with politicians - both. They also introduced me to this. I differed from them in that I was not from the Baltic states, that is, I was not brought up in a Jewish atmosphere and on the ideas of Zionism. In addition, at that time I was the only one who could provide evidence that it was possible to fight to leave and achieve this. When they offered something, they usually objected: “What are you talking about? You yourself sat quietly, without noise, submitted documents and left without endangering yourself, and now you are proposing to endanger other people. " Nobody could tell me that. I said the same things as they did, but it had a completely different weight.

- It cannot be said that they sat quietly and did not take risks. They published newspapers, Hebrew textbooks, books and magazines, distributed samizdat ...

- It's all good. But they tried not to cross a certain line, and they were told: "You did not risk it."

- Yes, you risked ... and found the sensitive point of the regime. Nobody has tried this before you.

- I was often asked: “It is not clear. The Soviet Union crushed Czechoslovakia, not reckoning with public opinion, but at the same time it gave you an exit, reckoning with this public opinion? They were able to break the whole world, they could bring the whole country to its knees, but could not cope with some boy in Moscow? Where is the logic?" I tried to explain that there is logic, that these are different things, different problems and ... different public opinions. I'm not even talking about different forms of solution.

- Internationally, the Jews were inconvenient for them. They just wanted to leave, but it was necessary either to plant them in front of the whole world, or to let them go.

- I said: it was necessary either to judge me, or to release me. Having created so many obstacles to the court, they apparently decided that the damage would be greater, judging by. They saw how the Galanskov trial went, how the dissidents' trials went. It is impossible to take me without a trace after I have inherited everywhere. To arrange an open or half-open process, as they did, means to draw the attention of Jewish America to the problems of Soviet Jews, attention that was not yet there at that time. This meant raising the issue in the most uncomfortable light. What is the case? For what? For what I asked to leave? This means to announce to the whole world that there are young people who want to leave, and they are not allowed to go. This is not the business of Sharansky, it is not the business of transferring information, it is not connected with the distribution of some kind of literature. Nothing. That is, there was nothing to cling to, and it was unprofitable to create an artificial business with the system of connections and fame they already knew about. I hoped that when they weigh everything, they will draw the correct conclusion.

- Have you analyzed all your actions and possible consequences?

- All the time. That is why I tried to make them notice my contacts. If I went to talk to Petya Yakir, it was only because of this. I knew they were recording it all. Or with Pavlik Litvinov ...

- You appeared quite often with Slovina and Sperling. Do you have a group?

- What happened? These guys are on their own. They are older, they had leadership and political ambitions. I have not played this game. We made a common decision not to join any political party, so as not to impart a political coloration to our actions. At that time, the attitude of society towards us was quickly divided. The part that supported us consisted of Herut's supporters * who were in opposition to the government, and those who sympathized with us purely humanly: Zevulun Hammer, Ben Meir and even Shulamit Aloni. The second part consisted of people who condemned our actions based on party interests or socialist ideology. And they mostly grouped around Lishka.

- Some activists argued that this second part was against aliyah.

- Once Zvi Netzer met me and said: “You have come to Israel. How can you oppose our policy? You are against the state. " I was angry with him: “Are you a state? You are not a state yet. " They were, of course, not against aliyah. They were against an open struggle, against an aggravation of the conflict with the Soviet Union. They were not ready ... They did not understand the Soviet Union, they looked at it from the outside, and they did not understand the Jews of the Soviet Union.

- Levanon writes in his book that at first the "Lishkovites" wanted to take Jews out of the Union illegally.

- It was and it worked. After the war, there was a mess for some time. People were illegally transferred across the border, hundreds of people were taken out in this way. But at the same time, many went to prison and died in the camps. Yaka Yanai, who later worked in Nativ, is from this group. They took him, he served time, went out and managed to leave. Mulik Ioffe brought one consignment to Italy, returned after another, and was arrested. He later died in the camp. Many were arrested and many died.

- Let's go back to 1969, when you and Sperling were going to go to the States.

- What happened? We met quite a lot. At a meeting with a group of officers, I met Arik Sharon, then I met Yitzhak Shamir, I was at his house - a small, modest two-room apartment on the second floor. Geula once suggested that we meet with an American. His name was Bernie Deutsch. We told him what we told everyone else. He was so shocked that he was eager to introduce this to the Jews of the United States. He began to prepare the trip, negotiate with Jewish organizations in the States. Nehemiah found out about this and turned to Begin, the head of the right-wing opposition, to try to dissuade us from going.

- Levanon himself could hardly persuade you. He came in from the rear and convinced Begin - reasonable.

- We must pay tribute to Nehemiah Levanon. He was a politically wise man, kept in touch with Begin, met with him from time to time and told, as the leader of the opposition, what was happening. What he wanted to tell. Begin was always flattered by this. Nehemiah did this when Golda was at the head of the government, although we must not forget that in 1967 Begin was a minister. Nehemiah calculated correctly, and it helped him when Begin came to power.

- Begin left him as head of Nativ ...

- But at the end, Begin said that he cannot, has no right to forbid us. People escaped from the Soviet Union, and how could he come and tell them no. This was inconsistent with his understanding of the role of a Western leader. And we drove off. In the United States, Lishka's representative was Yoram Dinstein. Yoram received instructions from Zvi Netzer, who was at the head of the "Bar *". At Netzer's direction, Yoram contacted all Jewish and non-Jewish organizations with which meetings were organized. On behalf of the Israeli government, he asked not to meet with us, because one of us is probably a spy, and the other is a provocateur, or vice versa. Jewish organizations almost all obeyed, but non-Jewish organizations did not. I remember how we gave an interview to the correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor newspaper. He said, "I don't understand how the Israeli embassy could say that about you."

- Did you already know about this then?

- He told us after the interview that they called him from the embassy and told him - so and so. “How could they say that? What you say is the most valuable thing that needs to be made public. "

- How did the embassy know that you were supposed to meet with this correspondent?

“I don’t know that anymore. The fact is, they knew and reacted. They also knew that we had to meet with representatives of Congress. Only non-Jews came to this meeting. Not a single Jew invited came. Israel said! After we returned, Sperling wrote a good article in the Maariva - how we got in the way and why. I wanted to sue.

- On Lishka?

- On the head of the "Bar" in Israel and on his representative in the States. But Geula Cohen dissuaded me ... When we returned from the States, my parents were already in denial. After a speech in the Knesset, Shulamit Aloni and others, censorship in Israel has been a little pressed. Then Geula says: "Let me interview you." I agreed.

- Before that, journalists could not interview you?

- Couldn't print. Geula interviewed me and sent me to censor. Censorship left about 20 percent: "This will anger the Soviet Union, it will aggravate relations." In addition, the censor demanded that the interview be presented as if it were not taken in Israel, and that my name not be mentioned. Geula did not agree with his decision and went to the scandal. In a conversation with Golda, Meir Geula threatened her with filing a lawsuit with the High Court of Justice. After some struggle, interviews were allowed for almost everything. It was large and was printed in two Friday issues, and it made a strong impression in Israel. There was everything that I am now telling you, and there was about the situation in the USSR and about the desire and struggle of Jews to leave for Israel. Then Bernie Deutsch, who arranged for us to travel to the States, translated the interview into English and distributed it there.

- What did you say about the mood among Jews in the Union?

- I said that there are Jewish youth who have no Jewish upbringing and who want to leave. Israel for them is the whole meaning of their life. These young people do not accept communism, and they are ready to fight for their departure. Not all young people, but quite a few. That activists demand an open and more active struggle, are not afraid of aggravating relations with the authorities, do not pay attention to how their struggle can affect the ideas of socialism. I said that the Soviet Union can be fought, that it is sensitive and succumbs to the pressure of public opinion. The usual, trivial things that we knew.

- Did you speak on behalf of Soviet Jews?

- No, I was talking about what I know.

- Yasha, but you yourself knew few such people.

- Not much, but it was enough to see how many people came to the synagogue on Simchat Torah. An unprecedented number! It was enough to see what kind of youth there were. They were ready to do more. The only thing they lacked was the support of Israel and the West. I said, “Your support gives them security. And my example shows it. If they are confident in your support, they will move on. They will do what they do not dare to do today, not because they don’t want to, but because you don’t support them. ”

- As you said yourself, Lishkovites saw the Union from the outside. And from the outside, he looked like a mighty superpower that defeated Nazism and crushed half of Europe under itself. The Soviet Union then instilled fear not only in Israel, the entire West was in awe.

- And so it was.

- Did the Lishkovites really fear the Soviet Union that much?

- Some of them are still afraid.

- And for fear, in your opinion, there were good reasons?

- It was a pathological fear, especially among those who got acquainted with the Soviet Union or served in Soviet prisons. In Poland, it was not just fear. It was horror. Centuries-old! Most of the Jews in Israel were from Poland. The Polish attitude towards Russia was in their blood.

- That is, the position of the Israeli establishment was explained not by the proximity of ideologies, the desire to somehow persuade, please, agree, but by the fear of the unpredictable cruelty of a huge country?

- This was explained to others. Indirectly, this could have a negative impact on the ideas of Israeli socialism. They were less interested in socialism in Russia, and more in how it would affect them. This could have a negative impact on their socialist position in Israel. With regard to emigration problems, they all tried to solve the methods of quiet diplomacy and were terribly afraid to make them angry.

- Fear of Russia for the fate of the state or the fear that Russia will deal with its Jews?

- No, no, in this case they feared that it would have a bad effect on Soviet Jews.

- The very first operations of Nativ in the Union led to the arrests of a large number of people with whom they contacted ...

- This is what scared me. In addition, some of Nativ's employees had been in Soviet prisons before. Joseph Meller, for example. Look ... - forceful interrogations, treatment in the camp, when a person is lowered to an inhuman level, are reflected in his psychology. This injury accompanies him for the rest of his life.

- But Begin also went through the Soviet camp ...

- And he has it all his life. When such a person once again sees something like this in front of him, he has a physical fear. It's almost covered in blood. They had a pathological fear of the power of this country, the belief that it could do anything, that nothing could stop it, that it was impossible to fight it. They believed that it was necessary to negotiate with her in some way.

- And you?

- And we said: "First hit in the face, and then negotiate."

“They were completely sincere in their approach.

“They were genuinely afraid. They truly believed.

“Do you think their fears and concerns were clearly exaggerated?

“Look, each of us has fears and concerns. But among them this was multiplied by ignorance and misunderstanding of Soviet reality, by ignorance and misunderstanding of Soviet Jews.

- Do you mean that they did not understand the Jews who formed during the years of Soviet power, that they knew only the Jews of the "shtetl", the Pale of Settlement?

“Not even shtetl Jews. They knew the Jews of Riga. They did not know the Jews of the Soviet Union, the Jews of Russia, Ukraine, Moscow. They did not understand how a Jew who had not gone through Jewish school and did not speak Yiddish could be so devoted to Israel. Where is it from? His mother did not teach this, he did not go to the cheder, his father did not bring him up like that ...

“They apparently still don’t understand this. How many graduates of a Jewish school here have left Israel!

- Well, yes. This is a general misunderstanding of what is happening to the Jewish people in Israel, a misunderstanding of what constitutes the essence of Jewry and Jewish identity at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this case, all this was manifested to the greatest extent. It was not a reluctance for the Jews of the Soviet Union to come. They just didn't believe it. Nobody thought about big aliyah then. When Nativ's people discussed this problem among themselves, they estimated the potential of aliyah at several thousand - at best. No one then operated with such terms as "big aliyah".

- At one time, the Union set a tough condition for the Israeli leadership: the Middle East separately, Soviet Jews separately, not to touch them.

- Yes ... Nativ's people did not fully understand the situation. They thought that it was possible to explain to the Soviet Union: “We are so small, we do not want anything, we are not fighting against the USSR, well, give us a few Jews, what is it worth, because you are so big, you are so rich, you have so many people. We don't want much. " This is typically shop psychology. They did not understand that there was no need to explain anything to the Soviet Union. He understood better than them what it was. He understood better than them what the Jews of the Soviet Union were and what the danger of their departure was. In his opinion, the Soviet government made its first mistake when, in 1949, it did not release the bulk of former members of Zionist organizations and Jews from the Baltic republics, who had direct relatives in Israel. What could have arisen without them, Bobkov believed, would be much smaller and weaker, and it would be easier to deal with this without resorting to harsh methods.

- Let's go back to your trip to the States.

- When we were in the States, my parents were already in denial, and I wanted to stay after the trip and go on a hunger strike so that they would be released. But both Geula and Bernie explained that I could not do this, because, under my visa to the States, they made a commitment to the American authorities: neither I nor Dov Sperling will organize any political demonstrations. When we returned to Israel, friends promised me that they would organize another trip when and if necessary. And just an article appeared in the Izvestia newspaper, in which the Pope was attacked for some kind of demonstration, some kind of action.

- Has he already begun to operate in the Union?

- Yes. He had already got into the jet, there were already other refuseniks, he had already met with them. Once my dad called me and I told him: “Go to Smirnov, the head of the OVIR, tell him my regards and tell him that if the interests of his state are dear to him, let him not fool his head and let you leave. I warned him. " He went, came back, called and said: "I was, talked - refusal." I say, "Good." When the newspaper was published, Geula called me and said: "Yasha, your dad was attacked, this was written in the Western press." I say, "This may be preparation for arrest." - "Do you want to go?" - "Yes, I want to go, we need to anticipate their next step." We got organized, I got a visa again, this time without any difficulties.

- Did you already know that you will starve near the UN?

- I already knew how and where, but I did not know the exact place yet. I arrived and it began ...

- Have the Jews carried out such actions in the States yet?

- Well, they were ... some Jewish hooligans, because of some Jews in the Soviet Union. And who said that the Jews want to go? Who said there is a problem? Yesterday they beat blacks, now this! The hunger strike impressed everyone as a bomb.

- Has she attracted public attention?

- The first day, the second day - not very good. On the third day it began, and then they knocked down.

- Did you live right there on the street?

- Yes, 24 hours a day.

- And the toilet, and ...

- A minibus with a toilet was rented for me ( in the States it is called a "mobile home" –Yu.K.) and I used it.

- Where did this happen?

- Ishiyagu Wall, just opposite the UN.

- When did this happen?

- In March-April 1970. On the third day, organizations began to arrive.

- Lishka was, of course, against?

- Of course, but I could not do anything.

- When did they change their attitude?

- While I was on hunger strike in New York, a demonstration took place near the Knesset. It was organized by the Israel Students' Union, with whom I also had connections. One of the leaders of the union was Yona Yagav, who later became mayor of Haifa. This is a telling story. At one time, he organized for us performances in front of the students of the Technion. After that, Zvi Netser from Lishka called him and began to threaten: "I will put you in jail!" Zvi Netzer did not understand that Israel is not Poland. Yona Jagav is a paratrooper officer, after the Six Day War the paratroopers had a special aura of glory, and then someone says this to him! Yona exploded. He organized a student demonstration outside the Knesset, and everyone spoke there: Zevulun Hammer, Geula Cohen and Shulamit Aloni. Students from all over Israel were gathered for a demonstration near the Knesset - there were a lot of people. The politicians with whom we met earlier arrived. And Golda ( Meir, head of government. - Yu. K.) said at a government meeting: "I can’t take it anymore, this guy broke me, we can’t stay on the sidelines, we have to help." When the second week of the hunger strike began, the noise began to be really serious: I no longer had time to rest, because people were marching in a rampart.

- And all the time there are articles in the newspapers?

- And in newspapers, and on television, and all radio stations ...

- And in the Union they began to understand that your dad is costing them too much!

- They came from their embassy, ​​found out - how, what, what rights? I tell them: “What's the problem? You see, I am still alive, but my parents are not released, which is even easier? "

- But you saw it wider than the release of only your parents?

- I had it written: "Let go of my family, let go of my people." From a purely public relations point of view, this was perfect, because the Soviets had nothing to say. Jews are not allowed out? Not released. Here's a good example. The boy who tried for two years was released. Now they are keeping his parents. What's the matter? You cannot say that everything is all right with you when leaving, but I can tell you dozens and hundreds of families, such as mine - they want to leave and cannot. What can you say to that? The effect was amazing. A turning point has come in Israeli public opinion.

- Golda began to understand that the invasion of Czechoslovakia– this is one thing, but the departure of the Jews– This is completely different?

“She had no choice left. The pressure and noise surrounding the hunger strike was such that the "innocence" was lost. They figured it out, and to hell with him. Tekoah, the Israeli representative to the UN, approached me ...

- At the direction of Golda?

- Yes. Then he spoke with Secretary General U Thant, and U Thant spoke with the Soviet representative to the UN. Tekoah told me, “I just spoke with U Thant. He said that the Soviets promised to release your parents, but you must end your hunger strike. They cannot announce it now publicly, under pressure. " I also had reasons why I could no longer stay. The hunger strike was superimposed on an extremely painful tragedy for me personally. When I first started my hunger strike, I was informed that my girlfriend in Israel had been in a car accident, seriously injured, and I had to return. Before I got on the plane, they managed to tell me that she was dead. I returned and, after serving mourning, came back to the States. That is, if she was alive, I would not have stopped the hunger strike. But her death, of course, broke everything greatly.

- How many days did you starve?

- Nine. In general, a useful thing, I lost six kilograms.

- Did you release your parents quickly?

- Dad was then summoned to the OVIR. The head of the OVIR says to him: "Why did Yasha do this to us?" And dad: "He warned you." This was in April. Already in December they were informed that they would leave, and in January they were in Israel.

- And if the parents were not allowed to leave, would you be ready to repeat?

- You see, there was no point in not allowing them to leave, but the main thing at that moment I achieved - I made them safe. After what happened, they could no longer be touched. Everything. The security guarantee was complete.

Has the attitude of American organizations changed since then?

- Firstly, new organizations have emerged, and secondly, student and other organizations have become more active. The Leningrad process became a new explosion that brought this struggle to a higher level.

- Have you ever met Meir Kahane?

- Yes, in 1969, when Dov Sperling and I first came to America. We were at his office. Then he was still a quiet, calm guy.

- Was he already the head of the League?

- Yes, but then they were still doing "little things" - they staged demonstrations, threw stones at the glass, beat the blacks in the muzzle, the blacks beat them ...

- And after they joined the fight for Soviet Jews?

- Then they played a positive role. They were among the first to draw widespread attention to the problem, sharpening it to the point of provocation. They crossed the boundaries of quiet diplomacy, and that was important.

- After all, the logic followed by the establishment was the very logic of behind-the-scenes diplomacy with a minimum of noise that the West wanted to impose and which the Soviet Union itself followed. The League for the Defense of the Jews, the Union of Soviets, the Students - according to this logic, they did not play. They groped for the very sensitive points of the Soviet regime and hit them without fear or reproach.

“Both sides were right. Nehemiah Levanon's mission was to mobilize Jewish and non-Jewish public opinion. But Nativ in every possible way avoided open struggle, publicity and mass character. He proceeded from the fact that quiet diplomacy in those conditions was more successful, while open struggle could endanger Soviet Jews and their emigration. Opposition organizations were joined by people who did not agree with the doctrine of "quiet diplomacy", as well as left the establishment for other reasons.

The truth is that the movement in support of Soviet Jews was started under the leadership and with the support of the Israeli government and a state body specially created by it for this. But the policy they followed was not entirely correct, and the implementation of this policy caused a lot of harm in the initial period.

- The Union initially had the hope of tying Israel to its chariot like the Eastern European countries. There was even a plan to send appropriately trained Jewish officers there. But they very quickly realized that this would not work with Israel.

- The question of whether it is possible to turn Israel into a communist state and tie it ideologically to the Union, they calculated correctly - this will not lead to success. Why? Because the Israeli state, the Israeli establishment were so attached to American and Jewish capital outside Israel that it was almost impossible to break it, and it inevitably had to play a role. Secondly, the Soviets did not have confidence in the ideological strength of the Jewish cadres, in their devotion to the Soviet communist ideology, and, I will add, these were well-founded doubts. Third, Israel's support for the Americans in the Korean War put an end to everything. This was the final nail in the coffin of the idea of ​​using Israel for their own purposes. And then the Soviet Union makes a turn - to hell with it, with Israel, we are more interested in Arabs. From their point of view, they are right. We do the same.

- How did the epic develop with a narrow *?

- It's a long story. It began in the 71st year, when one of the major American donors of the Sokhnut turned to the workers of this organization with a request to help transport his relatives to the States without visiting Israel. In the West, it is customary to respect people who donate money, and the workers of the Sokhnut, without hesitation, turned to us in Lishka. After consulting, the residents of Lishki decided that there was no particular problem in this, so why not do something nice to a respected person?

At that time, literally two weeks later, the offices of Khias * and Joint * in Vienna, which had been engaged in the emigration of the Jewish population since the war, were to be closed. In 1971, they gradually accepted Jews from Czechoslovakia, most of whom did not go to Israel. The work was over, there was nothing more to do.

At this time, Lishka asked them to send one family from the Union to the United States - those very relatives of a rich donor. They ferried the family and immediately asked to extend their stay in Vienna: what if another family asks for it.

And so it happened. When the rumor that one family went directly to the States spread, another family asked, then another family, then a few more ... So it all started out of stupidity and shortsightedness.

- By the stupidity and shortsightedness of Lishka?

- Of course. I have no complaints about Sokhnut, for him sponsors and their money are always more important - for this money he exists: Sokhnut did not deal with the policy of aliyah. Lishka determined the policy, she had to think about the consequences, but the Lishka people did not think.

- Levanonconcluded an agreement with Khias?

- No, there was no agreement. Levanon was unable to close the contract with Kias. All agreements were at the level of the American government and the Joint, that is, the agreement was with American Jewish organizations. At the same time, it was agreed that the representatives of the Sokhnut will be given the opportunity to explain to the noshrim why it is better for them to go to Israel. But JDC and Hias already saw a good opportunity for their funding in the flow of noshrim. The money came from the US government and from YGH, the premier fundraiser in the United States. And these are budgets, states and so on.

- Israelcould declare that it threatens aliyah.

- So what? Who was interested in this? It is an illusion that international Jewish organizations live only on Israeli interests. Nothing like this. When their interests coincide with those of Israel, everything is fine; when they do not coincide, their own interests dominate.

- From your point of view, the quota– is it an illusion or a reality?

- This, of course, is not an illusion. The quota has always existed, but it was not rigid. During the negotiations between Kissinger and Gromyko, the issue was always of a quota. What does this mean? The number of those who left can be regulated by the rigidity of the acceptance of documents, the time of their consideration, the issuance of indefinite and unmotivated refusals, etc. That being said, the refuseniks were not the most decisive regulator. The Germans also had a quota: they negotiated it, bargained, they also had refusals, but they did not raise a fuss.

- But if there was a quota, then the noshrim took the place of olim in the outgoing stream.

- Of course. The problem was that it was impossible to know in advance with certainty who was going where, and on the basis of assumptions, there was little that could be done.

- From your point of view, the Soviet leaders were worried that so many people openly violate the conditions of departure they had set?

- From my point of view, no. They even used it to their advantage. They say that talks about national revival, national movement and historical homeland are fairy tales. It's just about emigration. The Soviets called it "going on the Israeli channel." The United States and Israel agreed to such a formula. There was also a departure on the German channel. There were special cases. The KGB used this for its operational purposes. On the whole, this order was more in line with the interests of the Soviet authorities than contrary to them.

- Who was engaged in the reception of repatriates in Vienna?

- Abroad, Sokhnut has always done this. After several families got to the Americans directly and wrote about it to Russia, new requests of this kind began to appear from time to time. At first, this did not raise serious concerns. At one time, Israel obtained from the United States that repatriates who came to Israel from the Soviet Union had refugee status. The United States allocated from sixty to eighty million dollars a year to the program of assistance to these refugees. Refugee status was also extended to noshrim, with all the ensuing consequences. The Americans gave this money to the Israeli government, and the government transferred it to the Sokhnut, since the Sokhnut is a non-governmental organization. Dokhnut transferred the garment into the hands of the representatives of the Joint and Khias in Italy. Why Italy? Because in Italy since the Second World War there has been a staging post for Jews from Eastern Europe, and there have always been representatives of Hias and Joint, and representatives of the American immigration authorities were at the American Embassy in Rome. It happened so historically. After the war, the emigration of Jews went by sea, that is, a country with good ports was needed, and Italy was ideal in this sense. The American Embassy in Vienna was not adapted for this purpose. Therefore, the Jews from Vienna were sent to Rome. American organizations welcomed Soviet Jews with pleasure, as it gave them a means of subsistence. The Austrians were surprised at this turn, but turned a blind eye to it, because they did not want to mess with the Jews. Beginning in 77-78, when it became clear that the neshira would overwhelm the entire stream, the Israelis recollected themselves and began to discuss this topic.

- Representatives of the Liaison Office * weren't there?

- There were, there were ... It happened out of thoughtlessness, contrary to all laws and logic. The Austrian authorities did not understand why people do not go to Israel if the visa says "Israel". After the process loomed, they tried to do something, but it was too late. There were too many interested parties in this case, but in Israel they turned a blind eye. Back in the 72nd year, political structures began to discuss the issue of how to close the neshira. They raised the question in Herut, and - what? Its Russian part, led by Leia Slovina, categorically opposed any attempts to prevent the direct departure of Jews with Israeli visas to the United States, believing that this would be a violation of human rights. Under their pressure, Begin also agreed to this. Later, when it became clear that the situation was becoming catastrophic, Yitzhak Rabin wanted to raise this issue with Jewish organizations. He turned to Begin for support, but Begin replied that he would prefer to discuss this issue after the elections. And after the elections, when Begin came to power and this question was once again raised before him, he calmly replied that he needed the support of American Jews on the issue of Judea and Samaria, so he would not enter into a conflict with them because of the neshira.

- Begin came to power only in the 77th year.

- Yes, and it was again left to chance. We agreed, out of dementia, that people are not going to Israel, because they do not know what it is. Let's, they say, send representatives of the Sokhnut there, and they will conduct explanatory work and persuade people to go to Israel. This system was headed by Leia Slovina. She began to bring dozens of envoys to Vienna and Rome. Further, other "wise" plans arose - to make a large transshipment camp near Naples and not allow the representatives of Khiass there during the first week of their stay there. This week was supposed to be used to brainwash our people. Those who then want to go to America, let them go. The rest - to Israel. I said then that nothing would come of this, that the Noshrim would go to Israel only if they had no other choice.

- Levanontried to play a part in this?

- He tried to raise these issues, but since he did not have the support of the government, and American Jewish organizations refused to cooperate on this issue, he could not do anything. Khias and Joint have always dealt with Jews who did not travel to Israel. When some of the Jews who came to Israel began to leave Israel, they were also initially dealt with by Khiass and Joint in Italy, helping to formalize emigration to the United States with refugee status. And this despite the fact that they were already leaving Israel.

- Refugees from Israel? Why did the Americans do this?

- At first - under pressure from local Jews. Then the American authorities stopped recognizing refugee status for those who had lived in Israel for more than a year. But this status extended to those leaving the USSR. US administration officials said: “We know this is wrong, but we do not want to get into conflict with Jewish organizations. We do not want to be accused of anti-Semitism. " People from the administration told me quite calmly: "Protect us from your Jews, and everything will be fine." But gradually we increased the pressure. We said it was not normal for Jewish organizations to help Jews travel to the United States on Israeli visas with funds raised for Israel.

- I was present at a speech by a venerable Israeli scholar who once headed a center for the study of East European Jewry. He said that he did not recommend the government to bring to IsraelWe wear it for the following reasons: “They can make extremely unpleasant demonstrations. What will you do if they refuse, for example, to get off the plane? " I do not remember a case, including during the mass emigration of the early nineties, when any of the Soviet Jews refused to get off the plane. This position is incomprehensible to me.

- It's like in that joke about a German professor. He cut off the fly's leg and said: "Run." The fly was running. Then he cut off one more leg of her, and again said: "Run." The fly ran again. So he cut off all her legs. When after that he told her "run", she did not run. Then an entry appeared in the observation log: "A fly without legs does not hear." Same. Nobody seriously discussed this issue, because it meant entering into conflict with American Jewish organizations.

- Which American has shown the greatest tenacity?

- Khias, Joint and American NAKRAK ( National advisory community relations advocatory councils. - Yu.K.), which consisted of community representatives, and the communities supported this - they had such a rush of activity! Each organization supported this for its own reasons - economic, political or administrative, but they argued this as a struggle for human rights, for freedom of movement. The struggle for human rights and freedom of movement suddenly ceased to worry them when the Aliyah from Ethiopia began. Black Jews were not allowed to enter America, they all had to go to Israel. None of the Joint and Kias were involved in helping them get to America, theirs - only in Israel.

- When the Sharansky trial began, did you already work at Lishkat-a-kesher *?

- No, I started working there in 1978

- Lishka thought he was an American spy?

“She didn't think he was a spy.

- Dissident, not ours?

- There were two things. Sharansky was identified as a person who belongs to Sakharov's group, and he was in touch with correspondents because he spoke English more tolerably than others.

- In this role, he replaced Alik Goldfarb.

- Yes, since the end of 1974. He was in this role for about two years. Nathan was taken by accident. They did not prepare a case against him, but his proximity to Lipavsky played a major role.

- Was there too much concrete evidence against him?

- No no. The accusation was based on Lipavsky's testimony, since he lived with him in the same room.

- Lipavsky could testify against many, since he was a consultant and sometimes the attending physician of the Lerners, Slepakovs, Rubins, Rammov and others.

- They were afraid to take Lerner and Levich because of scientific connections abroad, although initially the authorities were preparing for a trial in this direction. They decided to take whoever they had to, and the choice fell on Sharansky. First, Lipavsky had material on him. Secondly, Sharansky was at the junction of the Jewish and dissident movements, and they hit two at once. Thirdly, Sanya Lipavsky was recruited by the CIA, and he testified about it.

- Was Sanya recruited?

- Yes, despite the fact that he was a KGB agent.

- Was he recruited by the KGB on the basis of his father?

- On the father, who was caught in foreign exchange affairs.

- You can tell when approximately he was recruited into the KGB?

- I think from the very beginning. He was recruited, he worked at first on the so-called "guilds" and "currency traders". Then he was introduced into the Jewish rejection environment.

- And when in the CIA?

- They are idiots. They accidentally sat on him and recruited him. The KGB did not know what to do with joy. It is very rare that your agent is recruited. But the CIA did not have time to do anything with him. What Nathan was tried for, among other things, ... if he had been tried in Israel, he would have received 15 years for the same. What happened? A person makes a list of more than a hundred refuseniks, indicates the place and address of their work, deciphers the "mailboxes", indicates what the enterprises for which the refuseniks worked and indicates the names of the leaders of these enterprises. The idea is great - "We must thereby prevent their international contacts." Write such a thing in Israel today, and that's it! .. In any country you can be imprisoned for this. According to Israeli law, this is punishable by 10-15 years in prison.

- And what about the American ones?

- I'm not that familiar with American laws. But look, in America, a free and democratic country, Wernher von Braun until the end of the seventies could not leave the States even for one day and even to his Germany. Everything!

“You mean the Soviets had real evidence against him.

- Purely professionally for this it was necessary to rip off the head. The political leadership wanted to give it a political color. Of all the options that they have left, that is, Lerner cannot be judged, Levich cannot be judged….

- Some believe that there was another option to hit the "cultured people". In December 1976, an international symposium on Jewish culture was to be held, which the authorities dispersed quite harshly, regardless of the Helsinki process and the opinion of the world scientific community. The organizers were well-known and active refuseniks. There are less than three months between the dispersal of the symposium on culture and the arrest of Sharansky.

- If you take the newspapers and look in which direction they attacked before, you will see where it went. The decision was made in the operational department of the fifth KGB directorate. They decided. Since the case was at the junction of the fifth and second directorates, another article could be given. "Kulturnikov" could be judged by Article 70. Sharansky could be judged by the 64th and 65th, that is, for treason and espionage. Under these articles, he was summed up by the testimony of Sani Lipavsky and the transfer of materials that could be regarded within the framework of these articles. For the fact that the Americans took these materials, they had to tear off their legs.

- I wonder who initiated the collection of just such information, the Americans or the refuseniks? I know that we constantly collected data on denials, harassment, call lists and passed it on to Israel.

- Americans and others have repeatedly asked us to give them the opportunity to collect information among refuseniks and activists. And we always said to them: "Don't touch our people, don't approach their circles and don't try to recruit anyone." And they were drooling, and then they could not stand it. Therefore, they treat Sharansky in this way - they have a stigma in the cannon. They were not allowed to take these documents. Tod shouldn't have taken these documents. You understand, the transfer of the address of the "mailbox" and the essence of its products is espionage.

- We all wrote data about the place of work in the questionnaires submitted to the OVIR.

- The OVIR indicated only the number of the enterprise, but not its address, products and the names of managers. You have no right to divulge this to a foreign country.

- How do you feel about the campaign launched against Sharansky in Israel regarding his trial?

- This is all nonsense of Yulik Nudelman.

- This is not only Nudelman. This is Kuznetsov, this is Nudel, this is Kislik ... There are quite a few participants. I asked Volodya Kislik: "Do you think that he laid you down?" And Volodya Kislik answered me: “Yes, I think. He called me during the investigation, he said what I was doing, he said that he passed my petitions to the West. "

- This is all nonsense. Why? Edik (Kuznetsov) was on excellent terms with Nathan. If he knew that Nathan was laying someone, this would not have happened.

- Edik just doesn’t say what he was laying.

- OK. Who is speaking? Yulik Nudelman. How did Nathan behave during the investigation? I saw some of the testimonies that relate to the investigation in his case, I saw the case itself. I also arranged a meeting with Putin.

- Have you seen all the materials of the case?

- It was with me. I was with him at the FSB when they brought all the materials of the case. We sat with him for several hours and looked through the tables of contents, noting which documents he wanted to receive. There was no evidence in the sense that he was laying. What could he say about Kislik that the KGB did not know? They could ask: "Did you take information from Kislik?" "Yes, I did." Well, then what? How did he lay it down?

- They could show him that he conveyed such and such information about Kislik. And he could answer: "You can check it is true." And then they could come to Kislik and tell him that Sharansky had shown that Kislik had given him such and such anti-Soviet information.

- Firstly, this is a KGB technique, and secondly, it does not play any role. This does not mean that he betrayed someone. He had no one to betray.

- Some say that he simply spoke too much during the investigation. It was not customary for us to talk to them. “I don’t know, I don’t remember ...” - that's all.

- OK. Only one person could say this - Edik Kuznetsov, because he knows the rules of conduct during an investigation, political or criminal. Don't confess, don't talk, don't sign, that's it! - no contact. Sharansky could not understand this, not know. Everyone was talking. I read the cases. Half of those who say so, how did they behave during the investigation ?! Only they, the investigator and me, know about this. Let them sit and be silent. And he, unlike them, did not repent. He behaved with dignity at the trial. And most importantly, what did the Soviet government need, why did they agree to it? Assessing Tolik according to his lifestyle of that time, they came to the conclusion that it is easy to break him.

- There is a funny document - an extract from the working record of the Politburo meeting, in other words, the minutes of the meeting for internal use, which, according to the firm conviction of its participants, had no chance of ever seeing the light of day. In this document, Andropov informs the members of the Politburo that Sharansky admitted his guilt during the investigation.

- What do you mean "he admits his guilt"? He admits the facts, but does not admit guilt. They were confident that they would break him. They thought - a guy from Donetsk, a little bit lumpy, weak in the female sex, notorious, fragile intellectual, without his own corner in Moscow, we will take him, he will sign everything for us. Lipavsky on this occasion says: “And what is he? Put it in the face, and everything will be fine. "

- But it turned out that he is psychologically stronger than them?

- But it turned out that he did not break down and behaved at the trial with dignity. And in prison he behaved with dignity. At least the fact that he demanded and received in prison both Makhzor, and tefillin, and everything else.

- They broke Dana Shapiro. He made heroes, accused the old refusal of being passive, and then appeared on television, repented, laid the activists.

- Specialists who are engaged in such matters know that the one who shouts the most, who behaves more aggressively, is internally weak. Aggressiveness is usually evidence of lack of self-confidence, in their abilities, evidence of fear. Unless a person has an extra chromosome, but we do not consider this case, since this is a pathology. A normal person is aggressive only out of fear, insecurity and awareness of his own weakness. Here is the one who will be the most erepeat, take him, push, and he will break before anyone else. These are elementary truths.

- But you also behaved very aggressively in the Union. He broke through to the embassies ...

- I did it calmly, deliberately. I walked deliberately, calculating what results these actions can lead to. Not to show everyone - look what I am doing, how brave I am. I didn't have that at all. This made it difficult to analyze them. I know their assessment of myself.

- And what about Kuznetsov's motives? Jealousy?

- No. The fact that Edik came to the conclusion that he spat on everyone, not there, but here, sold, and, on the basis of his past, began to create his political image, acting contrary to all generally accepted ideas about friendship, solidarity, about help - this is Edik right.

- Sharansky, apparently, understood earlier than others that politics and friendship are concepts from different areas.

- Edik treated him "according to the concepts" that he had. Sharansky considers himself great, and everyone else is pawns who should serve him. Correspondents have always grasped what the editorial board wants. The editorial board and society want Sharansky, and they went to create the image of Sharansky, because it is not so important what the material is, it is important what they publish. Natasha, rightly on her part, helped build the image of Sharansky in the United States and in the West. And this played a positive role in mobilizing the Jews of the United States to fight for the Jews of the USSR. The Americans felt that they had a stigma in their cannon, gave it their "push" and were ready to exchange. After all, more than once or twice they came to them with a claim: "You started all this, you were told not to touch our people."

- "Politicians"believed that Israelsupported the "culturalin ", and" cultured people "believed that the" politicians "... I got the feeling that Israel did not support either one or the other. The establishment treated the Union as a reservoir of aliyah and supported only what contributed to its strengthening: Hebrew, Zionist materials, positive information about Israel..

- We ourselves have worked a lot with Western politicians. We needed their support in the fight for aliyah. This is in the West. Inside the Soviet Union ... - the way the guys from the so-called "political" wing did this, we considered dangerous, first of all, for themselves, which was confirmed by the further development of events. Most of their actions were pure showmanship with no real results, if not worse. You are generally right, but, on the other hand, people sit in denial for years, they have to do something, otherwise you can go crazy. We supported those forms of activity that were, on the one hand, less dangerous for refuseniks, and on the other, more effective. An aliyah-centered culture was both rewarding and less dangerous. As well as a thoughtful, balanced struggle for the exit.

- Was the invasion of Afghanistan unexpected or was it somehow miscalculated in the West?

- Absolutely unexpected. This was unexpected for the Soviet Union itself. Events moved rapidly and the main reason was purely Soviet. If it had not been for the coup d'état by Amin in September 1979, there would have been no reason to invade. The coup came unexpectedly. Perhaps the CIA had something to do with this, because Amin studied at one time in America. Having come to power, he staged a personal terror: he massacred the entire family of the ousted Taraki, began to massacre the people of his tribe and staged terror among the leadership of Afghanistan. And the Americans did not find anything better than to give him a transport plane. Then the Soviets made simple calculations and decided that he was a CIA agent and that there was a great danger that he would reorient Afghanistan towards the United States.

- When, according to your information, did they begin to curtail emigration - with the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan or earlier?

- They made a decision on measures to restrict the departure of Jews at the beginning of 1979, almost a year before the invasion, and began to implement it in April.

- What happened at the beginning of the 79th year?

- Nothing special. They just decided that emigration was getting out of control, and if they didn’t, then the number of those leaving would be much higher than the level that they considered tolerable for themselves.

- In the seventy-ninth year, fifty-one thousand people left.

- If they had not introduced these restrictions, more than one hundred thousand would have left. The potential for emigration was enormous, and it all grew like a snowball.

- Who made the decision?

- I do not know for sure, but I believe that decisions of this kind could only be made by the Politburo.

- How, from your point of view, did they manage to do this in such a way that neither Jewish human rights activists, nor we, refuseniks, nor even you in Lishkat-a-kesher * reacted to it?

- Western human rights defenders and Jewish organizations increasingly personified their struggle. They were interested in the fate of specific refuseniks and dissidents. What did the Soviet Union come up with in response? In 79, he gradually introduced rules that created unrealistic refuseniks. How did he do it? He said that only direct relatives would be allowed to leave. Now there was no need to give people a refusal. They did not accept documents. They started in Odessa, and then, over the course of a year, they gradually spread it throughout the Soviet Union, and in each city, in each republic, new rules were introduced at a different time. Those whose relatives went to America, and the majority went there, could not apply at all, since calls were accepted only from Israel. So the chains were broken through which a relative could actually send a call. Therefore, the number of calls began to decrease, and, accordingly, the number of applicants decreased, and the number of documents accepted for consideration decreased even more. As a result, the number of refusals issued at the level of the early 1980s did not increase.

- Have you stopped sending calls not from direct relatives?

- We sent calls from Israel from direct relatives and from indirect relatives, and even from strangers, that is, we sent them anyway, but these calls were not accepted by the Soviet government. It was not possible to sharpen the problem on this, because everything was concentrated on the struggle for the refuseniks and prisoners of Zion.

- How did Lishkat-a-kesher react to the radical change in the situation?

- Didn't react in any way. She didn't really understand what could and should be done. There are refuseniks - you need to fight for their departure, there are prisoners of Zion - you need to fight for their release ... - that's it! As for emigration, they did not understand either its reasons or what to do with it.

- Did the information pressure on the USSR continue?

- It continued, only more carefully, because the repressions began, and they began to fear for the Jews, for the activists. Within Lishkat-a-kesher there was no coordination with the BAR *.

- After the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, the authorities began to destroy the organized Jewish movement.

- That's right, because after the introduction of troops, they no longer had to reckon with the reaction of the West: the reaction to the arrest of this or that dissident had no meaning in comparison with the reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan. Then they began to suppress everything, including the Jewish movement.

- Yes, they began to crush the dissidents much more powerfully.

- Jews have never been an independent problem for them, except in the field of emigration. Emigration was also considered in connection with a range of other issues.

- But, despite strong pressure inside, Lishkat-a-kesher envoys continued to come to the USSR, Israel continued to take an active part in international book fairs, from which activists managed to "take away" thousands of books, a project for teaching Hebrew in peripheral cities was working, continued to work seminars, samizdat was published. Life went on.

- Yes. The work went on, international conferences, demonstrations were held, there were streams of letters, from time to time some refusenik was released, and the festival began. Everyone is in business. And even the Soviet government was pleased. Do you know why?

- Why?

- There was no exit.

- Yes, the level of emigration dropped below a thousand a year, but the level of repression was still to some extent limited by pressure from the West.

- The authorities of the USSR worked with the Jewish movement according to the level of sufficiency, that is, they decided to what extent it was necessary to pressurize it so that it did not spread and did not get out of control. But, on the other hand, such fuss was even useful for them in some way, since it distracted the attention of Jewish and Israeli organizations from the problem of emigration and concentrated it on a relatively minor problem of several hundred famous people.

- And to what level did they lower the degree of the Cold War? After all, during these years foreign public and political figures came, international conferences were held, contacts of foreigners with refuseniks were allowed.

- But the initiative of the Cold War did not come from the Soviet Union. This was a reaction from the West, in which the Soviet Union was not interested. But as the Cold War went on, he tried to react to it without going beyond certain limits. What did he want? "Leave us alone with Afghanistan and everything will be fine." The initiative came from the West, and the Soviet Union is trying to somehow live with it.

- That is, the West itself regulated the degree of the Cold War?

- The West itself regulated the degree of reaction, which depended more on what was happening on the military fields of Afghanistan, and gave this or that political coloring. The Jewish movement also played a role in the opposition. That is, outwardly everything was fine. Everyone fought for the Jews of the Soviet Union. But how<,>and for what exactly, no one particularly delved into it.

- What happened to the Helsinki process?

- Who was he interested in?

- According to the format of this process, it was necessary to meet every two years, check compliance ...

- Well, we met, discussed, raised questions, published reports, as Amnesty International is doing today, they scolded the Soviet government. The Soviet government snarled. They let off more steam. It turned into a kind of ritual, similar to the rituals of the Soviet regime, and no one took it seriously, except for you, refuseniks and fighters for human rights in the Soviet Union.

- Has it somehow influenced economic relations?

- Trade relations, which were beneficial to the West, continued. They bought oil.

- What did the USSR department in Nativa, which you headed in the eighties, do?

- By processing all the information that came from the USSR. Receiving, recording, systematization, calculation, analytics. For example, Kosharovsky: what is he, what is happening to him, whether to send people to him or not, if they send, who exactly and with what message, what to bring besides this, why. Before me, there was no analytics as such in the service. When I wrote the first analytical report, I was asked why I was doing this. "Well, at least for myself," I say, "I must understand what all the information that accumulates in me means." Nehemiah Levanon and his inner circle had a rather poor understanding of what was happening inside the USSR. Somewhere on the level of the New York Times. And there were many sources of information: refuseniks, activists, telephone conversations, tourists, envoys, press, diplomats. But before me they had not been engaged in competent, professional, deep and comprehensive analysis in Nativ and did not understand why it was necessary. Everything was concentrated on the struggle for the refuseniks and prisoners of Zion.

- This is the personification of the problem. This is how the West worked. They needed a specific hero to fight for. It turned out to be less efficient to work abstractly.

- This is how the West worked, this is how our office worked, this is how the Israeli government worked. This was beneficial to everyone, including the Soviet regime. Because the Jews did not really leave, and this is what was important to them. They, unlike us, thought in state categories. Their problem was to reduce travel time, and the KGB coped with it superbly. What did they pay for it? The Soviet Union lost its innocence in the eyes of the West not only because of the Jews. Before that, he lost it in connection with the trials against dissidents. The Jews added, of course, but the innocence was already lost. Yes, refuseniks, prisoners of Zion are persecuted in Russia, then what?

- How did you start to enter the Soviet Union during perestroika?

- The Soviet Union has always been concerned about its international appearance, especially during perestroika. Therefore, we used all international organizations that participated in any international events in the Soviet Union, and, of course, we used all Israeli delegations, except for the communists - they did not want to cooperate with us. I remember how we instructed Shulamit Aloni.

- You somehow had to represent your interests in Russia ...

- Yes. It happened in this way. In the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, they realized that the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel was a mistake. But they didn't know how to get out of it. Around 1985, the first contacts began between the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It began on the initiative of Nimrod Novik and Yossi Beilin after Shimon Peres became Israel's foreign minister. All contacts were secret and took place in Europe. In the process of discussing questions of streamlining relations, the Soviet representatives asked for our consent to send a Soviet consular group to Israel. We, of course, approved this initiative: it does not matter under what sauce they send this group, the first step towards establishing and strengthening relations was important.

- And why did they need a consular group in Israel?

- A step towards streamlining relationships. They were not immediately ready to establish diplomatic relations, because they feared a negative reaction both within the country and abroad among their Arab allies. Therefore, we proposed this form. It was good. They sent their group supposedly to holy places and stuff. Clearly, on top of that, this was the Soviet Union's diplomatic group in Israel. Thus, we moved from a complete severing of diplomatic relations to diplomatic contacts at the lowest diplomatic level at the Finnish Embassy. A few months after that, I proposed to send an Israeli consular group to the USSR. The Israeli Foreign Ministry stood up: "Why are you going there?" I have substantiated. Then Yossi Beilin invited me to present my proposals in writing. I wrote a rationale for the goals and objectives that a consular group in the Soviet Union can do. Our Foreign Ministry said that the Soviet Union would not accept this, that it was nonsense.

- What did you write?

- I do not remember exactly. What later became the basis for our work: checking consular work, issuing visas and inspecting the entire process of emigration to Israel. Plus - the problems of people with Israeli citizenship in the Soviet Union. Then the Israeli Foreign Ministry shouted at me: "Do you still want to arrange provocations there with those to whom Israel has issued fake Israeli citizenship ?!" I said, “No, why? There are several dozen Israeli citizens in the Soviet Union who did not lose their citizenship when they came to the Soviet Union for various reasons. "

- Who told you that?

- Everyone spoke, including the head of the Department of Eastern Europe. Specifically - Zvi Mazel. And not only them. Both Mossad (Foreign Intelligence Service) and Shabak (General Security Service) objected to this. Only Yossi Beilin and Nimrod Novik were in favor. They set out my proposals in a request to the Soviet side: that we, the Israeli diplomatic group, temporarily come to the Soviet Union to work at the Dutch embassy. I asked to give them the same conditions of stay as the Soviet group at the Finnish embassy in Israel.

- And that means from the 85th year ...

- No, contacts began in 1985. In 86, a Soviet group arrived. In 1987, I came up with this initiative. We could have arrived earlier, but the "figures" from the Israeli Foreign Ministry could not make up a delegation for six months. They did not know whom to send, and therefore we arrived later - in July 1988.

- As far as I remember, you settled in the hotel "Ukraine", not far from the Russian Foreign Ministry. Is there anything new in the fight against the narrow at this time?

- By this time it became clear that this struggle ended in nothing. The only one I got to fight was Yitzhak Shamir. When he went to the United States, he brought up this issue and spoke very harshly on this topic in a speech at GI.

- What year?

- I do not remember exactly. It was in 87 or 88. He raised this issue. There was a sharp reaction from American Jews, but practically no one did anything in this direction.

- There was Shoshana Cardin, who actively addressed this issue.

- Almost nobody did anything. And the Americans told me that we were right, but no one would do this, because Jewish organizations would accuse them of anti-Semitism. And so it was.

- Until it passed certain levels, when did you begin to run out of money?

- American government funds were flowing, and they were no longer enough. Soviet Jews arrived in the United States as refugees. The federal budget did not finance the emigrants, but financed the refugees. The number of Jews who left in 1989 rose sharply. There was not enough money in the budget line for receiving refugees.

- In the 89th year, 74 thousand left.

- Almost all of this number fell on the American budget. The Americans realized that the federal government did not have enough money.

- Especially<,>that soon, at such a level, the Neshirs could arrive there hundreds of thousands.

- They could not accept such a number for many reasons. Why Jews - yes, and Poles - no? The American government could not disburse funds<а>more than 40 thousand Jews, and the number of those leaving was much higher. And not only Jews left the Union. Then the Americans decided to transfer the process to Moscow.

- And there to select those whom America deems it necessary to accept ...

- And close Europe. But when the Americans gathered representatives of the embassies in Moscow - I was at this meeting - and told us this, I asked what they would do if Soviet Jews got to Vienna and turned to them from there. They replied that, they say, we are declaring that the procedure will take place in Moscow. It became clear that the Americans did not understand what they had not thought of. Well, okay - they announced! And Jews on Israeli visas will come to Vienna and what is there? - will the Americans say that they will not accept them?

- So you thought that Vienna should be closed completely?

- Departure to Israel had to be organized through Budapest and Bucharest in such a way that no one could get anywhere from there with Israeli visas, except Israel. I organized this scheme, showed it to Shamir. He said: “Agree with the Dutch. If they agree, then yes! "

- That is, the Dutch had to present this scheme to the Soviet side?

- No no. We just had an agreement with them that we do nothing without their consent. They said, "Please."

- When did you receive the status of an independent consular group?

- After a group of criminals hijacked a Soviet plane to Israel. It was at the end of 1989. We then went over to our building. And then, after negotiations, we received the status of an independent consular group.

- When did the embassy open?

- Diplomatic relations were established at the end of 1991, and then it was decided that Bovin would be the first ambassador. He came to Israel in December 1991.

- Somehow everything developed very quickly. And when did Levin come to Moscow?

- Aaron Gordon arrived first, and then Arie Levin. In 1988, he came several times as the head of the consular group.

- You had a bad relationship.

- I played my game, and they were angry that I sometimes act contrary to their opinion and do not ask anyone.

- He always tried to establish contacts with the Soviet leadership.

- He did not understand that the Soviet leadership was making contacts within the framework of its policy. They acted only by decision from above, so it was necessary to understand what could be achieved from them and what could not. I did not ask either the Soviets or ours and did what I saw fit. It is clear that this infuriated many. But they could not do anything to me, the prime minister was behind me. Then the Minister of Foreign Affairs was Shimon Peres. Beilin and Novik knew what to do and what not. They understood everything I said.

- 89th year, emigration is sharply increasing ...

- The Americans made a decision in September, and since October we introduced rules according to which citizens could travel only through Bucharest and Budapest: we did not give other visas.

- The component of aliyah has sharply increased.

- Those who received permits earlier could go along the old route, all the rest - along the new one. Until January these guys left with the old permits, and then - that's it! No one was given a visa through Austria.

- How did the West initially perceive the change in leadership in the USSR and Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost?

- They did not yet understand what was really behind it. On the one hand, perestroika contributed to detente in relations between East and West, and on the other hand, they saw that Gorbachev was making big concessions, not always understanding what he was doing.

- I had the feeling that he started too abruptly from all sides.

- He did not understand what he was doing, he did not understand why. He made concessions that the Americans did not even expect from him. After Reykjavik, they were shocked: he went for a sharp change in the Soviet policy in the field of arms limitation. At first, the Americans did not believe in his consent, since at the same time the combat effectiveness of the Soviet Union decreased several times more than that of the United States.

- And what about internal democratization, glasnost?

“They saw it as a process that could weaken the Soviet Union. There is no need to idealize: the Soviet Union, even during the years of perestroika, was an enemy that needed to be weakened, and this was done partly through dissidents, as the German General Staff did in its time through Vladimir Ulyanov. It is true that part of American society had sympathy for dissidents, but the rest were interested in how much this weakened the Soviet regime, which was the number one enemy of the West. How to present it is another question.

- In this context, were the dissidents used?

- The American authorities used dissidents and the Jewish movement as an effective tool in the fight against the Soviet regime, since this weakened it both internally and externally, intensified the demonization of the Soviet regime in the eyes of society, and provided a moral basis for increasing pressure against the Soviet Union. It was also beneficial for us, but the Americans did it not out of love for us, but out of their own interests. They used it quite competently, I have no complaints about them. They have their own state interests, we have our own. And today too.

“Now is the time for historians to get to work. There is a lot of information, many participants in the events are still alive, people who have had a certain influence on the course of events.

- Therefore, what you do is important. If we want to take a more active position in the process, we must understand it, and not act on the basis of internal sensations or delusions of individuals. I was lucky to be in the right place at the right time and have a serious impact on the process of emigration and its direction. I mean the organization of direct flights from the USSR to Israel and everything related to solving the problem is not wide. It is necessary to change the approaches to solving such problems.

- Thank you, Yasha.

The future diplomat and statesman was born on March 5, 1947 in Moscow. Yakov Iosifovich Kedmi (real name - Kazakov) came from a family of engineers. He was the eldest of three children. After graduating from school, I went to the plant as an ordinary concrete worker-reinforcement worker. In parallel, he studied at the Moscow University of Railways.

In February 1967, Yakov broke through the police cordon to the Israeli embassy in the capital of the USSR. Here he applied for immigration. However, the strange young man was refused: the diplomats considered Jacob to be a KGB agent. Yakov received the blanks for travel to Israel only during his second visit to the embassy.

In the summer of the same year, a war broke out between Israel and several Middle Eastern states. The USSR broke off relations with Israel. Then Yakov renounced the citizenship of the USSR. Subsequently, he publicly condemned the policy of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and refused to serve in the army of the Land of the Soviets. Kazakov said that military service would only be in the Israeli army.

Emigrant Yakov Kazakov

In the winter of 1969, Yakov received official permission to leave the country. He was asked to leave the USSR within two weeks. First, Jacob got to Vienna, and from there he flew to Israel. In this country, the young man took part in a movement that set as its goal the organization of the repatriation of Jews from the Soviet Union.

In 1970, Yakov made sure that his family was released from the USSR to Israel. The young rebel fulfilled his promise: he joined the ranks of the Israeli army. He served in tank units. Behind him is a military school, as well as an intelligence school.

In 1973, Jacob completed his military service and went to work in the airport security division. At the same time, he honed his education: he studied at the College of National Security and the Israel Institute of Technology.

In 1977 Kazakov was attracted to cooperation with the Nativ bureau. It is an Israeli government agency that helps Jews move to Israel. In the spring of 1978, Kazakov changed his surname to Kedmi.

In 1990, Kedmi became the deputy head of the Nativ bureau, and two years later he became the head of this organization. He took a direct part in the mass migration of Jews from Russia to Israel. In 1999, Kedmi was dismissed. His departure was preceded by a series of scandals related to Kedmi's activities as head of the bureau.

After retirement, Kedmi became actively involved in politics. Until 2015, the ex-intelligence officer was banned from entering Russia. Now he is a frequent visitor to the territory of his former homeland. He often takes part in political television shows.

Jacob Kedmi is married. His wife Edith left for Israel from the Land of the Soviets in 1969. The Kedmi family has two children.

Yakov "Yasha" Kedmi (Hebrew יעקב קדמי; b. Yakov Iosifovich Kazakov; March 5, 1947, Moscow, USSR) - Israeli statesman, head of the Nativa agency in 1992-1999, a recognized expert on military-political issues and international politics.

Has significant political influence in the Russian-speaking community and among Russian-speaking politicians in Israel

Born in Moscow, in 1969 made Aliyah (Repatriated) to Israel. He served in the army in the tank forces. Veteran of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

He was an Israeli statesman, under diplomatic cover since 1977 he worked in "Nativa" - Israel's special service engaged in the evacuation of Jews to Israel from countries where they are prohibited from leaving or from hot spots.

The activities of Nativ under the leadership of Kedmi are associated with the most massive immigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel, with the resettlement of more than 1 million people, which became part of the social phenomenon Alia. Immigrants from the USSR and Russia significantly increased Israel's GDP and its defense capabilities, and also created a social base for Russian-speaking Israeli politicians.

Kedmi was a key member of the Israeli intelligence committee under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the Iranian Armed Forces.

The position of the Nativ chief is equal in rank to a general in the IDF, and since 1999 Kedmi, having retired, receives a pension equivalent to an army general.

IN USSR

Born on March 5, 1947 in Moscow into a family of engineers and technicians. He studied in absentia at MIIT and worked at the plant as a concrete reinforcement worker, since he was the eldest of three children and helped to provide for his family.

On February 19, 1967, he came to the Israeli embassy in Moscow and said that he wanted to emigrate to Israel. An attempt by a Soviet guard to detain him was unsuccessful. Using Russian swearing, Yakov Kazakov broke into the territory of the embassy, ​​where he was met by the Israeli diplomat Herzl Amikam (since 1955 - a Mossad employee). Amikam suspected that Kazakov's action was a KGB provocation, so he did not respond to his request to allow him to immigrate to Israel. A week later, Kazakov again came to the embassy, ​​where Amikam supplied him with materials and forms for emigration to Israel.

On June 11, 1967, the day the USSR announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel in connection with the Six Day War, publicly renounced Soviet citizenship and demanded that he be allowed to leave for Israel. On the same day, he made his way to the American embassy in Moscow and talked with the consul about leaving for Israel. On May 20, 1968, Yakov Kazakov wrote a letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in which he condemned the policy of anti-Semitism, demanded release from Soviet citizenship and proclaimed himself a citizen of Israel. In an address to the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he wrote:

I do not want to be a citizen of a country where Jews are forcibly assimilated, where my people are deprived of their national identity and their cultural values ​​... I do not want to live in a country whose government has shed so much Jewish blood ... I do not want to be an accomplice with you in the destruction of the State of Israel ...

His statement was the first open challenge of its kind. Yakov had no relatives in Israel, and the few exit permits were issued only for the purpose of "family reunification." After leaving the American embassy, ​​which was interrogated by the KGB, Yakov was detained and interrogated, but was not arrested. On the recommendation of the KGB, they wanted to call Yakov into the Soviet army, but he said that his homeland was Israel and he was ready to serve in only one army - the Israel Defense Forces.

Due to the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia, his draft into the army was postponed. In February 1969, he received permission to emigrate to Israel and an order to leave the Soviet Union within two weeks. According to some reports, after receiving the order, he publicly burned his Soviet passport in Red Square. Yakov Kedmi himself denies this. Arriving by train to Vienna, I flew to Israel.

In Israel

Immigration from Russia to Israel according to Russian and Israeli data. Bursts of immigration are clearly visible during Kedmi's leadership of the Nativ service

He was an activist of the social movement in support of the repatriation of Soviet Jews, along with journalist Geula Cohen, deputy Shulamit Aloni and others. In 1970, in New York, he went on a hunger strike in front of the UN building due to the fact that the USSR refused to allow his family to leave for Israel. At the same time, the American special services suspected that he was a KGB agent. After his parents arrived in Israel on August 4, 1970, he volunteered for military service in the Israel Defense Forces. He served in the tank forces, graduated from the officer's combined-arms school, then the school of military intelligence, transferred to the reserve in June 1973. By this time he managed to get married, his son was born in 1972.

He studied at the Technion Faculty of Chemistry, then graduated from Tel Aviv University and the College of National Security.

In the second half of 1977, at the suggestion of the head of government Menachem Begin, he began to work in the Nativ liaison office, which dealt, in particular, with the illegal emigration of Jews from the countries of the Soviet bloc. On May 1, 1978, he began work in the emigration transit center in Vienna, at the same time changing his surname to Hebrew-speaking - Kedmi.

In 1988-1990, he worked as an employee of the consular group of the Israeli Foreign Ministry at the Netherlands Embassy in Moscow. In December 1988, he took part in resolving the crisis associated with the seizure of hostages and the hijacking of an aircraft from the USSR to Israel.

In 1990-1992 he held the position of Deputy Director, from 1992 to 1999 - Director of Nativ. In 1999 he retired. He made a significant contribution to the organization of the repatriation of Soviet Jews to Israel in the late 1980s - early 1990s. It was Kedmi who ensured the redirection of the flow of Jewish emigrants from the United States to Israel in October 1989, which resulted in the massive aliyah of the early 1990s.

In October 1997, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu created a so-called "special group" - an interdepartmental committee that dealt with the problem of the Iranian arms race and ties between Iran and Russia in the military field. Kedmi was one of the key members of this committee. Kedmi's proposals to use the Jewish lobby in Russia as a counter to Tehran's interests were rejected by the head of government. After that, the relationship between Netanyahu and the head of his office, Avigdor Lieberman, on the one hand, and Kedmi, on the other, soured.

Kedmi resigned in January 1999 after several major scandals over Nativ's activities in Russia. In Israel, both the Foreign Ministry (due to the fact that Nativ employees acted under diplomatic cover) and the Mossad and Shabak special services opposed him.

According to his own statement, after retirement he is a pensioner and receives a pension equal to that of the general.

In April 1999, during the election campaign, Kedmi initiated a public discussion of his differences with Netanyahu. He attacked the prime minister for "betraying the interests of the aliyah from the CIS" and "destroying relations with Russia." Kedmi supported the candidacy of Ehud Barak and facilitated his support from the Russian-speaking community.

Journalist Mikhail Falkov wrote in 2000 that Kedmi made a significant contribution to the development of Israeli-Russian relations. According to Falkov, Kedmi had extensive connections in the government and business circles of Russia and the CIS countries and enjoyed influence in the Russian-speaking community of Israel. Moreover, from 2001 to 2015, according to Kedmi himself, he was banned from entering the Russian Federation.

A family

Edith's wife is a food chemist who worked for the Department of Defense. After 39 years of work, she retired. The Kedmi family has three children - two sons and a daughter.

Daughter Revital graduated from the Bezalel Academy of Arts. The eldest son graduated from Tel Aviv University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem with a degree in international relations, economics, finance and finance. The younger graduated from the Interdisciplinary College in Herzliya with a degree in jurisprudence, public administration and politics.

Publications:

Jacob Kedmi published a book of memoirs "Hopeless Wars" ("Hebrew מלחמות אבודות"). The translation of the book into Russian was published in 2011. In 2017, the book "Dialogues" by Yakov Kedmi was published in collaboration with Yevgeny Yanovich Satanovsky.

Air "Sputnik-Moldova": Moldova should be outside military alliances - Jacob Kedmi

Yakov "Yasha" Kedmi - Israeli statesman, head of the Nativ agency from 1992 to 1999. Born in Moscow, in 1969 he immigrated to Israel. He served in the army in the tank forces. Participated in the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Books: Hopeless Wars

Parents: Sofia Yakovlevna Kazakova, Joseph Yakovlevich Kazakov

Biography:

On February 19, 1967, he came to the Israeli embassy in Moscow and said that he wanted to emigrate to Israel. An attempt by a Soviet guard to detain him was unsuccessful. Using Russian swearing, Yakov Kazakov broke into the territory of the embassy, ​​where he was met by the Israeli diplomat Herzl Amikam, since 1955 a Mossad employee. Amikam suspected that Kazakov's action was a KGB provocation, so he did not respond to his request to allow him to immigrate to Israel. A week later, Kazakov again came to the embassy, ​​where Amikam supplied him with materials and forms for emigration to Israel. On June 11, 1967, the day the USSR announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel in connection with the Six Day War, publicly renounced Soviet citizenship and demanded that he be allowed to leave for Israel. On the same day, he made his way to the American embassy in Moscow and talked with the consul about leaving for Israel. On May 20, 1968, Yakov Kazakov wrote a letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in which he condemned the policy of anti-Semitism, demanded release from Soviet citizenship and proclaimed himself a citizen of Israel.

In Israel

He was an activist of the social movement in support of the emigration of Soviet Jews, along with journalist Geula Cohen, deputy Shulamit Aloni and others. In 1970, in New York, he went on a hunger strike in front of the building due to the fact that the USSR refused to allow his family to leave for Israel. At the same time, the American special services suspected that he was a KGB agent. After his parents arrived in Israel on August 4, 1970, he volunteered for military service in the Israel Defense Forces. He served in the tank forces, graduated from the officer's combined-arms school, then the school of military intelligence, transferred to the reserve in June 1973. By this time he managed to get married, his son was born in 1972.

He fought in the tank forces during the Yom Kippur War in the same crew with the future Prime Minister Ehud Barak. He studied at the Technion Faculty of Chemistry, then graduated from Tel Aviv University and the College of National Security.

In the second half of 1977, at the suggestion of the head of government Menachem Begin, he began to work in the Nativ liaison office, which dealt, in particular, with the illegal emigration of Jews from the countries of the Soviet bloc. On May 1, 1978, he began work in the emigration transit center in Vienna, at the same time changing his surname to Hebrew-speaking - Kedmi.

In 1988-1990, he worked as an employee of the consular group of the Israeli Foreign Ministry at the Netherlands Embassy in Moscow. In December 1988, he took part in resolving the crisis associated with the seizure of hostages and the hijacking of an aircraft from the USSR to Israel.

In 1990-1992 he held the position of deputy director, from 1992 to 1999 - director of Nativ. In 1999 he retired. He made a significant contribution to the organization of the repatriation of Soviet Jews to Israel in the late 1980s - early 1990s. It was Kedmi who ensured the redirection of the flow of Jewish emigrants from to Israel in October 1989, which resulted in the massive aliyah of the early 1990s.

In October 1997, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu created a so-called "special group" - an interdepartmental committee that dealt with the problem of the Iranian arms race and ties and Iran and in the military field. Kedmi was one of the key members of this committee. Kedmi's proposals to use the Jewish lobby as a counter to Tehran's interests were rejected by the head of government. After that, the relationship between Netanyahu and the head of his office, Avigdor Lieberman, on the one hand, and Kedmi, on the other, soured.

Kedmi resigned in January 1999 after several major scandals over Nativ's activities in Russia. In Israel, both the Foreign Ministry (due to the fact that Nativ employees acted under diplomatic cover) and the Mossad and Shabak special services opposed him. According to his own statement, after retirement he is a pensioner and receives a pension equal to that of the general.

In April 1999, during the election campaign, Kedmi initiated a public discussion of his differences with Netanyahu. He attacked the prime minister for "betraying the interests of the aliyah from the CIS" and "destroying relations with Russia." Kedmi supported the candidacy of Ehud Barak and facilitated his support from the Russian-speaking community.

Journalist Mikhail Falkov writes that Kedmi made a significant contribution to the development of Israeli-Russian relations. According to Falkov, Kedmi has extensive connections in the government and business circles of Russia and the CIS countries and enjoys influence in the Russian-speaking community of Israel.

Once upon a time there was Yasha Kazakov.

And he had a passport of a citizen of the Soviet Union sticking out of his “wide trousers, a duplicate of a priceless load”.

And he publicly renounced Soviet citizenship and demanded that he be given the opportunity to leave for Israel.

And they deprived Yasha Kazakov of citizenship and expelled from the Soviet Union.

And Yasha Kazakov came to Israel and so became Yasha Kedmi (advanced, yaani).

And he became in Israel an activist of the social movement in support of the repatriation of Soviet Jews, along with the journalist Geula Cohen, the deputy Shulamit Aloni and others who are in their face terrible - kind inside.

And he held a hunger strike in 1970 in New York in front of the UN building due to the fact that the USSR refused to allow his family to leave for Israel. At the same time, the American special services suspected that he was a KGB agent, which is confirmed in his current speeches on the odious platforms of the Russian media.

And he began to grow up the career ladder for no reason understandable to anyone and grew to the director "Nativ" (1992-1999).

And they kicked him out of Nativ in January 1999 after several major scandals in connection with the activities of Nativ in Russia. In Israel, both the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the Mossad and Shabak special services opposed him.

And having remained out of work, Yasha Kedmi earned himself the fame of "the great expert-political scientist": he wrote a book of memoirs "Hopeless wars" .

And these memoirs are similar to the biography of Baron Munchausen, which he himself told for his children and grandchildren. However, at the 2017 UNESCO meeting, it was decided to recognize Kedmi's biography as a valuable world heritage. For writing a biography, Jacob Kedmi and his co-authors were twice nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature, however, both times were not shortlisted (Wikipedia) because of the evil intrigues of the enemies of "progressive humanity."

And then, in collaboration with the noble By the "Russian Jew" E. Ya. Satanovsky, tome book - "Dialogues" called, than they clearly hint that Plato is a sucker and a layman, but Yasha and Zhenya are a completely different matter.

And Jacob Kedmi acts regularly in the role "Authoritative political scientist" on Russian television and radio, especially often on the Vesti-FM radio station, as well as on the program of one of the most deserved "Useful Jews" Of Russia Vladimir Rudolfovich Soloviev-Vinitskovsky on the TV channel "Russia".

And he made a condemnation in the discussion of the plane crash IL-20 shot down by Syrian air defense fire. Put it this way: “This is the result of a series of tragic mistakes ... Unfortunately, I must admit that most of the mistakes were from our (Israeli) side. Starting from the decision to carry out an attack in the immediate vicinity of the bases of the Russian troops, and ending with the fact that it was not taken into account what was in the sky, and it was known, the reconnaissance plane " .

And from that day he became a pariah named "I AMshka-Liar-Go-Out "

And here comes Yashka-Liar-Went-Out from everywhere, tears dripping from his face ...

And Yashka goes to bed ...

And he has a dream that something like this has to happen - the Russian Federation declared war on Israel and that, just imagine, won.

And a parade took place on Red Square.

And on the podium of the mausoleum Bibi Natanyahu with the generals of the IDF, and Bibi says into the microphones: “Oh, my people! In this hour of great victory, what would you like most ?! "

And the crowd of thousands on Red Square unanimously shouts, raising their right fist up:

"Return the citizenship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Yasha Kazakov, and deprive Israel of the citizenship!"

Here is the end of the parable - who is nra - that fellow!

Parshoin Gelibter-Geliger

Based on an anecdote from Soviet times from the submission of a respected